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Abstract
The postcolonial African state has been the subject of extensive study and scrutiny by various
scholars of great repute such as Colin Legum, Crawford Young, Robert H. Jackson and Carl G.
Rosberg, Pierre Englebert and Jean- François Bayart to name but a few. Crawford Young’s work
is especially interesting because of the manner in which he treats the process of state formation.
Crawford Young traces the process to the early beginning of European colonization and focuses
on the legacy of the colonial state after independence. Colonial appendages of old European
states were, for some metropolises, no longer economically viable or sustainable and/or
consistent with new post-world War I and II principles such as the right of all peoples to selfdetermination and decolonization, and were, thus, abandoned. Overall, however, perhaps because
of the simplicity of the process of state formation in Africa through European agency, the
everyday realities of the nature of the African state and lived experiences remain rather elusive
still. Nevertheless, this body of work that has benefitted disproportionately from the contribution
of political scientists cannot be underestimated. At the same time though, the manner in which
this process has been approached by such authors employs methodological perspectives in
political science that overlook or undermine attempts at determining the manner in which the
making, or unmaking, and evolution of post-colonial African states is viewed and contested from
below. Historians employing empirical information based on archival evidence can make such a
bottom-up analysis that is cognizant of popular views or dissent affecting the political evolution
of these states possible. While there have been a few country-specific studies, there’s room for
more scrutiny of how African states have evolved since independence paying closer attention to
popular forces from below. This study demonstrates that the late colonial experience in Kenya
was the foetal crucible of the postcolonial state. It does this with specific reference to the Mau
Mau war. This follows from the argument that the Mau Mau decade was Kenya’s defining
moment marked by widespread societal rupture embodied by the Mau Mau conflict. This war
represented a caesura in which Kenya’s future was contested between competing imperial and
indigenous ideological constructions of the state: colonial liberal and conservative, and
indigenous dissent borne of an existential struggle for survival. The study examines these
ideological strands, but focuses more acutely on the basic convictions and moral thought or
subliminal ideology of Mau Mau while, at the same time, touching on both its immediate and
long-term practical (land, labour, institutional and political) policy implications. Lastly, it is an
analytical catalogue of the legacy of Mau Mau dissent in post-independent Kenya. As such, it is
an analysis of its bequest to the present and, thus, considers the war as an unresolved
philosophical conflict. By so doing, this study suggests a lineage of political demands or
grievance and socioeconomic struggle in Kenya today couched on the basic need for survival,
which harks back to the Mau Mau political dissent and war.
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Preamble
Few words…are used more loosely than the word “Civilization.” What does it mean? It means a
society based upon the opinion of civilians. It means that violence, the rule of warriors and
despotic chiefs, the conditions of camps and warfare, of riot and tyranny, give place to
parliaments where laws are made, and independent courts of justice in which over long periods
those laws are maintained. That is Civilization—and in its soil grow continually freedom,
comfort and culture. When Civilization reigns, in any country, a wider and less harassed life is
afforded to the masses of the people. The traditions of the past are cherished, and the inheritance
bequeathed to us by former wise or valiant men becomes a rich estate to be enjoyed and used by
all.
The central principle of Civilization is the subordination of the ruling authority to the settled
customs of the people and to their will as expressed through the Constitution. …There is
freedom: there is law; there is love of country; there is a great measure of good will between
classes: there is a widening prosperity. There are unmeasured opportunities of correcting abuses
and making further progress.
Winston S. Churchill, “Civilization,” Chancellor’s Address, University of Bristol, 2nd July 1938.
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Chapter I - Inside the Mau Mau Mind:
“Returning the Imperial” Gaze in Centennial
Perspective

Preamble
Somewhere in the Moonward, or
Sunward, so to speak;
A span or two to Eastward, then
Southward by a streak,
Was heard to blare of tomtom a
shameless epic wail,
At fancy of some Lion who had whisked
his blooming tail
Plumb thro’ a nest of hornets, nor never
dreamt the hive
Had such a trick to mind him how were
that tail alive.
And it seems the skies were blathering
while every wind-god swore
The pities would have curdled to hear the
Beastie roar.
All offered salve and comfort, said never
done was Wrong,
But some requiting Themis should venge
it to her song;
Should smite the pesting dwarfies and
heal the giant’s mighty bruise,
….
Louis Selmer, Boer Lyrics (New York: Abbey Press, 1903), 3.
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Introduction
The postcolonial African state has been the subject of extensively study and scrutiny by
many scholars such as Colin Legum, Crawford Young, Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg,
Pierre Englebert and Jean- François Bayart to name but a few. Crawford Young’s work is
especially interesting because of the manner in which he treats the process of state formation.1
Crawford Young traces the process to the early beginning of European colonization and focuses
on the legacy of the colonial state after independence. Colonial appendages of old European
states were, for some metropolises, no longer economically viable or sustainable and/or
consistent with new post-world War I and II principles such as the right of all peoples to selfdetermination and decolonization, and were, thus, abandoned. Overall, however, perhaps because
of the simplicity of the process of state formation in Africa through European agency, the
everyday realities of the nature of the African state and lived experiences remain rather elusive
still.
Nevertheless, this body of work that has benefitted disproportionately from the
contribution of political scientists cannot be underestimated. At the same time though, the
manner in which this process has approached by such authors employs methodological
perspectives that overlook or undermine attempts at determining the manner in which the
making, or unmaking, and evolution of post-colonial African states is viewed and contested from
below. A bottom-up perspective that is cognizant of popular views or dissent affecting the
political evolution of these states has been lacking. While there have been a few country-specific
studies there’s room for more scrutiny of how African states have evolved since independence
paying closer attention to popular forces from below. This study was conducted with this as its
intended goal with reference to the postcolonial political history of the Kenyan state.
Generally, independence was followed by a second African revolution. The first had been
the arbitrary and artificial manner in which these now decolonized states of the 1960s had been
1

Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994);
Colin Legum, Africa since Independence (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999);; Robert H. Jackson and Carl
G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1982); Pierre Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Pierre
Englebert, Africa: Unity, Sovereignty and Sorrow (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009); Jean- François Bayart,
Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou (trans. Stephen Ellis) The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1999); Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2009).
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“imagined” in the minds of European statesmen since the Berlin conference in 1884 and in the
first few decades of the 20th century. It was in Berlin that the political future of the African
continent was determined. The continent was divided between the main European powers, which
drew up spheres of interest that were to be mutually exclusive and respected among the powers.
Groups of people who had previously resided in autonomous indigenous political polities of
various forms, were now lumped together, or were divided by new international borders. Most of
these boundaries remained the same after independence and continue to exist today. But despite
this seeming simplistic explanation of the origins and formation of the African state, there is
more about this process that is complex and intricate. Moreover, the implications of the process
go beyond political independence of the 1960s. For now, let it suffice to point out that it is
critical of note that former European colonies evolved uniquely with regard to the political; the
economic; and the social and cultural, which is why it is important to undertake country-specific
studies.
The study of the origin of the African state, in some respects, is relatively simpler in
comparison to its European counterpart. For one, it has not been the subject of competing
theories of genesis that have characterized the study of the former. For this same reason,
however, the study of the genesis of the African state does not lend itself easily to the theoretical
formulations advanced to understand the origins of the European state. Instead, as stated, it can
be understood as the product of various forms of European imperialism. The different
formulations with regard to the European and African state are discussed further below.
Kenya is a good example of imperial state formation with significant and far-reaching
post-colonial implications. As a direct result of the Berlin conference, it became part of British
East Africa.2 Later, on July 23rd 1920, it was declared a crown colony open to British settlers

2

It is worthwhile to observe that while East Africa and Kenya in particular were not on the Berlin agenda, the
scramble of the region was hastened by German designs on territorial interests against British claims. The
competing claims of the two imperial powers were finally settled in the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty, which was
signed in 1890. Under this treaty Britain conceded Heligoland (two small islands in the North Sea off the mouth of
the River Elbe) and the Caprivi Strip (between today’s Botswana and Zambia) to Germany, whilst Germany agreed
to drop claims in Uganda and around Kismayu. As part of the British protectorate in East Africa the people of Kenya
were given diplomatic and military protection from other third parties mainly Britain’s European imperial
competitors. In the meantime, at the close and start of the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively, British agents
were busy extracting treaties from various African chiefs and carrying out military expeditions where it was
necessary to effectively subjugate the region, commence and consolidate Britain’s position, rule and authority.

3

even before their actual physical presence and without a numerical majority, thus becoming one
of the few tropical territories designated as “white man’s country.”3 Like most colonies, a
nascent African nationalism developed towards the end of the second decade of the twentieth
century with the growth of political consciousness among the colonial peoples. In the intervening
period between the creation of the colony and eventual independence, this political
consciousness intensified leading to a two-pronged push for independence. One was radical and
violent while the other was more moderate and constitutional. However, both coincided with the
broader, international political climate resulting in the granting of independence in 1963. Kenya
was at last an independent state.
As a political project, the Kenyan state is a product of competing British colonial
ideological constructions. Its early beginnings reach back to 1895 and the early 1900s extending
to the post-World War II period, which was characterized by the subsequent wind of change
culminating to the decolonization process. It is a process that continued after political
independence against the background of the Cold War atmosphere. In its totality, the contested
making and/or unmaking of the Kenyan state has remained largely an unexplored subject.
Kenya was designed and constructed after the political and economic image or
imagination afforded by British white settler supremacy. Before the outbreak of anti-colonial
movements in Kenya in general and Mau Mau in particular, “the colonial world … rested on a
mental construction of social separations. Rulers and ruled were distinguished, and differentially
valued, by race.”4 Under this ideological conservatism, Africans were thought of as inherently
primitive and innately different.
On the other hand, liberal administrators and some settlers viewed them as “retarded
children who promised well as modern men.”5 These mutually opposed colonial ideologies were
already in dialogue with conservatives favoring the propping up of reformed tribal authority and
liberals trusting in the gradual improvement of the African when the Mau Mau war broke onto

3

That is, for large scale settlement of British farmer population mainly soldiers being rewarded for their service
during the First World War.
4
John Lonsdale, “Mau Mau’s of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya,” Journal of African History 31
(1990): 401
5
Ibid.
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the scene.6 The war represented anti-colonial African thought, which called into question and
challenged the colonial social order and power relations.
In a sense, therefore, the un/making of Kenya can and should be understood in terms of a
reconsidered and rework of the Braudelian notion of history as the longue durée. This study is an
analysis of the unfolding of Kenya’s post-independence history as an interpenetration of radical
ruptures; stubborn durabilities and sudden breaks and remarkable continuities.7 The flow and ebb
of the history of the Kenyan state is seen as the sum of unpredictable ruptures and subsequent
catastrophes such as British imperial conquest and fluid moment of colonial establishment; the
early beginnings of African political consciousness; the Indian Question and the struggle for
white supremacy; the Mau Mau war; decolonization; and the consequences of imperial collapse
among other momentary events that have had gigantic and enduring consequences in its
postcolonial evolution.8
In this regard, the political instability illustrated by the post-election violence following
the 2007 polls; the emotive “majimbo” or federalist debate; the proliferation of violent ethnic
militia; and spiraling violent crime figures all indicate that the making of Kenya (statehood and
national integration) remains an unachieved aspiration. At the same time, Kenyans remain locked
in an existential uncertainty and mentalité as the majority of the people struggle with the
mundane demands of day-to-day living that echoes anti-colonial sentiments.9

6

Ibid.
Grzegorz Ekiert, The State Against Society: Political Crises and their Aftermath in East Central Europe (Princeton:
Princeton University press, 1996), xi.
8
Ibid.
9
E.S Atieno Odhiambo, “Inventing Kenya,” in Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93 eds. William,
R.Ochieng’ and Bethwell A. Ogot (London: James Currey, 1995), 1-2. In this introductory note Odhiambo writes
that beyond the attainment of state power, the quest for nationhood and identity and nation-building still
continues. He observes that everyday living is the site of the struggle for the demands and basic essentials of life of
everyday life such as land, health, housing, water, human rights and justice, spiritual space. These demands
encompass the totality of the lived experiences of everyone in the family, at school, in the workplace, in the
community and in the process of governance that in turn defines what is or should be the legitimate province of
the historian. It is no wonder that at Odhiambo associates the definition of this intellectual territory with
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie who, together with French historians of the Annales School including Philippe Ariès and
Lawrence Stone developed the analytical term, “mentalité collective.” According to Gertude Himmelfarb, The Idea
of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), 11, the term, as used by these
historians and associated cultural anthropologists such as Clifford Geerz and Mary Douglas, suggests the
production of ideas, values, attitudes and beliefs by infrastructure or structures. Mentalité, as used in this
particular study will refer to the same notion of there being a relationship between material institutions in life or
infrastructure and ideology whereby material conditions of life structure mentalité, and therefore, can only be
7

5

In other words, to understand contemporary Kenya and the political challenges that it
faces, it is necessary to understand the transition from colonialism to independence in Kenya,
cast in sharp perspective by the outbreak of Mau Mau and its legacy. The war represented a lost
opportunity to reconfigure the socioeconomic formation; the political order; and power structure.
This research studies the circumstances under which Kenya attained independence. It makes the
argument that Kenya’s colonial experience, particularly the last fifteen years, and its entire
postcolonial political history are contiguous. It is this nexus that I have tried to capture through a
re-worked use of longue durée analysis.
In effect, I argue and demonstrate that the Kenyan state is the sum all specific
experiences and identifiable critical historical junctures and disjunctures; radical ruptures;
institutional and structural inventions; and a series of major political crises and events that in
spite of their varying degrees of significance, have had gigantic and enduring consequences.
Among them include the radical historical rupture of British imperialism of African societies at
the dawn of colonialism; its policy and institutional consequences; the Mau Mau war and sudden
decolonization as catastrophic events; the Kenya Air Force attempted coup of 1982; and the
underground anti-state resistance movement of the 1980s; and the demand for political pluralism
that led to the unrest of the 1990s.
Put differently, it is possible to draw a connection between the Mau Mau rebellion and
more recent social phenomena such as the violence meted out by and against ethnic militia in the
2000s such as Mungiki, Sabaot Land Defence Force and the political schism along ethnic lines
played out in intermittent ethnic clashes. This study considers all these movements, among other
militia, and political events in the evolution of the state as constituting an unbroken historical
ideological lineage of dissent or alternative popular statehood. It does this on the strength of vast
and varied empirical evidence relied upon to weave ideological connections of grievance

understood in terms of mentalities. Thus used, it is an unequivocal attempt at arranging Kenyan history around the
metaphor of struggle hence seeing it as “a moral enterprise,” as proposed by Odhiambo: a moral enterprise
against the injustice of colonialism; against poverty, ignorance and disease; against the foreignization of cultural
ecology; against the intervention of alien ideas in the indigenous discourses on nation-building. At the risk of being
branded Manichean or bifocal, this study offers an unapologetic and singular rendition of Kenya’s national history
around the metaphor of stuggle; of “matatizo” (problems) and ensuing “mgogoro” (tumult) of everyday people
responding to the process of state formation and state policies.
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between these movements. The subsequent argument demonstrates the relevance of this
historical analysis for contemporary Kenya.

Mau Mau War: Backwards, Going Forward
As noted above, there is a glaring and pressing intellectual need for a critical assessment of
the making of Kenya in the crucial Mau Mau war.10 The war has not been adequately examined
as a conflict fought over the construction of the state going backwards to the dawn of colonialism
and forwards to assess it postcolonial legacy. At the heart of the mind of this movement was the
desire to configure the colonial state with regard to socio-economic and political spheres of life.
In this sense, the Mau Mau war not only brought ambiguous ideologies and, as a result of the
war, political, labor and land colonial policies to the fore, but these same issues were the basis of
violent contestation in the field of battle. It is perhaps the most controversial historical event in
Kenyan history. It has been the subject of academic and political controversy. As a result,
analysis of the war is rather episodic, and therefore, simplistic. It is for this reason that I set about
to examine it simultaneously as a critical juncture of Kenya’s anti-British movements and a
crucial tipping point affecting Kenya’s postcolonial evolution.
I posit the argument that this phenomenon continues to affect post-independence politics,
national identity and the evolution of the contemporary Kenyan state. Therefore, the novelty of
this work lies in its interpretation of the war as a defining moment affecting Kenya’s socioeconomic and political trajectory. As the epitome of the everyday struggle for survival out of
which the war was born, “Mau Mau” is an ever present reality in contemporary Kenya as it was
before independence. This is an interpretation that has long been obstructed by a nebulous
intellectual debate characterizing the production of Mau Mau knowledge. There has been a glut
of information regarding its national or ethnic nature or extent and scope; whether it was a
success or failure; what its objectives and ideals were; and its ownership as an event and
historical subject. This research has attempted to rise above this hindrance, with the benefit of
previous debates and episodic views, interpretations to do the following:

10

The word “crucible” used in the title and throughout this study refers to the Mau Mau war as a critical, crucial
and violent state-building crisis. It also refers to subsequent significant constitutional and institutional changes
occasioned by this series of socio-economic and political crises triggered by the need to violently reconfigure the
state favorably. Specifically, the term refers to the Mau Mau war as a critical and crucial turning point in Kenya’s
political history.
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i.

Examine the various competing ideological constructions of statehood sharpened by the
war and their policy implications, which have affected Kenya’s political trajectory since
the 1950s.

ii.

Analyze the significance or implications of this ideological contest with regard to
statehood, nation-building and integration and politics in Kenya today.

iii.

“Presence” Mau Mau or situating “Mau Mau” in contemporary Kenya. That is, by
identifying and examining the locus of similar dissent expressing discontent or
manifestation of the mentalité of struggle with regard to the socio-economic and political
configuration of the postcolonial state.

These objectives of the study have, simultaneously, been the reason for, and also
necessitated, a new, if radical, “longue durée” view of Mau Mau.

Crucible of War: The Quest for a Holistic Mau Mau Present
Hardly enough can be said about how the history of Mau Mau war has been beleaguered
by opposing views about whether it was a nationalist movement or not; about what its contested
place in Kenya’s history should be; and about what its causes were. In innumerable instances, the
subject has attracted emotionally charged personal and ethnic idiosyncrasies about who owns this
history, or who can or cannot write about it. Odhiambo in his aptly titled article, “The Production
of History in Kenya,” on the Mau Mau debate captures the sorry subjectivism of it all.
Moreover, Mau Mau history was suppressed under the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. So
even after independence, as when it happened in the 1950s, it suffered from competing and
distortive claims and counterclaims. This has featured former Mau Mau fighters, some of whom
are still landless, whose continuous cry to both society and state has been that they have been
forgotten; featured people who view themselves as the only ones fit to write this history from
their firsthand experience; featured Kikuyu intellectuals such as Maina wa Kinyatti who view it
as the highest peak of Kenyan nationalism, or others who have accused scholars from western
Kenya of relegating it to secondary significance; and Kikuyu elites who have sometimes
appropriated this history as an exclusively Kikuyu movement thus excluding every other Kenyan
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individual and ethnic group from enjoying the fruits of independence.11 To further problematize
this, Daniel Branch has, not so long ago, offered new insights of this phenomenon showing just
how inter-penetrable loyalist and Mau Mau-fighter categories were.12
When one considers the deliberate official colonial obfuscation of the movement as
atavistic, savage and a reaction to psychic insecurity, what emerges is a dissipated representation
of Mau Mau history.13 With a rather uncharacteristic pessimism absent in his later intellectual
contribution to the debate, Odhiambo argued that not everybody needs this history, and this
could be right. Further, Odhiambo stated that there are various consumer components of
different Mau Mau pasts. Similarly, Lonsdale explored the imaginative meanings of Mau Mau
invented by white conservatives and liberals against their black opponents in the context of
divergent and fearful ambitions of shaping Kenya’s future.14
This study takes these arguments into account. However, it propounds the view that Mau
Mau was a seminal moment in which the Kenyan state was in the throes of formation. By so
doing, it casts the war as the epitome of the quest for popular statehood or “stateness.” The study,
therefore, attempts to detail the continued struggle for the full measure of “uhuru” in the absence
of which life is just but an attempt to survive precariously and in never-ending uncertain times.
In opposition to this is the postcolonial Kenya nation-building project that has benefited the
political class and those well-placed to benefit from state patronage networks.
Unlike most historical analysis of Mau Mau, this work does not concern itself on the
causes and effects of the war. In so far as it does, it is with the aim of unraveling its deeper
ideological and subliminal foundations of the movement and many others before and after it. In
the same breath, it does not concern itself with the question of whether the conflict was a
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nationalist or Kikuyu civil war. Instead, it views the struggle as an emblematic representation
and culmination of anti-colonial, and a precursor of postcolonial, movements in Kenya.
As such, the use of the term “Mau Mau” with regard to the postcolonial era is generic. It
is used to refer to the war’s ideological legacy or lineage of grievance. Archival and other
evidence from popular culture (music, art, graffiti and creative arts like cartoons, novels and
paintings) is adduced, and an incisive discussion of public criticism is relied upon, to bolster this
bold assertion.15 Furthermore, the study is not about the place of Mau Mau in Kenya’s history,
prominent or otherwise. Rather, it ponders on the more problematic question of situating it in the
present through historical analysis. In addition to the foregoing, the most important question that
presents itself for consideration is not why or who should write Mau Mau history and for whom
but, rather, one about the unboundedness of the phenomenon going backwards and forward. Put
differently, some of the questions I am concerned with include; why it happened when it did
(discussed in chapters three and four); how it was dealt with and with what implications for
postcolonial Kenyan politics, national identity and statehood (chapters four and five); and
whether the congenital struggle, which it epitomized was dealt with by political independence
with finality.16

A Centennial Perspective: Getting Inside the Mau Mau Mind
The Mau Mau war constitutes a turning point in Kenya’s history. At one level, it stands
out as a generic event or an epitome of anti-colonial movements that prefigured it including the
Kolloa Affray and Elija Masinde’s “Dini ya Msambwa” (DYM). It is, as such, a symbolic
representation of the cumulative African experience of half a century under harsh and oppressive
British imperial domination. At another level, it constitutes a critical juncture in the country’s
historical trajectory.17 It was, in this sense, a manifest state-building crisis. Subsequently, it
15

With regard to popular songs especially those rendered in Swahili or Sheng (a mixture of various Kenyan
languages, Kiswahili and English) I have exercised authorial discretion and translated them rather liberally. This has
been done with little interest in the direct and literal translation. Instead, in re-writing the lyrics into English, I was
more interested in the hidden nuances and, therefore, relied more on the context, in as far as the everyday social
and pertaining historical realities of the day, in which they were composed or performed is concerned. The
“translation” of various song lyrics is closer to an interpretation as I worked through them as scholars would other
primary sources of analysis.
16
I have argued throughout this study that the mentalité or Mau Mau spirit of struggle survived the war of the
1950s and continue to animate and inspire political discontent in postcolonial Kenya.
17
The term “critical juncture” is used as defined by Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier in the chapter, “The
African State at the End of the Twentieth Century: Parameters of the Critical Juncture,” The African State at a
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triggered significant reforms that produced distinct institutional and ideological legacies that
served to further strengthen the colonial state. The war occasioned a period of rapid reforms
characterized by the colonial creation of institutions and deployment of far-reaching
constitutional and land reforms to counter the apogee of anti-colonial sentiment. This was with
the result of institutional stasis in the postcolonial state because these changes were carried over
and consolidated even after independence.
Therefore, this is one of the most distinct characteristics of this Mau Mau war crucible of
state formation. After all, as a violent manifestation of the ground swell of African discontent in
British East Africa, it forced critical decisions in London and Nairobi. In its wake, there were
newly instituted state structures that have since persisted. Here, it is crucial to observe that
measures such as the strengthening of the provincial administration, qualitative electoral politics
and the Swynnerton land consolidation program including the million acre schemes were
implemented with relative uniformity around the colony even though they were triggered by, and
more effectively carried out, in Central Province, which was the theatre of the war.
Further, this centennial view of Mau Mau represents a radical departure in another way. It
constitutes an attempt to deconstruct Mau Mau as evil and an anathema. Thus, this study was
conducted as an intellectual retrieval exercise that contextualizes the movement within the fifty
or so years of British colonial rule. It argues that the war, and the widespread anti-colonial
discontent it exemplified, was shaped by the colonial state surveillance in lethal combination
with an emasculating architecture of land, labor and associated laws and policies. I have,
therefore, explained the war as an attempt at challenging, in order to reconfigure, colonially
inaugurated social relations of power to create an equitable political economy. Archival sources
relied upon confirm that the war was a symptomatic and highly symbolic moment of colonial
subjects returning the imperial gaze. That is, a reaction to colonial modernization through the
investment and wielding of force that produced a restrictive space-time, physical and
psychological environment, experienced by imperial subjects. The war was a demonstration of
just how far Africans were willing to go to navigate this new imperial physical-time and
psychological oppression dimension.

Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration (eds.) Leonardo A. Villalon and Phillip A. Huxtable
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 6.
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Colonial capitalism, law, order and associated modalities of state surveillance, individual
land holding, Christianity and westernization, education, labor relations and taxation, all had
produced an exclusive modern space dominated and enjoyed by the British and Indians.18 The
fledgling colonial political economy was unapologetically racially segregated. In less than fifty
years of colonialism, Kenyans, not just the Kikuyu, had been violently forced out of their
egalitarian pre-colonial world ordered by an unwritten but mutually binding code of civic virtue
and reciprocal moral socio-economic responsibility. This relatively idyllic pre-European order
characterized by economic security was ruptured and its distinct “ecological arenas – forests,
hills and plains …” reordered to pave way for a colonial landscape constructed to conform to
modern Western logic.19
Whereas this world had consisted of hunters, cultivating and hunting peoples and herders
operating within pre-European agrarian and pastoral modes of production, it was jarred into a
competitive, rigid and policed field where Africans were not only pitted against white settlers,
Indians and Arabs, but also against each other. The acquisitive nature of the white settlers also
meant that the African ecological arena was not only drastically altered but also dramatically
curtailed. As Lonsdale notes, their land was alienated by “capital,” which was the axe with which
to cut a path through political jungles as well as nature’s.20 African land was considered to be
tabula rasa inviting the colonial state to exploit and order it through the establishment of new
relations between capitalists and a few skilled workers.

18

Here “modalities of colonial state surveillance” is used with the same meaning as in Spurgeon Thompson’s,
“Returning the Gaze: Culture and the Politics of Surveillance in Ireland,” International Journal of English Studies 2
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Further, Lonsdale observes that the colonial state was a cartographer and maps were its
images of order.21 White settlers filled these inviting albeit dangerous spaces with roads, fields
and boundary beacons all the while with misplaced hope “for a contented black labor on quiet
farms with mortgages ….”22 This happened in the first colonial occupation between 1895 and
1930s. The sum of all the above constituted “order” through British imperial eyes imposed on
subjects by fiat. In this colonial matrix, imperial subjects were locked or trapped in subservient
subject positions held together by a restrictive architecture of laws, policies and racial attitudes.23
During the second colonial occupation between the late 1930s and the post-Second World
War era, Africans were subjected to even further colonial restrictions and intensive public works,
occasioned by the demands of more developed capitalist settler agriculture and the needs of the
metropolitan economy.24 This was perpetrated through policies that placed greater emphasis on
colonial development and welfare. This second phase of the imperial gaze was characterized by
even more ambitious state intervention and intrusion that included the infamous terracing
campaign; the eviction of squatters who had provided the labor required by white farmers to
tame the land in the white highlands; further restrictions on the growth of cash crops in Central
Province; and the confiscation of African livestock. Here, it is crucial to note that these were
measures borne out of colonial state logic of what was best for Africa agriculture while at the
same time presiding over an “order” in which the best land was owned by white settlers.
With regard to the colonial assault on their livestock, squatters called it “kifagio,” the
sweeping broom, which is symbolic of being forced out of every possible prior habitation and
practice through the imposition of a new mode of production –that is, colonial capitalism. This
explains why both Cooper and Lonsdale see post-war colonial policies as representative of a
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whirlwind of change. This was characterized by the adoption, by both the state and settlers, of a
rationalized labor system with both labor and land organized precisely around the cycle of the
settler crops. This was an official ideology oriented toward systematic social development, which
consigned squatters to categorical oblivion.25
According to Cooper, these policies resulted in a clash of ideologies with Africans being
accused of overgrazing and haphazard cultivation. Such colonial policies buffeted Kikuyu
squatters in Olenguruone in the Rift Valley and besieged people living in similar socioeconomic
arrangements in the colony in places like Kitale; and confined wage earning slum dwellers in
Nairobi into dreadfully squalid landscapes characterized by misery. These spatial displacement
and restrictions corresponded with official categories, both liberal and conservative, of Africans
as savages and retarded children.26
On the other hand, Kikuyu oathing, which is an idiom and counter-ideology of resistance,
was a form of mimicry and early beginning of the African returning the gaze. Similarly, DYM
and its Kolloa corollary were fantasies calculated to look back into imperial eyes with the same
or even greater intensity in a bid to destabilize and cancel the differences of power in the colonial
state.27 What these anti-colonial movements had in common was imitating the colonial state in
an attempt to challenge the imposed colonial politico-economic order. The Kikuyu anti-imperial
ideology was, therefore, contemporaneous with similar anti-colonial responses elsewhere in
Kenya, especially in the 1950s.
Taking note of this, both Odhiambo and Ogot observe that the period between 1945 and
1955 was an age of “matatizo” (social restlessness and the struggle for survival). As such, it
quite naturally, resulted to “mgogoro” (tumultuous agitation) characterized by pronounced urban
poverty, hunger in settler farms and general labor and political unrest in Kenya.28 Africans were
imbued by the mentalité of struggle. This is what prompted a rethinking of the history of the
colonial past of the previous fifty years. The result was that they were caught busily reworking
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the interstices of the colonial order to accommodate this hard past and the dim future through
strikes, demonstrations and struggle for autonomy.29
This was an era of the fear of final loss of access to, and security in, the White Highlands
by Luo squatters in Kisumu/Londiani district, Gikuyu in Nakuru and Naivasha districts, Nandi
and Bukusu in Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu districts.30 This is also what explains the major
strikes in Mombasa that involved thousands of workers demanding higher pay and benefits. But
this was not the beginning of unionized labor agitation by Africans. From the 1920s the
Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association, a purely Luo and Luhya organization, was involved
in a bid to protect peasants from African economic restrictions. Oginga Odinga also formed the
Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation, which aimed at providing not only political solutions to Luo
social and economic disabilities, but also establishing an alternative vision for the future.31 At
this time, Odinga was also involved in successfully opposing compulsory land consolidation and
reclamation measures. In Western Kenya, the North Kavirondo Central Association was founded
in response to the fears that had risen over land security following the discovery of gold in
Kakamega in 1931. It also promoted social and economic advancement for its members.
Among the Bukusu in Bungoma district, land was also the main problem as it became
acute in 1946 when restrictions were placed upon squatters. They believed that Trans Nzoia
district was their ancestral land which was stolen from them by the white settlers. Bukusu
squatters constituted the majority of the squatters in this region who experienced full exploitation
under the colonial system.32 Some Bukusu responded to this through DYM, a Christian syncretic
religious movement, which sought the expulsion of Europeans from Kenya and the rejection of
European civilization. Its leader, Elija Masinde, led the movement in protest against the colonial
order to uproot the Mexican marigold weed for which he was convicted and imprisoned in 1945.
After his release in 1947, he “openly advocated for the use of violence, urging the Babukusu, at
several rallies, to take up arms and fight the colonialists.”33 He was arrested but the movement

29

Ibid.
Ibid.
31
Ibid., 30.
32
This is well-captured by the respective chapter contributions by Bethwell A. Ogot, “Mau Mau and Nationhood:
the Untold Story,” and John Lonsdale, “Mau Mau and Nationhood,”in Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms, Authority
and Narration eds. E.S Odhiambo and J. Lonsdale (Oxford: James Currey, 2003).
33
Ogot, Ogot, “Mau Mau and Nationhood,” 14.
30

15

continued to demand the return of Bukusu land and expulsion of the British from Kenya. Elija
Masinde, and his lieutenant Joash Walumoli, were deported to Lamu and remained in detention
until the end of the State of Emergency ended in 1960.
At the same time, an adherent of the movement in East Pokot in northern Baringo, Lukas
Pkech, was promoting DYM’s activities there. Around 1949, Pkech was prophesying that the
British would soon be expelled. On 24 April 1950, he organized young Pokots, armed with
spears and shields, and confronted the government forces at Kolloa in East Pokot at dawn, which
resulted in his own death and those of three Europeans and that of twenty eight of his followers.
This event has gone down in the annals of Kenya’s colonial history as the Kolloa Affray that
marked Pokot defiance led by a self-proclaimed prophet and a band of three hundred followers
against “all that the colonial system stood for; its concept of law and order, its concept of
authority and its ontology.”34 This is a classic description and example of Africans returning the
imperial gaze.
In view of the above, the immediate historical context against which Mau Mau war was
born was characterized by similarly spirited colony-wide anti-colonial movements. These were
inspired by the socioeconomic and political flux caused by the imposition of disruptive
modernity at a breakneck speed. This produced a modern political space, which Africans, in
organizing themselves and embarking on various forms of resistance, were trying to navigate.
For this reason, Mau Mau cannot be considered in isolation but can, and should, be best
understood as the culmination of these African attempts at bargaining through various means for
a niche in this new space and their own place in time. As the section on historiographical review
below attempts to show, this interpretation of Mau Mau, while it has been alluded to in the past,
has not been studied empirically.
This study has tried to close this gap in the body of Mau Mau historiography using
archival material to experientially link, not only these anti-colonial movements, but also postindependence dissent and clamor for popular statehood. Herein, then, Mau Mau war is
representative of anti-colonial movements that prefigured it. Secondly, “Mau Mau” will also
refer to the war’s ideological legacy of resistance or dissent which is traced throughout Kenya’s
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post-independent history through critical analysis of available evidence. This stands in stark
contrast with how this sensitive subject has been approached by a constellation of Mau Mau
research experts in the past.

Previous Mau Mau Portraits
Kenyan history is characterized by an exuberant historiography covering the colonial
period. Nevertheless, much less has been done to examine the postcolonial state seen as a
flawless continuum with the colonial. Only recently have historians, for instance, Caroline
Elkins, David Anderson and Daniel Branch, started juxtaposing these two periods of Kenyan
history albeit in a limited way.35 This can partly be attributed to the fact that post-independent
history has been characterized by an unsettled and unsettling debate among nationalist historians
and other Kenyan history specialists over the nature of Mau Mau; its success and extent, or
scope, national or otherwise; over its objectives and ideals; and even the ownership of Mau Mau
as a historical subject.
Much energy has been expended on the question of whether this conflict was a national
movement of liberation or a sectarian civil war among the Kikuyu, whether or not it was a
success, what its ideals, aims and objectives were, whether it is needed as a history and if so, to
what ends. This has pitted Kikuyu historians and intellectuals such as Maina wa Kinyatti and
Mukaru Nga’ng’a against other academics such as Ogot and Odhiambo.36
Be that as it may, let it suffice to note that preoccupation with this debate has contributed
to a considerable hiatus in Kenyan historiography regarding the contextual, immediate and long
term significance of Mau Mau. Secondly, and as a direct result of the foregoing observation,
35
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revisionist history countering imperial depictions of Mau Mau war, while it does exist, is in
fragmented disarray.37 Lonsdale and Odhiambo observe that there are various Mau Mau pasts
waiting for their own historians: home guards, loyalists, British soldiers involved in it and so
on.38 As such, this lingering preoccupation and debate has tended to focus on various segmented
Mau Mau histories at the expense of a cogent problematization of Mau Mau with an overarching
singular motif that views it as a struggle for survival in an increasingly modernizing space and
landscape.39
This is what this study does. While appreciating its multifaceted complexity, Mau Mau is
seen as a movement that captured the fluid atmosphere symptomatic of a colonial society at a
crossroads between pre-European and colonial orders. This omission of an overarching or longue
durée perspective of Mau Mau as a crucible of war, in which Kenya was forged, represents a gap
in the literature that this study seeks to address.
Moreover, this gap has been exacerbated by the fact that documentation of this conflict
has until recently remained hidden in classified colonial records. Some of this collection still is.
In this regard, I have made an attempt to minimize this gap with the benefit of available primary
data that has been recently declassified. The use of this new archival material has been in light of
a broader reflection of emerging scrutiny and perspectives of the so-called “new imperial
history.”40
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The National and Imperial British Backdrop
I have endeavored to treat the Mau Mau war as part and parcel of Kenya’s experience
within the broader subject of British national and imperial history. As a political, economic and
social phenomenon, the British Empire (along with other European empires) greatly shaped the
contemporary world as we know it. The Empire developed in tandem and overlapped between
the 17th and the 19th century with the emergence of Britain as a nation-state in Europe. At the
same time, informal economic influence and/or direct political control in the imperial periphery
led to the emergence of independent states including the United States of America, Canada,
Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Egypt and India not to mention most of the sub-Saharan
countries.
With regard to the former process viz. –the emergence of Britain as a state of remarkable
continental and international stature, various historians have focused on different aspects of this
process that is relevant to this study. In The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State,
1688-1783, John Brewer propounds that war with the French between 1688 and 1783 led to the
creation of an aggressive, powerful and expanding fiscal military state in Britain.41 Lawrence
Stone’s An Imperial State at War: Britain From 1689 to 1815, a collection of papers, further
interrogates, along similar lines, the circumstances under which the British state came into
existence.42 In Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, Linda Colley makes a similar argument
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stating that imperial competition between the two leading European powers, Britain and France,
led to the forging of a distinct British identity in the 18th century.43
These three books show the significance of imperialism in the development of British
identity, state and emergence as a relatively cohesive political unit. They also draw attention to
war as coagulating and forging force that often times brings about the emergence of nationstates. Although this is not always the rule, it is under similar imperial circumstances that former
dominions and colonies such as the U.S.A. and India emerged, respectively. They were
inaugurated against the backdrop of rising tensions and conflict or the crucible of war in the case
of the former. This British imperial historical background is instructive. The Mau Mau war
standing, as it does, at the juncture of the colonial and postcolonial period, is a vortex at the crux
of the formation and evolution of the Kenyan state.
Fred Anderson’s Crucible of War: The Seven years’ War and the Fate of Empire in
British North America, 1754-1766 extensively explains how the United States of America
emerged in the process of breaking the shackles of British dominance or rule. It is an
examination of the broad circumstances, besides the War of Independence, that set the stage for
the United States of America which became a republic in 1776. Anderson argues that the Seven
Years’ War was the defining moment in US history since it led to the unraveling of the British
Atlantic Empire.44 The Indian equivalent of Anderson’s Crucible of war is Yasmin Khan’s The
Great Partitions: The Making of India and Pakistan which documents how the dissolution of the
British Raj was intrinsically intertwined with the partition and thereby, the forging of India and
Pakistan.45 The example of U.S.A, India and Pakistan highly influenced this study that is about
the formation and evolution of the Kenyan state within the same general background of British
imperialism and the Mau Mau war in particular.
Colonial Kenya is an exceptional example of a British imperial possession earmarked for
development as a white man’s country. This was in line with the principal conviction and
ideology that Britain and its acquisitions like New Zealand, Australia and Jamaica were
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culturally and morally contiguous with the metropolis. This was underscored by the classic
justification for imperialism: the mission to civilize barbaric and savage societies. This is an
imperial theme that is brilliantly captured and explored by Catherine Hall’s Civilizing Subjects:
Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830-1867.46 There were intellectual and
policy debates occasioned by Mau Mau that mirror the racial ideologies between liberals and
conservatives as discussed by Hall. These were between settler hardliner conservatives and selfstyled “liberals” epitomized by Group-Captain L.R. Briggs and Michael Blundell, respectively,
to which missionaries added their voices as well as middle-of-the-path observers like General
George Erskine.
In addition to this was the ideology or mentalité of survival that drove anti-colonial
movements in general, and Mau Mau in particular. Unlike their counterparts in Birmingham and
London who were disillusioned by the cumulative effect of the Morant Bay Rebellion (1865) and
the Indian Sepoy mutiny (1857), white conservative colonialists following the outbreak of Mau
Mau, were unapologetic in their bid for the re-imposition of white power.47 “Liberals” too
persevered in their bid to make Kenya a country that would secure their continued economic
dominance in the face of the Mau Mau war. Unlike in Jamaica where the rebellion of former
African slaves forcefully brought the spatial realities and geo-cultural indifference of the “other”
home, whites in colonial Kenya persisted in their pursuit of their imagined white man’s country.
In view of these imperial parallels, it important to understand the persistence, in the
construction of the Kenyan state, of the imagination of white man’s country or the triumph of the
colonial ideology after Mau Mau was brutally crushed even after independence. There was,
though, a subtle shift in the construction of Kenya as a white man’s country to a more
“accommodating” multicultural state albeit one that, besides favoring settlers, now admitted the
African big man to privilege and power.
Thomas Metcalf’s work too, contributes greatly to the understanding of the imperial
jockeying between conservative and liberal administrators. This is with respect to the British Raj
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in a bid to construct the sub-continent after contending images of Britain’s “other” self.48
Ideologies of the Raj is an important reference because it shows that the British Empire had no
standard ideological template for governing its colonies, which led to liberal and conservative
elements in official administrative or informal capacities developing different and usually
contradictory policies.
Drawing parallels with the Kenyan colonial experience has led to the appreciation of the
fact that this British imperial project was no exception. Contesting imperial ideologies were
thrust forth by the Mau Mau war, which was itself, a violent challenge to the making of Kenya as
a white and African big man’s country. The war amplified earlier anti-colonial sentiments and
pushed the issues of land, rationalized labor and African political representation to the fore. It
was symbolic of the ideological conflagration, which now played out in the actual physical field
of battle. The 1950s decade and the Mau Mau “Emergency” was the “halftime” of the British
imperial effort to impose an exploitative state-building project from above thus inaugurating
Kenya’s long century of violence.49

Vortex of Historical Continuities: Mau Mau Minds
According to the veteran Kenyan historian B.A Ogot, the years between 1956 and 1963
were decisive.50 He argues that the struggle against Mau Mau exacted a heavy political price,
accommodations and compromise gestures from the British imperialists. As part and parcel of
the fight against Mau Mau, the colonial government instituted the Swynnerton Plan for the
development of agriculture in the African reserves; the Lyttelton and later Lancaster House
Constitutions; the Carpenter minimum wage reforms; and the Lidbury civil service equal pay for
equal work review of terms. There was also a limited extension of rationed franchise and
increased African representation in the Legislative Council during and after the Mau Mau
Emergency (1952-1960). These developments were, in effect, triggered by the Mau Mau ferment
amid a groundswell of latent discontent in East Africa. This then suggests that this war was,
indeed, the crucible in which the postcolonial state emerged in the early 1960s.
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According to Ogot, after Mau Mau, Kenya could not exactly return to the colonial status
quo ante. In part, this study set out to collate various archival evidence that make a direct or
indirect connection between these socio-economic and political reforms and the war. A second
ambitious objective was to try and document the competing bottom-up (popular) and elite (topbottom) state-constructed ideologies in postcolonial Kenya. The assessment of the manner in
which these latter day colonial reforms were implemented before and after independence, proves
that Mau Mau hopes in particular, and general African aspirations, were not met. I have offered
and supported the argument that relative deprivation and denial of popular socio-economic and
political aspirations including human dignity and human rights; self-reliance; and civic
responsibility and liberties represented by the war, resulted in an ideological lineage of dissent
throughout the postcolonial period.
My study, like Odhiambo, posits that the colonial struggle of Kenyan people for civil
liberties, peasant self-reliance, civic responsibility and human rights had the opposite effect. It
“yielded” a more assured imperial gaze in the form of capture of state power by an African elite.
After independence, the postcolonial state remained, as ever, dependent on Britain. The Kenyan
state was a gate-keeper state in which the role of the African elite was to control the inward and
outward flow of capital in the form of foreign investments and aid, payment of exports and
multinational corporation profits.51
As a result, the nature of the Kenya state to date remains contested along the same grain
as in the 1950s. This, in turn, has dictated the nature of the country’s politics and affected
national integration and identity. The aspirations of the crucial formative years between 1945 and
1955, which informed the war of independence, still remain. It is in this sense that the war is
herein seen as a critical conjuncture and a meeting point for all the forces of history, economic,
social and ideological, that have shaped Kenya’s long century. This study proposes that this
period in Kenya’s history is not only critical for the understanding of Kenya’s past but also going
forward into the 21st century.
The struggle that characterized Kenya’s formative years is still on. There was general
turmoil and ferment not only among the Kikuyu but also elsewhere. These years were
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characterized by a general uproar in reaction to forced land consolidation in the Rift Valley, the
rise of religious syncretic movements among the Kipsigis and Luo and fear among the Bukusu
over their land and grazing rights in the Pokot highlands. It was a period of “matatizo”and
“matata” throughout the colony. There was a general undercurrent to rework the interstices of
the colonial order to accommodate a hard past and the dim future beyond Central Province where
the Mau Mau conflict was confined.52 The East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-55 unveiled the
groundswell of Mau Mau minds.53 It is little wonder that sweeping reforms, like the Swynnerton
land consolidation plan, in the wake of the war, left only a few regions in the colony untouched.
While it offers a refreshing new perspective of Mau Mau, this view is not entirely
unprecedented. John Lonsdale recognized the need to reconstruct the colonial image of “an evil
Mau Mau.” For him, this meant reconstructing past boundaries of morally valid knowledge and
power. According to Lonsdale, Mau Mau was a dreadful reality: “a pathological image of the
right social group relations which ought to order colonial life. These relations were …in disarray,
between …what once had been and the mirage of what they might become.”54 Lonsdale’s
interpretation of this colonial struggle confers upon it a historically redemptive quality.
The Mau Mau struggle was for self-mastery, respectability, patriotic virtue, for the
working of their own salvation in agrarian labor and over the moralities of class formation.55 It
was an opportunity for the white ruling class to dissolve race as a strategy of survival in the face
of the fundamental challenge of the imaginative structures of race and tribe underwritten by the
colonial order. Instead, the subsequent violent historical rupture of colonial society resulted in
divided contemplation of the future that invited new appropriations of the past. The whites,
according to Lonsdale, chose to continue writing their own history and that of the African
people. Ultimately, the remaking of Kenya after the war was decided by others. It was
re/constructed by metropolitan Britain and the new African ruling elite and not those who sought
to reconfigure the socioeconomic and political colonial order. Indeed, those who fought colonial

52

Odhiambo, “The Formative Years,” 26.
The commission was charged with the duty of investigating the potentially explosive atmosphere characterized
by restlessness, heightening political agitation and discontent in the region against the background of the Mau
Mau war. Across the board, Africans, not only in colonial Kenya but elsewhere, expressed their displeasure with
the colonial state and status quo especially the issue of loss of land.
54
Lonsdale, “Mau Maus of the Mind,” 404.
55
Ibid., 417.
53

24

“order” would reenter society to find that they were still landless in a rural world now realigned
by land consolidation and freehold title.56 This was true at the end of the war, the final days of
colonial rule and the dawn of independenc. Significantly, it has also been perpetuated long after
“freedom” was won.
This is an observation that others have made. William Ochieng’ pointed out that in his
independence speech, President Jomo Kenyatta did not even mention the people who laid down
their lives for the struggle.57 For Ochieng’, this shows that the new independent African
government did not commit itself to a revolutionary break with the past, which is what the Mau
Mau war sought. The war was an attempt at such far-reaching socioeconomic and political
transformation of society and, for them and most Kenyans, this is what independence meant.
Ochieng’ sees Kenyatta’s rule as a new-styled colonial governorship with his close cohorts and
the Kikuyu as the new Europeans.58 In the early days of the postcolonial state the newly uprooted
weed of race as a strategy of survival was replaced by the equally divisive seed of ethnicity.
The latter took the place of race as the basic point of reference in the state’s authoritative
allocation of resources and strategy of socio-economic and political survival. For Ochieng’ this is
why Kenyatta’s ex-Vice-President Oginga Odinga was convinced that even with an African
president, it was still not yet “uhuru.”59 Yet, while this is a valid observation, it is a rather
rhetorical oversimplification of the historical continuity between the colonial and postcolonial
state. To remedy this observation, this study marshals copious empirical evidence to show how
the Kenyatta and Moi governments perpetuated the making of Kenya into a big man’s country
and with what implications for both political eras and beyond.

New Historical Sources, New Histories
This empirical investigation has only been made possible by continuing declassification
of previously sensitive information covering this period of Kenya’s history. Indeed, this has
already spawned new work that is at the juncture of national and imperial history. Caroline
Elkins Britain’s Gulag and David Anderson’s Histories of the Hanged are good examples. The
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former is a detailed account of the British response to the Mau Mau struggle with specific
attention given to internment camps. It deals with the gory counter-insurgency tactics and
methods chosen by the British military, intelligence and colonial police to put out the rebellion –
villagization, torture, de facto detention, screening and rehabilitation and beating among others.
It is, so far, the most comprehensive study of British counter-insurgency measures and
policy. Elkins relied on archival data as well as oral interviews of former fighters and detainees.
However, she was criticized by, among others, Anderson and Branch for focusing on the
nationalist representation of the Mau Mau war. It is also worth mentioning that the book did not
offer any insights on the significance of the war and counter-insurgency in postcolonial Kenya.
Anderson cast the Mau Mau fighters in an entirely new light using available archival
information detailing over a thousand court trials of Mau Mau fighters. This study detailed the
reasons why the “accused” got involved in the struggle in their own words as they testified in
their trials, which is a powerful rendition of Mau Mau voices speaking from their graves. In
addition, it classified individual Mau Mau into those operating in the city of Nairobi; the
Aberdare, Mt. Kenya and other forests; and the more specific case of the Lari Massacre on the
outskirts of Nairobi. The book ends with a compelling reflection of the aftermath of the war –
how the police state was to be dismantled; rehabilitation of detainees; and return to normalcy and
what that meant. This marked the inclination towards historical reflection on the significance of
the war for contemporary Kenya. This new reflective approach to the study of Mau Mau is one
that has, in a way, inspired greatly my interest in an inquiry that is solely dedicated to the war’s
postcolonial implications.60
In his book Defeating Mau Mau, Branch studied the loyalist element of the Mau Mau
revolt. This book too ends with a note on its postcolonial significance. However, for the most
part, it foregrounded the loyalists in this defining event. To its credit though, it also looked at the
complex dynamics of what the author, largely, viewed as a Kikuyu civil war. It focused on what
being a loyalist really meant beyond broad social categories and ahistorical observations. Branch
argued that loyalists participated in the counter-insurgency because of their own experience of
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the violence. At the end of the book there is a disproportionately short reflection on the
implications of an appreciation of loyalist histories on the trajectory of the postcolonial state.61
These include the predominance of loyalists in institutions of both the colonial and
postcolonial state as well as the impact on Kikuyu political thought and householder ethics.
Branch observed that civil war and counterinsurgency became exercises in state-building just as
both Britain and the United States have their origins in conflict and violence. He also noted that
postcolonial loyalist domination and imposition of the “ideology of order” found continuity in
the Mwai Kibaki era. This, however, is not a detailed study that catalogues the evolution of this
ideology in the post-independent era. In developing my research scope, I wanted to be able
partially contribute to an understanding of the said “ideology of order” by focusing more on the
counter-ideology of popular statehood and struggle for mundane needs of everyday life. The two
have competed for mastery since the 1950s and much earlier.

Subliminal Ideology against Criminal Foundations of the Colonial State
The building-the-nation imperative, uhuru (freedom) and fruits of this freedom –land,
employment, education and healthcare, civil liberties and civic responsibility- which were the
omnibus rallying cry for the struggle against British colonialism, have remained elusive even
after independence. The first decade seemed promising and the long struggle for uhuru, which
was sometimes violent, was somewhat vindicated. But that is as far as the success story goes.
For that reason, Kenya has, since independence, limped down the road of liberation as a
modern African state with the threat of revolutionary violence ever looming. While enjoying
relative success compared to its neighbors, the country has teetered precariously on the edge of
violent conflict. This is wrongly viewed as a result of the ferment of ethnic conflict that threatens
to tear the state apart. In this study, I posit that ethnic conflict is but a symptom of a much deeper
structural violence rooted in unresolved historical problems and criminal injustices that stem
from the colonial era.
After the precipitous violent experience in 2007/8, much was done at the practical level
of national politics, the intervention of the international community and the search for a new
constitutional order. However, much more needs to be done by way of taking stock of the
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circumstances under which the Kenyan state was formed throughout its colonial experience with
emphasis on the 1950s as the key center-point. Elusive political stability and nation-building and
integration cannot be realized without drawing lessons from such a historical reflection, which,
albeit, has so far not been undertaken. If there has been a single most important justification for
this study, and from which I have drawn much inspiration and courage to undertake it, then this
is it. This inquiry of how the circumstances under which the Kenyan state was formed continue
to be relevant today has not been disappointing. In the chapters that follow I have advanced the
following pillars of my argument supported by empirical archival evidence:
i.

That Kenya’s colonial legal architecture propelled the state on a socio-economic and
political trajectory dominated by either white or African big men (chapter two).

ii.

That the introduction of colonial capitalism and attendant modernity jarred African
societies, which began an existential struggle that continues in Kenya today (chapter
three).

iii.

That the Mau Mau struggle among other anti-colonial movements contested the capitalist
order and colonial state, which they sought to reconfigure favorably (chapters three and
four).

iv.

That the institutional and structural reforms enacted in response to Mau Mau laid the
foundations for the postcolonial state and postcolonial order, which have never been
overturned since (chapters four and five).

v.

That Mau Mau’s anti-colonial ideological legacy of dissent continues to contend against
the official ideology of law and order represented by the ruling elite (chapter five).

vi.

That the pervasive ideology of tribalism, shared by ordinary Kenyans and the elite, has
recalibrated the real nature of politics in Kenya that is about the everyday struggles of
survival. As a result, the ideology of tribalism inhibits national integration in Kenya
(chapter six).

Wars Make States
The making of the generic African state was deliberate and artificial. It was a product of
imperial fiat. As such, it does not fit within the ambit of dominant theories of the origins of the
state such as neo-Marxism or liberal theory. In this wise, the formation of the state in Africa
stands in stark contrast to how European states were formed towards the end of the Middle Ages.
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The “architects” of the process in Europe did not set out to create a state per se. The European
state has its origins and foundations in local and regional alliances of dynasties with agents of
capital or, in some instances, specific individuals and merchants. In Europe, the state emerged as
result of intricate and mundane societal processes of more or less ordinary people negotiating
economic and other changes in their milieux. In Europe, the state emerged as a result of people
reacting to exogenous factors such as the peaking of long distance trade in the fifteenth century.
Subsequent structural changes and institutional innovations, according to Hendrik Spruyt, led to
the emergence of the state unit as a fundamental logic of organization.62
The state in Europe, therefore, emerged from the interactions and power relations
between plenipotentiary actors that were either entities such as the church or its representatives,
empires or its agents such as kings, towns and their denizens. This was a relatively allaccommodating process that was at once vertical, horizontal and bottom-up evolutionary process
dictated to by naturally occurring needs of society. It was, as in the case of Africa, a top-bottom
imposition. Rather, it incorporated different layers and sections of society. It was also, more or
less, a state-formation process stimulated by local and simple dynamics and mundane everyday
concerns of ordinary people acting on their own behalf.
The modern state in Africa stands in stark contrast. It was an imposition and a grafting of
the European state on pre-European African structures and institutions.63 Put differently, the state
in Africa was constructed after its European image. The African state was forged out of a process
of European imperial imagination. In addition, the obvious deliberate human agency in the
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process serves to further complicate the utility of the conventional theoretical framework
outlined above which explains state formation in the European context.
Moreover, Tilly’s argument that wars in Europe were crucial to the state-making process
is important. It can be applied as a theoretical framework in the context of the Mau Mau war.64
Seen through this theoretical lens, the war is the crucible of the Kenyan state. Up until the 1950s,
the development of the Kenya colony had taken place along the lines of European racial
dominance. Despite the classic imperial justification, European presence in the colony had
nothing to do with civilizing the African or governing the colony in trust until such a time that
political power would pass to the Africans.
Rather, the British were there to stay. Colonial rule was justified by, and is thereby best
understood as, British self-definition as a civilizing superior “us” against an inferior African
“other.” This explains the construction of the colonial state as a white man’s colony that in turn
explains the outbreak of the Mau Mau war. It is also within this context that nascent African
nationalism and political consciousness culminating in the struggle for independence should be
understood. In the same breath, Kenya’s post-independence political history should also be
understood as a continuation of the neo-imperial liberal state project. That is, the continued
attempt by Western governments to propagate democratic institutions, values and principles of
governance on a global scale in countries where these have not evolved locally.
At the heart of this project is the refashioning of the relationship of the state with the
market economy with the aim of reducing the role of the former as a regulator of the latter. In
essence, the free market ideology of “invisible hand” is supposed to order activity in a free
market economy. Agents of this process are Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade
Organization, the European Union and cultural experts but, more so, Western governments in
general. As such, post-independent Kenya can be seen to be effectively under British, or more
precisely, Anglo-American economic influence with regard to trade and bilateral relations. Here,
it is instructive to note that “decolonization” was under continued and unstinting Western
tutelage within the context of the Cold War. Consequently, discontent with the state has
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remained with the same intensity of the 1950 and 1960s if not more. This unbroken and
increasing decibel of discontent and resistance against the state is what this study has sought to
document.
African dissent was the spark that lit political consciousness at the end of the second
decade of the 20th century. It did not take Africans long to feel the negative effects of the colonial
system and its interference on how they conducted their everyday lives. Chapter two discusses
the legal, policy and institutional structure of the making of Kenya as a white man’s land. This
structure included land and labor laws that enabled the British to “legally” alienate African land,
curb their agency and grossly infringe on their freedoms and rights. It argues that at their very
core, these laws were, and still are, morally and legally questionable. They were, indeed,
criminal. They erected an extractive and exploitative surveillance state in which Africans were
not citizens but subject-chattels. This colonial structure was the stage upon which the violent
backlash of the Mau Mau war played out. The war can, and should be seen, as the ultimate
expression of outrage at the mixed bag of opportunities, but importantly, also challenges that
colonial order established by the legal production of illegality.
Chapter three foregrounds further the breakout of the war in the 1950s. It also
demonstrates that whereas only the Kikuyu were involved in this conflagration, involved
experiential and spatial grievances were felt across the colony in varying degrees. In this chapter,
I scrutinize the impact of this colonial architecture on Africans; how it was viewed in their eyes
and how it was experienced from below. I argue that the colonial existential struggle, that is, the
physical anguish, emotional and psychological anxiety occasioned by new rural and urban
colonial spaces and telekinesis of colonial capital, which radically transformed African societies,
is what produced the Mau Mau war. I posit the argument that the effect of this legal production
and social construction of illegality was the creation of many Mau Maus of the mind. These were
in embryo and at different levels of ferment when the war broke out in the 1950s in central
province of the colony.
This is a theme taken up in the fourth chapter. Unlike traditional Mau Mau studies, I
foreground not the actual physical war itself but, rather, ’52 minds elsewhere in the colony that
were airing grievances cut from the same fabric that caused the violence. The work of the East
Africa Royal Commission that was conducted as the violent drama unfolded, offers a snapshot of
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these Mau Mau minds in embryo in the form of testimonies asking for the righting of colonial
injustices. Of course, little was done to remedy this other than the various “accommodations”
made such as agrarian reforms espoused in the Swynnerton Plan; review of the minimum wage,
working conditions and registration; review of civil servant salaries to reflect equal pay for equal
work between different races; increase in African representation in the legislative council; and
constitutional reforms extending them the right to vote. The emphasis here is that whereas the
war provided an opportunity for a fresh start, it had the exact opposite effect.
The counterinsurgency measures and policies outlined above were in themselves colonial
state-building and strengthening measures. So while they were part and parcel of the
decolonization process and independence, they effectively hoodwinked Africans’ high
expectations. Measures and policies such as reforming the provincial administration, an
institution of social and political control, only served to significantly strengthen the state on the
eve of independence. Indeed, it was rewarding the colonial state apparatus in large part because
of the role it played in the war against Mau Mau.65 These institutional measures and their postindependent continuities are proof of the triumph of the colonial system. Together, they represent
a pact-of-domination that cushioned the demise, if not simply perpetuated colonial rule.66 These
changes were aimed at repressing Mau Mau phenomenon, both physical and the mind. This state
of affairs only served to strengthen the prevailing order although minimal concessions and
compromises including independence were made. Overall, Kikuyu loyalists and moderate
politicians, among them Kenyatta who were amenable to the colonial project, provided the
personnel to postcolonial state institutions. The end result was a security or surveillance state.
This postcolonial Kenyan state has been keener on political control and reactionary response to
crises as opposed on the provision of public welfare.
As a result, at the eve of independence, the threat or another break out was real. After all,
the war had given the Colonial Office room in which to make reality conform to the prior image
of officials and forge Kenya’s future as modern and agricultural.67 At the practical long-term
implementation of this effort was the Swynnerton Plan for land consolidation followed by the
65

David Branch and Nicholas Cheeseman, “The Politics of Control in Kenya: Understanding the BureaucraticExecutive State, 1952-78,” Review of African Political Economy 33 (2006): 15.
66
This term, “pact-of-domination” is deployed here as used by Branch and Cheeseman. Ibid., 11.
67
Cooper, “Mau Mau and the Discourses of Decolonization,” 320.

32

million acre settlement scheme after independence. There was also a practical policy aim of
these reforms calculated to reorder the political economy thereby building up a substantial
middle class of all races to be the back bone of the country, which then became the ideological
foundation of the post-colonial state.68 This was the so-called “official wisdom.”69 This meant
that political independence was nothing more than a massive and brilliant deception. This is what
forms the subject of the next chapter, five. Therein, I posit that people’s popular expectations
were shunted: that “social justice and redress” served rewarded white settlers as opposed to
Africans who had lost their lands to the former in the first place. This then sets the background
against which follows a discussion of the lurking ghost of Mau Mau proper and legacy of dissent
in the Kenyatta years.
The main thesis in chapter five is that independence was a pyrrhic victory for grassroots
forces of popular statehood. I advance the argument that the deliberate process of decolonization
was a well-calculated and considered policy to ensure flawless continuity of the colonial order.
The manner in which it was designed co-opted a friendly Kenyan African elite to whom power
was entrusted. A close eye of scrutiny, however, was maintained in both Nairobi through the
British High Commission in constant correspondence with the Foreign Office in London. This
case is built with benefit of various archival sources from the Kenya National Archives and the
British National Archives including diplomatic archives in the latter.
The notion of decolonization was at best a remodeling of the colonial state. It is a wellaccepted fact that there was configuration of interests between moderate African elites and
British commercial concerns that supported a capitalist development program.70 Instead of
dwelling on this reality, the aim of chapter five is not to examine these institutional continuities.
Rather, I humanize the assessment of this legacy of British imperialism by highlighting what
these institutional continuities meant for ordinary Kenyans’ political and socioeconomic
aspirations and ambitions.
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This chapter, therefore, focuses on popular and radical post-independent dissent. This
discontent fed on the groundswell of formidable challenges that faced the people whose
independence hopes had been spurned. It highlights soaring unemployment, continued land
hunger and the unbridled desire among Kenyans for the fruits of independence. This postindependent bitterness is captured by the slogan “uhuru na taabu” (freedom and suffering). The
chapter relies on correspondence between colonial administrators in Nairobi important aspect of
which were forwarded to London. It is from this flow of information that it emerges that the
ghost of Mau Mau lurked even after the movement was “crushed.”
It is worth mentioning here that chapter five benefitted a lot from the hitherto untapped
collection of files from the Office of the President in the KA series of the Kenya National
Archives. Whereas these files consist of “Complaints and Petitions” to the president for
beneficent intervention, they acted as an important source for state intelligence gathering.
Kenyatta’s independent government had stumbled upon a voluntary channel of state surveillance.
In the face of formidable challenges and increasing criticism the government resorted to
entreaties, threats and the laissez-faire ideology and exhortation that independence did not mean
freebies; the call for hard work; and the need for order. Sections of society tended to imbibe this
propaganda while the bulk of the people remained adamant. I have used numerous illustrations
and stories of disgruntled everyday people who voiced their grievances and skepticism. The
pervasive mentalité of struggle is also reflected in postcolonial literature a selection of which is
extensively cited. The prevalent hue and cry is cast against grand corruption that wracked the
Kenyatta regime. This template and approach is replicated in the analysis of the Moi and Kibaki
years in chapters six and seven.
Chapter six follows the same mold used in the previous one but in the context of the Moi
regime albeit having to cope with scant archival sources. Political dissent and discontent in the
first ten or so of Moi’s rule was difficult to voice especially after the failed 1982 attempted coup,
which forced political opposition underground. This, however, stands in stark contrast with the
fairly well-documented groundswell of popular opposition in the early 1990s that resorted to the
atomization and bifurcation dissenting voices as the Moi regime struggled to cling onto power.
In this chapter, therefore, the reader will find a brief discussion of the recalibration of the deep
politics of bread and butter to ethnicized politics.
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This, it is argued, came at the high price of intermittent violent ethnic conflict and
bloodshed especially since the early 1990s. This recalibration of deep politics in Kenya fostered
divisiveness and weakened nation-building with regard to integration of various ethnic group
components that constitute the Kenyan population. The last chapter, seven, is an analysis of the
Kibaki administration with special attention paid to continued workers’ travails (teachers and
university professors and support staff); focus on groups fighting historical injustices that touch
upon the emotive issue of land alienation and socioeconomic marginalization; as well as nuggets
of the spirit of struggle as expressed through new avenues of the expression of political dissent
and social communication such as Facebook and Twitter.
Overall, as observed above, the ultimate objective of this study is achieved. It amplifies
the voices of the forgotten in Kenya’s history throughout its ruefully long century. Sitting in the
middle of the country’s historical trajectory, the Mau Mau war is a striking reminder that Kenya
has a whole lot unfulfilled dreams. Even after independence, African-led governments are yet to
bring the kind of simple changes that most ordinary people have yearned for. It is their take on
the state that this research set out to capture in minute detail. The study weaves together
harrowing stories into a narrative of the state as experienced from below. It invites readers to
enter with the author into the Mau Mau mind, and thereby, peer into the majority of Kenyans’
bitter life experience at time ventilated in riotous and bloody street dramas; underground
movements; fiery sermons in church and mosques; through music; crime and extortive activity;
ethnic clashes over the emotive land issue; and, more recently, through new mediums provided
by the information technology revolution.
In following this crowd history of Kenya’s history as presented herein, one has reason to
hope that readers witness, up close, a people’s unwavering aspirations and determination to
realize a country of their own making. A nation that they can proudly say they own and belong
to. Since this as yet remains a distant aspiration for many, this study serves as a haunting
reminder that the struggle is still on.
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Chapter II – White Man’s Land: The Colonial
Foundations and Legal Architecture of the Kenyan
State

Preamble

The ...legality ... of an act does not make it a just one.... There is no power that does not attempt
to cover its actions with the cloak of legality. The legitimate ones without doubt. In the name of
the law, rights can be assured but privileges can also be entrenched. The legitimate aspirations of
thousands of people can be repressed and eliminated without contemplation.... Arbitrariness
disguised as legality.
Jaume Asens and Gerardo Pisarello, “The Illegality of Power,” 17th February 2012.
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One of the kingpins of any imperial quest is the consideration of how to physically
subdue and control the environment. This is true of ancient Roman empire-builders or Spanish
conquistadores whose “first impulse” to this end “was to read aloud the requerimiento,” a written
declaration of sovereignty, which was “a spectacularly bold announcement of arrival and
ownership.”1 This was also the case with regard to the early modern British imperialism
between1600 and 1830 as it was during the late period of colonialism in Africa during at the end
of the 19th century and early 20th century. Besides the crucial practical concern with the security
and protection of colonies, the other paramount preoccupation was the transformation of the land
or landscape. Colonists throughout the history of imperialism shared similar attitudes, beyond
taking possession, to make and remake their physical possessions.
Besides being secured, the landscape had to be tamed or be made hospitable through
cultivation, planting and other European methods of improvement for example, the building of
infrastructure, and remodeled for it to be better controlled as well as well as to be brought to
profit or support a settler community. As Glenn Hooper pointedly states, all these were important
markers of ownership and authority.2 All this required a great deal of arrogance and ruthless
confidence on the part of the actual colonial policy architects as well as that of actual settlers
who enjoyed the resultant expropriation and exploitation of locals and their land. As already
observed in the Spanish example above, the law was an important instrument in, and for, the
subversion pre-European order and the inscription of European stipulations to reproduce the
desired effect upon this newly acquired space.
The following is a critical examination of the legal, institutional and policy cornerstones
of the colonial, and subsequently, postcolonial state. It propounds that contemporary problems
that beset the country including land distribution, control and access, and unequal distribution of
social services, political configuration featuring competing ethnic elites and ethnicization of
politics all stem from this legal and policy blueprint of Kenya as a white and African big man’s
country. Put differently, that political attitudes and strategies with regard to the attainment and
use of state power, land hunger and the perennial question of individual/regional-communal land
ownership, and social relations underlined by the increasing gap between the rich and the poor,
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the obvious difference between Kenya’s big man and ordinary wananchi, to a large extent, are
influenced by these early beginnings of a deliberate policy of preferment on the basis of race,
which was replaced by ethnicity and elite cronyism on the eve of independence. It discusses in
outline the central legal, policy and institutional pillars that were erected with flagrant racial bias
favoring Asian, but mainly, white Afrikaner and British settlers. Since independence these deeprooted seeds of injustice nested in an unjust colonial legal framework have perpetuated the
illegal/irregular allocation of public land in Kenya.
This legal and policy invention and colonial economic intervention exemplifies the
construction of criminality by the state since it dispossessed, repressed and eliminated the
legitimate land rights as well as disposal of African labor and, therefore, the basic right to
livelihood as well as the bastardization, without due reasonable contemplation, of the aspirations
of millions of Africans couched in a pre-European mode of life and customary laws. In so doing,
arbitrary appropriation and/or expropriation of land was disguised as legality, which this analysis
takes issue with.3 This discussion of the legal production of an illegal architecture of exploitation
with the subsequent restructuring of power relations will be followed by a more detailed
assessment of how this new colonial political economy affected and marginalized African
populations leading to growing political consciousness. This is discussed in the next chapter that
examines and highlights the experience of “illegality ‘from below’” as a result of the anxiety
occasioned by the newly created rural and urban colonial spaces.4
That is, by discussing its impact with regard to the alienation of land and labor and
associated controls through an examination of everyday experiences of Africans who, as a result
of the forceful imposition of this legal and institutional architecture, were rather sharply or
quickly ushered into an alien socioeconomic and political order of the colonial capitalist state or
modern space to which they were ill-adjusted not to mention that it was systematically rigged
against them.
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While the discussion below scrutinizes this architecture, the next chapter attempts to
assess the experiential or psychosociological anxieties encountered by African populations as
they entered and navigated the newly imposed colonial capitalist complex culminating in the
struggle for independence epitomized by the Mau Mau war, which was prefigured by other
equally important anti-colonial movements that sought to redefine and reconfigure the colonial
state through violence. Such movements like “Dini ya Msambwa” (DYM) and its Pokot
corollary, Luo squatters in Kisumu/Londiani district, Nandi and Elkumi in Trans Nzoia and
Uasin Gishu districts and the characteristic labor strikes of the 1940s the major one being in
Mombasa, were all attempts, as the late Kenyan historian E.S Atieno Odhiambo noted, to rework
the legal, policy and institutional interstices of the colonial order to accommodate the hard past
and the dim future. But before that, a discussion of this architecture is important as it contributes
to a better understanding of these anti-colonial movements and the struggle for independence.
Indeed, the central argument at the heart of this work is that these anti-colonial movements were
attempts at reconfiguring social relations of power established by these colonial foundations to
create a more equitable political economy.
Put differently, it is important to trace or background the genesis of the ideology of
resistance inspired by the experiential struggle to eke a living, and the quest for better living
standards epitomized by Mau Mau at the height of the anti-colonial struggle, to this early
construction of the colonial order. For a long time, anti-colonial movements, not just in Kenya
but also elsewhere in Africa, have been merely treated as a reaction or a natural response to
colonial rule in a generic sense without an analysis of the intricate specific hot-buttons that
generated them. At one level, this has the effect of obscuring the sea change akin to a colonial
revolution upsetting the prevailing colonial order. While it was not ideal or idyllic, it was a
functional pre-colonial order that was ruptured through the creation of the colonial state.
Secondly, it sweeps the complicated and complex production of grievances and African political
consciousness against European colonialism under the generic term “African nationalism.”
Therefore, there is need to scratch much deeper into the nuts and bolts of the making of
“African nationalism.” This is done herein by closely scrutinizing the adverse effects of
modernization in particular as a result of the legal production and social construction of a
colonial landscape, which was facilitated by the colonial legal and policy architecture that
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created a hostile new space which Africans found difficult to navigate or survive within, in the
literal sense of the term. With the institution of colonialism, African societies were enveloped by
an unfamiliar cultural, physical and moral colonial landscape that occasioned, and was
characterized by spatial, psychological, technological, embodied and material anxiety. Anticolonial movements mentioned above, epitomized by the Mau Mau war, were resistance efforts
against the erected colonial capitalism complex of surveillance: law and order, institutions and
policies, which, taken together, constituted and created an oppressive imperial modern space or
landscape. This imposition of adverse modernity, rested on the bedrock of colonial land, labor
and taxation policies among other supportive institutional architecture, mechanisms and racial
attitudes.
In addition, the resultant fledgling colonial political economy, and/or restructuring of
human relations, was not only unapologetically racially segregated but it also ruptured and
reordered the pre-European African world socioeconomically. This was not without serious
moral, legal and physical implications. The previous, relatively functional, political and
socioeconomic pre-colonial order of African peoples was ruptured. As John Lonsdale notes, the
physical landscape or ecological arenas of forests, hills and plains were reordered to pave way
for a colonial space of plantations and game reserves with protective borders and boundaries
where there had been none, forts, keeps and stockades, townships and trading centers, and road
and railway networks and harbors all constructed to conform to western logic.5
Since the country was earmarked as a white man’s land that could be settled in
indefinitely, “the same kind of institutions” either protecting private property rights or extracting
rents that colonialists “lived with in Europe” were introduced.6 By focusing on the legal, policy,
institutional and physical apparatus of empire erected at a heavy cost for the pre-European
socioeconomic and political life, the discussion that follows below acts as the stage upon which
the violent backlash of the Mau Mau war played out. Put differently, the war can and should be
seen as the ultimate expression of outrage at the mixed bag of opportunities, but importantly,
also challenges that the colonial order established by questionable authority and “illegal” or
5
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unjust framework presented. This criminal and unjust structural and attitudinal edifice was the
stage upon which the drama of Mau Mau and its historical antecedents like DYM and
postcolonial critical publics would unfold. This colonial architecture, therefore and the violence
of the 1950s, act as tragic historical precedents and warning that contemporary policymakers and
political leaders should heed to avoid another tipping point of the postcolonial Mau Mau
ideology of dissent. It is imperative to observe that anti-colonial movements that culminated and
reached the highest crescendo in the Mau Mau moment and the 1950s were the foetal crucible
from which the postcolonial state emerged. Ongoing socioeconomic disparities harking back to
early colonial times and government policies and attitudes continue to inspire postcolonial
dissent and opposition to the state similar to Mau Mau.7
While the facts and knowledge of the making of Kenya as a white man’s country are well
documented, this critical process has, more often than not in the past forty/fifty years, been
glossed over. The legal and institutional undertakings of both the British government and
colonial administration, first in the East Africa Protectorate and Kenya colony much later, have,
so far, not been interpreted as the foundational building blocks of the contemporary state.8 Yet,
colonial land, labor, taxation and personal registration policies have left an indelible mark in the
country’s physical and political landscape, and psyche. Political historians and political scientists
have barely touched upon this subject from this perspective. This chapter attempts to fill this gap
by examining these colonial laws and policies especially those to do with the alienation of
African land and labor. Attention is also given to how Africans reacted to, and were affected by,
these legal and policy props that resulted in their loss of agency, control and ordering of their
own lives and destiny as they wished. It is important to state that the twin loss of African land
and labor was an existential and psychic loss since it meant the denial of ownership and control
of the two most basic life supports.
Despite the near absolute lack of critical legal scrutiny of these foundational factors and
the implications of their illegality viewed from below, several scholars have touched on them in
addressing Kenyan history. Among them is Bruce Berman whose collective work studies this
7
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period. Berman addressed the incursion of colonial capitalism and concomitant modernity into a
precolonial indigenous order from a neo-Marxist perspective. He saw this as a process
characterized by a crisis of political control since the transition from one mode of production to
another was not seamless. Berman, therefore, saw the transition from a precolonial mode of
production to a capitalist one in Marxist terms as a process of “articulation.”9 His study is a
highly theoretical analysis that builds its argument through abstract constructions, which, albeit,
contribute to an understanding of what happened in this early period of colonization in East
Africa. What is important, as Berman noted, is that Kenyan “indigenous societies in which
money, surplus commodity production, wage labour and bureaucratic forms of organization were
virtually unknown, were subdued and coupled to European forms of capital and the state that
already had more than two centuries of development.”10 Berman ably gave insights into the
workings of this phenomenal transformation in a language that borrows heavily from Marxian
phraseology such as “formal subsumption of labour,” “peasantization of the African population,”
“structural contradictions of accumulation and control,” and “indigenous protocapitalism” among
others, all of which are, no doubt, important to this end.
Beyond this, among the numerous interesting findings Berman discussed is the
observation that Africans, at the end of the day, “were caught not only within the contradictions
of administrative ‘development’ but also in its gaps and omissions.”11 He also noted that in this
newly established colonial order, “white settlers were able to shape the state and its policies to
meet” demands dictated to by capitalist principles under the tutelage of the metropolitan interests
and official government control in Nairobi.12 What has been documented is the history of a few
colonial officials in London and Nairobi who facilitated this transformation, that of individual
“settlers” and agricultural and colonial capitalist establishments that gained ascendance in the
new relations of production. As such, “African peasants” remain faceless and their plight,
occasioned by this oppressive legal-policy architecture, is as such ignored. Specifically, their
everyday experience of anxiety, occasioned by this intricate socioeconomic transformation and
9
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facilitated by this legal-policy framework, is overshadowed by the inherent theoretical
abstraction of Berman’s analysis. The colonial capitalist architecture of land, labor, taxation and
registration laws and policies that make the transition possible is also not discussed in detail if at
all or seen for what it was: that is, the legal production or social construction of illegality or, as
the Africans whose lives were controlled by it must have experienced and perceived it from
beneath, as calculated and pure deceit, a manacling of individual and collective wills upon which
was now imprinted a foreign one on the landscape, and curtailment of freedoms accompanied by
gradual impoverishment on account of imposed runaway modern wants.
There is, therefore, need to closely examine this legal and institutional structure and its
spatial, technological, psychosociological and material implications and impact. This calls for
deliberate humanization by peopling such a critical analysis of this period with special focus on
inter-racial and ethnic group competition; an assessment of everyday life experiences wrought by
this colonial architecture; and, lastly, conducting an examination of possible postcolonial
continuities in these terms. What follows, below, is a critical assessment of this legal and policy
framework and what it meant for pre-European African societies.
As noted above, such a discussion must be preceded with reference to how scholars
viewed it. Besides scholars, perspectives and the understanding of actual participants in, or
observers of, this historic process are instructive. This refers to an understanding of colonial
state-formation with reference to what colonial officials and settlers thought their role was in
administering and building it through pioneer-settler-agriculture. These perspectives are aptly
captured in Lonsdale’s seminal essay on the conquest state. Lonsdale’s book chapter contribution
stands out as an impressive work that details the burgeoning of what later becomes the Kenyan
state.
Lonsdale started his analysis of how the colonial state and administration was established
with the fascinating observation that it sprang from a footpath six-hundred miles long. In the
main, he was concerned with how this tremendous transformation was, first and foremost, the
result of the colonial investment of force. That is, the deployment of violence by the British on a
scale that was locally unprecedented.13 In the chapter, Lonsdale recreates for his reader the mood
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of the local African population and their group experiences at the butt end of British punitive
military measures: for example, while in the midst of a smallpox epidemic and famine that
plagued them, the Maasai also had to deal with land-hungry white strangers keen on
appropriating huge chunks of their precious land. At the same time, tough times confronted
Kikuyu agriculture as their southward migration was rolled back while Luhya pragmatism
occasioned by the need to survive, led to their cooperation with the British.14
Importantly, Lonsdale noted how forces of the new political economy produced
economic, political and social changes that destroyed traditional patterns of authority and
production. As a result, most indigenous societies were thrown into turmoil.15 This was
underlined by the other category of his analysis that he referred to as the “vulgarization of
power” that is comparable to “the illegality of power” as used by Asens and Pisarello.16 That is,
the result of the imposition of a new class of Africans with the dubious role of recruiting labor
and extracting tax for the new colonial masters. This analysis is useful as it demarcated the
general outlines within which the question of the colonial foundations of the Kenyan state can be
addressed.
Another useful scholar who focused on this crucial time period of Kenya’s history is
Robert .L. Tignor.17 Tignor examines how African lives were affected by the establishment of a
colonial system over them. Specifically, he attempted to answer questions such as what they had
to do differently and ways in which they remained unchanged and whether British rule was a
modernizing influence. This last question provided him with the opportunity to explain different
levels of modernization between African groups. While this book noted and compared the plight
of the three subject Kenyan peoples with regard to land alienation and labor policy, it does little
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to relate this to the British colonial state-building project as inaugurated within the framework of
legal provisions and policies necessitating these essential components of modernization.
Lastly, one must mention the work of Robert Maxon, which focused on the loss and
reassertion of the imperial initiative by London vis-à-vis the colonial administration in Nairobi
between 1912 and 1923.18 This is with regard to outstanding issues including the deportation of
Mr. Galbraith Cole, a British settler, but most importantly, settler political rights and ascendancy
in the export trade, labor recruitment and land alienation and the attendant legal supports of the
last two such as registration of persons and taxation ordinances. Maxon argued that the Colonial
Office in London was in control of colonial affairs in Kenya but temporarily lost initiative after
the opening of the First World War. It then re-established this authority with the issuance of the
Devonshire White paper in 1923 that sought to settle once and for all, the Indian Question.19
On the matter of the catering for both the socioeconomic needs/demands of Indians
equally as those of British/European setters, the Colonial Office ruled on the paramountcy of
African interests of which colonial government was in trust. While Maxon was correct in his
analysis regarding both the tacit protection of Africa interests and on the ascendancy of London,
what actually transpired in the period that initiative of policy decisions was lost between 1914
and 1923, the granting of almost every settler whim with regard to land, representation and labor,
is overlooked. Granted, Maxon ably detailed how colonial governors, at the behest of settlers,
enacted land and labor provisions that firmly entrenched the personal and group interests of the
latter.
However, it is the cumulative effect of this lapse of authority, which provided the
inadvertent opportunity for the completion of the institutional and legal framework guaranteeing
settler preponderance for a long time, and, with it, a legacy that would reach well beyond
18
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independence that Maxon did not address in great detail. Put differently, Maxon argued that the
Devonshire White paper represented the reassertion of policy initiative yet failed to note that this
did not translate to a reworking of the legal architecture that was, indeed, pro-the principle of
African paramountcy. This concept existed only on paper, literally, whereas arrogant and
ruthless white supremacy was the everyday colonial reality as Africans continued to languish
under the newly imposed colonial order.

Colonial Sinews of State Power: The Criminal Loss of Naboth’s Vineyard, Labor
and his Monetization
Preferential concessions to setters had begun long before governors Henry C. Belfield,
Charles C. Bowring, and Edward Northey. From the moment Sir Charles Eliot ended his support
of Asian settlement in 1902 in favor of that of Europeans, governors were faced with the
question of what right, equity and/or law an alien government “with the rights and duties of a
protector could assume the ownership of all the land in the country in order to give it away or to
sell it for trifling sums to its friends and countrymen ….”20
This, Norman Leys noted, was a question that was “much debated in the houses of public
servants in Kenya,” and one could perhaps add, one that had preoccupied the British for quite a
long time since the 1890s. It is important to outline the evolution of the ever increasing powers
and legal overreach in terms of land and labor provisions, not to mention a gamut of ordinances
governing other activities such as wildlife and township establishment legislations, since with
regard to land, “no precedent could be found in British Colonial and Imperial history for such
…expropriation.”21 Let it suffice to say that since Sir Charles Eliot and thereafter one governor
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after another granted incremental concessions to settlers although this commissioner and Sir
Percy Girouard were the most notorious. The latter would state in a report carried in the East
African Standard:
We consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling the native to leave
his reserve for the purpose of seeking work. Only in this way can the cost of living be
increased for the native, and as we have previously pointed out it is on this that the supply
of labour and the price of labour depend.
To raise the rate of wages would not increase but would diminish the supply of labour. A
rise in the rate of wages would enable the hut or poll tax of a family, sub-tribe or tribe to
be earned by fewer external workers, and as the payment of this tax is avowedly the
reason for what labour we have seeking employment it follows that if we increase the rate
of remuneration of the individual we decrease the number of individuals necessary to
earn a given sum.22
The kind of preoccupation with the transformation of the landscape with the requisite need for
labor, which was the ultimate marker of ownership and colonial authority alluded to earlier, is
quite clear from the above quote. It demonstrates some of the devices or mechanisms that
colonial administrators were ready to employ without any due consideration to their implication
for Africans or consequent repercussions.
Such settler sympathies and flagrant preferment enacted and protected by the law would
reverberate with the views of a later governor, Sir Edward Northey, who in his inaugural address
reported in the Standard remarked:
The Protectorate has taken over the ownership of millions of acres of good land and the
guardianship of large native populations. Is it our duty to allow these natives to remain in
uneducated and unproductive idleness in their so-called reserves? I think not. I believe
that our duty is to encourage the energies of all communities to produce from these rich
lands the raw products and food-stuffs that the world at large, and the British Empire in
particular, require. This can only be done by the encouragement of the thousands of ablebodied natives to work with the European settler for the cultivation of the land and
improved stock. I find some of the native reserves not clearly defined. I propose to settle
that definitely. Where there are doubt and disputes as to the ownership of land –title and
tenure of natives I propose to proclaim the area in question as a reserve; that does not
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mean that I recognize that whole area as belonging to any native tribe or individuals, but
it is Crown Land.23
Indeed, it was common knowledge that vexing problems such as availability of labor could not
be resolved until the colonial authorities fully controlled the country via legal means.24
It is such official sentiment, therefore, that colored and inspired legal mechanisms of
acquiring, or more aptly, “grabbing” African land and coercing its original inhabitants using
various devices such as the hut and poll taxes to work on it. One of the pioneer legal centerpieces
that made this possible was the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 which made provisions for the
sale and leasing of “wasteland and unoccupied” land for a maximum of ninety-nine years. This
was a significant improvement of what was the very first in a raft of legal productions of illegal
expropriation of African land: that is, the establishment of the East Africa Protectorate under the
Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890.
As earlier noted above, this piece of legislation did not, make it possible for outright land
alienation. As Norman Leys pointed out, the British government still faced the challenge of
resolving the issue of what right, in equity or law, it had in its rights and duties of a protector to
assume ownership of land that was still, in essence, still foreign.25 Britain, as Okoth Ogendo
observed, needed the kind of land control in East Africa that would lend “the imperial
government the power to acquire title to and deal with the land resources of the region,” which is
something that this legislation did not quite avail.26 Indeed, the declaration of protectorate status
over the region took place on June 15th 1895 but even this did not quite deliver the desired secure
property rights. “Protectorate” status had long been defined by Law Officers of the British
Crown as early as 1833 as being a foreign country. As such, it only gave the imperial power
“little more than political jurisdiction over the territory” concerned.27 It could be said that the
British, especially officials at the Foreign Office, were still operating within the moral bounds of
a clear bureaucratic conscience and margins of the norm but this would not last long. It would
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seem that London was not eager to wander from respectful confines defined by the Charter of the
Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), “which contained the following words: ‘In the
administration of justice by the Company to the people of its territories or to any of the
inhabitants thereof, careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or
tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to the holding,
possession, transfer and disposition of land and goods.’”28 This noble position would, however,
not last for very long.
The first imperial legal production of illegality mentioned above was rather rustic and
barely scratched the surface with regard to land acquisition for European settlement, which was
not yet envisioned at this stage of colonization. The first taste of the power of acquiring land
through legal force was in the agreement reached between the IBEAC and the Sultan of
Zanzibar, the Administrative Agreement of 1895. This gave the British government some
measure of indirect control over all lands ceded to it by the Sultan by virtue of a concession
agreement signed earlier in 1888 between the latter and IBEAC.
While there were at least ninety-seven treaties signed between IBEAC and tribal
functionaries in the hinterland, these carried no rights to African land. Such treaties under the
limited political jurisdiction framework only pertained to the protection, rule and government of
these tribal authorities (chiefs), their territories, countries, people and subjects by the imperial
agent at this time, IBEAC.29 The main architects and colonial agents pushing for more concrete
commitment for the inscription of European-style property rights in land were men on the
ground. The Foreign Office increasingly faced demands from colonial administrators to
“abandon its rather legalistic approach to the status of protectorates and assert original title to the
land.”30
This push then, is what sent the legal production of illegality with regard to the alienation
of land and labor in its course with ever-increasing confidence, assertiveness and proportionate
African dispossession and disorientation and hence, dissent. In particular, as Sorrenson has
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documented, Commissioner Sir Arthur H. Hardinge’s was instrumental in the shift from the
assumption of sovereign rights and political jurisdiction of the imperial government under the
legal framework that established the protectorate administered by IBEAC to complete territorial
sovereignty under the East Africa Protectorate. According to Sorrenson, Hardinge dismissed as
juridical fiction the said special status of “protectorate” bestowed by London, the Foreign Office
and later the Colonial Office.31
As commissioner of the protectorate, Hardinge yearned for power that would enable
administrators like himself “to promulgate legislation authorizing the compulsory acquisition of
land” for immediate practical purposes such as the construction of the railway beyond the
sultan’s dominions as well as a system of law that would secure rights to land for settlement for
agricultural purposes.32 For purposes of the former, constructing the railway from Mombasa to
Kisumu, the Indian Land Acquisition Act (1896) was used within the ten-miles where the Sultan
of Zanzibar exercised sovereignty but this law was later extended by Hardinge to cover the
interior as well.33 Whereas the legality of its application within the ten-mile coastal strip is not in
question, its extension and application in the appropriation of land up to one mile on each side of
the railway track in the interior is quite questionable.34
This notwithstanding, to be able to do so, the office of the Commissioner was vested with
the authority to undertake this acquisition on behalf of Her Majesty (HM) as per the East Africa
Acquisition of Lands Order-in-Council of 1898. At last, Hardinge’s argument that African
leaders could hardly be said to have sovereignty and juridical authority, and therefore, land rights
and territorial control had triumphed with the fleeting but powerful imagination of the landscape
through imperial eyes, which was concretized by the magical stroke of the pen.
What is more, Law Officers of the Crown impressed by this sort of imperial reasoning on
December 13th 1899 revised the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 in the form of an advisory
opinion to now bestow Her Majesty the “power of control and disposition” over unoccupied
31
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waste land in the protectorate.35 Now even in London, African customs and laws governing the
use and control of land were no longer hallowed. The bureaucratic margins of the norms of
juridical sovereignty were spilling over driven by an imperial rationalization that pronounced the
legal control of African land and the environment. African land was said to be “unoccupied”
because of the convenient interpretation of indigenous land tenure as usufructuary. That is,
African societies did not legally own land but held it as long as they worked on it. This erroneous
understanding of African land tenure in general, and specifically, that of the Kikuyu of central
Kenya, would become a massive colonial headache for colonial administrators throughout the
rest of their rule. Filing a report for the Department of Agriculture of the Colony and Protectorate
of Kenya in the mid nineteen-thirties, V. Liversage, a government agricultural economist, still
perpetuated this convenient truth about African communal land tenure. Liversage stated that
“usufruct and seigniory are the warp and woof of the Githaka system” of the Kikuyu.36 Suffice it
to say that the clever invention of the description of uncultivated African land as “unoccupied,”
and therefore vacant, emboldened colonial administrators further in promulgating laws that
further encroached on African land rights and access.
Moreover, African land relations were fit into conceptual categories derived from English
common law and the suppression of “the development and adaptation of customary land tenure
regimes” paved way for the stripping away of land rights from Africans.37 The communal
African land holding system was interpreted as being primordial and it was believed by both
colonial administrators and agrarian specialists that it was gradually evolving into European-like
individual land tenure. Liversage, for example, argued that “communal tenure arises in the
beginning of Agricultural development, when land is abundant and, like fresh air, has no
exchange value” and that under such a system “land rights are entirely undemarcated, though the
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individual will generally be left to enjoy rights of user over the land he has cultivated.”38 In a
manner characteristic of most imperial agents who sought to inscribe European institutions of
private property, Liversage further observed the following:
The African rural economy today us comparable in several respects with the manorial
system which existed throughout Britain and Northern Europe in the Middle Ages. That
system, with its sharp restrictions of individual liberty and enterprise, broke down with
the spread of a commercial as distinct from subsistence economy. The break down was
accompanied by rural disorganization and great hardships to individuals. Numbers of
people were divorced from the land and a social problem of the first magnitude was
thereby created. The same forces are capable of creating the same problem, in Africa
today.39
At least, Liversage was realistic enough to observe that land was the “most important
element of production” and that the changes “in rural life and organization” that were being
wrought by British imperialism were happening “at such a pace that it might appropriately be
called a revolution.”40 Others were not so honest with themselves, which perpetuated the rupture
of the make-up of pre-colonial African societies that eventually led to the rise of disenchantment
a few decades into the 20th century. A good example of the convenient reading of the European
institution of private ownership of land in the African tenure system was by Dr. L.S.B Leakey, a
British archaeologist and Kikuyu language expert, who argued that “there was individual tenure
among the Wa-Kikuyu before the arrival of Europeans.”41 Attempting to divine what the cause
of Kikuyu political agitation was in the late 1930s, Leakey, like many before him who presided
over the radical and disruptive agrarian revolution at the turn of the century, argued that precolonial and African held land during colonialism was property that was vested in individuals
especially where the Kikuyus had been in recent contact with Europeans. This was in his
estimation because native tenure was “automatically beginning to approximate and moulding up
in the direction of individual tenure….”42
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Of course, similar observations made at the end of the 19th century led to the declaration
of vast African land as “waste land” and “unoccupied” by British imperial agents. They could
then, with great ease, fail “to recognize the existence of sovereign rulers in indigenous society”
and conclude that the colonizing sovereign was the “owner” of the land.43 With the adoption of
the advisory of the law officers of the crown, “unoccupied” land that was not overseen by a
recognizable form of government or appropriated by local sovereigns or individuals could now
be declared to be crown lands by HM or be given as grants to individuals for a fee and for any
period of time. This provision would later be incorporated in the East African (Lands) Order-inCouncil in 1901, which conferred upon the commissioner of the protectorate power to dispose of
all “public lands” on such terms and conditions as he might think fit and only subject to such
directions as the secretary of state might give. In what is a remarkable demonstration of the
incremental chutzpah on the part of all involved both in London and Nairobi, all the above was
followed, in the series of legal production of illegality in 1902 by even greater powers spelled
out by the Crown Lands Ordinance that was promulgated by Sir Charles Eliot, Hardinge’s
successor. It provided “for outright sales of land and leases of 99 years’ validity.”44
As part of this new legal cloak, Sir Charles Eliot got considerable leeway in making the
rules for the sale and lease of land, something that another senior administrator, Governor Sir
Henry Belfield, would later exercise within an even more ambitious revised land alienation
framework, the Crown Lands Ordinance of June 1915. Maxon observes that this new ordinance
was reconstructed on “broader lines” when compared to the tempered principles on the subject of
land laid down by the Colonial Office in 1908 or 1912.45 For example, it removed vexatious
restrictions of land lease for ninety-nine years, which had hindered development.46 It also
dropped the requirement of continuous residence on the property by the landholder and made
African reserves crown land, which meant that all such land was now under the direct control of
the colonial state. Odhiambo observes that this law did not only ensure that the protectorate
government had complete control of the land occupied by Africans, “but it was made clear that
43
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natives had no right to alienate any of the land whether they occupied it or whether it was
reserved for their own use.”47
Of course, the legal dispossession of land caused Africans untold fear. Growing African
insecurity was exacerbated by the “celebrated case of Wainaina v. Murito” in which Chief
Justice Sir Jacob Barth ruled, in 1923, that “‘no native rights were reserved’” under the Crown
Lands Ordinance 1915 and further, considering the Kenya Order-in-Council, 1921 land reserved
for the use of native tribes was vested in the Crown. As such then, the Chief Justice ruled, “‘all
native rights in such reserved land whatever they were under the Gethaka system disappeared,
and the natives in occupation of such Crown land became tenants at will of the Crown of the land
actually occupied.’”48 A memo that sought to clarify the legal position with regard to African
land rights and ownership drew reference to this ruling, and quoted the Kenya Colony Order-inCouncil Article 2 (3), which defined crown lands as “…all public lands in the Colony which are
for the time being subject to the control of His Majesty, and all lands which shall have been
acquired by His Majesty for the public service or otherwise howsoever and shall include all
lands occupied by the native tribes of the Colony and all lands reserved for the use of the
members of any tribe.”49
As such, on the strength of this definition and Barth’s ruling, the acting Attorney General
H.C. Willan who drafted this memo in 1939, concluded that, “there could be no legal ownership
of land by natives in the Native Reserves and that rights by native law and custom were not
recognizable.”50 What this meant was that Africans had the right of “use” of land as opposed to
the “ownership” or “alienation” rights, and thus, “natives had no legal ownership of the land” as
this was not provided for in the law.51 Indeed, the memo captures everything that was wrong
with various legal provisions regarding land, which is reflected in it. One of the legal cul de sacs
was with respect to define the nature and extent of African land rights, which the memo deals
47
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with towards the end. The memo acknowledges the difficulty of the question of the rights of
Africans especially under native law and custom: thus the drafter does not attempt “to give any
definite answer.52 The Barth ruling was the zenith of the complete disregard of norms and was,
indeed, within the outer limits of the margins of what was the norm.
The case of the Maasai is another good illustration of the suffering and injustice caused
by this rather inconsiderate legal regime. According to an East African Standard report, the
Maasai move orchestrated by Girouard led to the dislocation of about 10,600 people, 200,000
cows and 1.5 million sheep and goats from the Laikipia plateau.53 This simultaneously bears out
the illegality of colonial power and also captures the complete disregard of African land rights. It
aptly demonstrates the observation of Asens and Pisarello that the legality of an act does not
make it a just one, which, in the case of these colonial land alienation devices, was a serious
affront for most African societies that lost no time to register their incredulity and outrage.54
This series of the said land laws among other future modifications too numerous for
individual treatment herein, are instances of the legal production of illegality through which
colonial authorities attempted to cover their actions with the cloak of legality. As illustrated in
the two examples above, the rights of settler land holders were assured and European privileges
entrenched by these laws while the aspirations of thousands of people were repressed and
eliminated without contemplation by deliberate and convenient arbitrariness disguised as
legality.
Following from the above, it is not difficult to appreciate the core demands behind Mau
Mau, land and freedom. Years later, prior to the height of the Mau Mau struggle in the 1950s,
Lieutenant Colonel O.F. Watkins, a self-taught student of native tenure, contested Leakey’s
thesis regarding individual African ownership of land. He did not believe that it was so in 1895
and further, that “the conception of ownership of land is foreign to native ideas. It is a European
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legal, feudal notion of the land required to support men-at-arms for the lord.”55 His enquiries
about African land tenure led him to the conclusion that the African was “more simply and
severely practical. He wants the right to cultivate the best land obtainable.”56 More importantly,
Watkins observed that when he was talking to Africans in 1911 about their land laws, he asked if
land could be sold, and the answer was, “‘how could it [sic]. The land is always there like the
air.’” Watkins recounts another instance in 1927 when he talked to Africans ten miles outside
Nairobi: he told them that land titles would mean the creation of “barons” who would own the
land on which the rest of the people would merely live until they were turned off. This statement
drew “that roar of uncomprehending laughter. ‘They couldn’t turn us off,’” the Africans retorted.
“‘Where would we go [sic] It is not our custom.’”57 Watkins concluded the article with the
observation that individual tenure in the reserve was for the future and not for the past and that it
would evolve gradually “but those who charge themselves with its establishment should be
looking, not for analogies with Europe’s feudal systems, but for the best way of grafting on a
new growth onto the wonderful native social system, which has a place for all, and food for all,
and no class hatred or humiliations.”58 On the eve of the Mau Mau war in 1948, in the copy of
Mumenyereri newspaper, the leading Kikuyu space for public expression and venting of African
grievances, squatters complained that they were “always removed from our original places and
left without land for all the land has been taken from us. We are therefore, like wild animals.”59
Permanent absolute and exclusive ownership of land by Europeans was therefore,
shocking and unexpected. Some Kiambu Kikuyu under Chief Koinange Mbiu who had also lost
clan land to white settlers felt guilty about this loss. “We Kiambu people are to blame for the
Europeans entry into Kikuyu country,” stated an article that appeared in Mumenyereri. The
writer, Chief Koinange Mbiu, argues that initial Kikuyu contact with people like Count Teleki,
Ainsworth and Northcote was innocuous blood brotherhood sealing a bond of friendship that
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made “another person a real brother. Nobody thought wrong of such Europeans because we
administered oaths with them.”60
Land control that was allowed to such administrators, the writer continues, was in the
hope that they would help the Kikuyu to conserve and manage the soil and forests better for the
sake of future generations. Chief Koinange is quoted in the letter as having gone a step further to
help Europeans to secure African labor on their farms to further cement the agreement, an
arrangement that was at the time acceptable: “no one could classify the other as white, black or
red.”61 But then Lord Delamere “while he had land that could be occupied by the whole of
Kiambu’s population,” after the Great War “went to South Africa to find out how he could
trouble Kikuyu.” And “when he returned he arranged a meeting at Ruiru Club of Europeans”
where “he advised them to deceive the Kikuyu.”62 As a result the Kikuyu were collected and
ferried free of charge to the Highlands to work on European farms on which they had been
promised prosperity but instead the “Europeans …occupied their land and forests, they broke the
agreement….That was the beginning of Squatters’ troubles and evictions. Squatters were made
to be like slaves when they settled at other places like Loitoktok, they were also sent away.”63
Another Kikuyu newspaper, Muigwithania, likened the understanding between the Kikuyu and
the early European settlers to the initial symbiotic relationship between the Muhuti tree and the
Mugumo (fig tree).64 The paper carries “The Tale of the Muhuti tree and the Mugumo,” in which
the latter approached the former and asked for “a night’s lodging at…Muhuti’s village. …The
Muhuti did not refuse” after all, “the homestead was built for travelers.”
…The Mugumo entered the village and put away his bundle and rested. And when it got
night, the Mugumo went to bed and commenced to let down one little root. Again near
morning he commenced and let down another. And when it got light, the Muhuti said to
him. ‘Friend, why don’t you get up and go home?’ And the Mugumo said to the Muhuti,
‘Friend let me rest; I will go home my friend.’ They remained for little [sic] and then the
Muhuti said to his friend, ‘Why don’t you go home?’ The Mugumo said to the Muhuti,
‘Friend, I am very tired; let me rest …it is getting dark; I will certainly go home
tomorrow; for now I am very, very tired.’ Again when it got light the Muhuti said to his
60
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friend, ‘Get up and go home!’ The Mugumo then answered harshly for it had now
established itself , ‘I won’t go! Did you not give me this house? And moreover, don’t you
know that if I were to seize you I would wind myself about you, and you would be unable
to wriggle yourself free?’ After a little [sic] the Muhuti was mastered by the Mugumo
and withered, and the place came to belong to the Mugumo instead of the Muhuti.65
The meaning of the above story and its moral appeal to reason are rather obvious. The
Kikuyu felt betrayed by the British who had gradually entrenched their position in Kenya
through the strength of land laws designed for this express end. Even when the Carter land
commission in the early 1930s seemed sympathetic to the plight of the Africans, it was felt that
African still did not get the exact or proper compensation of the full extent of their original land
that had been alienated. The Mumenyereri letter writer, earlier cited above, complained that
“people who were given land were getting about 10 acres of land for one clan instead of the
clan’s original land …taken, about 2 or 3 miles in length.” This was done so that people could be
convinced that the commission had done justice. However, this writer was not so persuaded as he
wrote further:
We were opposing these laws because we had no representative (today we have
representatives in Councils). We shall never accept these laws until they are revised with
our African representatives.
Since that time our people have been roaming about every place worried with difficulties
like a person suffering from T.B. They are the people who worked for Europeans very
hard. They are feeling like a person who has been robbed of all his clothes. The
Europeans cultivate their land while they have no lands of shelter.
These people are now at Olenguruone and many thousands are ex-squatters who have
been evicted from farms. This trouble was caused by Lord Delamere to whom these
people gave much wealth.66
The two examples of Kikuyu strong sense of grievance in the face of unjust British laws speak
for themselves. Land for the African was the sole source of sustenance and for it to be swindled
by people that were once welcomed and trusted was unthinkable. Chief Njega, the writer of the
Muigwithania article, likened land to a woman from whom the Kikuyu had lived on since Ndemi
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na Mathathi (from time immemorial). Therefore, to lose it to calculating foreigners that they had
deemed worthy friends was an unspeakable affront.
Besides the above outline of land laws and the associated labor legal framework
manipulated through taxation, revenue collection as a state-building device needs special
mention. Taxation was an important component of what was, in effect, a fiscal imperial conquest
state. From the onset of active administration of acquired spheres of influence and protectorates,
there was an emphasis, from London, of a policy of colonial economic viability and selfsufficiency. The need to collect sufficient revenue to pay for local administration was one of the
greatest challenges of colonial rule in Africa especially.67 Since governing an empire was costly,
as its boundaries expanded, British bueaucracts encouraged their counterparts in colonial capitals
to find ways of paying their local expenses without help from British Treasury.68 As a result, by
the early twentieth century, the bulk of imperial expenditure was funded by revenue raised in the
colonies rather than in the metropole.69 Part of the East Africa Protectorate (EAP) that later
becomes colonial Kenya is a great example of this.
Revenue collection, in light of growing administrative expenditure in the EAP, was a
constant source of pecuniary embarrassment for imperial agents running the region on behalf of
the British Crown. This was particularly more so considering that, although the British taxpayer
had underwritten the construction of the Uganda Railway, the region had been able to pay its
way a decade later.70 Before 1912, the EAP had depended on annual grants-in-aid. In what
highlights the financial tentacles milking African imperial subjects for economic and political
life, the colonial state survived, especially between 1908 and 1913, from export revenue built on
African peasant production.71 The hut and poll taxes instituted by the colonial authorities were
economic devices employed to encourage commodity production from African households.
Indeed, this economic model only served to effectively undwerwrite and subsidize European
settlement.72
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Moreover, in the wake of the First World War, the African sector of the colonial
economy suffered a major setback. At the same time, the EAP was saddled with a portion of the
imperial war debt contributing to the region being engulfed in a serious financial crisis in 1919.
Yet, the protectorate was badly in need of development finance to extend the communications
and railway network during this same period. As if it was not enough that African land and labor,
poll and hut taxes had shored up this imperial project at its most crucial statge, colonial officials
determined that the way out of this central postwar economic reality was the African cash cow. It
was decided that the alternative for raising additional revenue would be realized by placing
additional burdens most heavily on the African population and least heavily on European settlers.
In effect, once again the African population was underwriting European settlement. Pressed by
the seriousness of the revenue situation, and against the wisdom of doing so as well as without
London’s approval, colonial administrators’ decision to raise the rate of hut and poll taxes was
made in November 1919. Of course, this was facilitated by the preparation of a policy and legal
framework to increase the hut and poll tax rate. As in the past, this was backed up by the firmly
held and equally preposterous tenet that this increase would awaken the African, especially ablebodied males, from idleness and subsequent drunkenness and viciousness. After all, it was
believed, the Africans “were rich.” This as Maxon points out, demonstrated how utterly ignorant
the colonial administration was of the economic and social systems of the people over whom
they were establishing the imperial architecture of policies and laws.73
Apart from policies affecting African land, labor and financial resources, Maxon
highlights the importance of another colonial architectural component –viz. the Registration
Ordinance.74 It was a legal provision that ensured consistent supply of African labor. Approval
was obtained within a year of Governor Belfield’s dispatch request to London at the end of
1914.75 To the legal loss of land and independent individual or group decision-making and
direction of labor, was now added the restriction of the free movement of African. This further
illustrates control and curtailment of free movement, and therefore, an almost absolute loss of
individual and group agency.
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This law entailed the carrying of identification papers and enactment of pass laws for
African males over the age of sixteen. They carried details such as the carrier’s name and other
identifiers as well as a record of individual labor history. It was a highly effective method of
restricting desertion from employment by Africans and assured adequate and consistent labor
supply. It is important to emphasize the manner in which it curtailed African agency. It meant
that Africans as individuals and groups could not author their own lives, let alone determine their
day-to-day activities.
Not only had African societies lost their individual and collective human agency to
determine their respective destinies but also their ownership of labor especially with regard to its
disposal. Ngugi wa Thiong’o captured this loss of agency when he wrote that, once “the land is
taken from away from its owner, and the owner is turned into a worker on the same land.” Thus
he had no control of his natural and human resources.76 Moreover, “the colonial subject has no
say over the colonial state; in effect, while he produced, he had no say over the disposal of the
final product. The state, therefore, had power over every aspect of his being.77
Whereas the Kenyan African had been his own ruler-subject, he was now a subject of a
distant but absolute imperial authority.78 An amendment of this law in the form of the Masters
and Servants Ordinance in 1916 made desertion and other employee offenses cognizable to
police who could make arrests without warrants.79 Norman Leys notes: “…The fact has to be
recorded that the Registration Ordinance has been amended so that now an employer has to take
a summons costing half-a-crown in order to prosecute an employee for leaving work without
permission, instead of, as formerly, merely sending the particulars to the police, who then
conducted the case for him. …Offense of leaving work without permission is still punishable by
a fine of 100s., equal to six or seven months’ wages, or by two months’ imprisonment.”80
What is even more interesting is that Leys relates an incident concerning labor, which
embodies the general experience as a result of the alienation of African labor. He recounts the
fate of a young Bukusu laborer that demonstrates the manner in which Africans were looked
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down upon as chattels existing solely to labor for settler profit. Refusing to fill the place most
Africans had been thrust into (read, provision of wage labor) a Bukusu boy, a laborer, only
referred to as “the Kitosh,” fled from his employment after working for eighteen months. When
he was apprehended he was fatally flogged.81 It is such individual stories and collective
narratives of colonial suffering that are rather overlooked by analysis that subsumes them under
headings and summary titles such as “issues” and “grievances” leading to African resistance and
political consciousness that culminated in the Mau Mau struggle in the 1950s.
Yet another example of colonial architecture favoring white supremacy in colonial Kenya
was the settler sense of political entitlement, which paid off when it was approved in 1918.82
From this time on, concessions were made by Nairobi and London embracing the idea of elective
settler representation as unofficial members in the Legislative Council. The granting of franchise
as Bottomley correctly surmised was inspired by an even more ambitious plan. He wrote in
1918, “The settlers are largely from South Africa …who find themselves cramped by the
limitations of administration in a Black Man’s country. They have been anxious in the past not
only to obtain self-government, or as a first step, a system of representative government which
would lead at an early stage to the grant of responsible government …to secure decisions in such
matters as land and labour which would benefit their own interests …irrespective of the claims
of the native population.”83
Not only were Africans now physically shut out from fertile white highlands through
exclusivist colonial policy of “color bar”; crammed in flooding reserves; their movement
restricted by pass and registration laws; bombarded by numerous taxes; but also ushered into a
political space where they enjoyed no privileges or any recognition whatsoever. As a result,
African political consciousness burgeoned such that by early 1922, African workers in Nairobi
were able to express growing dissatisfaction with the status quo. In an event representing the
beginning of a long political struggle around this time regarding the release of Harry Thuku,
clamor for his release from what is present day Central Police Station was met with force leading
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to the massacre of at least 100 demonstrators including their impromptu leader, Mary Muthoni
Nyanjiru. Numerous others were injured or maimed among them Nicholas Kariuki Njuguna, the
present author’s grandfather.84
All the while, settlers had unfettered access to colonial state institutions and preferential
land, labor, registration and taxation policies to the detriment of Africans in Kenya. In equal
proportion, if not more, were the unspoken and undocumented everyday experiences and
anxieties of ordinary Africans at the dawn of British colonialism. How white racial supremacy
was institutionalized and legitimized; how it was countered by African constitutional African
resistance degenerating to Mau Mau warfare in the 1950s; how the colonial order was revised,
subsequently; and how independence was ultimately granted ushering a period revealing
sediments of these foundational influences, is treated in a more details in the next two chapters.
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Chapter III – Colonial Rupture: African
Experiential Anxiety of Transformation in Time,
Space and Place, 1900-1951

Preamble: When a morsel of bean had fallen to the ground …we had split it amongst ourselves. But a
while later, when Cain was asked, “Where is your brother Abel?" he replied, “I am not my brother’s
keeper.”
Paraphrased from Ngugi Thiong’o, Petals of Blood and Genesis 4:9
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Introduction
British imperialism created an adverse colonial space and a complex modernity. For the
most part, this was the result of various legal strictures and related policy and institutional
inventions to effect imperial domination. For a long time, the finer details of the harsh
experiences and psychological anxieties of Africans inhabiting this imperial legal, policy and
attitudinal architecture, have been ignored. African responses to imperialism have been generally
discussed under sweeping concepts such as “nationalism” and “resistance.” Wars of liberation
such as Mau Mau, especially in the colonial era, were deliberately misconstrued and explained
away. Since, then there have been attempts made by nationalist historians to debunk the colonial
interpretation of Mau Mau as a backward and atavistic movement members of whom were said
to be “childlike” and, therefore, unable to adjust to the demands of progress and modernity.
There is need, however, to further examine the subliminal emotional and psychological
springs of this expression of discontent through war. Colonial views and explanations of the
events of the difficult decade of the 1950s, beamed around the world, not only continue to distort
hindsight, but also act as an overbearing historiographical anomaly that needs critical attention.
In making the case for the conservation of colonial official records of Kenya in general, and
specifically, those of the Emergency period, M.P.K. Sorrenson lamented in 1962 that “it would
be a great pity if, because of careless or deliberate destruction of the records, Mr.Corfield was
…left as the sole historical judge of this important period in Kenya’s history.”1
Sorrenson recognized the importance of historical records that, by the early 1960s, were
still scattered throughout the country. Yet, for example, “some important files relating to
European settlement around Nairobi (some of the material used by the Carter Commission,
…which appeared to …contain evidence” that “would justify a re-interpretation of that august
body’s findings)” were in jeopardy.2 Such historical records, bearing firsthand accounts of
individuals, clans, communities and ethnic groups that fully trusted the execution of justice with
regard to the loss of land by, for instance, the Carter and Hugh Dow commissions, contained
distilled and checkered experiences of grievous loss. These narratives of critical African
1
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discontent presented to these dubious colonial commissions of inquiry were testaments to
monstrous, embarrassing, undignified deprivations and depredations that Africans endured. The
submissions made by various communities, groups and individuals to the Carter and Dow
commissions present an opportunity, and evidence, for retrospective examination through which
African experiences of land loss and alienation of labor, among other crude and humiliating
infractions, can be used to foreground the outbreak of the Mau Mau war. Very little or nothing
has been written about the African submissions to the Carter commission so far.
It is also not surprising that there has been a new “discovery” of sensitive government
files of the Mau Mau era that, for decades, remained concealed in a secret archive deep in the
Buckinghamshire countryside. This shrouding in mystery of the systematic deprivation and
depredation of colonial subjects is not a coincidence. It would seem that the colonial official who
told Sorrenson “that some Mau Mau records” would “not be made available to the public, not
even after fifty years,” was not bluffing.3 It is, therefore, difficult to reconstruct the oppressive
colonial environment and the severity, depth and breadth of African psychological anguish due
to this dearth of information. Furthermore, there is a resounding paucity of self-documentation of
narratives of suffering by African colonial subjects in Kenya.4 Like E.P Thompson’s “laboring
poor,” ordinary farm and factory workers and dispossessed peasants in colonial Kenya “did not
leave …workhouses stashed with documents for historians to work over….”5
As such, the everyday history and experience of ordinary people, before and after
independence, has remained invisible and outside the purview of intellectual analyses. The
historian has to contend, and be content, working with “archives of the gentry or aristocracy,”
which in this case means British colonial “archives of oppression” that do not document the view
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of the majority of the population.6 This can be a particularly wearing and uphill task especially
considering the nagging and haunting awareness that more incriminating and sensitive “archives
of oppression,” were systematically destroyed by burning if not “forever” hidden, and who
knows-what-else.
This paucity of evidence is a great stumbling block to the endeavor of reconstructing the
imperial production of the African psychology of grievance, scrutinizing the experiential anxiety
and, quite naturally, the legacy or resultant mentalité of struggle. This is even more daunting a
task considering the passage of time. It is difficult to reconstruct and, therefore, reconstitute, to
an appreciable measure, accuracy and acuity, the intensity of African emotions, sense of loss and
suffering borne of systematic deprivation and shockingly brutal exploitation attendant to the
British colonial enterprise in Kenya, or elsewhere for that matter, after the fact and after so many
years. Indeed, it is difficult, as it is, for empathetic, perceptive and probing historians to peer and
enter the everyday experiences of the present. It is doubly so for historians to truly step inside a
people’s experiential anxieties when they are far removed in time; and when, what one has are
only a few surviving entreaties and petitions to imperial authorities for redress.
Nevertheless, this chapter is a singular effort exploring the African psychology of
oppression. The previous chapter already offers a broad legal, policy and attitudinal sketch of
assumed racial superiority, and hierarchy of priority in the collective human enterprise of
“civilization” and project of modernity. This chapter, despite such hurdles and obstacles
outlined above, attempts to reconstruct and capture the resultant shrunken colonial cosmos of
dispossessed Africans encroached upon and circumscribed, as it was, by the broad architecture of
limiting legal, policy and racial strictures. It argues that Britain’s violent rampage and ruthless
assault upon African societies determined the nature of social existence and reality and, by
extension, the little understood or appreciated boundaries of individual biographies and
communal narratives of oppression.7
It does this by examining and highlighting some of their individual and group
experiences, which inspired anti-colonial movements that prefigured the Mau Mau war. It
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scrutinizes the everyday realities and implications of the colonial architecture. It, therefore,
paints, with as fine strokes as possible, the legal production or social construction of illegality as
seen, felt and experienced from below. In so doing, it endeavors to present and analyze accounts
of experiential anguish and psychological anxiety attendant to the imperial exploitation of the
weak by the more powerful; the plunder of the poorly equipped by the better equipped; and the
unjust and illegitimate rule of the less organized African majority by the more organized
minority. In short, it is an attempt to catalogue the impact of a racially hierarchical colonial
capitalism that was tantamount to the imposition of imperial will and greed on African societies.
Herein, one will find an account of a hitherto unexhausted Kenyan colonial history in which the
wealth and development of Britain depended on the near, if not utter, ruin and underdevelopment
of African societies.8
The chapter opens with a focus on the mundane everyday experiences of ordinary
Africans who inhabited the colonial edifice that acutely curtailed African agency, self-mastery,
individual and communal rights and freedoms. This is done to demonstrate the physical anguish
and deeply felt psychological anxiety occasioned by the newly created rural and urban colonial
spaces in Kenya between 1900 and the early 1950s.9 A few brutal incidences of personal
violence meted upon Africans who were already institutionally subjected to inhuman situations
are discussed in outline. This is followed by an outline of legal restraints and constraints placed
upon African resources and livelihoods as well as their very physical bodies in that regard the
impacts of which is extensively discussed. Some of these legal and policy measures, resulting to
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the grievous curtailment of pre-European African life, are enacted in the early years of
colonialism. Nevertheless, the world wars and the Second World War in particular, resulted in
even greater policy and legal measures that affected the alignment between Africans and
agricultural production and, hence their relationship with, and access to, food. This chapter,
therefore, details not only the impact of the early colonial depredations on African lives but also
the sea change and hardships accompanying World War II.
Thirdly, I discuss the unjust actions of the colonial state with regard to the pivotal and allimportant issue of land loss and, thereby, immensely “punitive” assault on African land and
human rights. It is suggested that this is the inauspicious threshold of contemporary African
poverty and underdevelopment that is everywhere manifest today, in both urban and rural
settings. In addition, I attempt to present a detailed analysis of how African societies were moved
spatially, in time and place, causing literally “untold” chaos, anxiety and suffering. While their
world lay in ashen ruins, with their security of reciprocal relationships sundered, the majority of
people in African societies were incorporated to the new colonial order and modernity, not only
as “third” class citizens, but as imperial subservient or servile subjects. They were also
objectified, in the main, as agricultural labor or, at best, low-ranking bureaucratic clerks or coopted junior partners in the colonial enterprise. Thus, African societies were not only moved out
of their pre-European relative cosset, but also denied their due place in the modern space and
time. It is worth making the bold assertion here that, Mau Mau was not anti-modernity. As an
embodiment of anti-colonialism it was, to a certain extent, revulsion to a modernity delimited by
a racial hierarchy. While many Africans eagerly altered their way of life, they still found
themselves second class citizens. This, no doubt, did more than cause a little rankle. More so
because they were the ones making the greatest sacrifices for this project of modernity: their
land, labor, taxes and peasant agricultural production (especially that of grains before the First
World War).
This therefore, is a discussion of the monumental and deeply felt loss of dwelling spaces,
homes, entire villages and loss of everyday sustenance and source of subsistence and, with it,
human agency and self-mastery to chart individual, communal and group destiny. It foregrounds
a brief examination of how the African pre-European world is ruptured and the unravelling of the
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social fabric and mutual networks of social support. Also discussed herein are the challenges and
disabilities attendant to the process of urbanization in as far as it affected Africans.
Towards the end of the chapter, I turn my attention to inaccurate, biased explanations and
analyses of narratives of African discontent. Also included in this discussion is a more proximate
analysis of the same as related by the Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiong’o who is one of the few
of the generation that experienced and witnessed colonial hardships firsthand. The
dismemberment of society and socioeconomic hardships occasioned by British imperialism is a
theme that has preoccupied Thiong’o in his work. The subsequent section is a proposition: that
there is need for a retrospective psychological and analytical revisit in a bid to better understand
African narratives of discontent, how they produced the Mau Mau war and the generic mentalité
of struggle that was especially pervasive and intense in the 1950s and, thereafter, the shunting
and betrayal, of popular expectations at independence and after. Part of this proposal is the
ultimate objective of deconstructing or debunking the propaganda dressed-up as critical
“professional” psychiatric examination of Mau Mau dissent by Frank Derek Corfield and Dr.
John Colin Carothers’ colonial pseudopsychology.10
Indeed, I argue that to fully appreciate the validity of the armed Mau Mau freedom
struggle and the generic mentalité of oppression, this period of Kenyan history (1900-1950)
needs to employ cutting edge 21st Century perspectives in the discipline of psychology. I refer to
at least two such new psychological analyses and approaches. I close with a case study
illustrating the psychology of oppression as a suggestion of how such new perspectives in the
discipline figure or apply in shedding the more light on African narratives of languishment as it
related to their loss of land. This brief discussion also demonstrates that the mentalité of struggle
did not only imbue Mau Mau forest fighters or only a small section of the Kikuyu. This last
section also acts as a bridge to a more extensive account and assessment of more widespread ’52
Mau Mau minds on Kenya’s destiny in the next.

Colonial Brutality, Impunity and Lack of Legal Redress
A good example of individual anguish, to begin this examination, is the Luhya man
already mentioned in the previous chapter. The story illustrates the stricture and severity of labor
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and registration policy legislations accompanied by a condescending colonial-settler attitude of
racial superiority and paternalism. This young worker’s rather brutal and fatal experience is
important as an example of the ill-treatment of full grown men and women who were looked
down upon by their white employees as children. No doubt, such incidences of flogging, or
worse, were reenacted in numerous other white-owned settler estates in the country. The thirtyyear old man was accused of riding his white boss’s mare to the railway station 17 miles away
where he had been sent to run an errand. The white big man, a considerable land owner in the
colony, was displeased by this action as the mare was in foal. “Who gave you permission to ride
the mare?” asked the master. The young man, finding his master’s fury inexplicable by anything
he had done, retorted that he had not stolen anything, which his master found impudent. Piqued
by his worker’s “insolence,” the master got hold of the Luhya man, pushing him into a building
where he proceeded to flog him with a lash made of double ox-hide.11
The beating continued for about fifteen wearisome minutes after which the tired big man
asked one of his other employees to finish the job. As this employee was half-hearted about this
odd assignment, the master asked another employee to assist with the gruesome task. He too was
found wanting and so a third flogger was required. By this time the victim was exhausted and
soon fainted. To the white farmer, he was simply playing possum and so he “flung some buckets
of water over Kitosh, who then revived.” At this point, the master ordered him to be tied up in
the store en route to which he was kicked when he fell. “He was tied up with his hands tied
behind his back and his legs tired to a stick.” After having his dinner, the boss came to check on
Kitosh and found that his laborer friends had untied him to ease his pain and so he tied him up
again “but tighter” this time around. Visiting Kitosh later that night, the African kitchen staff
gave him some water to drink. Kitosh told him that he was suffering and was in so much pain
such that he was willing to take his own life with a knife if he had one. He did not have to take
his own life because he would soon die at four in the morning. When a medical doctor was called
to examine the body, he said that the well-built, and therefore, healthy man, had died as a result
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of injuries received in the flogging and kicking. Even if Kitosh had survived, the doctor noted,
his fundament would have become gangrenous.12 This punishment happened in 1923.
Another case of the total disregard and abuse of African human rights that gained
notoriety and drew a lot of controversy was that involved a large land owner, Galbraith Cole, a
dozen years before, in 1911. Believing himself to be a victim of stock theft from Africans, Cole
was riding in his vast estate armed with a rifle when he “caught sight of a native, some distance
away, and hailed him.”13 At this point he did not know whether he was one of his own
employees or a stranger, and therefore, an intruder into his estate and a potential thief. Then the
African bolted. As the European axiom in colonial Kenya was if an African runs away, he must
be guilty, Cole did not hesitate to mete out instant justice by opening fire on the man, hitting him
the second time. He then “rode up to where he lay and found him shot through the stomach, from
which the bowels were protruding.”14 He then searched the general area and found a dead halfskinned and cut up sheep that he thought was his and proceeded back home. Cole took no further
steps with regard to this “normal” incidence.
Indeed, it was not until friends of the murdered man found his body and reported the
matter to the district officer that the matter came to light. Galbraith Cole “admitted quite frankly
in response to” police inquiry of the facts and was soon brought to trial for murder.15 In his
defense he argued that he had experienced theft of his sheep and referred to the recovered
remains of the half-slaughtered one he had found. Villagers denied having stolen the sheep and it
was clear that Cole had not established if indeed, the slaughtered sheep was one of his. Cole had
a huge estate and it is quite probable that the sheep could have been the African’s but he had,
somehow, wandered onto Cole’s farm. As far as the shooting was concerned, there was no doubt
that he had fired to kill with “justifiable” impunity. However, he was unanimously acquitted by
the jury of his peers within a week of the beginning of the trial on 31st May 1911 in spite of the
fact that it could have, at least, have found him guilty of manslaughter. But colonial Kenya was
12
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white man’s country and, consequently, a place where the legal architecture served settler
interests first and foremost with the African relegated to a distant third class citizen.
What is more is that, confined within colonial legal boundaries and policy restrictions and
requirements with regard to land ownership, physical movement, traditional leisure activities
such as beer-drinking and dances, socio-economic activities like hunting of game for meat or
sport and disposal of labor, these two examples were not isolated. They are a microcosm of
experiences of everyday colonial oppression that were played out in hidden spaces of suffering
and public sites of collective humiliation; the systematic negation and invalidation of the African
as a human being or human enough yet, save through his/her “civilizing education;” and
alienation and deprivation, defined and underscored, by unequal power relations between, on the
one hand, superior government agents and settlers and Africans, on the other. Besides land and
labor laws earlier discussed, Africans had to deal with legislations and policies that intruded into
all aspects of their lives affecting their very being and identity. There are few things in their
previous traditional way of being, ranging from land tenure, disposal of their labor, social
structure, organization and hierarchy, and spending of leisure time through beer-drinking and
dance that were left untouched by colonial legal innovations that were invented to suit specific
circumstances or meet certain needs.

Legal Restraints on African Resources and Livelihoods: Food and Livestock
Indeed, African lives were circumscribed and restricted by all manner of conceivable
orders, rules and successive ordinances governing various aspects of human life such the Cattle
Cleansing Order (No. 32); Native Authority Ordinance; Native Liquor Ordinance; Sale and
Purchase Slaughter Stock Ordinance; Game Ordinances; Land and Water Preservation
Ordinances (1929 and 1943); Hide and Skin Trade Ordinance (1948); Native Foodstuffs
Ordinance; Forest Ordinances; Fish Protection Ordinance (1939) amongst other innumerable
legal productions, most of which were fraudulent. These legal strictures and the attendant
attitudes are what then defined African experiences from the inception, or more aptly, the
invention of colonialism in Kenya while at the same time engendering white privilege and
supremacy in the fledgling political economy. While the key legal inventions were calculated to
secure African land and labor, others, such as those that affected African leisure, serviced these,
whereas others yet were aimed at the control and management of natural resources such as
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forests, water and wildlife. They were, therefore, avenues for the realization of European
“civilization,” which was itself a product of the scientific method and ideas. These were in a
direct collision course with the African cosmology, customs and ways of being.
As earlier noted, the Second World War exacerbated such legal strictures producing even
more constraints, changes and hardships. As a result of the demands of World War II, there were
new or miscellaneous legal innovations that addressed specific needs that it occasioned. There
were others specific to the modernization project: that is, policy and legal strictures that were a
prerequisite for the creation of a supportive infrastructure of an extensive railway network, roads
and electric power installations. However, Africans caught up by this legal web, and the resultant
colonial system of capital it produced, did not understand all this or draw any such distinctions.
The bottom-line, as far as they were concerned, was that the world, as they once knew it, had
shifted and/or was in the process of doing so leaving them worse off than they had been.
In its bid to create an “ordered” landscape and “better” organize and manage colonial
space, the executive council expressed their support of the statement made by the member of
agriculture and natural resources in 1948. This was “to the effect” that “Farm 12, Nyeri, would
have to be closed for a considerable period on account of its eroded condition and that on
account of its situation it would be desirable that part, or perhaps the whole, of this farm …be
declared as a National Park” especially since it formed a natural corridor regularly used by
elephants between Mount Kenya and the Aberdares.16 Further, the council observed, “for reasons
of soil conservation it would be essential, if this farm was to be alienated” and, as a result, “a
large proportion of the area …closed.” However, at the same time, these senior colonial
administrators drew attention “to the existence of the problem created by the presence of Kibia
and his brother and their families, and a note added to the effect that the Governor had examined
in detail the question of their removal, but was not yet satisfied, as required by law, that adequate
alternative accommodation was available ….”17 This case shows that the colonial authorities
were not always ignorant of the important issue regarding the African right of access to land. In
this particular instance, this was coupled by the right of access to a salt lick that was within the
confines of the designated park that was to be fenced. The council resolved that every effort was
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to be made to find adequate alternative accommodation for Kibia and his brother, Munyiri, and
their families.18 Such regard was, however, the exception rather than the rule since similar grave
issues concerning land were not always countenanced. More mundane land issues with respect to
infrastructure facilitating the penetration of capital and other arising issues were not accorded
serious attention.
Of such experiences, Africans could narrate many. Under the Native Foodstuffs
Ordinance, for instance, Africans, as part of the Second World War effort and recovery after the
war, were prohibited from the purchase and barter of maize, millet, and legumes for the purpose
of resale. This law, enacted in the early 1940s, was later extended at a 1943 council meeting to
other parts of the country, namely Nyanza, the Rift Valley and the Maasai reserve where the
barter of foodstuff was prohibited save with the written permission of the district
commissioner.19 Needless to say, the control of foodstuffs was an all-important preoccupation at
the time for the logistical purpose of efficient execution of war in Europe and other Second
World War theatres in Asia and elsewhere. The war effort had, however, occasioned serious
shortages especially of maize, wheat flour and bread in the early 1940s squeezing Africans faced
with socio-economic hardships even more. Yet, the leading settler-politician of the time, Major
Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, at a January 1943 meeting of the executive council, reported to
the council that the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board had recommended that the
price for maize be raised to Sh.12 a bag at the start of 1943 thus raising the African cost of
living. 20
At the same meeting, a member of the council, Mr. R.E. Norton, informed it of a plan
devised to stock up the wheat reserves by rationing wheat flour and bread consumed by
Europeans and Indians as well as making restricted supplies available for Africans at selected
shops thus making the situation even direr. As if this was not enough, there was to be daily
rationing of posho (maize meail), which was originally set at two pounds (lbs.). but, which was
now to be reduced to one and a half lb. at the beginning of February. In response to food ration
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matters, the council charged Norton and the central wages board to examine the question of
alternative foodstuffs, especially sugar and biltong, to take the place of the portion of the maize
ration which could no longer be supplied. The proposed reduction in the ration of maize meal
was to be given the widest publicity by broadcasting and in the press.21 A week later, the Central
Wages Board agreed that from the 1st February, the daily ration of maize for conscript labor was
to be reduced from two lbs. to 1 and a half. A circular was to be issued containing a list of
foodstuffs which could be substituted for maize meal. The council was to consider making it an
offense to issue more than one and half lbs. of maize meal to native labor.22 It later emerged by
the second half of that year that, in the Rift Valley, “many employers did not supplement with
other rations the issue of 1 ½ lbs. of posho daily.” As a result, “a large number of voluntary
labourers” were set to leave their employment there.23 If the colonial authorities were worried
about the plight of the suffering occasioned by these war-measures and food shortage, they were
indifferent about it because the worsening maize and wheat situation and then meat, was
followed by even more administrative, legal and policy overreach.
Moreover, as early as 4th February 1943, the council ruled that “all possible maize” was
to be “extracted from native areas” and motor vehicles stopped and searched; that a day to be
appointed for a search operation led by the director of produce disposal but results of which were
to “be the responsibility of the Commissioner of Police….”24 The search was to take place on the
appointed day throughout the colony simultaneously “in order to avoid the transfer of foodstuffs
from one hiding place to another….”25 Further aggravating the food needs of African workers on
settler farms, the council noted that “apart from the ration which may be issued to squatters on
the days on which they work, no other provision” was “to be made for them or their families
who” were supposed to “rely on their own stock and other resources for food.”26 But the food
shortage leading to famine was unforgiving and experienced, not only by African farm hands in
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the settled white highlands, peasant households, urban workers and house servants, but also felt
by their employers.
The arising food shortage situation was, without a doubt, dire throughout the 1940s and
even after the cessation of World War II hostilities. The colonial state’s intelligence reports
throughout the 1940s detail African unrest as a result of food shortages triggered by, not only
famine, but also a runaway rise in the cost of living. Basic household consumption goods such as
sugar, salt, maize and beans were short or erratic in supply. The acute shortage of food, in 1943,
prompted the colonial administration to reenact the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance to make people
with foodstuffs sell farm produce especially in Embu and Machakos.27 The situation was said to
be particularly bad in Tharaka, Machakos, Mukogodo and Nyeri. The Kamba of Kangundo,
Matungulu and Iveti, which were the three most thickly populated locations in Machakos district,
complained bitterly about their lack of food.28
The lack of food amongst people in Machakos was feared to be the cause of ill health in
the district. Intelligence reports noted that the scarcity of food was beginning to produce ill
effects on the population. A special survey made of some of the schools in the region, Miu and
Masii, ascertained the extent ill of health that had resulted. In these two schools, particularly
Miu, a large proportion of the pupils showed advanced emaciation, and mild malnutrition.29 In
Nyeri, which would in a few years become one of the epicenters of the Mau Mau war and one of
its most intense spots, Chief Nderi reported six deaths that he attributed to starvation. It is
significant to note that senior intelligence officers who put out such reports together recognized
that in these particular cases, fatalities were as a result of neglect of customary social duties by
the neighbors, which played a large part.30
The situation was so bad that the Kenya Sisal Growers and the East African Production
and Supply Council approached the government for assistance with regard to “the repatriation of
labour consequent upon the food shortage and the re-recruitment of labour when the food supply
position improved.”31 While to its credit, the council did not approve this request, the pressing
27
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food situation resulted in the issuance in a new government law, the Defence (Restriction of
Meals) Order, 1943, which frowned upon the wastage of food in restaurants.32 It is with a certain
air of relief that the financial secretary reported to the executive council in June that year that
cassava flour, which substituted maize meal, was being purchased and distributed by local native
councils at “the price of 15 cents a pound or, in cases of destitution, free.”33 This apparent
“success” of meeting bread and butter needs of Africans notwithstanding, they had, yet, to
contend with colonial cunning to satisfy the ever rising demand of meat that was overlaid by
quite plausible scientific reasons why Africans had to thin their big herds of cattle and other
livestock.
While the executive council was busy trying to balance the staple food needs of the
colony and logistical demands made upon it by the war, drought and famine it was, at the same
time undertaking an incomparable task. In February 1943, the government undertook, and
informed military authorities appropriately to supply, during the next six months, 4,000 head of
cattle monthly, which was 1,000 less than was supplied at the time. The council was determined
that, if possible, this monthly quota was to be increased to 5,000.34 At this same meeting that had
struck upon the brilliant idea of colonial-wide food searches due to the dire situation, one of the
settler council members, Lord Francis Scott, suggested “that the time had come for the apt of a
Food Controller.”35 The governor’s deputy, who was presiding at the meeting, could not agree
more. He “expressed the view that the appointment of one person who could devote his whole
time to food supply and distribution problems” could “serve a useful purpose….”36 To
underscore the gravity of the food situation, it is important to note that at a meeting in April, the
council not only agreed to form a commission of inquiry into the food shortage but noted that
provincial commissioners were to “be instructed to make special efforts to supply the monthly
meat quotas from their provinces and to exceed them if possible.”37 The council felt that
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additional supplies of cattle could be drawn from Nyanza Province, especially the Sotik area, and
from squatters in the Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia districts.
If the disruption of the African economic and social fabric and, indeed, his whole
cosmos, held together as it was by the significant role of wealth in cattle, had been spared by the
introduction of a money economy, its total destruction was now assured. This was especially
because four days after the issue of the first monthly quota, the meat supply figure was revised
upwards to 10,000 head of cattle for both civil and military needs.38 What had made this
ambitious figure possible was a prior consultation meeting between the Executive Council
member charged with identifying alternative food sources, Norton, and the livestock controller
who was also the director of veterinary services. What is more is that this kind of thing was not
new. In 1939, in the name of the soil erosion, Dr. Pole-Evans in his “Report on a Visit to Kenya”
published by the Government Printer had made the following recommendation:
If goats and sheep cannot be disposed of by purchasing them from the Natives and
turning them into fertilizer or some other useful product, then only one practical course is
open viz. – compulsory handing over of all goats and sheep to the Administration, and in
place of them supplying the owners with ration cards over a period of five years; the
establishment of food depots in the Locations, just as dispensaries are now established,
where the natives can be supplied with their ration allow no remission of taxes but rather
make the Natives seek work outside the reserves or within the reserves on the work of
reclamation. The cattle problem can be dealt with in the same way.39
In the same report, Kikuyu petitioners quoted Colin Maher, a soil erosion expert, as having
recommended “the elimination of three years or so, of all goats; the limitation of the number of
cattle –present and future –by culling to accord with the true carrying capacity of the reserve.”40
In view of the above, several observations can be made. One obvious deduction is the
casual manner with which the very bedrock of the African traditional moral and political
economy was disregarded in favor of the benefit of soil and environmental science, which were
suspect, and/or misunderstood, European ideologies for those it was tailored. Secondly, this
scientific benefit was not without the opportunistic caveat of undercutting and undermining the
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foundation of African life, which it was calculated to destabilize, but also designed to
transmigrate the African in time, place and space in a process that was disorienting. Destocking
or the culling of livestock was not only good science but a creative means of inducing African
dependence by replacing self-reliance pillars that upheld traditional economy with ration cards
and food depots. The overstocking problem was not only dealt with but hordes of African
workers were also generated as they had to seek employment outside the reserve or inside it as
transformation agents of soil science digging terraces or planting napier grass along river banks.
Even the most progressive African, who had but only little doubt about the benefits of the
scientific methods of soil erosion and destocking, felt the pinch associated with this
transformation from the traditional economy to a modern colonial economy. It was difficult not
to resist, if not against partial or wholesale implementation of these ideas, at least, the pace with
which they were initiated.
The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) as early as 1940 expressed concern that the
effect of such policies was to lower the African standards of living. The members of the
association felt that while the transformation that the population was undergoing was dynamic,
the demand for a better standard of living was not, “accordingly standing still.” African living
conditions were at the same time, “exasperated by the series of harmful locust, “Army Worms”
(Ngunga) shortage of rain and crop.”41 In the memorandum to Lord Hailey, the KCA pointed out
that “these problems” were “deeply felt in every household and by many Africans” and they felt
“the weight of these changes of mode of life and” wondered “how and when…favourable
change” would “take place.”42 This memo was particularly critical of the fact that any expression
of what Africans thought or wanted in this regard was labeled as agitation and their points
seditious. Pressed by the demands of the Second World War, however, the colonial
administration was oblivious to such concerns and pushed forward with their ambitious, but
disastrous, requisition plans, which sowed the seed and watered the growing spirit of African
dissent that bloomed and loomed across the geopolitical landscape with the outbreak of the Mau
Mau war in the early 1950s.
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In order to meet the new impossible figure of 10,000 head of cattle conjured with the
connivance of the executive council and the director of veterinary services, 3,150 head were to
be raised from Nyanza; 500 raised from Nandi; 300 raised from Kamasia and East Suk; 880
raised from Central Province; 600 raised from squatters in Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia; 3000
raised from Maasai etc. a month. The council noted “that it was essential for these fresh quotas to
be filled, and that, if necessary, requisitions …be resorted to.”43 This pressure on livelihoods
continued following the war.
Having emerged out of the Second World War with the psychology of a victor but with
economic circumstances more resembling those of a defeated country, Britain was literally
bankrupt, and faced the prospect of unbridgeable balance-of-payments deficits for years to
come.44 Indeed, in the first half of the 1950s, Britain still had to contend with various food
rations ranging from bread, butter, meat, bacon and ham. Back in Kenya, destocking and
agricultural measures were bolstered, in August 1946, by the Cattle Cleansing Order No. 32,
which was related to the Fencing Order and Preservation Order. By this time, the steep cost of
living in the colony was alarming and, therefore, a great cause of concern.
Thus in February 1948, when the executive council discussed this situation and proposed
to increase the price of slaughter cattle, the financial secretary dissented that the price of meat be
increased by four cents per lb. and carried the day.45 When the matter was revisited a week later,
the Reverend Leonard J. Beecher, representing African interests, expressed concern “that
consumers were seriously perturbed at the rise in the cost of living.”46 It was suggested that “an
investigation be made into the Price Control w/a view to seeing whether it would be possible to
restrict the percentages of profit now in force.” In the course of 1948, food prices continued to
dominate council meetings with that of maize rising from Sh. 12 per bag in 1943 to Sh. 20; that
of wheat was fixed at Sh. 32.75 for the top grade; and butter fixed at 2/30 per lb. wholesale for a
period of three years, subject to revision downwards or upwards and not to exceed 7.5% in any
year. It is instructive that at this time, the council was sensitive to the security ramifications of a
runaway cost of living in the colony because this is when the Emergency Powers Bill was
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introduced to the LegCo “to make exceptional provision for the Protection of the Community in
cases of Emergency.”47
This was at the meeting a week before the council advised approval of the publication of
this bill. The council then resolved that the African anti-colonial movement, DYM, be declared
an “unlawful society” alongside the Society of Jezu Kristo.48 A few months later in May, the
Kipsigis Central Association “and an associated religion called the ‘Dini ya Mbojo’” were also
declared unlawful societies dangerous to the good government of the Colony, under Sec 69 (2)
(ii) of the Penal Code.49 This demonstrates that in preparing a legal framework to deal with a
security emergency, the colonial administration recognized the adverse impact of the cumulative
effect of their various legislations and policies. Even more crucial than the important cattle
industry that was the backbone of African traditional economy was the land out of which
Africans had been uprooted to pave way for the infrastructural network and financial grid that
included power installations, forts and stockades, townships and trading centers, and road and
railway networks. Combined, these were the hallmarks of modernization which did not come at a
small cost to some sections of African society.

The Cost of Modernization: Unjust State Requisition and Assault on African
Land Rights
The foregoing was not a new issue as specific groups of people were adversely affected
by the incursion and imposition of modernization. As early as 1929, Joseph Kangethe, writing on
behalf of a group of people, submitted a letter to the Kikuyu newspaper Muigwithania. Kangethe
complained about the “width of roads in the country of black people.”50 He expressed the
community’s indignation on account of Limuru road, the construction of which had resulted in
the uprooting of food by the public works department. The department had dug 147 feet wide
yet, they argued, the governor and the local native council had assured them of 17½ being
required “from the middle of the road.”51 Further, in their consideration, this was a small matter
compared to many other things that they had been made to suffer that were wrong from the
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outset but were, nevertheless, carried out in surreptitiously or in an underhand manner. Such
things, they said, caused the hearts or spirits of the Kikuyu people to be as though dead or
without life.52 Put differently, government actions, with regard to laying out infrastructure, were
not only unjust and unfair but also dehumanizing and undignifying.
Echoing Kangethe’s attempt to capture the plight of the Africans, another Muiguithania
contributor paraphrased Lamentations 5:1-10, a prayer of the oppressed asking God to remember
the things that people were facing. This contributor, Muorianyoni, beseeched:
Look and see the insults with which we are insulted.
See our inheritance is given to strangers,
and our houses made to belong to other races.
We have become orphans as though our fathers were dead....
…We buy our water with money,
and our firewood is sold to us.
Those that pursue us are about our necks, we are weary and find no rest
…Servants are better than we….
We obtain our food with great difficulty and distress.53
For his part, Kangethe, concluded by confessing that unless a just and fair government addressed
the issue the destruction wrought by the construction of the road in Limuru thus demonstrating
good will towards Africans and especially future generations, any plan of action it had would be
unacceptable.
Similarly, in 1928 residents of Kamaguta protested against the building of an electricity
plant at the junction of the Maragua and the Tana River. In as far as they were concerned, the
matter had been put paid to at a meeting of the local native council that met in Fort Hall at the
beginning of 1928 in the presence of the DC. However, the issue was reopened again at the end
of that year. Speaking on behalf of “raia” or peasants at a “baraza” held with the DC on 14th
December, Kimani wa Njuku, one of the common people, said that “there were over 10,693
people living …on this land …” and after all, when they had first discussed the matter in March,
the people had informed the DC that “there was no place …to hand over for the construction of
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an electricity plant.” Wrapping up his short speech, Njuku posed, “…Now, from whence has the
matter come up again?”54 The DC’s response was that in Europe, electricity plants were placed
“just wherever the Government” wished and if people were there, they were removed and given
another place. Joel Kimunge, another peasant, stood up and said that the people who lived in this
particular land could not be removed because they were exceedingly many.55
Morevover, Kimunge argued, the land was the only place left to the Kikuyu when the rest
of the land passed to the European “chomba” (boss).56 The DC, nevertheless, pursued his case:
“It is desired that you give it up because the Government requires …a place in which to put up
an electricity plant.” Feeling this unrelenting pressure, another peasant farmer, Daudi Githanda,
stood up and said that since old times, Kikuyu country was bounded by the Maasai and Kamba
and, in colonial times their land from Thika to Maragwa, was in the hands of Europeans. Not
even salt licks where Africans fed their livestock were left yet the colonial government was
“back upon” them “for the little piece which” it had left them, which is where all the thousands
of people gathered at the meeting lived with all their possessions. Why, what did the government
want? What was it after? queried Githanda. He continued to say that the people expected such a
government to be more understanding and sympathetic in view of the plight of thousands of
people that would be affected.57 The DC was rigid in his position and said that the building of the
electricity plant had been issued as an order and provided for by law. Githanda pressed the
people’s case exasperating the DC who threatened that if they continued to obstruct the
construction of an electricity plant, he would prosecute and charge them in a court of law.
At this juncture, Naaman Njoroge stood up and said: “Bwana, we feel grieved at you
because we are in the habit of settling matters together with you and why, therefore, do you bring
the matter up again? You (yourself) informed us about this piece of land on 1st March 1928 that a
Company wanted it, and now you tell us it is the Government (who want it). This matter appears
to us to resemble raiding, for at the time of a raid or war, if a man refuses to part with his cow, it
is looted from him by force. And you now wish to loot this land by force, for we, the owners, do
not wish to give it up, because in this place there live more than 10,693 people and moreover, all
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our property is here.”58 By this time, the DC was frothing at his mouth and hurling insults at the
people who, hearing what he had to say, decided to disband muttering amongst themselves that
this was not a matter of reason and justice but of robbery.59
Eventually, the government alienated the land and the electricity plant was constructed
where previously stood 200 huts; 335 granaries; and 195 cattle pens belonging to an African
community of slightly more than 10,000 people.60 More than a mere loss of property, it must
have been an emotional displacement from a sentimental physical space and place at the
onslaught of colonial modernity. That colonial authorities prioritized a power plant over a
“timeless” people’s way of life also means that the latter had been supplanted and, somewhat
outmoded by modernity. In this sense, in addition to the spatial injustice was a more subtle level
of “displacement”: that of time evidenced in the clash of the African traditional and the British
modern infrastructure. Detailing what this loss meant for the likes of peasants like Njuku,
Kimonge, Githanda and Njoroge, the KCA memo noted that on the stretch of the river taken,
there was a good ford, where the Kikuyu used to cross to trade with the Wakamba. Now they
have to go 20 or 30 miles to another ford where their animals could cross.
Furthermore, since the taking over of the land, many Kikuyu have been arrested and fined
heavily, (from 200 shillings upwards) presumably for trying to use the ford.61 Kenyatta
complained that the valuable land was not willingly surrendered but taken over through coercion
and the Kikuyu had, once again, been “deprived forever a further valuable area of fertile land
essential for stock raising, grazing and agriculture, as well as a potential source of cheap water
power.”62 No compensation or alternative land given in exchange. Furthermore, “the proposed
electric light and power station” was “to be a private, dividend paying, undertaking, financed by
the proprietors of the large Sisal Mills, and the current generated …used for their own
commercial enterprise.” As such, “the power station” would “not be of any advantage to the
Africans, whose forced submission” had “robbed them of the valuable land and water, for the
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benefit of a purely commercial enterprise.” The KCA desired to place on record their “most
earnest protest against…being called upon by the Government to assist the commercial projects
of non-African undertakings in Kenya, by surrendering to them any parcels of…land, large or
small, to the lasting detriment of the people….” This consistent preferment of white settlers who
had the advantage “of being able to influence the Government to bring pressure upon the
Africans” was, more than anything else conceivable, “certain to embitter the relations between
the Kikuyu peasants and white immigrants.”63
Moreover, the association felt, if the policy under which trading requirements of
European concerns “operating for private profit” continued to “enjoy the active support of the
Kenya Government, under the claim that their operations” constituted public interest, “then the
supposed security of African tribes in their lands” could, “under such conditions, amount to little
or nothing.”64 The memo went on to note another similar case in which the Kikuyu of south
Nyeri had narrowly escaped “another serious appropriation of land…at the hands of a Mauritius
Sugar Corporation, or some such European company.”65 Also mentioned was the fate of Lazaro
Mundia of Mang’u whose land was part of an appropriation of a total of 6805 acres that were
taken by the White Sisters from the Kikuyu. It notes further that, there was at the time, a total of
60,000 Kikuyu who had been dispossessed of their lands without compensation thus forcing
them “to become wanderers –homeless and landless” who could be seen “…wandering or
squatting all over Kenya. This oppression has disgorged the Kikuyu and many” had fled “to the
neighbouring tribes, thus causing great loss to the Kikuyu Community.”66 The memo protested
the fact that forests and grazing lands that had been part of Kikuyu property were now controlled
by the Government Forest Department. Kikuyu who entered the forest to collect firewood were
now “treated as trespassers and heavy fines…imposed.” The grazing lands were also “almost
entirely under control of the Forest Department, or European immigrants, and the Kikuyu” had
“to pay very heavy grazing fees, and to accept very inequitable terms of lease, in order to
maintain their herds.”67 There were innumerable similar experiences of spatial injustice across
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the colony some of which will forever remain in the dark since they were “unimportant” to
document or, simply, because it was the order of the day.

Loss of Basic Subsistence and Homes: Evictees and Squatters
Two more examples, similar to the distraught of homelessness visited upon Africans,
merit special mention. These are the case of Tigoni evictees and Olenguruone squatters. The
former’s petitions to the Secretary of State (SofS) for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, in 1947
and 1948, captured their anguish and frustrations: in their own words, they had been “forced to a
state of penury.”68 They believed that they had, for years, been “subjected to a series of
systematic hardships by the Government and …White Settlers …as a result of which as large a
number as 22,000 Kikuyu Squatters” had been “forced to a state of penury and want of every
description.”69 Tigoni evictees railed against the introduction by the colonial government, in
1927, of the prohibition to own livestock except goats and sheep adding that even these were
taken away from them with further rules of 1939 that whittled numbers down. These measures
were made worse by the restriction of the area of land which they could occupy in 1945.
By this time, they further argued, Africans were legally disabled to cultivate more than
one acre of land if they had one wife and two acres if they had more. In spite of these measures,
they had continued to work on European farms although they felt that “their rights and privileges
were whittled down and trampled upon.” But the crisis came and the conditions were “made
unbearable when the Rules were brought into force in 1945 whereby the ownership of even
…sheep was limited to 15 and that of the land to one or two acres ….This completely broke the
hearts and the morale of” the petitioners who now realized the “hopelessness of their plight and
organized destruction of their individual and community life.”70 This agglomeration of calculated
hardships, they felt, struck at the Africans’ very existence as they were being pushed to the brink
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of virtual extinction. “They could see with horror,” they said, “their march to slavery and gradual
elimination” as a community.71
Similarly, the men, women and children of Olenguruone felt that once they were
dispossessed and their “original land taken way for white settlers,” they were “forced to obey
laws framed against” their “interests and detrimental to” their existence.72 Their families were
breaking down as a result of some of measures like allocating families eight acres of land
irrespective of the number of wives or children one had. Further, destocking policies and forced
extensive grass-planting “reduced the area available for gardening food crops for their existence:
“we are forbidden to grow the crop of our daily use and are forced to plant wheat which does not
meet our immediate need,” they lamented. Forty acres per family in their view was more of a fair
deal. While they approved soil conservation methods, they deplored all other methods
detrimental to their existence.73 The sum total of all their woes, Njoroge concluded, was the
realization of the government’s chief aim of making the “settlement a chief source of cheap labor
for …big farms of white settlers...” where they were forced to serve on “very low wages” of
eight shillings per month.
In their letter to Creech Jones, Tigoni squatters in Limuru recounted how they were
served with eviction notices by their erstwhile masters without even being afforded “an
opportunity to harvest their crops of food and, worse still, to take away with them the grain they
had already in their granaries. Thousand [sic] of men, women and children, the young and the
old were displaced from their homes in most unhappy and distressing circumstances. They did
not know and no one else cared to know…where” they could resettle and thus resume their lives.
Consequently, they were wandering aimlessly “about the country with no homes to live in, no
land to cultivate and no food to eat and no cattle to rear.”74 Attempts to right the injustices meted
out by unfair contracts drawn by settlers had been thwarted by the government since 1946.
Tigoni squatters felt that they were being compelled to work whether they liked it or not by the
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force of circumstances created about them and over which they neither had any control nor
possessed the freedom to negotiate.
A meeting held in Kiambu with government officials had ended with the arrest and
imprisonment of nine of the Tigoni squattters, which was “a source of great annoyance and grief
to the thousands” of petitioners. Just when they planned to march to protest outside Government
House, they were, against their “wishes and inclination …forced into …waiting lorries in large
numbers overloading the vehicles” and hauled off to Limuru. During this “freight,” about a mile
and a half from Limuru, one vehicle overturned as a result of which one man received fatal
injuries and died and some 19 persons received serious injuries rendering them incapable to do
any work. They found it particularly inhuman for police officers in escort not to attend to the
suffering occasioned. They wrote, “Nothing of the kind was done.” Injured evictees were left on
the spot of the accident. This was an unfathomable callousness parallel of which was “difficult to
find in the modern civilized world.” 75
Ignored for half a year, the squatters upped the stakes and forwarded their pleas to the
United Nations at the beginning of 1948. In this new appeal, they expressed their disbelief at the
government’s silence about the return of, as they put it, “their food and land” as justice demands.
As it were, the government attitude was causing great hardships and the squatter condition was
precarious. They were in great sorrow and depressing circumstances of near starvation.76 This
time, the squatters were emphatic and unflattering: a demoniacal settler government, they wrote,
was discriminating against desperate ex-squatters who had refused to continue being poor and
starved. They said that they were not willing to continue “to serve on a low wages of Sh. 6/- and
Sh. 8/- per month to Settlers Government.”77
Indeed, they were by now persuaded that the government and the settlers were one and
the same. After all, they alleged, His Excellency the Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, had just
bought a Farm at Subukia in Rift Valley Province called Ndiroi Estate from a Mr. J. Clay.
Moreover, the legislative council, they argued, was composed of settlers who were only
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interested in their property. Relentless, they sent more petitions in the course of the year in April
and July. The latter was laden with emotion. Under the subject, “land & foodstuffs,” Tigoni
peasants referred to themselves as miserable ex-squatters who were “moanfully outcrying” [sic]
and appealing to the United Nations to intervene to end their suffering immediately.78 The
correspondence between Nairobi and London, however, were rather curt and dismissive of these
petitions.79 This was the arrogant manner in which such entreaties were dismissed in the period
leading up to the outbreak of Mau Mau war one of the bloodiest incidences of which was played
out in Lari near Limuru.
But even more important, it is worth noting the confluence of the Tigoni-Limuru squatter
grievances with those from Olenguruone. The latter were taken to the Limuru area, which had, as
noted, homegrown land problems of its own. It is important to note that when these two strands
of related grievance interacted the result, in the 1950s, was explosive. The process of European
alienation of Tigoni lands had started in 1906 thus making Limuru “the storm-centre of Kenya’s
history” towards the end of British rule.80 Police in Tigoni demolished 45 huts leaving “270 men,
women and children totally homeless and foodless at the time when hunger in Kiambu district is
still great,” according to a KCA memo to Lord Hailey in 1940.81 A decade later, it became
increasingly divisive and continued to be a thorny issue causing concern among politicians in
London. David Rees-Williams, a minister in the Colonial Office sent his colleague, Member of
Parliament Major Lyall Wilkes, a long reply answering why the issue of Tigoni people was
complex. He explained that about four Tigoni clans had rejected the “most generous” land
proposal put forward as resettlement by the Carter land commission in a designated land in
Nyamweru. They continued to refuse “every effort by Government to reach a just and generous
settlement of their claim.”82 It was the Carter land commission that had proposed this settlement
of 1,500 acres at Nyamweru for the 1,000 that the people of Tigoni had lost. The settlement, for
Rees-Williams, was, therefore, acre for acre of land that was of equal value. Six other clans
accepted the offer as well as the disturbance compensation, but the remaining four clans not only
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refused, but in order to prevent Nyamweru being occupied, elders laid a curse upon the place.
Offering no practical solutions, Rees-Williams stated that it was clear “that these people” were
“not prepared to accept any alternative land even if it were offered to them.” There was no valid
reason why they could not re-join their fellows at Nyamweru where the land was still available
for them. He added that there were, after all, known tribal means of resolving the curse and that
need not, therefore, be regarded as an obstacle to their going there.83
For Rees-William, the case of Tigoni did not merit any special treatment or attention.
After all, as far as compensation was concerned, “the Tigoni people were treated in exactly the
same way as others in similar circumstances. Their huts, stores, bananas, yams, wattle etc. and
other improvements were all valued at the fair market rates for 1939.”84 He, however, clarified
that the valuation was done in the absence of the people of the said four clans as they “all refused
to show their improvements and even removed their dependents from Tigoni so that their
property could not be pointed out.” Further, Rees-Williams observed that another discrepancy
that could have been a point of protest was the fact that the price for the people’s wattle fetched a
much higher price than that assessed in 1939 of Sh. 160 per acre for full-grown wattle because
the market prices increased.85 Like the acting governor of Kenya had counseled a month earlier,
Rees-Williams advised against the re-opening of this case especially as “of all the proposals put
forward for the settlement of land claims by the Carter land commission, those of the Africans
residing at Tigoni ‘township’ were by far the most generous.”86 The people of Tigoni were,
nevertheless, unrelenting in their firm resolve to stay in their hereditary land.87
They argued that the move to the new land, Lari in this instance, had been facilitated by
bribing Luka W. Kahangara with the post of headmanship.88 As a result, thousands of acres had
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been taken away by the government and people forced to Nyamweru Forest Area that was under
the control of the said Luka Kahangara in Makimei’s location, Lari. The remaining people were
categorical in their refusal of this proposition. They argued that the government had barred
compensation to the clan right holders and original ownership of land. With regard to the acre for
acre proposition, they countered that the quality and quantity trade off overlooked the original
land’s proximity to Nairobi, which was the chief and central market for all farm produce.89
As such, they felt, people’s essential dependence on agriculture for their livelihoods were
forced to live without any alternative fallback. They also stated that they were not blind to the
fact that their plight was due to the clever colonial machinations behind the “idea embraced in
…policy…forcing Africans to seek employment in European farms.” As Africans saw it, “the
whole policy, officers in all Departments of the Kenya Government” were “vigorously pushing
the theory of dispossessing Africans of their land at the time detribalizing them, aiming
ultimately at making them not only Tenants at the Will of the Crown, but also useful source of
labor supply for the European farming interests in particular.”90
Up to and until 1948, the people of Tigoni sent numerous telegrams to the prime
minister’s Office in London to appeal this case. They reminded the PM of their consistent appeal
of the case both “to the local and home government” and showed that they were “strongly
opposed” to accept the offered land at Nyamweru as stated in the House of Commons by the
SofS on 6th August 1947. In this short note of defiance to London, they were again declaring
fully that they would only resume their lives as farmers in their land in Tigoni.91
Not only did the greater Limuru area become to focal point of the Olenguruone and
Tigoni existential woes but also of those in the general region as well. Apart from the land,
deprived but resilient four Tigoni clans and ahoi that despite being part of the Lari move soon
found themselves uprooted from their dependence on land, were others in Limuru who found
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themselves landless. Thus, Limuru became a vortex of an ongoing experiential loss and site of
bitter dialogue among kith and kin about traditional mutuality and moral obligations that had, for
centuries, tied the fate or fortune of individual members of the community together within a vast
and permanent bond of reciprocity.
Unlike in the Tigoni case, it did not always pit kindred against each other. The Mugocuko
and Nguru clans with land north east of Limuru station were claiming it from Mrs. J.V. Druirs.
Njomo Kihika sent, on their behalf, a letter to the PM’s office to this effect, imploring him to
intervene in moving terms that echoed centuries’ old norm of mutual obligation, even from the
imperial heart of empire. “We wich [sic] to appeal through you to His Majesty the King, who is
our Father and the Father to all and he is looking for one Son [sic] and overlook the other for His
mercy on this occasion,” Kihika appealed.92 Further, he expressed the hope that if the colonial
government counterchecked and studied the facts of their claim, which the clans had tabled
before the Carter commission in 1932, then they, “landless children of the King,” would stand to
benefit. A letter bearing the same claim sent to the Carter commission more than fifteen years
earlier by the two clans was not so flattering, however.
Back then, the claimants, in as simple a way as they could, tried to explain the cunning
and impudent manner Mrs. Druirs forced them out of their land. They also expressed their
bitterness of their land being turned into a pig-rearing farm, which was a radical departure to
their traditional uses of land previously. This was a microcosm of wonder and dissent associated
with the taking up of African land in Uplands and its surroundings by white farmers who were
rearing pigs for the Uplands pork and bacon factory in the Limuru region. This is how they
recounted their series of woes at the hands of Mrs. Druirs and others:
Mrs. J.V. Duirs came in our Githaka with [sic] a simple way. She started with a little
grass hut, and at the same when she was starting, my Father Kihika asked her why she
forted [sic] there She said that she is on her journey further on. It is just a few days (she
says) [sic] She proceeded with her commerce ….
After a season she started to build a big House, and she asked my Father to supply her
with one jug of milk at 15 Rupees per mensem. After she was supplied with milk during
5 seasons (2 ½ years) She paid only 3 month [sic] and refused with the rest, and at the
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same time she start [sic] to discord with my Father and during the same confusion, 30 of
our Sheep and Goats and 6 Bulls were taken by her and all our shambas were Given to
swine and goats in order that my Father be angry to move away. Still further on 20 huts
of our families were burned up, and this make [sic] my Father to leave the place and went
a further [sic] place towards West of the same Githaka.
Another European (Farther Diath) captured 2 Bulls & …Rams from my Father, and then
my Father removed and went a further to East of the Githaka. The last one, was Mr.
‘Tigiti’ (Impy) and he took away 2 Rams. And this period Mrs. J.V. Duirs who was still
making discord with my Father came and burn [sic] all my Father’s Villages and drove
him off from his Githaka, Since that time up to date, We his childrens [sic] are still
suffering for lacking this.93
Similar claims and narratives of suffering abound not only in Central Province but farther
around the colony. Besides claims made upon land in Nyanza Province by people who were
historically the inhabitants of the region, there was the extra big and constant headache for the
colonial administration there and in Nairobi. This came from six-hundred Kikuyu families that
had settled in the region. This small group of Kikuyu alleged that they had purchased land in the
district from original owners but, in 1949, a summary removal notice was issued. While they
were not fighting this eviction, they found it difficult to vacate their purchased lands without a
refund of the cost so incurred and their destroyed crops compensated accordingly. Otherwise, in
their opinion, the colonial government was contravening and ignorant of laws governing removal
and compensation.94 They felt that the eviction was hurried and overlooked the full
compensation of the prized land and destroyed crops and houses.
One of the evictees, Nahashon Mwaura, wrote to the PM’s office about an earlier attempt
to remove these Kikuyu out of the Kisii region in 1948. Nahashon talked of “the crops of
…Kikuyu who were in custody having been ‘forcibly harvested at night’ and allegations” of
assaults on their wives that had been ignored by the police.95 In trying to explain to London what
had actually transpired in this operation, the governor told the SofS that there was no substance
in the allegation made by Mwaura with regard to the taking of cattle by colonial authorities.
“This complaint refers to the compulsory cattle quota supplied to the Livestock Control during
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the war, in which the Kikuyu were obliged to make their contributions, together with the Kisii.”96
As far as Kagunda’s complaint about forced labor in white settler farms was concerned, the
governor explained that the “complaint presumably” referred “to the war-time conscription of
labor for essential purposes, for which the Kikuyu immigrants were liable, together with the
Kisii.”97 Intimating the sentiments of all affected Kikuyu, Kagunda had written to the DC: “We
feel very strongly that no good can come by enforcing a removal order against us without
previous investigations and if necessary arbitration by a committee of enquiry or arbitration.”
And further, “We regard Kisii (Bantu) as a party of our Kenya country, and it it [sic] is denied to
Kikuyu (Bantu) …confirms that there is a dual policy of White and Black. The Blacks are being
restricted and descriminated [sic], while White Settlers, Indian, Goans and Arbs [sic] move about
in freedom about the country (Kenya) unrestricted regarding Education, Representation,
Religiouos [sic] and Trading etc. as this is not within, the conception of the British ideals-British
commonwealth.”98
What is clear from this is the African awareness and acute sense, as well as painful
experience, of flagrant double standards and preferential treatment of white settlers by both the
imperial and colonial governments. Indeed, it can be argued that the tragedy that befell Africans
was in large measure due to the fact that they were vulnerable illiterate societies and thus
unequipped with the availing equipment, power and knowledge of the law. The oppressive and
unjust colonial structure effectively took root because Africans did not have lawyers. However,
in due time, some of them, like Njomo Kihika above, became alive to new avenues of agency by
invoking the same imperial legal system of oppression. To regain agency and fight colonial
injustice, some started to argue for equal the application of, and treatment before, the law and
fairness with regard to colonial policies. In the absence of uninterested and just redress of their
general concerns and specific everyday travails, they confronted the colonial state using a more
proactive avenue of legal redress.
One good example is that of the emigrant Kikuyu in south Kavirondo (south Nyanza) on
behalf of whom Kagunda wrote, “We are …unfortunate people …dispossessed of their lands
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….”99 Insulted, with their inheritance given to perfect strangers; their houses made to belong to
other races; having to buy their water with money; their firewood sold to them; weary and
finding no help; and unable to navigate the complex and strangulating laws and policies of those
that pursued them that were about their necks, Africans sometimes turned to the law and British
lawyers.100 As an expression of faith in the British colonial “justice” system, and a legal strategy
to regain agency, the Kikuyu of Kisii district would eventually seek the services of a Nairobibased advocate.101 While this effort was ultimately not successful, there are other similar cases of
which more is known about how African communities protested against the colonial legal
strictures, absence of human rights and underdevelopment.

Protests against Colonial Legal Strictures, Absence of Human Rights and
African Underdevelopment
Africans, as already noted above, expressed great faith in themselves, at times, to tackle
the intricate web of imperial and colonial laws and policies themselves. In retrospect, this was
with a great measure or sense of an uncanny understanding of what was at stake. A good
illustration is that of Authur Tutu and Stanley Kiama Gathigira who were the President and
Secretary of the Progressive Kikuyu Party of South Nyeri District, respectively. This example
exemplifies this uncanny legal understanding and strategy to regain African agency. The two
officials noted in their memorandum to the SofS that due to the long history of the Kikuyu
people’s association with the land as hunters, shepherds and cultivators, the “question of the
land” filled “the heart [sic] of all, men, women, and children.102 Tutu and Gathigira asked the
land commission to “try by all means in their power to find some way” that would “destroy the
discontent that has arisen” so that they could make peace between all the inhabitants of the
country, black and white. As testament to their colony-wide political outlook, they stated further
that “all the black peoples of Kenya” were “like the Kikuyu People” in that they were
“cultivators and shepherds…” and that “long ago those who shepherded their flocks used to buy
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food from their neighbours.” However, food under colonialism had become dear because much
of it was being exported and they too were “turning their attention to cultivation. Thus their
needs have grown, as have the needs of the cultivating tribes, and we would ask therefore that to
each tribe be given enough land to satisfy all their needs,” they pressed.103 Tutu and Gathigira
expressed well-informed concern that areas designated as reserves set apart for them were not
sufficient for them to have enough land and flocks for their sustenance as it was in the preEuropean past, which they believed was paralleled in the experience of other ethnic groups in
Kenya.
Moreover, turning to attack matters legal and how these affected their everyday lives,
they expressed displeasure with the choice of words by the colonial administration. They
complained, “We do not like the word ‘RESERVE.’ To us it means ‘something left over,’
‘something held back.’ It does not indicate that we owned the land before the Europeans came.
We feel therefore that we can have no security or trust when our lands are so described, because
to our minds the word would indicate that he who holds back from touching this ‘Reserve’ may,
when need arises, come and take it.”104 Further, they took issue with the fact that when the said
“reserves” were demarcated, people were not informed, nor did they know “that the boundary
lines were to be like the walls of a cattle byre. We were told that the Boundary Line was drawn
to prevent the Native Peoples from burning the bush. We did not know that our cattle could no
longer be allowed to graze there, or go to the salt licks there, or that we ourselves would lack
firewood, or a place to build. We were allowed to graze our cattle in these places for a short time,
but we did not know that these would be taken from us for ever [sic].”105
From the outset, this statement appears simple. It seems to be all about lack of legal
information, which a KCA petition addressed as a calculated African “legal disability.”106
However, hidden within it is a subtle and unspoken subtext of unfair limitation of African
mobility as well as strictures that curtailed prior lifestyle and Pre-European African economic
activities. At the same time, they registered their bitterness at seeing these same places that were
once forest land being cultivated by Europeans and grass lands that had once fattened their cattle
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become white owned coffee farms.107 Tutu and Gathigira were unafraid to state how the
production of illegality was perceived by Africans whom it affected. They believed that various
forest ordinances were not designed to prevent the destruction of forests through African slash
and burn shifting cultivation but, rather, “that these lands might be given to the Europeans.”108
Subsequently, African suffering was untold. Tutu and Kiama wrote, “We have suffered
because our old lands have been taken from us and given to the Europeans, and these things we
mention …are those which have made us to suffer most.”109 Then followed examples of legal
fines that were the result of blind and unforgiving, if ignorant, colonial policies and laws, which
disrupted previous African ways of being. For example, they were fined when their cattle crossed
lines that had been instituted by the colonial authorities; fined for cutting firewood or timber for
building within the forest; while grazing and firewood collection now had to be paid for. The
changes wrought on the physical landscape by the imposition of colonial law and order,
especially the tampering with the African land tenure and use, had adversely hampered their
cultivation. Tutu and Gathigira explained that they were affected by the fact that their cattle and
other stock now had “to return to the Reserve.”
Yet, before the Europeans took their lands from them, livestock “herds dwelt in the plains
where there was plenty of grass nganatha-ini” or the wide open wild common grazings.110
Confined at the homestead, cattle now had to compete with the few sheep and goats that were
traditionally reared there and grazing and cultivation areas were no longer sufficient, complained
the two officials. As such, Africans fortunes were affected significantly. “Each man’s portion is
so small that he cannot plant coffee nor can he have a large herd and produce butter,” Tutu and
Gathigira complained. As a result of all these changes, the position of Africans was worse than it
was before especially with the encouragement from the authorities for them to plant wattle trees
as a source of income. This, they argued, caused further reduction of “the area for food
production and grazing. Again…thanks to the help of doctors and nurses, both the Missions and
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of our Government, our population is increasing, and this increase brings about a demand for
more grazing land, and more land for cultivation.”111
To the above eloquence in relaying the everyday experiences of Africans under new
colonial laws and policies four decades after the start of colonial rule, was added an extensive
request to reorder boundaries. The two officials furnished the SofS and the land commission with
the old boundaries of the now dispossessed people that were not indicated in the colonial maps
but which old men knew well enough. These covered Othaya, Tetu, Mathira, Ndia and Gichugu
divisions. They also provided a comprehensive list of the names of people who were
dispossessed and “driven out of from the villages they had built, and the gardens they had
cultivated in the valleys” as a result of “the troubles brought about by the taking away of all the
land between the old boundaries and the new ones.”112 The affected were, in Othaya Division,
566 people; Tetu, 340; Mathira, 333; Ndia and Gichugu, 104; bringing the total of all affected to
1,343 people who were well known to them but noting that there could have been even others
more.
This makes clear the centrality of land in sustaining livelihoods. They argued that since
most lands lost had been taken for the public good for townships, government camps, trading
centers, schools, hospitals, railways and railway stations, it ought to have been “from both white
and black, and not from black alone.”113 They, therefore, called for the restitution of their
dispossessed lands, which they felt would ensure that “full justice” was done with regard to their
claims and ensure that their needs were fully met. They anticipated, empathetically, that this “in
turn would cause grave hardship in many cases” for “settlers who now” occupied these lands
who had come “by invitation of the Government” but who would be dispossessed when these
reforms would be instituted. To resolve this anticipated problem, they suggested that instead of
the government paying compensation to settlers “in equity” which “would bankrupt the country,”
the best suggestion was to provide land for Africans “out of the Crown Lands” which were
available.114
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Turning their attention to the Native Land Trust Ordinance, they said that they did not
like it for three reasons. One, it did not have a provision through which any African whose land
was encroached upon could take up a case against the European party doing so. It also
recognized that African lands were under ownership of the Crown, thus making the original
owners tenants with the Crown having the last word on issues arising. They, therefore, asked for
the ordinance to be amended so that they could take their cases to the High Court. Secondly, it
provided Europeans with the privilege of holding “their land as leasehold, or freehold,” yet they,
“the original owners of the land,” had “lost all right in the land except the Tenant Right created
by the Lands Trust Ordinance.”115 In this regard, these able African “advocates” requested King
George V to recognize their past ownership, especially considering their faithful service during
the Great War and their loyal obedience to him all things of which, in their opinion, should have
been rewarded with the grant of their land as freehold “subject to necessary safeguards as to the
sale of land to alien races.”116
Lastly, they said that most Africans felt insecure since they remained tenants on Crown
Land. For these reasons, they expressed the desire to have “the old laws of Native Land Tenure
remain,” as they were, at the time, “at least …best suited” for their “customs and needs.” They,
however, realized that these would “have to be changed to meet changing conditions” but held
that “the time for drastic alteration” had “not yet arrived.”117 The two reminded the recipients
that King George V and his government were their trustees and should, therefore, urge the SofS,
the governor and the land commission to apply all their powers to decide the land question so
that they, their sons and daughters of the land, did not lack their inheritance.
Anticipating some form of legal redress and revision, after the end of the 1928 land
commission enquiry, they said its resolutions should be published in Kikuyu and given the
widest circulation possible to enable the collection native criticisms of the report. In so doing,
their memo pointed at the one legal handicap that allowed the illegal production of illegality that
facilitated the creation of Kenya as white man’s land. Perhaps, if Africans understood the full
implications of various legal constructions that made this possible, political consciousness could
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have come sooner and would have been more intense earlier than it did in Kenya. But since, laws
were never widely circulated or published in vernacular languages, African silence had been
misconstrued as either acquiescence or ignorance, which also meant that the African was
juvenile and did not know what was good for him.
If anything, it was obvious from all the unjust laws passed, among them the Native
Authority Ordinance; the Native Land Trust Ordinance; the Native Registration Ordinance; the
Native Passes Law; the Native Squatters Ordinance; the Employment of Natives Ordinance;
Native Liquor Ordinance; and Township Residents’ Permits, that both the government and NonAfrican representatives on the legislative council were “ignorant of conditions of African life and
grievances in Reserves….”118 Yet, the sum of these ordinances obviously concerned and affected
the African in his everyday life. For this reason, the KCA, in its extensive 1932 memo to the
SofS, submitted in London on its behalf by Jomo Kenyatta, stated that all of these laws should
have been published in African languages. It added that, for resolutions and minutes of local
native councils to be fully understood by non-English speaking Africans, decisions arrived at
should also have been published in vernacular. The failure to do so meant that the cumulative
effect of these ordinances, which included restrictions of the freedom of speech, press and right
of assembly, was not only not understood but also not known to Africans who used their
vernacular languages. According to the KCA, this constituted the creation of “legal disabilities.”
It was, therefore, “essential that all Laws, Ordinances and Enactments relating to the
Government of a Kenya,” particularly those touching on Africans, “and all bye-laws and
regulations controlling the urban areas, be published in African language, so that all may know
the laws of the land” to which they had to conform, “and so …realize under what Powers legal
proceedings” were instituted against them.119
With particular regard to the freedom of speech, KCA urged that clauses in the Native
Authority Ordinance, under which Africans were denied the right of free speech, free press, and
the holding of meetings, be removed arguing that “liberty in these matters” was “the first
essential in any democracy,” and was “a traditional privilege of all free men under the British
flag.” To withhold from the Africans this freedom, was to “deny them the elementary rights of
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citizenship,” and “a cause of grievance” which militated “against the Kikuyu taking an active
part in the civic life of the country for the benefit of all concerned.”120 The association was
particularly critical of the fact that measures obstructing public meetings inflicted “considerable
hardship upon law-abiding citizens” as they were evoked to break up family functions, for
example, traditional weddings and beer-drinking parties. The KCA memorandum cited Criminal
Case No. 83/29, which was heard at Fort Hall, by a 3rd class magistrate. In this case a Kikuyu
named Daniel Kingori, who was also a member of the local native council, was arrested with two
others, after being found conversing in a house following an evening meal. After they were
convicted, the magistrate ordered the first and second accused to refrain from visiting the third
accused. It is such ridiculous restrictions that alarmed the Africans, who were led to think that
they are treated as though they were slaves.
But despite such a plausible argument presented by the KCA, the deputy governor argued
that, “to understand the laws of Kenya a native would not only have to be an expert Swahili
scholar but would also have to attain to a far clearer understanding of legal definitions and
distinctions than is compatible with his present stage of unintellectual development.”121 Further,
the deputy governor doubted whether there was a single “native in Kenya” who would “benefit
in the slightest by the monumental work of translating the volumes of the Laws of Kenya, and
even if this were done there would still be the work of translating every amendment and every
rule. Sundry attempts had been made to summarize some of the Ordinances which most
obviously concern the native in his everyday life, such as the Native Authority Ordinance but the
attempts were not particularly successful.”122
The KCA memorandum had specifically criticized the ordinance arguing that the
appointment of chiefs in positions of leadership should have been by election as opposed to
government nomination. The memo stated that clause 8 (q) of the law be deleted because under it
Africans were “deprived freedom of speech, press, holding of meetings” yet they deserved to
enjoy the same rights as Europeans and Indians. In addition, the memo called for the abolition of
“kipande”; municipal permits; restrictions on ownership of land in townships and highlands;
120
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domestic servants’ certificates; and the removal of all restrictions on free movement of Africans.
The KCA argued that the cumulative effect of registration, having to obtain special entry permits
before entering a town and having to produce a certificate of employment was estrangement of
the Africans in their own land since they enjoyed “greater liberty outside their own country than
in it.” This was a form of control “only accorded to criminals in other countries” and when
exacted in Kenya gave “rise to constant hardship and resentment.”123
Beyond this, the KCA called for representation in the legislative council and African
representation in the Executive Council. The memo went on to argue that taxation without
representation was an unjust principle. Further, for over thirty years, taxes collected from
Africans were “spent largely for benefit of non-Africans without knowledge or consent of
Africans.” Yet, Africans too had needs and urgently needed education and hospital facilities,
roads and agricultural improvements. In Nairobi, the taxes were “heavier than many poor
Africans” could bear, “for in addition to the Poll tax of 12/- a year, and certain other taxes, those
settled in the Native Location” also paid a ground rent of £3 per year for the land on which they
erected their huts yet their wages were very low. In spite of such arguments, African living
conditions remained poor as the cost of living skyrocketed raising the concern of both the
colonial intelligence apparatus and the legislative assembly.

Urban Issues and Disabilities: Political Unrest
Housing, in major urban areas and townships, was a serious problem. House rents rose
and accommodation was difficult to obtain, while there was a tendency to increase hotel and
boarding house prices. Although investigations were launched to examine the cost of living for
Africans living in Nairobi, it had, undoubtedly, risen considerably.124 The Government Housing
Committee, which was also known as the Number Sub-committee, showed that, by 1943, in
Nairobi alone, 14,000 Africans were “unhoused” out of a population of 52,000.125 Some 12,000
Africans had left the city and its environs as a result of this but especially on account of food
shortage with 4,000 of them receiving free railway tickets to do so.
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Subsequently, strikes were on the rise, especially in Mombasa and Nairobi, throughout
the 1940s proving that African poverty was, indeed, the cause of agitation. It proved, as Henry
Muoria wrote in Mumenyereri, that when Africans asked for more land, it was because they had
none. When they asked for more pay, it is because their pay was not enough. Furthermore, when
people asked for the removal of the “kipande,” it was because they had seen its drawbacks.
When they asked for better housing, it was because they needed it.126 As such, Muoria had
argued, it was quite obvious that they were agitating because of the treatment they received from
Europeans. They, therefore, had a right to ask for whatever they felt they needed. After all, it was
natural for any person to long for better living.127
Thus, in October 1942 alone, there were, as expected by the authorities, 19 strikes
involving over 700 employees. In almost every case, labor made a simple demand for higher
wages to meet the extra cost of living and agreed to go back on the understanding that their
demands would be considered. It was also noted that the African food shortage seemed likely to
be a cause for strikes. With respect to these strikes, another probable cause was that action under
the Fact Finding Committee for some form of cost of living bonus had not been implemented
earlier.128 African taxi drivers also went on strike to protest petrol rationing.129 It is telling that a
colonial administration that was fond off leveling the standard condemnation of any African
protest as political agitation that bordered on the criminal did not do so under these
circumstances. Instead, they saw the inherent wisdom of relaxing this official response template.
To stimulate meat supplies to Africans and ease the food shortage, the Municipal Native Affairs
Officer even suggested the relaxation of rigid health standards and the introduction of camel
meat.130
Cumulative hardship occasioned African unrest in towns. But urban unrest was not
exactly new. It was palpable and had been on the rise since the late 1930s. Indeed, it was the
subject of intense debate at the legislative council in the late 1940s. Not everyone in the echelons
of colonial authority was convinced that African expression of grievance, distilled as it was in
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the cauldron of various experiential hardships, was genuine. The legislative council member for
the coast region that was hit by a series of successive labor strikes during this period, S.V.
Cooke, criticized and indicted the colonial government for the very perturbing trend of affairs in
the country. He castigated the government for its weak and vacillating policy so far as Africans
of Kenya were concerned. Cooke felt that the political agitation that was rising and sweeping like
a rapid tide throughout African reserves in Kenya was a symptom and not a cause of unrest.131
Cooke alleged that arresting people was not the solution to the problem and, in 1939, he
had made it his business to see Sir Henry Moore, soon to be the governor of Kenya, about it. As
he saw it, the vocal and voluble members of the African community whom the government liked
to call agitators were working on fertile soil. It was too easy for them to get support because the
government gave them every opportunity on which to thrive: the dissatisfaction and unrest in the
colony. After all, the government made little effort to remove the grievances thereby offering
them up on a plate to the agitators. When there was trouble these agitators ended up in prison but
that was not the right way, Cooke argued, to tackle a problem that was too deep, which had to be
tackled at the roots.132
Cooke’s view was supported by Eliud Mathu, the first African member of the legislative
council, who opined that between 1939 and 1948, the African population started to show the
government and the world at large that it was alive to the problems in Kenya. This, Mathu
thought, was one of the reasons why the government saw “political agitation” among the African
community. But it was not political agitation, Mathu argued. What was happening, in his
opinion, was that “the brain of the African” had “started to function in a proper way” such that
the Africans were becoming conscious that they were members of a society, and as members of
that society they wanted to play their full part in the activities of that society.133
However, the Chief Native Commissioner, Wyn Harris, dismissed such views and argued
that Cooke’s motion was unnecessary. Africans, he countered, only had themselves to blame,
especially considering three points: one, his labor output had decreased since 1939; two, the
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African trading was uneconomically active; and three, more than ever before, Africans looked to
government to supply their wants and gave little thought to the doctrine of self-help.134 Harris
was of the view that there was a belief that the administration was omnipotent. An attitude
prevailed that when there was unrest and where difficulties prevailed, the administration, being
omnipotent, could put things right if it wanted to. In his opinion, the Cooke and Mathu view was
that the administration was failing in its plain duty unless it removed all causes of dissatisfaction
and difficulty from every community. If high wages were demanded by the worker, the
administration was to see that high wages were paid; if higher output was required, then the
administration had to ensure that every worker worked long and willingly. The administration,
according to skeptics, had not only to produce bricks without straw but also produce houses
without bricks. If squatters from Naivasha clamored on Government House lawn for land in the
Limuru farm area, the administration had to provide farms and, at the same time, “persuade the
unfortunate dispossessed European farmers that the whole thing” was “fair and for the best of all
possible worlds.” That, as far as its critics were concerned, when land was short, the
administration, could, of course, make “the desert blossom like the rose….”135
At the same time, however, Harris also conceded that the nature of any administration in
the British Colonial Empire was framed in such a way that the rights of the individual and the
belief that the individual was more important than the state, was bound to encourage the demand
by the governed for more and more share in their government, and if every demand by the
governed for more self-government was not immediately met, obviously the governed began to
question the bona fides of that government. This could cause lack of confidence but it was itself
inherent in a democratic empire, and participation in government was bound to increase the
appetite it fed upon.136
Mathu snapped on this point to state that this was exactly what the African wanted: a
niche in the colonial political economy. Mathu stated that that is what the African wished for
when he requested to play a great part in the trade of the country such that when he did not get
the trading licenses he felt that there was a certain amount of discrimination thus accusing the
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government of not giving him the licenses for which he applied. The same applied to the land
problem particularly in the Central Province. Mathu said that the legislative council had heard on
many occasions that there was congestion in the African land units. That there were more people
than the land could hold. According to Mathu, the African always asked, “What is the solution?
Give us more land?” The government answered saying that there was no land yet the African
saw that there were acres and acres of land lying in the European areas, some of it undeveloped,
some with one person on it. “What about that?” Mathu posed.137 It was evident in the course of
this debate that there was a general agreement between members that the administration was
faced with “very, very difficult problems most of which” were economic. As the member for
Ukambani, Major Joyce, observed, it was the economic pressure underneath that was causing
most of the unrest. It was clear for him that from such unrest arose political agitation, because
political agitation had been proved in history as the means whereby unrest was voiced and, in
some cases, causes of unrest cured.138 While this was an acknowledged and undeniable fact, the
government was defensive of its integrity with regard to the matter and its position vacillated
between admission of responsibility and resolution and denial in the same breath.
As such, it is no surprise that not very long after the debate, at the end of 1951, Cooke
stood on the floor of the legislative council and charged that when the public asked for bread, all
they received was a stone.139 On 11th May 1951 when the ministry of finance reported to the
council on the report of the Cost of Living Commission in November 1948, it stated that it was
extremely difficult to pin down the unfortunate and intractable problem of the cost of living. It
had the unfortunate habit of changing even while it was under consideration.140 Seven months
later, the Finance Secretary, V.G. Matthews, echoed the same refrain when he asked members to
face the facts: there was no use pretending that it was within the government’s power to bring
down the cost of living because it was not.141 Those charged with duties in relation to the cost of
living soon realized the irresistible nature of the forces with which they contending. This irked
Cooke who viewed this statement as most defeatist and most shameful. Cooke said that that was
“the most untrue statement” that he had heard from a government official in the Council. The
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official’s statement was in complete disagreement with the Conservative Party in Britain where
Churchill had said that there was a compelling need to halt inflation. Cooke also quoted Harold
MacMillan, British Minister of Housing and Local Government, who had expressed his hatred
for the words “it cannot be done.”142
Further, Cooke cited an article carried in the leading organ of educated Africans, Baraza,
which had stated that it was all very well for the government to tell the LegCo that the rises were
beyond its control or that the government had done all that it could to hold prices down: but the
public simply did not believe it, particularly as far as farm produce was concerned.143 Cooke also
ridiculed the secretary for agriculture’s big gaff of stating that the cost of ordinary foodstuffs in
Kenya was, as far as he knew, lower than anywhere else in the world. He challenged the
secretary to refute that maize, which was the staple food for over 95% of the people of Kenya,
was not cheaper in Uganda and South Africa.144 In retrospect, it is apparent that the government
did not heed Cooke’s ominous warning that people in Kenya bitterly resented the government’s
attitude to this and similar matters.

The Colonial Assault on African Cosmos, Traditional Lifestyles and Values
Less than forty years earlier, Sir Percy Girouard, one of the architects of the colonial
edifice, eloquently proposed how Africans could be wooed out of their assuring idyllic life of
independence, self-reliance and, from the outset, a disproportionate leisure-filled lifestyle of
dance, celebration and traditional beer-drinking by increasing the cost of living.145 By the early
1930s, the Kikuyu Central Association was demanding freedom for dances. In a memo presented
to the British government in London, the association argued that dances, especially the
Muthunguci for elderly women and men, was the only recreation available. Commenting on
KCA demands, the governor stated that he had no sympathy with the request for unlimited
license. As far as dancing was concerned, this open-air pastime commonly led to all sorts of
excesses, drunkenness and immorality.146 It is worth noting that African traditional dances,
especially in the context of colonialism, were the source of communal awakening that offered
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some sort of transcendence that transported them from the inanity of their lives to some form of
meaning that enabled them to live a day at a time.147
But after African peasants had been caught up in the cash-nexus, that is the intricate web
of economic devices, such as wages and taxation as well as choking land, labor, conservation
amongst a gamut of various other legal strictures, the colonial regime was unwilling to turn back
the hand of time. Although finding a logical and manageable balance alleviating the burden of
colonial modernity foisted upon African backs was impossible, the overseers of the new colonial
order were content that the ultimate objective of instituting private capital and ownership of land
had been accomplished. That could not be undone. It could not as that would be a reversal of the
gains of the institution of imperial capitalism. The African pre-European world, however, had
been undone. Its socioeconomic and political fabric was ruptured, which was also the unspoken
cause of African “political agitation.” The bulk of this agitation was tied to the issue of land
alienation. It is important to stress why land alienation was such a pressing matter.
Land, according Job Muchuchu, an African contributor to Mugwithania, the Kikuyu
newspaper, was the breast on which the people suckled.148 As such, it was the chief sustenance,
“office” and/or “bank” that Africans bequeathed from one generation to another for centuries.
According to another contributor to Muigwithania from Nyeri, Charles Ngundo, the land had
sustained the children of the Maina and Mwangi generations and had been passed on, since time
out of mind, to successive elders by Ndemi and Mathathi who were the very first Kikuyu to live
off the land.149 For Ngundo, the land was akin to a life bearing sacred sheep, Ng’ondu. It was the
communal cow that gave sustenance to the children of Maina and Mwangi. Land, Ngundo wrote,
was the primary or principal element in the inheritance apportioned to the Kikuyu by God.150
The effect of the alienation of such a precious resource, then, is not left to the
imagination. It occasioned untold anxiety and distress because it is not just land that was
physically taken away when it was commoditized and individualized. It was the very basis of
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African being that was removed.151 As it were, the African soul was gorged out when the land
was alienated. Put differently, land alienation had a profound pyschosociological impact upon
the African and his socioeconomic and political institutions. The alienation of land turned selfsufficient Africans into wage-labor thus causing one of the most crucial social upheavals of
twentieth-century Africa, and one, moreover, fraught with pregnant possibilities for the future of
Kenya and the continent beyond.152
Further, the other blow that was dealt upon the pre-European world was the systematic
decimation of the all-important cattle complex. After land, cattle, sheep and goats were the next
most important socioeconomic and political element that held together African life. It is no
wonder that livestock was equated to land. A specific number of the former could be used to
purchase land thought to be of similar value. As such, African wealth was either valued in land
or stock. Even during the early years of colonialism, and much later, livestock continued to be
used to store monetary value. Thus, the science of livestock thinning to improve herds and better
utilize pastureland, which for obvious reasons was embarked upon with great vigor in the 1930s
and 1940s, was a great devastation for Africans. The significance of the cattle complex was not
lost to early British observers of African life.
As early as 1908, for instance, Lt. Col. O.F. Watkins thought of the cattle industry as a
“cattle cult,” which was the corner stone of many pre-European African economies. According
to Watkins, cattle formed the woman’s marriage price; cattle were paid as blood money or for
inter-ethnic raids; cattle were the measure of a man’s wealth and social standing; cattle were the
investment of savings and the provision for old age; and cattle and women were the main if not
the sole inheritances. Cattle, Watkins concluded, were the main object of ambition and the
reward of endeavor.153 The acquisition and ownership of cattle was regarded as an important
indication of wealth and prestige.154 Since by custom stock changed hands through loans,
bridewealth or insurance against catastrophe between families, clans or even ethnic groups,
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bonds of acquaintance, friendship and family were forged and strengthened.155 Thus, the removal
of these two key economic pillars of traditional society, land and livestock, even without the
conversion of the Africans to the labor factor of production, caused inestimable damage. Indeed,
the impact consisted in the disintegration of entire ethnic groups and the unraveling of the
traditional social fabric and values.
In its submission to the Carter land commission, the Central and South Kavirondo
African Chamber of Commerce reiterated the importance of cattle. It stated that the possession of
cattle was very important for the life of the Africans as the possession of ready money and
estates was to Europeans. It is from this industry that the African drew his livelihood, especially
during harsh climactic or economic conditions; paid tax; fed himself and his family; and paid
dowry for his sons, bought clothes from the proceeds of ghee and the sale of whole milk.156 This
pre-European African self-sufficiency was replaced by the reduction of the African as a colonial
source of cheap labor that left people even more deprived than they ever were when all they had
to contend with were the vagaries of nature and disease. According to a Carter commission
witness, Zablon Aduse son of (s/o) Nyandoje, the reduction of the number of cattle that Africans
could keep from one-hundred to five per family pauperized people like him.157 The sum effect of
the imposition British control with regard to land, livestock and the disposal of labor, according
to the veteran African novelist, Chinua Achebe, put a knife on the things that held people
together. As a result, things fell apart.158 This was a process to which some conscientious British
administrators and settlers in Kenya were not blind.

Explanations of African Discontent: The Badly Flawed, the Proximate and the
Brazenly Ugly
Major General J. Orde Browne was one of a few first hand observers who sought to
explain and understand the impact of British colonialism and, by extention, African discontent.
Seeing the adverse impact of British colonialism among the Meru, Browne sought to analyze and
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document this phenomenal transformation in a book.159 Browne aptly captured and described this
transformation that, no doubt, caused a great deal of African insecurity, anxiety and distress. The
impact of this process was felt unevenly in British Kenya and the social ferment and political
consciousness that resulted, likewise, was not the same in intensity in various regions.
What is certain, however, is that colonialism across the board caused, according to
Browne, the “disintegration of the tribal soul” or “tribal integrity.” For this first hand observer of
this transformation, colonialism caused the “gullying of the tribal soul.”160 It destroyed the preEuropean cohesion individuals, families, fathers, brothers, friends and other social units as a
result of domination. The foreign control of virtually all aspects of life exposed the African
mind to the disorganizing action of individualism.161 The introduction of individualism to
Africans was at the expense of their own pre-European principle of mutuality and reciprocity.
While individual responsibility was an essential part of African culture, the individual African
was secondary to the social system within which s/he operated. In this social context, no one was
ever alone, even the unfortunate landless. Mutual dependence meant mutual obligation, which
was a way of being that was only clear to those who were keen.162
As such, fathers guaranteed that their sons and other dependents including the landless
ahoi among the Kikuyu acquired land, which was at no cost and was an inalienable right.163 The
right to cultivate land was vested in kinship units such as the extended family or clan.164 Fatherfigures such as uncles and cousins all contributed towards the bridewealth of their close kin
without demur. It was not unusual for family and friends to retaliate if such help was not availed.
Kinship also determined how and where one worked, and how much of what range of material
goods one had command over.165 Seldom, if ever, was labor hired.166 It is a fact that, under this
organic social organization in traditional African economies, the minimum level of material
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sustenance was guaranteed to all persons.167 Pre-European African societies were soldered
together by paternal obligations of the provision of sustenance in an unbroken bread-nexus. This
mutual responsibility sometimes went beyond bonds of kinship to embrace other ethnic groups
ensured that people upon whom others depended reciprocated when needed if catastrophe did not
visit them all. The poor in African societies did not have to beg or ask for charity from the welloff people who were usually senior males in society. Instead, wealthy men were bound by duty
to provide relief especially in times of dire need. It was a well-balanced system of entitlement
through which people gained access to essential food supply.168
According to Dalton, the onset of colonialism resulted in the erosion of these attributes of
African traditional society replacing the bread-nexus with the colonial capitalist imperatives of a
cash-nexus with its insistence on the invisible forces of demand and supply of the prime
necessities of life.169 The market, introduced by colonialism, became the dispenser of subsistence
and sustenance.170 The cash-nexus with its institutional, policy and legal supports altered the
relationship of people to food. Put differently, colonial capitalism altered and broke-down this
relationship between people and food, which was enshrined in systems of power, property and
law in African societies.171 Therefore, land, which was the basic source of subsistence and
sustenance, became the central stage of the struggle for freedom and independence.
By the 1940s, traditional civic virtue was just but a myth, which began to mock the
African majority rather than inspire.172 African father-figures, big men who were custodians of
mutual responsibility and who had been entrusted with the welfare of the community no longer
welcomed dependents. Indeed, with the atomization of what was organic communal
organization, rapine individualism ensured the expropriation of dependents. Without land and
having to sell labor, young men could ill afford food, housing or even dowry and so, they could
not marry. This, ultimately, is what led to the growth of African political consciousness and
agitation and, when grievances and petitions elicited no official response, the Mau Mau war in
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the 1950s. The Mau Mau war ought to be understood against this broad context of the African
experience of the social, policy and legal production of injustice and loss of dignity in the
colonial political economy.
Transformation in the means of life, and how they were produced, exchanged and shared
out, and the social institutions that the whole process gave rise to profound shockwaves in the
African body politic. It affected the very quality of life. It affected what and how they ate, spent
leisure time if at all they did, when and how they got married, and according to Ngugi wa
Thiong’o, how they made love.173 Ngugi wa Thiong’o did not exaggerate the psychic impact of
colonialism in Kenya. According to Thiong’o, British imperialism affected elements of African
life that constituted a universe of moral significance and values that determined the quality of
human life and dignity.174 After all, even to the British administrative cadres, it was rather
obvious that the government interfered in most aspects the African’s life: his land, his
agriculture, his animal husbandry, his judicial system, his laws, his health and his education
among a host of others things that came within the scope of government’s activities of
instruction and control.175 For Browne, this foreign domination was a force of disruption that had
spectacular effect akin to gully erosion. Both colonial administrators and missionaries were
agents of the disintegration of political and religious ideas augmenting the process of
individualization. According to Browne, colonial capitalism and Christianity erected new
boundaries that went beyond the family and ethnic groups resulting to social differentiation. As a
result, African societies were damaged beyond repair.176
Further, Browne argues that what was once organic was transformed into the mechanical
and artificial. African authority and power was vulgarized when councils of elders that once
presided over communal affairs were replaced by chiefs. Offenders were punished individually
and individual murderers were removed instead of making their clans pay up. Colonial agents
introduced the outright sale by individuals to other individuals of land, labor and livestock.
Individual taxation was introduced. So was cash, which did not breed, except in the post office,
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as the new medium of exchange.177 Cash crops, which were useless until when exchanged for
cash, were now grown. The British also introduced individual identification of the African by a
system which in their own homeland, they only found necessary for their warriors and their
criminals.178
Yet, these individualizing efforts did not finish there as already observed. Colonial
authorities used cunning policies in an attempt to detach from the family unit one of its important
member: the cow.179 Afraid of overstocking produced by their insistence on scientific rather
than spiritual values, colonial administrators did their best to destroy the cohesion between
families by selling their symbols through auction and then acted rather surprised at African
response to it all.180 Livestock was a sign of usufruct of land and insurance for children and
grandchildren.
According to Browne, it was difficult for people like him who were brought up on
individualism, to visualize its effects on a traditional economy based on reciprocity. Even more
interesting, Browne thought that taking livestock by force was “tantamount…to the
commandeering of entailed estates.” For Browne, destocking through state agency, for example
the police, was an act of war. But unlike cattle taken in war, African livestock taken through
destocking were not replaceable. So there developed a state of strain between two loyalties –the
African’s customary respect of his in-laws and his imposed respect for colonial by-laws.181
Although it cannot be said that he had complete comprehension of the full measure of
African colonial transformation, Browne criticized his own race for failing to discern the
working principle and the institutions of which they were a function and upon which the integrity
of African societies depended. He argued that when, through colonial agency, these institutions
lost power, the principles which produced and maintained them were called into question,
critically examined and since they failed to meet the new need, were discarded as no longer
applicable.182 Browne thought that this was an unconscious mental process but it was nonetheless
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real. In a sense, this did manifest itself in the rivalry between young Kikuyu men and big African
men who were the traditional authority figures backed up by the colonial power structure.
Despite the fact that this tension was obvious since the late 1920s when colonial transformation
was beginning to be felt, this quiet disintegration was obscure to colonial administrators.183 Since
the British could hardly expect readily to realize the inapplicability of their own rules of life
immediately to Africans, resistance and political opposition was explained in terms of obstinacy
or racial backwardness of the ruled rather than lack of intelligence or imagination in the ruling.184
All this was somewhat clear to Browne and it worried him. Although Browne shared his
sentiments with his superiors as evidenced in the existence of his manuscript in official colonial
records and published in his book in 1925, it is obvious that his warning below went unheeded.
Browne wrote:
Perhaps to the administrative officer the most disturbing symptom of the effect of the
European occupation of East Africa is the evident disunity which it has induced in the
native tribes, the weakening of the integrating forces, the less of the typically African
theory of communal responsibility and mutual help, and of the spiritual principle of the
continuity of the past, present and future. …
Disintegration is to a certain extent inevitable whenever one race takes upon itself the
government of another with a different economy. Local institutions are usually incapable
of adapting themselves to new conditions without assistance, and that assistance is not
forthcoming because the alien government is generally unaware of the strain to which the
indigenous institutions are subjected and indeed frequently unaware of their very
existence.185
Whatever one might call it; colonial wisdom, intelligence or imagination, it is obvious
that the project of building the Kenya colony as a white man’s haven had serious legal and policy
flaws that the architects were either unaware of or simply ignorant about. What is more is that
the rather obvious consequences of colonial laws and policies upon African subjects of the crown
were dismissed as political agitation. The alienation of land and labor and erasure of the
centrality of the cattle industry in African life had a deleterious effect on pre-European social
networks and institutions of mutual obligation and reciprocity.
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In turn, this took a psychosociological toll upon the African, which, in a final
demonstration of arrogant ignorance after the outbreak of the Mau Mau, was explained by 19th
century science as either the African’s anatomical deficiency or by theories of culture and
personality purporting to account for his “backwardness.”186 Mental health practitioners like the
Kenyan pathologist F.W. Vint, South Africans D.J.F. Laubscher and Wulf Sachs, the French
Algerian Antoine Porot and John C. Carothers who, between 1900 and 1960, regarded
themselves as authorities on the psychology and behavior of African people, were influenced by
the social and political context in which they operated.

Besides their ridiculous anatomical pseudoscience that sought to prove the supposed
fundamental inferiority of Africans by adducing data on the morphology of the brain, these
colonial psychiatrists ignored the fundamental springs of African political action. Indeed, they
argued that the African’s alleged moral and intellectual retardation legitimated the colonial
political system designed to ensure a plentiful supply of unskilled, segregated, poorly paid
laborers.187 It is significant that McCulloch, an anthropologist, demonstrated the dated nature of
this ethnopyschiatry in its social and political context. However, in view of the foregoing
discussion of African experiences conditioned by the oppressive colonial system, it is important
to debunk the psychological explanations of Mau Mau by F.D. Corfield and J.C. Carothers. It is
important to conclude this discussion of the experiential anxiety of African transformation in
time, space and place during colonialism with a commentary on this blotch in colonial Mau Mau
historiography. At the same time, it is equally important to do so with reference to recent 21st
century trends in the development of the discipline of psychology in order to appreciate the
limitations of colonial ethnopsychiatry of the last.
In this regard, Carother’s monograph, The Psychology of Mau Mau, is worth singling out
for that purpose. Carothers did not dispute that there was a drastic transition that colonial
capitalism initiated. He also stated that even European societies were prone to the fluid world of
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probabilities in the age of industrial modernity. Such change caused social disorganization that
was for the most part a phenomenon of a great transition. Great transitions, even in western
societies, caused movements that broke up the social systems that controlled and integrated the
behavior of people. As such, it was expected that when European influence impinged on the
African, his whole cultural machinery was apt to collapse quickly.188 To his credit, Carothers
recognized that Mau Mau arose from the development of an anxious conflictual situation in
people who, from contact with the alien culture, had lost the supportive and constraining
influences of their own culture, which caused individual and collective internal conflict.189

Carothers thus acknowledged that the great bulk of the population was, in a transitional
state and that this was, indeed, psychologically the chief thing that could be said about African
societies in Kenya. These then were the points of departure from which Carothers plunged into a
lengthy consideration of what were the essential elements of African psychology in transition.190
In so doing, Carothers, who was one of the most progressive psychologists and an obvious leader
in the area of transcultural psychology, deviated from objective psychological analysis thus
tangentially failing to make a significant contribution to his discipline. As McCulloch observes,
it is surprising and ironic that Carothers’s progressive recommendations for culturally sensitive
and humane delivery of mental health care, of which present day psychiatrists might approve,
coexisted with racist notions of cognitive and moral inferiority.191

In his report of Mau Mau psychology, Carothers repeated insinuations of African racial
and moral inferiority and intellectual underdevelopment first enunciated in his contribution, in
1940, to the East African Medical Journal entitled, “Some speculations on insanity in Africans
and in general.” In the article, he had argued that the African, like adolescents and like European
people with schizophrenia, lived in a world of fantasy which he projects on the outside world,
while denying personal responsibility for his own actions. In his work, Carothers provided a
rationalization for conventional white settler beliefs about “the African.” One of the key
weaknesses of Carothers’s work was his reliance on child rearing practices to explain both
188
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psychopathic traits and alleged intellectual deficits, including an apparent lack of logic and
abstract thought.192 In the Psychology of Mau Mau, Carothers attributed the war to the
upbringing of Kikuyu men who were spoiled in their early childhood. African infants, Carothers
stated, were suckled for a lengthy period, often up to two or even three years. Devoted mothers
carried the African male child wherever they went, and handled him with confidence, pandered
to all his whims, and fed him on demand. He was thus, for a long period, indulged to a fault and,
although his ultimate weaning was relatively abrupt, he must have carried into later life some
vague remembrance of a blissful time when the world responded to his slightest whimper to
satisfy all his desires.193

There was thus, Carothers concluded, a tendency of viewing the past as a Golden Age,
hence the need to try and put the clock back. Colonial administrators and white settlers had
Carothers to thank for what became one of the most popular explanations of Mau Mau that was
broadcast around the world: it was an atavistic movement of crazed nut heads. Put differently,
Carothers, while admitting the destabilizing impact of colonial agromodernity, urbanization and
erosion and corruption of indigenous African principles and institutions which caused anxiety,
argued, at the same time, that Africans had not lost their “magic” modes of thinking. Carothers’
report emphasized the role of animistic and magical modes of explanation in producing a
childlike mentality and molding the “psychopathic” character of the nationalist rebels, while
ignoring the fundamental cause of the Mau Mau uprising, which was the misappropriation of
Kikuyu land.194 But this is not the basis worth indicting Carothers’s judgment because, as stated,
he was a product of the social and political context and the times in which he lived.

However, what is worth putting under the microscope is the psychological paradigm of
radical or critical psychology within which his work was, approximately, premised. This
psychological framework locates the source of distress firmly in the structures of society that
lead to oppression and concerns itself with proposing interventions aimed at preventing these
from occurring.195 That this was the paradigm that informed Carothers is evidenced by Llyod’s
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insightful observation on the top-down acceleration of agricultural capitalism and colonial
visions for rehabilitation in the wake of the Mau Mau war. Llyod took note of the startling
paradox of the colonial visions for reform and a “modern” Kenya, which endorsed the idea that
supposedly “detribalized” Kikuyus would be “cured” through a state-organized attempt to
“retribalize” them. That is, the attempt by colonial authorities to send them back in time to an
idealized communal, agrarian “past,” in which they would reconnect to the peacefulness of their
“old lives” by being surrounded by their families and elders.196 Llyod traced this romantic notion
that Kikuyu communities could be teleported back to a prelapsarian existence arranged around
the “village” back to both Carothers and Leakey in their contributions to understanding the Mau
Mau crisis.197 As such, colonial psychology and psychiatric analysis failed to do justice to the
particularity of distress and the complexity of the anxious experience wrought by colonial
transformation of African societies. It did not go far enough to understand what produced this
anxiety and distress because the analysis was dimensional, reductive and generalizing.198 For this
reason, it is important to revisit this matter with the aim of better understanding the African
colonial experience. In so doing, advances and new approaches that have since taken place in the
field of psychology must be reflected and employed. What follows below is a brief probe into the
manner in which this can be done and thus debunk and deconstruct biased and dated
explanations discussed above.

The Imperial Catastrophe of Relative Deprivation: Towards an Understanding
of Narratives of African Discontent
It is imperative and necessary, in light of the foregoing, to employ recently developed
analytical approaches for a better understanding of, not only Mau Mau psychology but, also, the
experiential cauldron from which was born the spirit of Kenyan nationalism and the struggle of
independence. At a very rudimentary level, it is possible to examine, and therefore understand
and appreciate, the African experience through the Maslowian North American humanistic

of Distress in Public and Private Fora,” Emotion, Space and Society 1 (2008): 56.
196
Thomas Llyod, “Making ‘Mau Mau’: Remaking Kikuyus; Remaking Kenya?” Paper Presented at the Researching
the Colonial and Postcolonial Workshop, 41. The emphasis in italics are the current author’s.
197
Ibid. Some keen obervers would argue, aptly, that the same can, and should, be said of Browne’s analysis in the
1920s.
198
McGrath et al., “The Scenes and Spaces of Anxiety,” 56 & 57.

122

dialectic. That is, seeing African’s bitter “experience” as the cumulative inner complication of a
structure of needs over the course of life.199 In this sense, the continued frustration of Africans as
they struggled for the basic necessities of life including food, water sources, dwelling space,
shelter, pasture and salt-licks for their livestock; a quality, secure and stable livelihood, selfmastery and agency, dignity and respect; and freedom from fear led to anxiety and mounting
petitions and call for redress, which, when unmet or unsatisfactorily addressed, led to armed
resistance. But this is a rather simplistic and outdated analysis. Recent developments in the
discipline of psychology have made it possible to come to an even more complex understanding
of the psychology of oppression and experiential anxiety that produced amongst Africans a
mentalité. Deleuzian scholarship is a good case in point.

Deleuzian scholarship, which derives from the work of the French Philosopher, Gilles
Deleuze, has gained a lot of currency in the last decade. It presents a more complex
understanding of human experience suggesting that it is best grasped as a form of multiplicity.200
In this sense, human experience constitutes of different but mediated parts or planes that are
irreducible to one another. There are, therefore, a multiplicity of intersecting forms or planes of
experience including the psychological plane; the spatial plane; and the social plane etc. The
total sum of experience is equally affective, spatial, embodied, material, technological and so
on.201 As such, what colonial psychiatry, using the unidimensional approach, narrowly called
“psychological” referred to only one set of a multiplicity of planes of experience.

Put differently, the picture presented by colonial psychiatric analyses of Mau Mau was
not only biased but also severely limited in its methodology. Limited as it was in its approach,
colonial psychiatry was blind to intersecting planes of anxiety that made up the sum of the
African colonial experience. Deleuzian analysis, then, should be deployed to scrutinize the actual
African emotion that drove anti-colonial “resistance” and “nationalism” in Kenya and elsewhere.
African societies found themselves being encroached by a harsh colonial policy and legal edifice
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that produced an unfamiliar socioeconomic and political environment that they found difficult to
navigate.

The crown land ordinances (1902/1915), for instance, shifted the ownership of land,
previously an immovable public common, from Africans to the British crown. Further, it meant
the physical removal of Africans and their livestock out of their physical spaces of habitation.
This appropriation of land also meant that Africans had limited access to agricultural land, and
therefore, denied their basic source of subsistence and livelihood. This had serious impingements
and repercussions on their existence in as far as the physical space namely, land and other
associated aspects of life such as the cattle complex, rivers, wells, salt-licks, forests etc. that
together, formed their basic subsistence and acted as integral life-supports.

At the same time, the colonist, imbued with authority, promoted and reinvented the
physical landscape to suit his/her own modern tastes. This meant even more evictions as the
colonist installed the physical apparatus of empire and modernity namely game reserves, roads,
the railway, harbors, new towns, forts and stockades, plantations among other incursions on the
landscape. These were constructed at a heavy cost for the pre-European African socio-economic
order.202 This also marked the arrival of “modernity” and the introduction of “relative time,” the
Western measurement of absolute time, an instrument effectively employed to extract African
labor in hours’-work days. Moreover, it resulted in the creation of a world that emphasized the
economic imperatives of the colonial capitalist market and monetary system with its strict
insistence of honoring partial justice to the right of property and wealth. This was at the expense
of, and out of balance with, natural humanity of ordinary laboring African people.203 The
resultant colonial modernity, guarded by the usurpation of power, a racial hierarchy and
deployment of violence, was one of socioeconomic inequalities in which settlers sat, prim and
exclusively, at the top of the coterminous material conditions of life.
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The situation of colonial oppression and respective material well-being was manifest in
space and place. On the one hand, the colonist settler resided in spacious houses in exclusive
wealthy neighborhoods. Suburban streets were clean and brightly lit with well-manicured trees
lining either side; there was seldom any litter thanks to cheap African labor; material objects and
signifiers of modern sophistication including parked cars or bicycles reflected peace, order and
organization; and seldom did the well-fed and well-dressed people, either in the huge boulevards
or the spacious houses, feel hemmed in or crowded. In such neighborhoods, people were cordial
and helpful to all as long they fit the requisite characteristics, usually racial.204

On the other had were congested workers quarters where one or two African families
shared a single room and ghettoes or informal settlements where the oppressed lived in
dilapidated tenements, hovels, and shacks. The streets, if paved, were rough and full of potholes,
forbidding because they were poorly lit and dark; garbage collection was sporadic and there was
litter everywhere; and one could catch a glimpse of the ill-fed and badly dressed denizens of such
places. Their rural counterparts were crowded in “reservations” that served as a source of cheap
labor. In both urban and rural settings was to be found squalor, the sight of malnourished
children, poverty and disease and, for that reason, death hung in the air.205 African colonial
societies in Kenya were a living specimen fossilized in impoverished, marginal and diseased
spaces and places set in rosy background of a colonial modernity to which they contributed, but
from which they were discriminatively shunned.

All the above, the institutionalized violence of the colonial conquest state (military,
paramilitary and police); and the legal and policy architecture alienating both land and labor as
well as imposing other strictures such as the movement of Africans, food and use of natural
resources such as rivers and forests, was all part of a systematic negation of the African that
denied him all attributes of humanity. What this meant was that, at different planes of experience
(time, space and place), most Africans suffered experiential anxiety as a result of imperial
transformation. Colonization was, for the majority of them, a catastrophe. For many, this was not
the only catastrophe. Racial discrimination exacerbated this experience. Some could have
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afforded and been able to gain a place amongst the settlers because their education and
socioeconomic means allowed them. They were, nevertheless, denied an equal place or share in
the barefaced and racialized hierarchical modernity.

In particular, land alienation stood out as brutal and inconsiderate kind of spatial
injustice. It is, therefore, important to reiterate here its psychological impact it must have had on
Africans. At the height of the Mau Mau war in the 1950s, a leading settler politician, Lt.-Col.
Ewart Grogan, proposed, in a legislative council debate concerning the progress of the
Emergency, land alienation as weapon that, if employed, was sure to end it. For him, it was the
only one weapon that was likely to have “the slightest effect” by providing a massed
psychological shock to the Kikuyu ethnic group as a whole was the land.206
Grogan suggested that in the case of “treason” and “rebellion” such as the Mau Mau
uprising, the crown reserved the right to bring the whole or part of the land unit back to the
category of crown land. Then every single inhabitant would know that he was personally subject
to the crown. But, more importantly, he clarified, Africans did not think of anything else except
land. That was because their roots were in the land –everything derived from the land. The whole
“tribal system” was like a tree that spreads from the land –the title of the land- and it was the
very symbol of authority. Taking it away as punishment against the Kikuyu would, therefore,
provide a massed psychological shock.207 This is an important and instructive point. The said
desired psychological shock with respect to exaction of “deserved” punishment in the 1950s was
a miniature of the old colonial plot of the “legal” alienation of African lands in 1902 and 1915. It
had the same effect as the unwarranted illegal and systematic deprivation of a resource from
which everything through the crown land ordinances. Indeed, the latter was even more
detrimental considering that it was not “deserved” or “punitive.” This point helps underscore the
primacy of land alienation as, perhaps, the most painful plane of experiential distress.

The primacy of land among other resources cannot be underestimated in as far as it
defines self-mastery or competent living and the efficacious security of livelihood. According to

206
207

Legco. Deb., LXIII (21st October 1954): 341 & 342.
Ibid.

126

leading scholars of personality and the social branch of psychology in general, and Subjective
Well-Being (SWB) in particular, societal resources, such as land, at people’s disposal allow them
to make progress in achieving their goals and enable them to lead a life of satisfaction and
affective well-being. In this emergent field that studies people’s cognitive and affective
evaluations of their lives, it is suggested that income and human rights correlate with SWB
because they affect the ability of individuals and communities to achieve diverse goals.208
Control of land among other vital natural, human and financial assets is, indeed, at the center of
basic human rights and dignity. The loss of this central resource by African societies produced
the mentalité of struggle across the board the only difference being its degree of ferment. This
spirit questioned the colonial situation and order that engendered the psychology of oppression.
This mental attitude of discontent and criticism of the colonial order was lodged in the African
mind by the end of the second decade of the 20th Century. Among the Kikuyu, this
pyschosociological ferment came to violent fruition in the early 1950s. It is important to observe
that it was quite self-evident as oppressed Mau Mau minds in chrysalis elsewhere in the colony.
This is an argument that merits exposition.

The Production of Mentalité of Struggle: Mau Mau Minds in Chrysalis
The foregoing discussion above has been an attempt to approximate the African
experience of ordinary people in the process of engaging everyday realities of colonial life, space
and time. It demonstrates that African anxiety emanated from the world into which pre-European
societies had suddenly been thrust.209 British policies and laws reconfigured space and social
reality to suit imperial tastes. The inherent telekinesis of colonial capital moved African societies
forward in time. The colonial landscape of roads, railway networks, harbors, forts, electric
plants, townships and trading centers was strange and had created an altogether different set of
problems to which Africans were unaccustomed. It simultaneously baffled and outraged the
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African mind, and destabilized meaning and certainty.210 The legal and policy architecture, the
falling apart of the African social fabric and the ensuing struggle over the morality of social
differentiation was tragic for colonial societies. This is what the Mau Mau war was about. The
war was a demonstration of the desire to reconfigure the ordering of the colonial state favorably.
Certainly, it was a war of decolonization in which the demand of the colonized Kikuyu freedom
fighters had one basic demand: the whole social and colonial structure being changed from the
bottom up.211
As such, it was not inspired by the mental derangement of young Kikuyu men.212 This
colonial rupture, characterized as it was by experiential anxiety in the process of transformation
in space, place and time, constituted a profound psychic shock. When it was accompanied by the
knowledge and experience of inequalities in what had become, in effect, white man’s land, the
ensuing envy and suspicion ensured that the shock passed into desperate fury and unrelenting
outrage.213 It is important here to ponder on the expression of emotional distress occasioned by
imperialism. As there exists no documentation in terms of diaries of individual experiences or
communal narratives of discontent, the existing vocabulary of that could have been used to
express the range of emotional distress has been relied upon in this study in its endeavor to
reconstruct this unique but undocumented past. For the most part, this range of the vocabulary of
emotional distress is related to the impact of the loss of land on African life in general.

Before, British incursion, land was always there like the air. It was the pre-European
“bank” and “office” from which African societies not only drew sustenance, it was the cow that
gave sustenance. In 1927, Lieutenant Colonel O.F. Watkins, a self-taught student of indigenous
tenure, warned a group of Africans living ten miles outside Nairobi that colonialism that land
titles would mean the creation of “barons” who would own the land on which the rest of the
people would merely live until they were turned off. The African response had been that of
incredulity: there was that roar of uncomprehending laughter. Europeans could not possible turn
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them off, where would they go?214 But they did: mother earth, which was the breast from most
African societies suckled, had been rudely whipped right out of their mouths. The most
important thing had been taken away from them. This is the kind of thing, the Kikuyu
understood, that caused them to give out a heartrending cry because it could only mean one
thing, “ng’aragu” (starvation). It was, as such, no small deprivation.

This caused great afflictions and occasioned insuperable distress. African hearts were as
though dead. Colonialism, therefore, in as far as it affected land was “uriru.” It was a calamitous
catastrophe, a matter of great consternation, fear and bewilderment. Its impact must have also
been thought of as “gicanjama”: a calamity that was a cause of wonder. Its attendant policies
such as the exaction of taxes, issuance of passes and individual registration, the spatial
“organization” of the physical landscape into administrative units and African reservations and
alienation of labor brought about “nduikano”: a strain of pre-European social relations, values
and virtues that brought them to a “breaking-point.” Thus, British colonialism brought about
“nduikaniro,” a “snapping-point” or rupture of the old social and economic order of the past.

Moreover, the brutal application of these unjust laws and policies and measures of control
and exploitation with an air of racial superiority was mortifying. The ultimate effect was that
Africans felt that they had been heinously cheated, made a mock of, hated and looked down
upon. The hallmark of this kind of treatment was dispossession. The majority of Africans, who
were peasants, urban proletariat or house servants, were subjected to work in undignified
conditions and treatment. Whereas before colonial times there were individuals or bands that
wandered about aimlessly, with the creation of “rithafu” (the African reserve) and “rokiconi”
(location), Africans oftentimes now found themselves butted by the law because of “vagrancy”
After all, their movement, under colonialism, was constrained to specific administrative units.
Not only were people dispossessed, but also constantly moved or displaced as well as
constrained and confined in congested spaces. Overall, Africans were an insulted and scorned
people whose inheritance had been swindled and their living spaces, houses and villages,
occupied by white strangers. Under colonialism, life was an unfair and difficult burden.
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Within a very short period of time, Africans had become like orphans who now had to
buy water and fire wood among other essentials with money. This whole range of emotion and
bitter experience is expressed through various derivatives of the word “nyarira,” which means to
be plundered or squandered. Under the weight of the imposition of this oppressive system, the
Africans let out “mucaayo,” a great groan or moaning in individual and communal angst and
pain that they expressed in persistent cries, as prayers and petitions to the colonial authorities for
redress. As the “anyamari,” people under great suffering, poverty and destitution, they hoped
that their cries for help would elicit timely, fair and just colonial redress that would ease their
pain. This kind of experience of poverty and suffering, in and of itself, was enough for Africans
to be a tinderbox of latent agitation that awaited an explosive combustion especially when and
where it did not evoke empathetic and timely response.

Such words constitute an emotional register of colonial hardships and experience. It was,
therefore, only natural for Africans to agitate especially with regard to issues such as land, more
pay, taxation and individual registration among others. Their consistent petitions and outcry most
of the times went unanswered or, when it was, it wasn’t satisfactory enough. After all, under a
racial regime, they were third rate “citizens.” As a matter of fact, they were subservient colonial
subjects. This, then, was the early beginnings of outrage, anger and African discontent against
the oppressive colonial system. This mindset or attitude of struggle against the system in
chrysalis finds validation in the manifestation of the same profound experiential distress in other
ethnic groups caught up by the same colonial situation and social reality of grievous loss and
deprivation. Put differently, other ethnic groups in the colony exhibited the same register of
emotions that confirms the existence of a similar psychology of oppression and mentalité of
struggle in formation. The following section below explores this sense of outrage and Mau Mau
minds in chrysalis among the Luo and the Luhya.

Languishing Minds: The Psychology of Oppression Illustrated
The outrage with the colonial system, the desire for redress and justice, and psychology
of oppression was widely shared in Kenya. Members of the Kanyakwar Luo clan, for example,
made it clear that they sure would have, from the very start, given their lives for their land were
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it not for the fact that the British possessed the most formidable and latest weapons.215 With
bitterness, they complained to the KLC in 1932 about merciless dispossession of Kanyakwar
lands of Migosi, Nanga, Pandpieri, Dakakuoga and others that were transformed into the Kisumu
Township with the passing of the 1902 and 1915 land ordinances.216 They appreciated British
civilization but they argued that it did not solve the question of land which was the sole means of
their livelihood. They regretted that their woes in this regard had started with a simple agreement
between them and Charles W. Hobley who had asked for a small portion of Luo land at Kibuye
to erect a government boma. They never thought it important to keep a copy of the agreement
with Hobley since they never suspected that the word of a white man would be changed. Those
testifying claimed that people really believed what they were told about the British: that they
were the symbol of peace, justice, light and liberty.217 In the end, however, they had been
dispossessed and left in a desolate state, being deprived of their ancient land, and thus denying
them of their liberty and freedom that they had enjoyed for centuries. They were even forbidden
to hold any gathering in their own area or collect funds to enable them to make necessary
representations beneficial to them. This was whilst, in reality, their motive was to express their
great feelings only.218

At the same time, another group of Luhya elders lamented that the amendment of the
Native Lands Trust Ordinance, 1930, was contrary to the best interests of the community. They
strongly protested against it, pointing out that when the government of Kenya enacted laws, no
provision was made for African land security until this law which definitely promulgated African
reserves. Under this proviso, as per section 2 (1) of the ordinance, their understanding was that
designated reserves would be for the exclusive use of the Africans forever. However, any
proposed law, past and present, and their revision, they felt, always by-passed the native
authority. This they argued was inconsistent with common principles of justice and moral
fairness of the British Empire. Certain sections of the law in question, they noted, were being
repealed with regard to compensation by substituting money in lieu of land leaving the
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petitioners in great distress. Moreover, money, they argued, could not fully compensate the land
taken.219

It was believed, furthermore, that the colonial administration had reneged on the pledge
that reserves would be for their exclusive use because of its gold mining potential. The
petitioners said that this land was their safeguard of the last resort and upon which their only
hopes were pegged. They were especially in great distress of mind owing to the overflowing
number of more than a thousand Europeans into north Kavirondo in search of gold.220 This led to
overcrowding in an already congested area causing fear that their fate would be like that of
Johannesburg in South Africa where Africans had been rendered landless or had very little land
if any. For this reason, they were dreadful of the consequences that would overtake their
agricultural life. There were resettlement difficulties already for individuals targeted to be
disposed of their land for gold mining purposes. It was clear to them that their present and future
needs had not adequately been provided for. Further, they also feared the breakdown of the
African social fabric as good old customs and traditions inherited from their forefathers were
eroded.221

The same issue of compensation was a great concern for the Luo elders of Kisumu
location among them chiefs Nikodemo Okore and Oliech Obiro, Osiro Opinya and Olang Ogada.
Assisted by H.W. Innis, they complained that land that they had inherited from their fathers was
continually being taken from them. In 1907, 462 acres of Luo land was given to the B.E.A
Corporation as a result of which, some five-hundred people were obliged to give up their homes
without compensation. They lamented that they not only lost their land and homes but also the
graves of their ancestors, which had been left in the hands of strangers. This injustice, they
intimated, continued to rankle their hearts as many of those who were driven off were still
without land and had been compelled to make temporary homes elsewhere.222
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Specifically, they explained that their Kisian River land was now in the possession of an
Indian. Two acres of this land at German Point had also been allotted to a Dr. Harloff who did
not even live there yet they were deprived of its use. Moreover, they had also been deprived of a
considerable area of grazing land which the Europeans of Kisumu appropriated for a golf course,
trespass of which had some people prosecuted when their cattle or goats were found grazing on
it.223 Another one-hundred acres of land at Ojolo was, in 1906, given as a mission station site to
the Roman Catholic Mission. In addition, land was also appropriated by the government for an
aerodrome and more yet for a branch of railway that cut through the African reserve not to
mention that earmarked for roads.224 According to mzee Osiro Opinya, the aerodrome alone had
displaced three villages even after the governor had assured people that they would not be moved
again for whatever reason. But since this promise, they had been moved four times, which
eventually rendered them landless with nowhere to cultivate.225

While the Luo elders did not object to the necessary building of infrastructure, they
pointed out that the reserve was already too small for the growing population and herds.
Therefore, they hoped that His Majesty King George’s government would consider the petition
and restore Luo land and establish boundaries as their forefathers had left them. After all, had
they not given themselves even unto death in defense of the Empire during the Great War and in
the event of another war or any other needed service, wasn’t their pledge of their faithful
allegiance assured?226 Despite these entreaties, little if anything was done to remedy their woes.

Closely related to the issue of compensation and resettlement was the complicated issue
of transforming land tenure. The Native Chamber of Commerce, representing Central and South
Kavirondo districts of Nyanza Province, protested that individual land title was not only complex
and foreign to the African mind but also very expensive and its results ruinous to them.227 Their
petition to the KLC argued that the initial costs of individual grants of title were too high and out
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of proportion to the capacity of average Africans not to mention the subsequent costs of transfers
entailing heavy and legal stamp and registration. All this also meant that without proper
safeguards, wealthier individuals and individual subgroups of the Luo people could legally
dispossess the poor subgroups and individuals. Land, the chamber argued, was better organized
under the old land holding system of communal ownership. Any departure from it would result,
it was feared, to detribalization and the breakup of the social fabric of natives and economic
ruin.228 One of the disadvantages of individual titles, they observed, would be Africans ceasing
to think of the tribe as a whole. Instead selfishness would develop in the African’s character.
Subsequently, any imaginary encroachment in grazing area of agricultural shambas would be
contested in the spot and in frequent cases of bloodshed and family would ensue.

Conclusion
From the articulation of grievance above in other regions other than Central Province, the
region that was rocked by Mau Mau war, it is obvious that the experiences that over a long
period of time fermented the trouble of the 1950s were shared and widespread. The cracks in the
colonial edifice were obvious and well documented in numerous communications of African
hardships and challenges especially with regard to land and the restriction of movement. If
anyone was acutely aware of this national ferment of grievances, it was the colonial
establishment in Nairobi and in London, where the government from time to time recommended
commissions of enquiry into African problems. They were the chief architects of the colonial
project that had caused untold suffering to the majority of Africans. If anyone knew and
“understood” the concomitant African discontent and narratives of suffering, it was the British
authorities.

They, therefore, had it long coming and, besides, they had the benefit of the attenuated
imperial history of conquest and domination. From the outset, they expected such ferment of
discontent to occur and manifest widely across the colony and elsewhere. This is one of the
reasons exclusive political organization and ethno-regional administrative units were important:
to avoid crosspollination of narratives of discontent. The British knew that the Mau Mau war was
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not an isolated case. Furthermore, they knew, but did not acknowledge it then or since, that it
was not a case of Kikuyu social atavism. That they were able to portray it as such, it must be
said, is a great propaganda success. Colonial records show all this, especially the apprehension
that the war would ignite a colony-wide inter-ethnic anti-British uprising. It is on record that
there was an attempt, as early as the 1920s, to link the frustrations and grievances the Kanyakwar
clan pertaining to land with similar discontent among the Kikuyu.

The Kanyakwar clan had contact with the Young Kikuyu Association as early as the
1920s. Wakenya Abutho told the Carter commission that the Pinyowacho, a Luo movement, had
collected money for petitions at the time of the “Kikuyu riot” in Nairobi in 1922. After this, the
clan had sent one of their educated sons, John Odele, to Nairobi where he had private discussions
with officials of the Young Kikuyu Association about the plight of the Kanyakwar. Abutho even
stated that the Kikuyu Association had given Odele, the Kanyakwar clan treasurer, a cash
donation.229 What is also even more interesting is that, like the Kikuyu, the Luo viewed land as
their mother. In his testimony to the Carter commission, Aduse s/o Nyandoje told the KLC that a
mother nourished her children with milk.230 The sense and degree of deprivation especially as it
related to land was shared but at different extent of ferment as a socioeconomic grievance.

As such, the Mau Mau war was to the British a troublesome manifestation of economic
malaise that was deeply felt in British colonies and even in at the very heart of empire during and
after the Second World War. For both Nairobi and London, it was a warning flash behind which
was illuminated haunting shadows of widespread discontent in British colonial holdings in East
Africa. The similarity of experiences and African grievance that had led to the Mau Mau moment
in the 1950s was aptly captured by the royal commission on East Africa. Although it was never
made available to the public, this commission’s investigations revealed Nandi, Kipsigis, Luo,
Luhya, Somali and Kamba Mau Mau minds in incubation. The only reprieve being the
administrative genius of governing geoethnic regions as sanitary and exclusive units that
prevented the cross-fertilization of radical Mau Mau methods across the country and region. The
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next chapter will be devoted to an extensive discussion of Mau Maus of the mind of other ethnic
groups other than the Kikuyu in Kenya as documented in the material collected by the Hugh
Dow commission against the backdrop of the Mau Mau war in the 1950s.
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Chapter IV - ’52 Minds on Kenya’s Destiny: The
view from “the above”

Preamble:
I do think it is time that a stern warning should be issued to the Africans. …To slow down African ideas
and hasten up European ones. …Antagonists, black, white and brown, long ago perceived that the destiny
of Kenya will be decided in Fleet Street, in Grub Street, in Westminster, Washington and the Kingsway
Hall ….
The African would eventually have a very raw deal …I think he would probably eventually be reduced to
the remoter places in the territories much as peoples equipped with inferior qualities have in other
countries. In other words I think the impact of western development would far outrun the capacity of the
African to equip himself to stand up to it.
Letter to Michael Blundell from Kendall Ward, 26th April 1955.
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Introduction
This chapter is a significant part of what makes this study of the Mau Mau war rather
unique, unusual and, therefore, unprecedented. That is in the sense that it has little to do with the
actual “shooting war.” Rather than discuss the war of the forest and the antagonists involved:
British forces and divided Kikuyu opinion and ideological divide between Mau Mau fighters and
so-called “loyalists,” it explores and aspires to map-out a comprehensive view of African Mau
Maus of the mind. I have endeavored herein to extensively identify and examine the bulk of
evidence that illustrates that African discontent and potential for dissent was somewhat uniform
across the colony and elsewhere in British East Africa.
Put simply, African colonial subjects had suffered from the colonial experience
characterized by rupture of the pre-European socio-economic and political order and fabric with
its safe-supports of mutual responsibility and self-mastery; dispossession with regard to land,
alienation and exploitation of labor and proletarianization; marginalization and discrimination in
the political arena despite being the majority; and the legal and policy strictures that, in the main,
affected their relationship with, and access to, food, thus driving the cost of living beyond their
reach. I boldly assert that there was, besides the physical Mau Mau of combat, a comparable and
identical ideological twin of discontent, the Mau Mau of the mind.
There is, therefore, no drawing a line between the kind of strong experiential struggle that
drove Mau Mau fighters to take arms and the deep-seated distaste with the colonial status quo
safely concealed in forever hopeful minds that, entreaties and petitions directed to the colonial
administration and London, would eventually alleviate the struggle of precarious everyday
living. These pleas and prayers of the African population are well-captured by the East African
Royal Commission (1953-1955) chaired by Hugh Dow, which assessed the situation in the
region against the background of the physical Mau Mau combat. This commission helped to
uncover grievances that the colonial state had allowed to simmer in the minds of suffering
Africans and that the Mau Mau war acted upon.
In large part, this chapter unpacks and scrutinizes this body of evidence that illumines the
shadowy outlines of African anguish and discontent concealed and limited to the realm of
thought and suffering borne with stoicism. Besides this main aim of the chapter, I argue that hard
times imbricated both the metropole where they were a continuation of war rationing, and the
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Britain’s East African Empire. I also offer a brief review of the harsh and high cost of living in
Kenya towards the end of the 1940s and at least two relatively objective assessments of the
situation in East Africa in the early 1950s by independent socioeconomic and political analysts.
These precede the obstructionist and obfuscating official explanation of the Mau Mau war by
both Nairobi and London to the rest of the world. I briefly dwell on how colonial and imperial
propaganda played out in the court of world opinion vis-à-vis Mau Mau especially in the manner
that it was reported in newspapers around the globe. It is against this background then that the
material evidence and testimonies gathered by the Dow commission is unpacked and examined.
Lastly, I discuss what it really meant to “defeat Mau Mau:” that is, through the colonial policy
responses and reforms that it occasioned. In the main, it is argued that the war was waged against
colonial injustices and succeeded in revealing associated ills and moral corruption of the system.
However, it the same time, it also presented an opportunity for an imperial re-think of the
colonial project, which was successfully repackaged with the result of strengthening the colonial
state, which succeeded itself after independence.
As already suggested, the Mau Mau war was a lightning rod behind which, lying hidden,
were shadows of discontent in the 1950s with their roots in the deep colonial past. These Mau
Maus in mind and lineage of dissent was uncovered and captured by the East African Royal
Commission (also referred to as the Dow commission) that was appointed in London at the
behest of Sir Philip Mitchell, the Governor of Kenya, to investigate the social, economic and
political conditions in the region. It is quite disappointing that the Dow commission’s report was
disproportionately thin considering the enormous amount of submissions amassed especially
from hopeful Africans. Following the report's publication, British commentators in government
and among the public debated its proposals. Left-wing critics denounced the document as a freemarket tract that proposed exposing Africans to the full blast of an agricultural and industrial
revolution, similar to that which had inflicted suffering upon British workers in the nineteenth
century, without attempting to cushion the effects.1 According to Hood, Africans presented to the
commission contending historical narratives explaining the past, present, and future of East
Africa. African witnesses took the opportunity to address the state, demanding redress for the
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injustices of colonialism. However, in their report, the commissioners suppressed the African
dissent, largely ignored settler demands, and privileged much of the official narrative. The
commission presented colonial development, achieved through multiracial cooperation, as the
hope for East Africa's future.2
Put differently, the report revealed the full extent and intensity of African grievances in
Kenya the language and tone of which echoed that used in numerous petitions of various groups
of aggrieved Kikuyu and other Kenyans since the 1920s. The Dow commission was inundated
by numerous humble and honest disclosures of simmering discontent and endured colonial
hardships. In London, the report must have read as an imperial checkmate and end game, but
various submissions and petitions were even more revealing. The view of the socio-economic
and political conditions in East Africa in general, and Kenya in particular, from above was a
sobering dose of reality especially against the spectacle of the Mau Mau war.
Based on a collection of African testimonies of suffering, this exercise by the Dow
commission revealed an array of Mau Maus minds in chrysalis. The material collected by the
commission illustrated the replication and production of Mau Mau psychology out of the
colonial experiential cauldron, the only difference being the degree of ferment and the extent to
which imperial subjects were willing to go to seek redress. The Dow report collected evidence
from aggrieved individuals and groups from the region, which, for London, translated to imperial
fault lines and a powder keg that could, at any time, be set alight by the war. Indeed, London had
reason to appreciate the colonial administrative genius of administering imperial holdings and
ethnic groups as exclusive sanitary units that could contain the cross-pollination of Mau Mau
radicalism and dissent among other African groups in Kenya. But besides Britain’s colonial woes
in East Africa, London not only had to fight economic imperial troubles but also had to deal with
serious financial fires on the home front.

Imperial Imbrication of Existential Struggle: The Micro-economics of Bread
and Butter
The economic crisis that London had to oversee both at home and in its various imperial
holdings since the end of the Second World War was felt throughout the British Empire. Not
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even cleverly conceived and designed ethno-geographic and imperial boundaries could prevent
imperial subjects from feeling the pinch of war-weariness that was experienced long after the end
of the Second World War. At the end of World War II, Britain, hitherto the most powerful state
that had been the leader in world affairs for over three hundred years, entered the last cycle in its
orbit of decline. While it was still a powerful European state of reckon, the British Empire was in
terminal decline. The country emerged from the Second World War with the psychology of a
victor but its economic circumstances resembled those of a defeated country. Britain was literally
bankrupt. After the war, Britain entered a “financial Dunkirk,” according John Maynard Keynes,
the chief economic advisor who was helping in the reconstruction process.3 The military
demands made upon imperial Britain had devastated its economy. This was more so considering
that most production and industry had been diverted towards the war effort. The consequent
economic hardships affected not only the heart of empire but also its far-flung peripheral satellite
economies where the old system of colonial governance was altered irreversibly by the
tremendous economic, social and psychological consequences of the war. In India, for example,
the war effort strained and ultimately reconfigured the very nature of the political economy of
the colonial state. According to Yasmin Khan, British colonial administrators in India were
overburdened and at the same time heavily constrained by a fiscally cautious regime.4
Meanwhile, back home, the British government, long after WWII, had to deal with
domestic kitchen micro-economics of bread and butter. War-time commodity rationing was still
fast in place in the country and dominated both talk in the streets and debates in parliament up to
the mid-1950s. Food rations in Britain affected commodities such as bread, butter and
margarine, meat and liver, bacon and ham, peas and other vegetables, and Christmas sweets. The
British economy, even more than seven years after the Second World War, still was not
completely out of the woods. Its people lived in uncertainty and questions about this situation
still lingered and loomed large. The future, for some, was more than a little gloomy. It is
interesting to note that the three most vocal politicians who were personally interested in these
bread and butter issues were women parliamentarians.
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At the beginning of December 1952, a dark and heavy fog hung over the city of London.
On 8th December, the fourth day of the dense killer London fog that left four-thousand people
dead and even more later, Mrs. Jean Mann, a parliamentarian, complained that British margarine
was below standard. Mrs. Mann asked the Minister of Food, Dr. Charles Hill, if he would import
Norwegian margarine or, otherwise, find from Norway their recipe for margarine which was
more palatable than that made in Britain.5 Margarine in Norway, Mrs. Mann said, really tasted
like butter and had “a rather strong, sour-milk flavor.”6 Besides having to handle this question on
the quality of British margarine, Dr. Hill also had to deal with concerns about its adequacy to
meet the demand in the country: would he de-ration the commodity?7
Indeed, in the course of this debate, it was the general feeling that the actual take-up of
rationed foods from the shops, especially by the poorer sections of the community was
unsatisfactory. The Member of Parliament for Coventry, Miss Elaine Burton, wanted to know, in
the view of the application by bakers for an increase in the price of bread, whether the minister
would give an assurance that the cost of a loaf to the consumer would not be increased. Miss
Burton argued that if the price of bread went up yet again, it would “further squeeze the standard
of living of people” who were “already finding it hard to buy essential foods.”8 That is just how
bad the economic situation was in Britain. While a lot of parliamentary debates focused on
economic hardships and food shortage at home, it also discussed the growing reflection of the
same problem in East Africa and Kenya, in particular. Indeed, London, for a while, had its thumb
on East Africa’s worrying economic pulse. British politicians and the government in London
were increasingly concerned about the deteriorating situation in Kenya. This concern is what
ultimately led to the appointment of the royal commission on East Africa.
Peter Freeman, the MP for Newport, for instance, asked Oliver Lyttelton, the Secretary of
State for the colonies, a question about Kenya’s agricultural workers’ wages two days later.
Freeman remarked that in some cases, farm workers were still being paid a wage of 6d. a day for
a 60 or 65 hour week. Freeman posed, were such conditions not instrumental in bringing about
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the situation prevalent in Kenya more than anything else? Lyttelton said there was no statutory
minimum wage for agricultural workers. The SofS explained that the average wage was 25
shillings per month plus rations at 20 shillings per month, and that most workers were also
allowed to cultivate a plot on their employer’s farms. Unsatisfied, Freeman wanted to know what
steps Lyttelton was taking to improve that situation.9 Labor MP George Wigg asked the SofS
whether he still held the view that the state of affairs in Kenya had nothing to with economic
circumstances, especially in view of Lyttelton’s statement that the average wage was 25s. a
month. Lyttelton protested that Wigg was putting words in his mouth that he had never used.
Illustrating the attitude of denial that was the official position on the crisis in both London and
Nairobi, Lyttelton “clarified” what he meant by saying that the Mau Mau secret society was not
the direct result of economic pressure.10 This statement caused uproar in the House. Supporting
Wigg, Sir Richard Acland pointed out that the Church Missionary Society had circulated a report
that very definitely stated that the economic and social conditions in Kenya were a major cause
in bringing dissent to an endemic stage.11 Reginald Sorensen was yet another MP who lent his
voice to this view. Sorensen told Lyttelton to appreciate that there was a psychological and moral
factor and, therefore, a non-economic factor, which had some relationship to Mau Mau.12
Although Sorensen did not elaborate further, Frank Bowles provided an appreciable
estimation of what were the deep springs of the movement. Bowles pointed out that the African
marriage custom was affected by the breakup of families and bride wealth being paid in cash. He
said that bridewealth, which was known to be as high as 100 British Pounds, was unaffordable
considering that the average wage for an African agricultural worker on a farm was one pound a
month. According to his calculations, it would take a wage laborer eight and a half years, if he
spent nothing at all, to produce the purchase money. In as far as Bowles was concerned, the
desire to get married had a serious effect upon the activities of people. Further, Bowles believed
that it was a great mistake to assume that all the crimes which were taking place in Kenya were
really due to Mau Mau. Bowles intimated that he thought that some of these crimes were purely
and simply ordinary armed robbery and burglary by Africans in search of wealth, so that they
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may find bridal price. This, Bowles said, was one of the things which had changed since the
European settlers arrived in Kenya and was quite a serious matter, a remark that was greeted by
laughter in the House.13
Apart from this specific change that ensured elusiveness of matrimony for many a man,
there was far-reaching transformation of African systems of power, property and law with
serious implications. The legal appropriation of land through the illegal imposition of institutions
either protecting private property rights or extracting rents, occasioned socioeconomic and
political hardships, which dominated legislative council debate in colonial Kenya since the mid1940s. This was compounded by the alienation of African labor and a gamut of legal restrictions
that shrunk the pre-European cosmos. African institutions and principles upon which the stability
of African societies depended were undermined and overturned. They were discarded and were
no longer applicable leading to the unraveling of the socioeconomic and political fabric of
African societies. With the breakdown of the system of entitlement and social ties defined by
reciprocal duties, the bread-nexus was replaced by a cash-nexus that benefitted a few African big
men close to, or who took advantage of, the colonial enterprise while causing the majority of
people to suffer.
People, especially the poor in Kenya, could no longer ask African big men for relief or
charity as a natural right that ensured their access to essential food supply. By the late 1940s and
early 1950s, the latter had well-bought into the new system dominated by settler agrarian
capitalism. The African economy of affection was significantly weakened. Wealthy Africans no
longer felt bound by duty to meet their social obligations to their dependents. Since the market
was the new dispenser of subsistence, the wealthy, both African and white, were now unbound
by duty and felt that they now stood outside society. Thus the relationship of people to food was
compromised since farmers had their eyes on the maximization of profits.14 As such, there was a
feeling that certain sections of society in the colony were benefiting from other people’s plight.
The friction and conflict generated by land laws that determined land ownership and usage
became the central area of the nation’s life.15 Any debate focusing on the rising cost of living at
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the legislative council, therefore, could not avoid addressing this sea change that affected
Africans for the most part.
The Member of Legislative council for Kenya’s bread-basket, Uasin Gishu, Lawrence
Robert Maconochie Welwood, who was the embodiment of settler agrarian capitalism and
landed interest in Kenya, took issue with African suffering as presented by the Cost of Living
Commission. Welwood acknowledged that the European living standard in the colony was very
high. Indeed, he stressed this fact in a 1951 debate on the cost of living. For that very reason, it
was not in the European community that the cost of food was a major item in the cost of living. It
was obvious to him that in that case, the lowest income group in the colony was the African, and
it was the African’s cost of living –mainly food costs, especially maize- which was a cause for
concern. Welwood, however, went on to argue and challenge anybody on either side of the
Council to contradict him, that the vast majority of Africans in the colony either grew their own
food or were supplied with food in the form of rations by their employer.
Welwood further noted that there was a very small minority of urban dwelling Africans
in Mombasa and Nairobi who had to buy food at the prevalent high prices of maize, the subsidy
of which, without rationing, he rejected. He also rejected the firm belief that the main cost of
living was the cost of food. Maconochie Welwood ventured that if one accepted that this was the
case, what was then implied was that where the cost of food was the most expensive item in a
person’s living meant that that person was living to the lowest possible standard. He did not
believe that this was the case. To the contrary, Welwood argued, the true cost of living to most
people in the urban areas was undoubtedly rents and transport. He took issue with the idea to
which most people in the world were apt to subscribe: that somebody else was making a large
sum at their expense. This was the prevalent notion that all well-to-do Kenyan farmers were
making very large profits. He conceded that, of course, the larger enterprises were making large
profits in the same way as the larger manufacturers in industry were making large profits. As far
as Welwood was concerned, it was obvious that it was the small man who, of course, had to
struggle under the circumstances.16
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For this reason, Welwood criticized the commission’s report referring its views as
“glimpses through the iron curtain.” He was particularly irked by the commission’s idea that the
agricultural community should be treated as a separate entity –particularly parts of the industry
that were prosperous- and, therefore, supposed to subsidize the producers of domestically
consumed stuff, purely for the benefit of the consumer.17 Further, he said there was also a
tendency for people to believe that the agricultural industry in Kenya could and should have
produced food cheaper than anywhere else because of cheaper land and perhaps cheaper labor,
which was misleading. Welwood, obviously arguing in favor of unfettered operation of agrarian
capitalism profiting middling African and large white farmers whose fortunes and prosperity was
on the rise, went on to state that beef, bacon and pork, and butter fat prices compared to those of
other countries were much lower in Kenya.18 This implied that Kenyan farmers were far much
better off exporting their produce than selling it as a loss at home. The Kenyan producer was not
in fact receiving the enormous prices as the report purported.19
As an agriculturalist, Welwood felt duty-bound to challenge what was, to him, a futile
attempt by the Cost of Living Commission to abolish the capitalist system for the farmer and
retain it for everybody else. As far as he was concerned, it was this sort of disastrous
compromise which was continually being attempted in Great Britain leading to inflation from
which all were suffering. There was no middle path in the matter, Welwood argued. If someone
was going to abolish capitalism, then they should just do so not merely for the basically essential
industry of agriculture on which people lived but for all the industries. He did not believe that
that sort of “financial massacre of the kulaks” of Kenya proposed by the commission would, in
the long run, really achieve a high standard of living for the civil servant or a high standard of
living for anybody else. As far as he was concerned, the commission was sitting in the position
of Canute trying to prevent the tide from advancing, and naturally there was little that could be
effected.20
On the other side of the debate were active defenders of the African point of view from
below like the member for the coast region, Cooke. Cooke said that he had distanced himself

17

Ibid.,136.
Ibid., 137.
19
Ibid., 138.
20
Ibid., 140.
18

147

from a number of candidates who, in their youthful exuberance in the elections of 1948, had
made the question of the cost of living one of the principle planks in their platform. As an old
campaigner, Cooke had learned that it was easy to promise but more difficult to perform. As
such, he had personally kept more or less out of the controversy. Cooke expressed his
disappointment since it had taken six months before the Cost of Living Commission findings
were tabled for discussion after it had carried out investigations for two and a half years. Cooke
lauded the government’s cost of living allowances to government officials, but he made it clear
that if the commission’s report had been discussed, it would have been possible for the council to
have found some means by which the community in general would benefit rather than one
particular section of that community. Cooke categorically stated that the cost of living position
was “Kenya’s Number One” domestic problem and that it was up to the representatives of the
people to see that that problem was speedily and properly resolved.21
Unlike his Uasin Gishu counterpart, who felt that the report was against agrarian
capitalism, Cooke argued that the question of effecting food subsidies was a pertinent one since,
for good or evil, the colony was a planned economy. Cooke stated that it was wrong for any
section of the Kenyan community to arrogate to itself the right to say that they could plan this or
that. This was especially because while the government planned to give farmers, and quite
rightly, higher prices for their produce, it failed to plan to give the poor old consumer his right to
a square deal. For Cooke, this seemed to be a misuse of the term “planning.”22 Three factors
entered mainly into the cost of living in Kenya, namely rent of housing, the high cost of transport
and local food. As far as he was concerned, the question of food subsidies was the most
important. Cooke felt that subsidies were more effective than spending money on the cost of
living allowances. If food was subsidized, there would be no transfer of the national income
outside the country since 95% of the food consumed in the country was produced by Kenyan
farmers. This would not affect the colony’s balance of trade nor would it, Cooke argued, have
affected Kenya’s national income. It would merely have been a transfer of purchasing power
from one section of the community to another.23
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As observed earlier above, it was the African’s cost of living with respect to food costs
and maize mainly that was the chief cause of suffering since the late 1940s in Kenya. Earlier on,
in a February 1951 council motion initiated by Cooke, the proposal that maize be subsidized was
defeated by a large majority. By May of the same year, the acting financial secretary drew
considerable comfort from this fact. Referring to the February Cooke motion, the financial
secretary “acknowledged” that the question of food subsidies could not be regarded as having
been, in the wake of the defeat of the maize motion, finally disposed of. However, he ventured to
suggest that world prices at the time militated against the introduction of food subsidies on a
scale that would have had an appreciable effect on the cost of living.24
During the maize subsidy motion, Cooke argued that in Kenya, while accepting the
principle that maize producers should receive a reasonable and economic price for their produce,
there persisted the opinion that since maize was the staple food of the majority of the people in
the country, which then affected the wage structure and with it the national economy, no increase
in the price to the producer was to be passed on direct to the consumer. For this reason, Cooke
recommended that any intended increase be met through the means of a subsidy from general
revenue.25 This insightful analysis and statement proves that, indeed, the question of basic
survival with regard to the demand and supply of prime necessities of life had become the central
area of the nation’s life and its politics. The alteration of African land tenure and the disposition
of labor through colonial laws had compromised livelihood and sustenance. This legislative
council debate, which prefigured the breakout of the Mau Mau war, therefore, was not, per se,
about the subsidization of maize. Rather, at the crux of the matter was the transformation of the
relationship of people to food, which involves systems of power, property and law. This state of
affairs occasioned anxiety and suffering that was felt throughout the country with regard to the
ever-increasing rise of food prices.26
The economic pressure and difficulties had started to be felt especially around March
1948 which is when a motion was filed at the LegCo suggesting that prices were reigning very
high throughout the country. It was then suggested that the government take action to control and
alleviate the price of foodstuffs. Another motion, said to have more teeth, was brought to the
24
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council in August of the same year requesting the government to take appropriate measures in
this regard. The August motion resulted in the appointment of a select committee to deal with the
raised concerns but its report the government neither considered nor brought a motion into the
council either accepting it or rejecting it. As such, Cooke let it be known that the government
was ignoring and flouting the council in what was a matter of grave concern: a subject of such
great importance, which deserved immediate attention. Cooke charged that the rule of first things
first ought to have applied since the issue concerned 99 per cent of the population of the country
so vitally.27
As far as Cooke was concerned, there was no question of a precedent in the proposal. He
asserted that those who were in Kenya in 1943 and 1944 remembered that in consequence of the
food shortage, specially the cereal shortage, cereals had been imported from abroad and the
council had voted a large sum of money towards a subsidy for cereals during those two years.28
As opposed to the time when those large sums of money were paid outside Kenya thus affecting
the national income, if action was taken to pay money to stabilize the price of food at the
beginning of the 1950s, it would mean internal movement of that money.29 In supporting his
motion, Cooke referred to the findings of a select committee which had suggested by a majority,
with only a minority of one against it, that there be a subsidization of food and maize in
particular. One of the biggest opposition to the suggestion was the question of who would pay
for the subsidy. Cooke argued that the consumer-taxpayer would foot the bill but the monies
would circulate within the national economy.
Further, he believed that whether the price of maize went up or a subsidy was
implemented, it was the consumer-taxpayer who picked the tab eventually. That, for example, if
the price of maize went up, big government employers would ask for money from the Treasury
and taxpayers would pay it back. Or big plantations, or the big producers, or employers of labor
such as the docks and the shipping companies in Mombasa would have to pay more to their
laborers. However, Cooke argued that it was a much easier procedure and much simpler if the
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economy of the colony was not upset by having taxpayers pay through taxation into the Treasury
and from the resulting collection, a fund formed to subsidize maize.30
At the time of this debate though, the national economy was already upset and there was
a very real danger, especially where Africans were concerned, that where wages were raised and
deflation followed, the African, and indeed a great many Europeans, would not see any reason
for reducing wages again. A deflationary period would follow with the high wages still
prevalent.31 This could be prevented, Cooke argued, if maize was subsidized. Moreover, Cooke
stated that it was policy both in Britain and in Kenya that all contribute when it was a question of
national interest to do so. He quoted the economic historian, Ephraim Lipson who propounded
that: “The best method of assisting an infant industry or any other industry whose maintenance is
considered necessary for national reasons is the payment of a subsidy from general taxation,
since the burden ought to fall on the community as a whole and not on the section which
consumes a particular product.”32 The effect of the rise in the price of maize on the African
family was quite considerable. Cooke pointed out that the African man and wife with an average
family of three found their cost of living rose to about 4.50 shillings a month. With the upcountry
farmers in Kitale and elsewhere pressing for another rise in price, it was quite possible that at the
turn of that year, there would be a rise of something like 10 shillings per family in the cost of
living, which was a considerable sum of money that could upset the national economy. It would
require the raising of wages. In closing his remarks, Cooke emphasized the thrust of his
argument, which was that subsidies had the effect of taking money from one section of the
community and transferring it to another. It was an internal transfer of money. It transferred
purchasing power from one community (urban and poor African majority) to another (rural and
especially white settler farmers with vested agrarian interests).
In supporting the motion, G. Usher, the member for Mombasa, stated that the high price
of maize had the effect of increasing costs across all economic spheres including transport, house
rent, woolen suits, and handling costs, particularly in a port town among other things. As a result,
many peoples’ hearts, including employers, were wrung by stories of families who could not
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make ends meet. Africans in particular felt that the best possible thing was to have the essentials
of life for him pegged. With the country being subjected to all kinds of unpleasantness and
impossible situations beyond anyone’s control, Usher felt that there was a need for a searching
review of the national fiscal structure. Otherwise, Usher said, cryptically, there was the danger of
wildebeests getting into aviaries.33 Of course, among the people who opposed the motion was
Welwood. He argued that the growers of maize and wheat had performed the task of subsidizing
foodstuffs in the colony for far too long. Welwood felt that in a world of inflation, food subsidies
could be but only a temporary alleviation and would simply cripple the rest of the country.34
Further, the council could not sit down without allowing a measure of inflation to take
place. This is the exact sort of argument that Cooke was against. In the May, 1951 debate on the
cost of living, Cooke cited John Maynard Keynes acceptance of Vladimir Lenin’s analysis of the
role of inflation in a national economy. Lord Keynes had said: “Lenin …declared that the best
way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch the currency. By a continuing process of
inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth
of their citizens. By this method they confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily …. Lenin was
certainly right, there is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society
than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the
side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.”35
This was a strong argument that perhaps explains why Welwood offered two more alternatives
besides inflation.
Besides inflation, Welwood suggested having industries as part of the economy that
could pay for such food subsidies. Secondly, having farmers become major exporters of
foodstuffs at a higher price when they could sell them at a lower price in the country. Another
voice of opposition, the Member for Nyanza, T.R.L. Preston, agreed that cereal and maize
farmers were already subsidizing the colony since they were selling their produce at well below
world prices. At the same time, they continued to buy all the things needed for farming
operations at world prices. Yet, whenever there was any question of a rise in price on anything
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that was produced by farmers, it was said: “‘Here are the wicked farmers exploiting the public of
the Colony once again.”’36 What those who successfully opposed this motion did not dispute was
the fact that the rise in the price of maize did hurt the (urban) African, who suffered particularly
as far as his family was concerned. However, it was argued, especially by those opposed to a
maize subsidy, that in the African family budget, the increased cost of maize was not nearly as
important as the cost of clothing.37 Moreover, it was felt by those opposing that there was no
need for a maize subsidy since the council had agreed to implement cost of living allowances
earlier on in the year.
The debate concerning the cost of living allowances as an alternative to subsidies in
February 1951 illuminated the poor economic conditions in the country across all races. Besides
this, the debate concerning it captured the reality of the early 1950s: the hard economic times,
even in the LegCo, were seen through a racial prism. This because the review of the cost of
living allowances was offered to the civil service disparately along racial lines. A particular
salary attracted a different percentage of relief according to the race of the recipient. This led
some members of the legislative council to argue that it was only fair to admit that if the cost of
living had increased, it surely followed that it had increased for all races. The member for central
area, the future chief justice C.B. Madan, for instance, said it was illogical to presume that the
cost of living had increased more for Europeans and not so much for Asians and Africans.
Madan leveled his attack on the European Elected Members defense of this state of affairs as
iniquitous.38 Future African minister Appolo Ohanga added his voice with great eloquence
stating that he did not think that proper justice had been done to the lowest paid officers who
happened to be Africans in the civil service. Ohanga argued that the general hardship which was
felt in the matter of cost of living was experienced by all people, be they highly paid or lowly
paid officers, “but the greatest, by far the greatest sufferers,” were the Africans who formed the
lowest paid group.
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However, senior members of the civil service, both European and Asians, had received
the lion’s share of the percentage increments to shield them from the dire economic times. On
the other hand, for a large number of lower paid groups of Africans, the only way to exist with
the reigning market prices that characterized the beginning of 1951 was to borrow and borrow as
generously as they could on a very high percentage as a matter of necessity in order to live. As
far as Ohanga was concerned, the suffering of Africans who formed the bulk of the lowest paid
officers had, indeed, gone on for a long time before 1951. Ohanga believed that even such cost of
living allowances were only a temporary relief to their suffering. He, therefore, suggested a
salary increment so that Africans benefited more than people who received higher basic salaries
than themselves. Even with that done, Ohanga added that it could not be lost sight of that the
wage levels for the laborers or manual workers in Kenya were “absolutely uneconomic” and
thus, could not go on as they were for a long time.39
These remarks echoed those by Preston while contributing to this debate that the poor
economic situation could not be solved by mere cash increases to any one section of the
community. As far as Preston was concerned, it was easier to meet the problem by a direct
increase of salary, but he was convinced that nothing less than a more practical approach to the
problem was going to achieve any permanent result or do anything to arrest the inflation, which
the country faced. A focus purely on a cost of living allowance was, in his opinion, only
designed to meet the urgent and immediate needs and was not adequate preparation for future
challenges. Furthermore, the allowances proposed were tailored to give maximum relief to
practically all civil servants of two communities. Worse still, Preston stated that the rising cost of
living not only affected civil servants but also every man, woman and child in the colony. The
last thing that anyone would wish, Preston pressed, was to create a class of people who were
entirely sheltered from the economic blast.40
Like in the parliamentary debate trying to get to the bottom of the root cause of Mau
Mau, the issue of marriage and family budgets emerged in Nairobi. Ohanga opposed the idea of
family size being tied to the cost of living allowance over and above job qualifications. He
argued that salaries of government officers be solely confined to qualifications regardless of how
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big their families were. The cost of living allowances committee explained it was displeased that
an African with a hundred and fifty shillings a month with a wife and family did not have enough
to enable him to run his house and to dress himself as expected. But Ohanga opposed family
consideration because of racial discrimination that saw indifferential treatment between
European, Asian and African families. This differentiation was defended by pointing out that in a
social system that was still polygamous and without registration of births, would be African
beneficiaries could not prove to the government their entitlement to the allowances suggested.
Instead, the crafters of the allowance considered that the African bachelor was always paying out
money for bride price and was, as such, at a disadvantage financially. But Ohanga held that
marriage could not really be a criterion in determining salary scaling. According to him, the
hardest hit people were the lowest paid people whether they were married or not. Ohanga had
then gone on to say that if marriage was going to be an extra burden, he was quite sure it was a
voluntary luxury that people could do with or without.41 This illustrates the casual manner with
which the vital matter everyday economic survival for ordinary Kenyans, especially Africans
was dealt.

Hard Times: A Rear Mirror View
Despite the lack of a serious longue durée analysis of the economic predicament in Kenya
and especially how it affected Africans newly inducted into the colonial political economy,
official concern was longstanding. In 1948, a group of nine legislative members under the
chairmanship of E.A. Vasey was sitting to inquire into the cost of living and collected
information from ordinary individuals from all races. Some of the information collected by the
Vasey commission is worth highlighting here.
Giving evidence to the cost of living commission in Nairobi on 18th November 1948, one
of the witnesses, a certain Miss Deverell, said that she thought that African clothing dismal and
constituted the absolute minimum standard on which anybody could keep himself clothed.42 This
point was amplified by Dedan N. Githege who read a memorandum composed together with two
African colleagues who gave evidence to the commission. Githege informed the commission that
the cost of living was very high for Africans, and this had gone on for far too long. As a result,
41
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he added, Africans were walking around with clothes that could be regarded by other races as
rags because most of their money was spent to buy food.43 Another African witness, Ruth
Pascalli, told the commission that her husband, a Luhya man from Samia, was in tatters because
he could not afford a new outfit. Pascalli also stated that none of her three children went to
school because of the unaffordability of school fees. Her husband was on a minimum wage that
could only sustain the family for one week. For the other three weeks of the month, the family
survived on charity from friends.44
Further illustrating African poverty was evidence given by Dorcas, a Luo woman who
lived in Kaloleni in a two-roomed municipal house. She told the commission that her family
seldom bought clothes because they could not afford it. Most of Dorcas’s family members,
therefore, had one piece of clothing each although the smaller children wore no clothing at all.
She also told the commission that she was not satisfied with the amount of food she and her
family got because it was barely sufficient.45 Responding to a question from one of the
commissioners, Dorcas was of the opinion that the government was behind the increase in the
cost of living.46 The Githege memorandum demonstrated a keener understanding of the cause of
the increase in the cost of living. The foursome attributed the high cost of living in Nairobi to the
pressure from surrounding rural farming districts that had pushed the prices of goats, sheep,
chickens, charcoal and wood fuel higher with detrimental effect on town dwellers. Further, they
complained that a bag of posho (maize meal) of 200 lbs was sold by African producers for 11.90
shillings but once in the market, African consumers were required to fork out 28 shillings for the
same quantity. They pointed out that this margin of profit was too large.47
Jivraj Meralli, a businessman and past president of the Indian Chamber of Commerce,
tied the high cost of living to the war. But Meralli also stated that to ease the situation, the
control of the distribution of foodstuffs had to be abolished and free movement of foodstuffs
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allowed between the East African territories. Meralli argued that the government should have
moved to stop any exports of foodstuff unless it was absolutely certain that there was sufficient
food for the needs of the country. He further opined that while the price controller had tried his
best to keep prices down, the commercial community reaped consumers’ heart and soul.48
Another witness, Kantilal P. Shah, said that he thought that the maize control and produce
Control board was trading and taking more profit than any trader would.49 Similar sentiments
were expressed some seven months later by Mr. Francis Khamisi, an outspoken African
journalist who would be elected to the LegCo in 1958 and later played a prominent role in
KADU. Khamisi told the committee that the cost of living among the African community had
increased owing to the fact that the bare necessities of life “were so very expensive.” Khamisi
said that the cost of living in food had gone up and in many cases good food was unobtainable.
He complained that a few days before the committee arrived in Mombasa, there had been no
milk, cigarettes and soap adding that he thought that these things, had mostly gone right into the
black market. There was also a great shortage of meat and fish and he had personally not had
these for a long time. The cost of clothes had also gone up, in spite of the fact that the shops were
full of them, continued Khamisi. This was either due to excessive customs duty or perhaps due to
the margin of profit that traders charged for their goods. Africans like himself had been living the
last two or three months without meat which then disappeared from the market. At the same
time, fuel and charcoal were heavily priced against the meager African incomes. Khamisi also
pointed out that African housing in the city was inadequate. As there was not enough, the
consequence was that the existing houses had exorbitant rents and even if one could pay a lot it
was difficult to get a room.50 With all these increases that Khamisi enumerated, it was obvious
the minimum wage was inadequate. The minimum wage at the time was 40 shillings per month.
Many of the Africans earned 50 shillings but even that was not enough to cover necessary
expenses, which was a cause of anxiety.
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Some of these apprehensions were confirmed by J.F. Troughton who served in the
colonial government as the member for finance. He also gave evidence before the commission.
Troughton admitted before the commission that the government had, during the war, managed to
keep the cost of living pegged down fairly well. But after the end of the war, grave difficulty was
experienced in keeping the cost of living down due to increases in the cost of imported goods
and also partly consequential on the demands made by primary producers of food crops
particularly cereal and dairy produce. Indeed, the perception by many Africans, among them
Dorcas, that the government was behind the high cost of living was validated. Troughton told the
commission that prices were decided by the governor in council with advice from an executive
commission presided over by the member for agriculture and member of finance. There was,
Troughton intimated, a battle between him and the member for agriculture over the balance
between consumer interests of keeping the cost of living down on the one hand, and farmers who
wanted a fair price on their primary produce, on the other. In this duel, the member for finance
admitted that he was losing the battle. Thus, Troughton was well aware of skewed deliberations
at policy-decision making level that favored the white farming community at the expense of civil
servants and the majority African consumers.51
Maize, Troughton noted, was a basic factor in the cost of living as it entered into the cost
of production of everything else. Troughton confessed that the government had taken the
decision that the price of maize should not be increased but the powerful white agrarian interests
in Kenya disagreed. Troughton went on to admit that he thought that the prevalent weight was in
favor of the producer adding that if producers were entitled to an increase in prices that should
have taken the form of a subsidy.52 Such was the dire economic situation that foreshadowed the
terrible 1950s. This state of affairs, embedded as it was in the Kenya colonial situation, did not
escape the critical and analytical observation of a few keen eyes in the early 1950s.

Colonial Origins of Mau Mau Minds: Some Earnest Observations
While commendable, the government’s attempt to collect broad-based evidence of
everyday hardships pales in comparison to the views of Colin Legum, a correspondent for The
Observer. In an extensive document, Legum demonstrated a fairly in-depth analytical
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understanding of the dynamics of the colonial political economy. Writing against the background
of the outbreak of Mau Mau violence a few months earlier, this perceptive political commentator
and critic of British imperialism in Africa, attributed the war to the extreme expression of
genuinely felt land grievances. Legum argued that if people were going to be taken off the land it
was necessary to eliminate the worst problems associated with urbanization and the onslaught on
traditional African society. The colonial government needed to provide adequate housing, a
living wage standard, and adequate social amenities. In addition, there was need to develop
secondary industries closely associated with Kenya’s agricultural production. These were to be
established along cooperative lines to give Africans a share in the development and ownership of
the new industries.53
Further, Legum argued that there was a need to find a place in urban areas for landless
African peasants and for the establishment of a minimum wage policy that offered the prospect
of maintaining a family decently; a reduction of the price of posho, the staple food of the colony
which had risen sevenfold to 56 shillings since 1939; the provision of adequate housing; the
elimination of all obstacles to the development of skill and the removal of color barriers in the
Civil Service; and the intensification of technical training. The growth of Nairobi and the
development of a black proletariat, mostly Kikuyu, with the inevitable concomitants of early
industrial society –slums, low wages, insecurity of employment, high living costs- all were
having a tremendous effect in the Kikuyu.54
However, the most remarkable aspect of this document is the accurate manner in which it
captures the colonial transformation of African societies. Legum pointed out that migration,
fragmentation of land, uneven development of land productivity, increasing population and
diminishing land availability was having a profoundly disturbing effect on Africans, especially
the Kikuyu whose traditional society always depended for its stability and for its progress on the
closely knit family and clan system and the availability of new lands. Under colonialism,
however, the family and clan system was beginning to break up resulting in fratricidal interfamily and inter-clan quarrels due to disputes over succession rights, land occupation and
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numerous other petty and serious issues over land usage. This was typical of peasant societies
where they had been thrown out of relationship with their land.
This break-up of the closely-knit family and clan life of the Kikuyu meant the destruction
of the foundation of Kikuyu society, the resultant stress and strain from which there was no
escape. In the past, Legum noted, when a brother fell out with his family, he could move to new
land, which was something that was not possible under British colonialism by the 1940s and
1950s if not much earlier. This situation thus resulted in bitter conflicts that were tearing the
Kikuyu peasant society apart. The speed of disintegration had been increasing rapidly altering
the state of equilibrium for the Kikuyu traditional peasant society, which was changing so
drastically. There had developed, as a result among the Kikuyu, an increasing gulf between
wealthy Kikuyu peasants and badly-off peasants. This disequilibrium further intensified the rate
of change of the old society.55
This situation was exacerbated by the impact of European settlement and the concomitant
legal, policy and attitudinal environment that supported white supremacy in Kenya. According to
Legum, the high level of material welfare and the relative success of white settlement were both
an inspiration and a challenge to Africans. It bred envy. The growth of both extreme and positive
African nationalism was an expression of “anti-whiteism” and feelings of struggle for
independence and advancement. These tendencies among the Kikuyu went as far back as the
earliest Kikuyu political activism and consciousness under the leadership of Harry Thuku in the
1920s.56
According to Legum, the situation had become even more pronounced and explosive,
especially in Kikuyuland, by the end of 1951. Citing the 1951 African Affairs Department annual
report, Legum stated that the land problem among the Kikuyu and the northern Kamba had
grown more difficult by the measure of another year of population increase among the two fertile
ethnic groups. The number of landless men was greatest among the Kikuyu of Kiambu and Fort
Hall. The report had pointed out that the Kikuyu could not expect to continue to live on the land.
Nevertheless, it was hard not to sympathize with the Kikuyu who lost the means of rearing cattle
and goats with all that those things meant to the social and magico-religious functions that made
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up the web of his traditional life. Africans lacked a proper and secure place in the modern
colonial society. They were unwilling to give up the security traditionally meant for them while
at the same time anxious to become part of the new urban life. For Legum, this situation called
for a sympathetic understanding. The Africans were not only being required to change from selfreliant peasants to wage-dependent proletarians, but also to make the concomitant social and
psychological adjustments which is something that they were either unable or unwilling to make.
There is no gainsaying that it was a case of more of the latter than of the former.
As such, the rising tide of African nationalism was an inevitable product of the
prevailing condition. It could, therefore, not be suppressed or ignored. The fact that it was
negative and destructive meant it was a challenge to wise leadership and merited countermeasures that were not shortsighted and ill-tempered.57
Legum’s perceptive understanding of the causes of the Mau Mau war was augmented by
analysis of the same by Fenner Brockway, a Labour MP and longtime anti-colonialist. Brockway
visited Kenya together with Leslie Hale, a fellow Labour member of parliament, for ten days at
the height of the war. After conducting extensive consultations and meetings in Kenya, they were
compelled to put together a report, which was not limited to this short visit but, also, informed by
his longstanding interest in the colony’s affairs. In Why Mau Mau?, Brockway argued that Mau
Mau had arisen from a deep and continuing frustration, which was social, economic and
psychological and one from which the African found that he could never escape.58
Further, Brockway noted, it would take some considerable time before such social
frustration could be fully understood. But he added that as he and Hale spoke to Africans and
tried to reach down to the cause of their bitterness, it became more and more apparent. It was
framed within the idea that the British had destroyed the old tribal system through which African
instincts, thoughts, and emotions found expression and failed to replace it by a satisfying
substitute.59 For example, old democratic structures had been demolished and replaced with a
low, impenetrable ceiling of administration which thrust Mau Mau grievances back upon the
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people. This state of affairs was compounded by economic frustration underpinned by acute land
hunger. Brockway observed that to the African land was life as livelihood depended on it. For
him, land hunger in Kenya was equivalent to unemployment in Britain. That is, unemployment
without benefits, children allowances or other social services. Brockway intimated that when he
visited Kikuyu areas and spoke to the people he could think of no other parallel more exact than
conditions in the valleys of South Wales in the Hungry Thirties when seventy per cent
unemployment drove the population to seek a livelihood elsewhere. Of the 1¼ million Kikuyus,
half a million had had to leave their reserve because there was not land on which they could gain
a living.60
Moreover, Kikuyus turned to the towns to seek a livelihood, yet some of them, like
Nairobi, already had about 10,000 homeless Africans every night. Even when they had some
form of housing, they were crowded in one-room dwellings with friends. These would be 10’ by
10’ rooms with no windows. In one particular room, the MPs found that three married couples
were sleeping in it, their quarters limited to narrow beds behind curtains. In another rather
architecturally picturesque newer housing estate, the members found a 15’ by 12’ room shared
between two families: four adults and four children. Others yet, slept on the forms of the stalls in
the squalid Burmah Market or dragged over their bodies what materials they could scrounge
from the city dump heaps.61 Brockway also observed that posho, maize flour that was the staple
food, had increased by 600% since 1938. As such, the African population, driven from the land
where they grew maize, could no longer buy enough maize flour to satisfy their pangs of hunger.
Such was the existence of thousands of Africans who were cheap labor of the towns.
Therefore, from the foregoing, it can be averred that while a few Africans eased into the
new order, the majority found it difficult to navigate the colonial capitalist system, which is
something W. Hyde Clarke acknowledged when he testified before the Cost of Living
Commission in 1949. Clarke stated that “the African” had been in touch with the cash system for
only fifty years. In the pre-European past, barring harsh environmental catastrophes, “the
African” considered it to be his divine right to eat and be housed. Africans during this period
rarely went without food, and it was a new departure for him to earn something and to pay this
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out for things which he regarded as his prescribed right.62 Although this was a rather sweeping
and simplistic view, it is, nevertheless, the closet one can come to an official acknowledgement
that the altering of the mode and means of production but, more so, the alienation of land and
labor, significantly affected the relationship of the majority of Africans to food. This was
complicated by the racialised hierarchy of both the rural and urban colonial political economy
and, thereby, biased authoritative distribution of public goods.

In the Court of Global Public Opinion: The Official Mind on Mau Mau
Despite this appreciation of the movement’s springs in psychosocial roots and, therefore,
the political-economic motivations of the war, there was blatant denial in official and unofficial
circles in both London and Nairobi. The fact that Mau Mau methods were unconventional and
murders and mutilations grotesque and horrid, meant that it was demonized. It was primitive
with all its barbaric and bestial trappings and was the most virulent and infectious disease of the
mind.63 While prominent white politicians representing settler interests were ready to
acknowledge these economic roots, they did so with marked reservations. For example, in a
letter to Lt. Col. Howard in 1953, Michael Blundell, a settler member of the legislative council
and later a member of the war council, intimated such deep economic causes.
However, Blundell argued that while he believed that there was an element of economics
in it, for a number of reasons he could not accept that this was the main reason, for the simple
fact that most of the really hot-stuff oath administrators were rich men.64 There were those who
recognized the essential of making a resolute attempt to tackle African economic and social
troubles thus enabling them to be kept behind government.65 Others while sharing this sentiment
argued that what was wanted was firm handling as opposed to the much talked about new
services, new housing, bigger wages and more opportunities. This, at least, until Africans had
come to their senses and all the subversive activity cleared up. After all, the government had to
be most careful that the African did not get the impression that Europeans had had the fright of
their lives as this could do immense harm. There was no doubt between many observers and
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Europeans living in the colony at the time that other tribes were watching most carefully. As
such, any sign of weakness would be fatal.66
There was, therefore, a deliberate attempt made to ensure that Mau Mau did not win the
sympathy of other ethnic groups in Kenya and elsewhere in the world. Even extra care was taken
not to dignify the “terrorist” movement by spreading the impression that Mau Mau was a band of
ardent nationalists fighting for their land and rights against a group of bogus, upper-class, niggerhating, cocktail-drinking whites who had seized the Africans’ lands and were sitting on them.67
This was the kind of impression given in a special series of articles by Edward and Majorie Ward
in the BBC Radio Times, which was a radio journal that had the biggest circulation of any such
genre in the world. This series had caused a lot of concern since it had the potential to damage
the white man’s political and economic project in Kenya against the Mau Mau troubles in the
colony. According to the Secretary of the Electors’ Union, Kendall Ward, in a letter to Blundell,
it was part of a mounting attack on the European position which was not helped very much by
some of the more stupid activities in Kenya political affairs. It was perturbing that all but a few
Kenya Europeans were unaware, in light of such publicity, of the weakness of their position.
They never troubled to learn how to influence the vast, sentimental electorates outside Kenya in
whose power they were, whether they liked it or not.
Yet, their antagonists, black, white and brown in Kenya and elsewhere, had long ago
perceived that the destiny of Kenya would be decided in Fleet Street, in Grub Street, in
Westminster, Washington and the Kingsway Hall or wherever two or three are gathered together
with a speech to make, a vote to catch, or a column to fill.68 The Mau Mau spectacle that
mattered in such places was cast in light that ensured that the tide was rising against white settler
interests in Kenya, which was attested by the BBC series among other factors. The Bandung
conference, for instance, was one such important factor. It was clear to most observers of the
conference that participating anti-imperial elements were going to reach an agreement in
opposing colonialism, which was significant in that it would lead to the groundswell of the quite
vicarious sense of guilt in colonial Kenya that colonies were right out of step with the trend of

66

Letter from W.A.C. Bouwer of Chepkoilel to Michael Blundell, Papers of Sir Michael Blundell, RHO: MSS. Afr.
s. 746.
67
Kendall Ward to Michael Blundell, 26th April 1955, Papers of Sir Michael Blundell, RHO: MSS. Afr. s. 746.
68
Ibid.

164

world events. The continuance of such colonial projects as Kenya would be seen as yet another
cause for war and hatred both of which were manifest. In this regard, Mau Mau was winning in
the field of world public opinion.69
Secondly, under the leadership of Eliud Mathu, the Kenya Guild had made demands to
the European Economic Community that would, in both Kenya and Uganda, result in a large
African demand for universal suffrage. Mbiu Koinange, who was in London during the
emergency period where he had taken refuge, was Mau Mau’s mouthpiece and was increasingly
vaulted in circles that could only be described as being the vanguard of intellectualism. Koinange
had even had a book published in the USA and was distributing a thousand copies in the UK.70
Consequently, the Mau Mau cause was gaining sympathy outside the colony, which alarmed not
only settlers but also the colonial administration in Nairobi.
It was said that in Uganda, for example, at Christian missions Africans were praying for
the success of their Mau Mau brethren, which was seen as evidence of the spread of the infection
of the movement’s virulent disease of the mind.71 Mau Mau reverberations were felt in the
Congo where there was uneasiness among European inhabitants of the eastern border areas of
that country.72 A memo sent on 18th December 1952 by the Mogadishu Consulate to the African
Department of the Foreign Office in London reported that there was a general feeling among the
Somali population in the city at least as strongly inclined to be sympathetic with Mau Mau as it
was with nationalist aspirations in North Africa.73
Indeed, the Mau Mau movement and its cause received a lot of positive international
reception and coverage especially from Africa. The Lagos based West African Pilot, for example,
carried, in 1952, a leading article entitled “Is this the Hand of Jacob?” It quoted a Reuter dispatch
claiming that the police intelligence in Kenya was convinced that the organization was directed
by brains that were not African and that overall control was perhaps exercised from outside. The
Lagos paper, therefore, assumed that the Kenyan police thought that the African was generally
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inert. That he was a dog that barked, but did not usually bite. Now he had started to bite, the
Kikuyu rebel must have borrowed his teeth from somewhere outside Africa!74
Another paper, the Daily Express in Accra, in one of their lead stories on 28th October,
said that with a little more ignition, the outbreak of Mau Mau violence would be an explosion
that could be heard far and wide. Further, the Daily Express opined, the war was not a new
invention; it was only the continuation of the revolution which had swept Europe, America,
Oceania and Asia, out of which the spark was being seen in Africa, flaring up with immense
intensity. Having traced, with more or less accuracy, the struggle for independence in various
parts of the world, the paper said that Africa was the last of five continents emerging from
slavery to nationhood. The article even suggested that “Mau Mau” in the Ewe language could be
interpreted as an appeal or a supplication to God, “Mawu” being the word for “God” in that
language. It referred to a statement which it attributed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Oliver Lyttelton, who was quoted as having said that, “however small a movement like this may
be, it does not spring up unless there is some fairly deep cause.”75
That, continued the paper, was exactly where it stood. Workers in the East African
country, it pointed out, earned seven East African cents a day. Who, it posed, was to blame for
this oppressive practice? Was it to be concluded that the people of Kenya hated white men so
much that they had planned to murder them? Certainly not, it argued. The upheaval in Kenya,
therefore, served as a warning to all colonial administrators as to what was in store for all. It had
reached the boiling point and could explode. Prevention was in the granting of freedom to all
colonial peoples and allowing them citizenship of the world without a bar of any sort. Those who
chose to suppress the truth could do so at their own destruction.76
The Colonial Office and the colonial government were obviously concerned about this
sweeping international sympathy and mounting attack on the European position in Kenya as a
result of Mau Mau. Perhaps arising out of this growing attention focused on the goings on in
Kenya in the press, both London and Nairobi got hostile and domestic and international
propaganda was upped. An important communication from the Commonwealth Relations Office,

“Is this the Hand of Jacob?” West African Pilot, 28th October 1952.
Daily Express, 28th October 1952.
76
Ibid.
74
75

166

“Kenya: Mau Mau,” was drafted and circulated to senior CRO officials, the UK Delegation to
the United Nations in New York, and high commissioners and ambassadors in Pakistan, India,
Canada, Ceylon, New Zealand, USA and Australia among other countries.77 It was designed as
an attempt to elicit, from all these imperial officers and the commonwealth, surveys from various
regions of views, in their respective countries, on developments in Kenya. This was followed by
redoubled efforts to present the “true” picture of what was really happening in Kenya in both
London and Nairobi. The British Information Services, an agency of the British government,
released damage control press briefings explaining that Mau Mau was a terrorist movement of
Kikuyu who were bewildered by European civilization with the result being growing discontent
in villages and unemployment, poverty and crime in the city of Nairobi. One such propaganda
document mentioned the Hugh Dow commission that had been set up to look into the question of
land and related issues. British diplomats pored over press articles from the Commonwealth
carrying developments in Kenya with dedication. Their observations were relayed back to the
CO for action.78
In one instance, it was decided that there was need to correct the Kansas City Star, which
had made the underlying assumption Europeans were occupying lands from which Africans,
specifically the Kikuyu, had been turned out. This, it was argued, was not the case because, when
the British administration came to Kenya, it was a welter of warring tribes chasing one another
over the country and the White Highlands, in particular, were populated, if at all, by a few
nomadic Maasai, for whom ample provision was made elsewhere. All this, however, was not to
deny that there was overcrowding in Kikuyu country. But this owed in large measure to the
introduction of public order, the suppression of warfare, and social services, made possible by
wealth created mainly by white settlement.79 The public relations coup from London and Nairobi
was a resounding success especially with newspapers outside Africa and the Soviet Union. Soon,
foreign media started outdoing London and Nairobi in explaining what Mau was all about.
For example, a Mrs. Malinowska, writing for the New York City based Life Magazine,
and, perhaps, closely adhering to the official template prepared for various press outlets around
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the world, wrote: “The Kikuyu –through their inherent characteristics-have been …more
adversely affected by this phenomenon [primitive agricultural methods coupled with the rise of
the population, European settlement and consequent development] than other tribes. Naturally
quick, impatient and politically conscious, their feeling of frustration in the difficult and social
situations arising from the development of the country has found expression in a reversion from
education and Christianity to primitive tribal practices and superstitions.” For this reason, the
leaders of the movement were establishing their own courts in their attempt to usurp the
functions of government.80
Another American paper referred to the Mau Mau as the criminal fringe of an Africa on
the march. Quoting the Sunday Times, the paper explained the movement in terms of there being,
throughout Africa, a breaking up of an old social order based in tribalism and primitive nomadic
ways of life. This old order had crumbled under machines, technology, money, economy,
modern transportation, systems of law and elective authority. But, as yet, the native Africans
have not been able to find stability in a society based on European ideas.81
So, while the reality was approximated with some degree of accuracy, the next logical
conclusion, that Africans wanted existential stability and a secure niche in the new modernized
order, was not reached. Africans wanted to access and enjoy the facilities of modernity on an
equal footing with other races. They also wanted ample accommodation quarters and higher
wages; cash crops; trade licenses; the demand for educational opportunities formal as well as
technical and vocational; demand for credit facilities to, and training for, farmers; and
establishment of cotton ginneries. Needless to say, land was the single most important
preoccupation as well. Instead, the myth of exoticism and primitivism had more currency and
traction in the international court of public opinion.
That explains why, according to Detroit News, the war was being spurred by black
magic. According to this American paper, the movement was, by employing terror, trying to
drive out foreigners in order to recover the land. It went on to point out that the situation was
roughly equivalent to the efforts of American Indians to stop white settlement of the American
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continent, although the Africans were infinitely more powerful.82 Other papers were a little more
balanced in their analysis. The US paper, Speedy Daily, while labeling Mau Mau a “terrorist”
movement, noted that “some of Kenya’s problems include European settlers pre-empting the best
land, confining the great black tribes to reservations, lack of employment to meet the high
birthrate of the natives, and segregations. Quoting Negley Farson’s book, Last Chance in Africa,
the Speedy Daily concluded that such a situation was bound to cause an explosion some time.83
The press in Western countries was, therefore, uncritically drinking from the brook of
London and Nairobi propaganda, which was informed by Carother’s report, Psychology of Mau
Mau. As earlier noted, while admitting the destabilizing impact of colonial agromodernity,
urbanization and erosion and corruption of indigenous African principles and institutions, which
caused anxiety, Carothers argued that Mau Mau was an atavistic movement of crazed nut heads.
In this rather biased psychological analysis, the role of animistic and magical modes of
explanation in producing a childlike mentality and molding the “psychopathic” character of the
nationalist rebels was emphasized. This is what then informed the popular perception of Mau
Mau as a disease of the mind, a plague, a virulent infection and a sore that had to be cut out
before it affected other loyal Africans in the region.
In Kenya, this was the official view and line of the Mau Mau war. The movement’s oaths
were bestial and their methods depraved beyond words.84 Kikuyu leaders, Eliud Mathu and
Harry Thuku appealed to their people in the name of Jesus Christ to abandon things of which
God Himself disapproved. Did they not see that the Mau Mau were vagabonds and spivs and
hopeless persons? Thuku appealed to Kikuyu to abandon everything to do with that evil
association of Mau Mau and work with the government to bring back peace of the land as of
old.85 Thus Mau Mau was effectively criminalized and bastardized both at home and abroad.
Foreign press in the Soviet Union and India, however, were more critical. Komsomol
Pravda devoted its “International Review” section to affairs in Kenya. The slant of the reporting
was rather obvious: colonial oppression was causing discontent and protest against the regime of
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terror, poverty and deprivation of rights established by the British. Pravda added that Africans in
Kenya were deprived of lands which for centuries their forefathers owned, and they were driven
into reservations.86 Unlike Soviet newspapers, which were obviously motivated by ideological
leanings, the Indian press was more balanced but critical of British imperial policy in a manner
that approximated the situation. This can be attributed to India’s experience under British
imperialism for an even longer period than in Kenya. The Indian government was concerned
about a series of damaging reports appearing daily in the newspapers. There, reaction in Indian
press had been uniformly hostile even from normally responsible and friendly editors who
commented bitterly that it was British policy that had led to the outbreak of Mau Mau.87 Two
months later the prime minister was worried about bad press because it was increasingly linking
events in Kenya with the situation in South Africa in the eyes of the Indian public.88 The British
High Commissioner in India assured the Indian government that Britain aimed at getting order
restored and then to tackle the root causes of the trouble and lay a sound basis for further social
and economic advance.89
This was not convincing enough for the Indian government which thought that
deductions from firm action which had had to be taken in Kenya were, of course, quite false. In
the battlefield of Indian public opinion, military operations, arrests, round ups, shootings and
confiscations of property in Kenya were seen as thrashing about wildly.90 The Times of India
wrote that the colonial authorities were willfully exaggerating operations of the Mau Mau
conspiracy seeking to utilize it for curbing political and economic aspirations of the African
people. Quoting statements made by Jomo Kenyatta, it contrasted, at length, the desperate
poverty of, and the restrictions placed on, Africans with the prosperity and freedom enjoyed by
the European community, which enjoyed a monopoly of the most fertile area of Kenya, the
highlands. Further, it stated that it was sheer desperation generated by failure to get their just
grievances redressed that had driven Kenya’s Africans to violence. The paper urged the UK
government to take immediate steps to remedy legitimate grievances of the African people who
had been cheated off their lands and rights of citizenship in their own country. It concluded by
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asserting that poverty and hunger could not be put down by the sword.91 Another Indian
newspaper, the Statesman, while less critical, stressed that the proclamation of a state of
emergency and strengthening of security forces would cause complex issues to be
oversimplified.92
These kind of sentiments echoed similar observations from unexpected quarters in
Kenya. Speaking at the LegCo, the member for the coast, Cooke, stated that he thought that a
good deal of the unrest in Kenya was due to the fact colonial leadership had not anticipated
African grievances in the past. As a result, such grievances, real or imagined, had been allowed
to simmer in the minds of a dissident and aggrieved people.93 The Asian Member for Eastern
Electoral Region, A.B Patel, made similar remarks. Patel argued that it was necessary to study
the legitimate grievances and aspirations of the African community and to meet them where
necessary because it was important in dealing with the nature of emergency that faced the
country.94 Thus, even for white representatives like Cooke, it was not enough to win the physical
battle against Mau Mau but also not to lose the confidence, not only of the Kikuyu, but also that
of other ethnic groups in Kenya.95 There was apprehension the Mau Mau disease of the mind
would spread to other parts of the country. Not only had the war beamed in headlines around the
world. It had caused seismic political tremors that were felt in the colony.
In Nyanza, people were thirsting for education with the result being the rapid awakening
of political consciousness. There were a great number of schools in that particular region, many
of which were entirely run by African teachers and overseen by African inspectors. Some of
these people were university-educated, and considering what had happened with independent
schools in Kikuyuland, this was seen as a potential tinderbox. Mrs. Shaw, the member for
Nyanza, told the LegCo that in a tour of the region, some of these educated people imbued with
advanced ideas and African nationalism had openly supported the objects of Mau Mau.96 E.W.
Crosskill, the Member for Mau, shared this view when he said that there was continual
recrudescence of Mau Mau throughout the country. Crosskill told the Council that administrative
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officers in Nyanza were very disturbed by the danger of infiltration of Mau Mau along the
boundaries with the Rift Valley Province. Whereas this had initially been rumored, after extra
vigilance by the Kenya Police and settlers, there was evidence of this spread had been found,
which had been proclaimed in the press by the Kericho District Commissioner. The DC had
stated that things were much worse in the “Lumbwa” area (presently Kipkelion) than had been
suspected.97 As such, it was not lost on either settlers or the colonial authorities of the
countrywide danger posed by the Mau Mau menace.
Indeed, the picture must have been even more worrying for the UK government and the
Colonial Office in particular after the dispatch of the East African Royal Commission on Land,
Population headed by Hugh Dow. As earlier noted, this commission was established at the behest
of Sir Phillips Mitchell, the governor of Kenya, to investigate the social, economic and political
conditions in the region. Actually, the urgent nature of this kind of inquiry as suggested quite
early in the late 1940s, was underplayed. It only became imperative after the outbreak of the Mau
Mau violence and, even then, London still dragged its feet over the matter. Nevertheless,
evidence collected and testimonies heard by the commission revealed widespread discontent and
grievances, which mirrored those expressed by the KCA, Kikuyu individuals and communities
over the years.

Mau Mau Minds from “The Above”: A Nightmarish View
The Dow commission findings presented a view from the top of an unsettling state of
affairs in the colonial Kenya. The narratives of suffering and grievance that constituted the
evidential material revealed Kenya Mau Maus of the mind in embryo. There was a groundswell
of aggrieved voices demanding redress and justice from the British and colonial governments.
This evidence was enough indication that all was not well in colonial Kenya. African
submissions and evidence came from all over Kenya from the Maasai, Nandi, Kamba, Luhya,
Keiyo, Marakwet, Taita and Luo among others. They contained grievances about land shortage
and overcrowding in the African reserves; worker grievances such as demands for better
accommodation quarters and higher wages; cash crops; trade licenses; the demand for
educational opportunities formal as well as technical and vocational; a demand for credit
facilities to, and training for, farmers; the establishment of cotton ginneries; the abolition of the
97
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maize and produce control board and the free movement of agricultural produce at the district
and national levels; urban problems etc. It was evident that the colonial order and imperial
legitimacy was in question, and a different future Kenya envisioned.
For example, in their submission, the Kanyakwar Luo clan that hailed from Kibuye
Location, close to Kisumu Township, complained and expressed regret that even after about
twenty or so years since the Carter land commission, the government had failed to respond to its
petitions. This was in spite of the fact that the clan had repeatedly submitted grievances to
successive colonial governors since 1915. The clan claimed legitimate ownership of the land
upon which the township was located by ancestral, and thus, customary right. The land was
theirs, they wrote, long before the advent of British colonialism. Yet, the government continued
to turn a deaf ear and refused to give the matter due consideration even as the clan was by-passed
by economic development in the area and the community, rendered redundant. The clan also
protested that it was not in favor of modification of the form of land tenure and rights from the
traditional one practiced by Africans to a new one. Further, that any arising land disputes be dealt
with under that particular preferred land tenure system and rights. The clan was confident that
this would conclusively prove that the land in question was its property hence its transfer was not
subject to control under colonial law.98
The Kanyakwar refuted the Carter commission’s conclusion that Kisumu was a market
town that attracted agricultural produce from African farmers in the region. The commission had
argued that, as such, the township was not a liability but was beneficial to the clan that lived near
Kisumu market more than anyone else. They had easy access to perishables like eggs, milk and
vegetables stated the commission. Kanyakwar told the Dow commission that while it appreciated
Carter’s observations, it had to disagree in entirety as it was absolutely incorrect to say that the
clan enjoyed the benefits that accrued from the proximity of the market. If anything, it was those
with land to cultivate who enjoyed the proceeds from the sale of their produce. The alienation of
their land to pave way for the township with its attendant urban features such as administration
posts, police lines, courts and the prison; railway station and houses; airport; Nyanza oil mill; a
soap factory; European housing; water-treatment plant at Ujiji, now renamed “masikini” (poor);
98
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Kisumu hotel; football stadium; and European and Asian cemeteries had resulted the
displacement of clan members. They were as a result scattered with every new extension of the
township boundaries. Their submission contained a comprehensive list of families displaced for
every of the urban developments listed above.99
This anguished Kanyakwar land claim was but only one of numerous similar claims
made by a range of people acting in accord or as individuals. In their submission to the Dow
commission, the Kipisigis of Kimulot in Kericho District stated that the hearts of many people
were broken because they had been evicted from their lands and their houses burned down by
colonial agents in 1927. The total number of houses burned, they claimed, was 1,641 in
Kaptimdui-Kimulot, Kamongonjet, Kaptulgeny, Kibulgeny and Timbilil among other Kipsigis
areas. On the basis of the loss of what they boasted was the best land in the colony with fine
weather, the Kipsigis advised the commission that what the people of Kenya wanted was to live
in their own lands which had been labeled “Crown Lands.” When the Carter land commission
held sittings in the early 1930s, these Kipsigis had demanded that their lands be returned. As in
other African claims, the Carter commission’s resolution had not been satisfactory.100 Although
the recommendations of the Carter commission were accepted by the government and regarded
as the basis of all land problems in the colony, they did not stop Africans from making land
claims. Among the Kipsigis in the 1940s, Dini ya Mbojo, which was similar to DYM, alongside
the Kipsigis Central Association continued to agitate for redress of land hunger. Both of these
Kipsigis bodies were declared unlawful societies dangerous to the good government of the
Colony in the late 1940s.101
Although the Kipsigis land claim at Kericho had been presented to and mentioned in
executive council meetings during this time, no action had been taken. The Kipsigis submission
to the Dow commission described this issue as having been very hot by 1951 because the
appropriation of an estimated 7,250 acres of land belonging to the Kipsigis African District
Council was simply unjustifiable. The little prevailing peace that had held since the late 1920s
99
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evictions had been disturbed since the government pulled down more houses in KaptuigenyKamongonjet on 28th February 1952. White farmers and tea growers had then been settled on
this Kipsigis land. Yet, the Kipsigis argued, their population was growing bigger by the day with
people having to farm ever smaller strips of land. Poverty and malnutrition was an everyday
reality.102 They criticized the government for developing lackadaisical, discriminatory and
covetous laws that only provoked hatred.103 It was pointed out that there was, at the time, no
room for Kipsigis expansion southwards as was the case before the advent of colonialism. Taita
arap Toweet, one of the first and most educated Kipsigis, argued in a personal submission that
had the British not intervened, this southward migration would have reached Tanganyika.104
Similarly, the Keiyo and Marakwet protested in strong terms that they faced an existential
threat as a result of land alienation. Land, they said, was everything to them. It determined
whether one was rich or poor and if their children could be educated or remained ignorant. In
their memorandum, they expressed their bitterness over the loss of their source of livelihood that
had been theirs since time out of mind. They complained that they were crowded in a one mile
broad strip together with their diminishing and lean cattle herds which had once been their mark
of wealth. Old land boundaries were a constant ringing din in the ears of the old and young in
their daily lives especially considering that the Carter commission had ignored their claims
twenty years before, they said. The elders felt that although destocking was the “solution,” it was
a direct weapon designed to confine them in a crowded reserve and to keep them from
demanding more land. As a result of all this, there was only sadness in Keiyo and Marakwet
hearts.105
For their part, the Nandi Mau Maus of the mind expressed the desire to embrace
advanced agricultural methods and transition from nomadic life to mixed farming. The
progressive members of the ADC stated that they were anxious to go in this sound and economic
direction towards this progressive land use. However, there were obstacles such as land leases
and titles for security against which they could leverage for agricultural loans to develop their
holdings. Further, the Nandi submission argued that no matter how the Nandi land unit was

102

Memoranda from the people in Kericho, BNA: CO 892/5/4.
Siroin Kipsigis to Dow commission, 22nd December 1953, BNA: CO 892/5/4.
104
Taita arap Toweet to the Dow commission, 14th April 1953, BNA: CO 892/5/4.
105
Memorandum to the Commission by Elgeyo and Marakwet Elders, 24th March 1953, BNA: CO 892/5/4.
103

175

farmed, they anticipated a large landless population without an alternative means of livelihood.
For that reason, they wanted Nandi land that had been retained by Europeans in Kipkarren and
Kaimosi. While 13,000 acres of these farms had been returned to the Nandi in 1950, it was not
enough. The Nandi considered that the award of these lands under the soldier settlement after the
First World War was “a very big mistake.” At the time, not only did the Nandi inhabitants in
those areas lose land but they also had their homes destroyed. This then, they argued, was the
justified foundation upon which they demanded for the mistake to be made good.106 At the same
time, the series of punitive British military measure visited upon the Nandi was still fresh in their
memory. They felt very strongly that their removal from their Tinderet lands as part of
punishment for interfering with the construction of the Mombasa-Kisumu railway between 1898
and 1901, was not justifiable. They estimated that there was only 751 square miles of land
against a population of 80,000 Nandi as per the 1948 census. At least 20,000 Nandi squatters
were believed to be landless and lived on European farms. Some of these Nandi people, who
could be found outside their reserve, had not immigrated “for sheer adventure.”
The Maasai too were hopeful that “the impassable abyss of suspicion and resentment”
between them and the British of half a century over their land woes, would be bridged by the
Dow commission. Different sections of Maasai affected by the 1904 and 1911 treaties wrote
impassioned and moving submissions. Under the leadership of Kirringol ole Risie, Maasai from
Kajiado assured the London-appointed commission that the bitter memory of their forced
eviction from Laikipia was still fresh and would continue to be in the future. Further, they
blamed the Carter commission for being responsible for even more excisions of valuable land
and making “diversionary additions of a few bits there and there.”107 One such dispossession was
the Ololelai land, which was included in the Tsavo National Park without Maasai consent and the
Ziwani Estate area.108 Kajiado Maasai also claimed that there had been further encroachment of
the Athi River railway station eastwards. At the same time, the Kitengela and Mbagathi
boundary set at the Mbagathi River, clearly laid down in the 1911 treaty, had been overstepped.
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The Ngong boundary was shifting at an alarming rate and their protest in this regard had fallen
on deaf ears.109
The Narok Maasai were even more combative and critical of government machinations
with regard to land than the Kajiado group. They made it clear that they did not recognize the
1911 treaty, which they deemed as null and void. They cited the 1904 treaty that stated and
assured the Maasai that the settlement would be honored as long as the Maasai existed. They
indicated that it had only taken exactly six years and 261 days for this promise to be broken.
Blame for the breach of this agreement was laid on the “political pressure of the Land-grabbing
settlers.” Narok Maasai made it clear that they saw this as a deliberate physical violation of the
1904 treaty, which they highly resented.110 In addition, they expressed grave suspicions with
regard to what they termed “insidious moves” on even more appropriation of land in preparation
for the creation of National Parks in Maasailand.
But it was the Loitoktok Maasai who were more eloquent on the issue of national parks
and game reserves like Tsavo and the Amboseli. The Loitoktok Maasai stated that land was
essential for their continued existence. As such, it was a great cause of concern that colonial
conservationist policies were inimical to their economy, which was directly affected by their
implementation. They hoped that the British would consider their requirements “more important
than those wild animals.”111 After all, if settlers could kill or drive away wild animals because
they were a nuisance, why did the government want to make national parks or game reserves on
the land that was left? They pointed out that it was the very people who removed game from
their farms who appropriated Maasai land in order to protect wildlife for tourism. The Loitoktok
did not see how tourists benefitted the country considering to the great sacrifices the Maasai
were being forced to make for extensive sanctuaries for wild animals. The little fees paid to the
ADC could not compare to their losses, in both human and material terms, they argued. While
they once coexisted with, and exercised discretion with regard to wild animals, they lamented the
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fact that it was no longer within their power to take any action when they attacked people or
livestock.112
Likewise, the Kamba of Kitui District expressed their displeasure about land alienated for
conservation purposes. They claimed that land designated as Crown Land and other areas set
aside for a national park had affected a quarter of a million people. The creation of national parks
around 1948 had adversely affected the people of Kanziko-Ikutha locations, the Athi River and
all the way south to the Kitui-Malindi boundary. The Tsavo National Park also affected the area
south of Kibwezi. Kamba people, as a result, were left “to hang about in land hunger.” The
memo to the Dow commission called for immediate repeal of the Crown Lands Ordinance
(1938) to relieve land hunger that the Kitui Kamba had suffered.113 The Taita of Taveta were
also among many colonial people who made similar appeals. The Taita were “crying” for the
land west and east of Lumi river part of which was possessed by the Ziwani Sisal Estate. But the
land they needed most was in the area between Lumi and Salaita, which in Pre-European times
had been used for settlement, bee keeping, cultivation and cattle grazing activities that were
illegal under the new colonial order. The Taveta Taita were confident that these lands were
rightfully theirs as inheritance from their forefathers. Yet, they were surrounded by Europeans on
all sides “like people in an island” leaving a small area for their use.114
Besides the Taveta claim, there were other notable land claims made by groups of people
who had lived and conducted trade in the along the East Africa coast line for years before British
presence. Hadi Z. Bakari expressed fear and unease because the government had seized his plot
of land at Mwandudu, Miritini, for example. This land had belonged to his father, Kituwe
Ngome, who was illiterate and had, in old age, succumbed to dementia that Bakari attributed to a
court case over the plot. Bakari argued that it was not fair for someone to lose his property
simply because one was illiterate. Failure for plot No. 291 to be returned, Bakari said, would
subject him to a hard life of poverty.115 Ahmed bin Stambul put in a letter on behalf of a dozen
land claimants from Kilifi District. The land in question was in Kuruitu that covered the area
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from Vyewe to Kijangwani. Although the land had been passed to a succeeding generation, it
had been designated Crown Land.116
As illustrated in the land claim examples discussed above, many communities in Kenya
of the 1950s were perturbed and experiencing the same hardships as those that motivated the
Mau Mau war. At the same time, however, there were other issues and grievances shared
between various Kenyans that were highlighted in various African submissions to the Dow
commission. Among these included the housing problem in main urban areas, among them
Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Thika; the high cost of living and low wages; the demand for
education and technical training; and the demand for markets for African agricultural produce
among others.
As earlier noted, housing and the twin grievances, cost of living and low wages, had been
a major issue of discontent especially, in the mid-1940s. The Christian Council of Kenya
highlighted the plight of African urban workers, which was deplorable. It stated that anyone
acquainted with housing conditions in Nairobi could substantiate and illustrate the state of urban
housing from personal experience. Babies were known to be born in a room in which two or
more married couples were housed. Adolescent girls slept in the same room as their fathers and
brothers at the expense of decency and dignity.117 Nairobi councillor Kairu Ngure pointed out the
acute shortage of African housing for male migrant labor, which could only get worse if the
question of their families was also considered.118 The Kenya Federation of Trade Unions did
exaggerate when it pointed out that, “more than 10,000 people” were on the Nairobi City
Council housing waiting list since 1944. Some resorted to building shanty villages on the
outskirts of the city, for example Buruburu, where 16,000 lived but from where they were
evicted in 1951 by the city council. Other informal settlements included Kariobangi and Mathare
Valley.119 Very few firms provided accommodation for their employees, the Kisumu African
Commercial Employees Association, complained. Even when they did, it was usually a 10’ X
10’ room or even much smaller room. Such housing was of poor quality and inadequate yet
employees were supposed to live happily and comfortably with their families. Further, argued
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the Kisumu Employees Association, the wages paid would not enable members to buy furniture
and even if this were possible, it could not even fit the small space. African salaries, were thus,
“a starving one,” which forced them to rent a very dirty small room to keep out of the elements.
It was a basic survival salary enabling Africans to tide over another day.120
This point was put before the commission even more bluntly by J.K. Rono who submitted
an individual petition. Rono told the commission that his wage was very low yet he was
“supposed” to live and lead a better life as any other person of other races. Like them, Rono
would have wanted to live in a good house that was well furnished, possess a car, run a farm,
educate his children in an international school, meet the needs of his family and meet his tax
obligations. He posed, “How was he expected to get all these things with a low wage? Rono
stated that what an African got was not in a true sense a wage. It was, a basic “Cost of living
allowance.” This was nothing at all: it did not cover the bare necessities of life. He, therefore,
urged that wages for urban Africans be trebled and teachers recognized and rewarded for their
public service. Rono suggested that teachers needed to be pensionable, and a minimum wage set
up for agricultural workers permitting a progressively higher standard of life.121 These
sentiments were echoed by Waminyaro, a barely literate peasant farmer from Kapsirowa in the
Rift Valley Province. In his pencil scribbled submission made in broken Swahili, Waminyaro
informed the commission that Africans were having troubles because they were suffering from
the lack of all things. Their salaries were too low and insufficient to buy clothes or even food.122
Overall, no matter from what part of the colony submissions came or who wrote them, the
grievances were more or less the same.
Few, however, put things in perspective as a memo sent by an anonymous writer from the
East Africa Meteorological Department, “What is land to Africans.”123 This elaborated on the
point made by many petitions that land was in the past, and continued to be, the African’s
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mother.124 That land to the African meant, and still meant, life.125 According to the African
meteorological department writer, the value of land was intricately related with economic and
social services in society. It was from the land that food including maize, millet, peas etc was
grown and livestock reared. The writer explained that in pre-European Africa, food crops would
be grown in one place to another when the soil was exhausted since there was plenty of land.
There were no paddocks or fences to restrict the use of pastures for livestock or to separate land
for food crops and communal grazing grounds. As such, there were plenty of healthy livestock
owned by most people compared to the 1950s when they were few and weak and gave little milk.
The crop yields were poor and land was in high demand. The writer continued thus:
As the British came and settled, there was no more moving from one place to place,
people remained permanent to land they held and claimed…. Land therefore became a
natural property with a fixed quantity and no quality.
Present Kenya is a place of competition of getting more, not of people of Kenya but of
invaders. There are no regulation to condition the use of land especially African land.
African population has grown higher because of British economic system which never
evolved from African custom but was applied on African by the exploiters. The higher
population indicates a low standard of living. Need has been enlarged by the exploiters
and left them to be satisfied from sale of labour, making (African Land) a store of such
labor, ….
The family is completely ruined….
Need had been multiplied and land which is the only human productive source has been
thrown to ruins, …even grains can’t be produced enough to meet the needs, and the only
substitute is labour sale….
All towns were erected by British pioneers except Mombasa. They either owned land by
begging or simply erecting tents on sites where there was no claim. This …made the
European a landlord in cities and towns in Kenya, …assisted by government of the time
who proclaimed such lands. …They found land free. …I leave as a rentier to government
while an Asian and Briton as masters and landlords. My salary is too low that buying and
building a house even if I am free will be a dream.126
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This letter encapsulated how most African people viewed their colonial plight and
experienced their chaotic life characterized by misery.127 Where once individual livelihoods were
guaranteed through entitlement of land held against the community, there was, under
colonialism, individualism and fragmentation of land, which was a “baffling enigma.”128
Besides the grievances discussed above, there were numerous other important ones that
cannot be described in great detail. The Nakuru African Advisory Council, for example, was of
the opinion that in all areas in the African land units, cash crop growing restrictions on coffee,
tea, wheat and pyrethrum were to be scrapped.129 It was argued that the limitation of coffee
growing to a hundred trees after every one year was a drawback and that planters be allowed to
plant according to ability.130 Lamenting that Africans were in a position of poverty and slavery,
which increased discontent, hatred and bitterness in people’s hearts, the Kalenjin Union
demanded the right of selling and buying things to and from abroad. Further, the union called for
the abolition of the color-bar especially in as far as it affected the prices of African agricultural
produce. They wanted maize, vegetables, chicken and eggs to be traded freely and their prices
made equal whatever the color of the producer.131

Defeating the Physical Mau Mau of the Forest: An Ever Stern Imperial Glare
In the 1950s, the Mau Mau threat was acknowledged by many, including Governor
Baring, as a great problem that faced all the men and women in Kenya.132 The longer the
Emergency played out, the greater the anxiety expressed by some European members in the
legislative council who felt that the country was on the verge of a mighty cataclysm. For most
people, the Emergency was a period of uncertainty in which the entire future of the country was
at stake.133 Anxious members of the council, led by Michael Blundell, had called for urgent
prosecution of the war and elimination of the enemy before he eliminated the government.134
This then was the beginning of a long debate in the course of 1954 about the progress and ending
the emergency characterized by rabid fear. Defeating Mau Mau and the return to normalcy was
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of paramount importance. In the course of this debate, therefore, the most important question that
emerged was what it really meant to defeat Mau Mau.
Under tremendous pressure from the Legislative Council and acting on its own
imperative, the colonial government opened talks with the Mau Mau, which struck at the heart of
the debate. Most settler members of the legislative council were opposed to negotiations that
were in any manner designed to aid the objectives of the Mau Mau.135 Members called for the
realization that the problem posed by the movement was more than a slight disturbance or
disquiet.136 There was need for the government to deal with the threat with all the seriousness
that the war deserved. When people resorted to force to achieve an objective, Blundell argued,
then that force had to be met with force.137 This was supported by others who felt that to end the
Emergency quickly, the only way to end lawlessness was through force. After all, military
operations were being carried out by the best military experts in the British Empire with vast
military experience.138
This aggressive view was, however, tempered by the recognition that winning a war did
not entail the killing of the last man: that utter defeat of the enemy involved a measure of
surrender, of course, on one’s own terms being promulgated upon the loser. It was, therefore, not
only enough to win in the physical field of arms but also in the mental and moral fields.139 Sir
Evelyn Baring, the Governor prosecuting the war on Mau Mau, had noted the same having
spoken about a two-pronged attack on the Mau Mau.140
On the one hand, there was military force and, on the other, economic and social
measures. It was clear to some that while the government was winning the physical battle it was
in great danger of losing the spiritual battle and confidence of the Kikuyu and other ethnic
groups.141 The colonial government had little chance of stamping-out Mau Mau and winning in

135

LegCO. Deb., LXII (27th May 1954): 521. This was a motion moved by Group L.R. Captain Briggs to oppose
talks with Mau Mau “criminals.”
136
LegCo. Deb., LXI (18th February 1954): 21-36
137
LegCo. Deb., LXIII (21st October 1954): 359.
138
One of the members of the Legco supporting Blundell’s position on this motion debate was Dr. Hassan.
139
LegCo. Deb., LXII (27th May 1954): 540. This was Crosskill’s contribution to the motion over “Talks with Mau
Mau Criminals.”
140
LegCo. Deb., LXIII (12th October 1954): 1
141
LegCo. Deb., LXI (19th February and 23rd February 1954): 125 and 136 & 144, Cooke and Patel respective
contributions to the debate on the “Urgent Necessity of Ending the Emergency.”

183

the psychological and moral fields considering the punitive measure of land forfeiture meted to
individual forest fighters. This measure was the result of the colonial government’s appreciation
that Africans thought of nothing else other than land: the fact that Africans had their roots in the
land from which everything else derived. The African social system was like a tree that spread
from the title of land, which was the very symbol of authority.142 To deal with the movement’s
adherents, therefore, the government instituted a policy that penalized them speedily and with
efficacy by announcing that they would forfeit their tribal land titles.
Furthermore, having noted that it was the long-term future of the colony that was at stake,
the colonial government and European politicians sought to rebuild Kikuyu society, reorganize
other ethnic groups and, thereby, the country’s future, on “men of character, distinction, integrity
and straightforwardness of outlook.” Most such people had been on the side of the colonial state
during the Emergency even though some, if not all of them, secretly wished for the same things
that Mau Mau was fighting for. It was recognized that Kikuyu who had stood up to the Mau Mau
movement needed a post-emergency and post-independence scheme that would bring them into a
closer cooperation with the government in the subsequent reconstruction and limited
reconfiguration of the state. It was essential to build on such men and no other men. It was upon
these loyal people that the future of the country was to be built. Indeed, they were the people
who had to benefit in the future. “Constructive” measures of reform, therefore, sought to plan
beyond the troubles of the 1950s without carrying the disadvantages that would make the last
state worse or as bad as the first.143
Besides the foregoing issue regarding how to defeat the physical Mau Mau, government
authorities understood that it represented a lot more. It was emblematic of colonial subjects
returning the imperial gaze. It was a response to the colonial state’s legal and policy architecture
of restrictive space and time a circumscribing physical and psychological environment. Put
differently, the forest struggle physically enacted and mimicked, through the investment and
wielding of force the same colonial process that had created this hostile environment. This is
something that authorities appreciated about Mau Maus of the mind, the ferment of which would
reproduce physical combat.
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After all, there was a pervading desire among Africans, for the reconstruction and
reconfiguration of the social relations and structure of power and, thereby, remaking the
socioeconomic and political colonial order of the state. Colonial authorities in Nairobi and
London moved swiftly to steal this “thunder from the mountains” and the potential violence in
African minds. They took upon themselves the onus to “reconfigure” and “remake” the colonial
state. Of course, this was with the stakes heavily laden in favor of the colonial order, British
imperial interests and Africans loyal to them. To effectively reassert the ever stern imperial gaze
and defeat the real Mau Mau of the forest and disarm that of the minds, the authorities undertook
several limited agrarian and political, constitutional reforms.144 This was in a tenuous effort to
maintain the status quo with the system rigged to highly favor white settlers. It meant
recalibrating the system and changing the rules of the game to conceal this unjust and
discriminatory system much more cleverly. This came out of the “realization” that things were
“wrong” and actually, needed to be “fixed.”
It was a well appreciated view albeit among a precious few, at least openly, that whatever
the Kikuyu were, it was what British colonialism had made them.145 Further, it was quite clear
that land was the key to a people’s life. It was, therefore, “a real tragedy” that a few thousand
Europeans had attempted to establish for themselves a permanent aristocracy in a land inhabited
by and belonging to five million Africans. 12,000 square miles of the White Highlands was the
monopoly of 3,000 Europeans. With the outbreak of Mau Mau, these settlers had to come to a
realization that they had made their homes among millions of Africans who possessed the power
to destroy them.146 The view of the forest Mau Mau and that of the mind from above did not lie.
The Kenyan fire drew its fuel from land hunger among other affiliated chief sources including
urban crowding, shortage of housing and the growth of slum-living; unemployment; the quest for
universal free elementary education; poor African wages coupled with the steep cost of living
such that a considerable proportion of the African population could not afford to buy the

144

Since it is not the intention of this research to pursue the minute details concerning the arising disagreement and
debate in the 1950s with regard to how far such reforms were supposed to go, this is not discussed herein.
145
To the best of my recollection while collecting evidence, this is from an anonymous and undated letter, “The
Future of Kenya,” KNA: CS/2/8/175. However, what can be deduced is that it was probably written by a liberal
European of British extraction who was among the very first to travel to East Africa having set foot in Kenya, then
the East African Protectorate, in 1902. Secondly, it was written in the 1960s as it mentions the independence of
Tanganyika.
146
Anonymous and nd., “The Future of Kenya,” KNA: CS/2/8/175.

185

elementary necessities of life; racial discrimination and the application of color-bar legislations
with regard to land, residential areas and public places such as hotels, restaurants and bars; and
universal adult suffrage.147
With regard to the issue of land, The Observer noted that land-hunger was to the African
what unemployment was to the European. The paper referred to an official report on the
conditions in Kiambu where 40% of its population was landless. The said report had also given
warning that some 90,000 people there could be without means of support within a short time.
This, the report had concluded was something that could not be faced with equanimity.
Nevertheless, the report was never acted upon to remedy this most bitterly felt of land grievances
especially in light of the reservation of the White Highlands for white settlers.148 It, therefore,
came as no surprise that with the outbreak of Mau Mau, Governor Baring soon reported, on 25th
September, that active measures were to be taken in an attempt to “remedy” what was “wrong”
in the colony.149 As soon as this statement was made, therefore, plans were under way to
“alleviate” the plight and “better accommodate" Africans.
This could not be embarked upon too soon, nevertheless, lest it send the wrong signal to
“restful” ethnic groups that Mau Mau was being rewarded. In the interim, therefore, the colonial
state flexed its surveillance muscle to underscore its ever stern imperial glare. Under the
Emergency regulations, after 20th October 1952, measures were effected to exact collective
punishment on Kikuyu and Embu populations to defeat Mau Mau. This included the confiscation
of property of Mau Mau fighters, mass evictions and transfers of population, summary
executions, Royal Air Force “blind” bombing, the passing of severe, if savage, sentences for
infringements of regulations and hangings.150 According to Berman, entire villages suspected to
provide moral and material support to Mau Mau were concentrated into stockades that were built
on land confiscated from guerrilla fighters. By October 1955, more than a million people had
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been concentrated into 854 villages, and the program had proved a strategic success in bringing
the mass of the population under firm control by the provincial administration and isolating the
forest fighters from their base of support and supplies.151 In due course though, emphasis shifted
from punitive measures, that were corollary to the war effort, to “remedial” long-term measures.
For a while, villages were used for the reconstruction of Kikuyu society.152 According to
Berman, this was on a stable tri-class basis constituting of the wealthy elite, a solid and
numerically dominant class of yeoman farmers and a lower class of landless artisans and
laborers. This was all contained in a program for the consolidation and legal registration of
peasant landholdings in the reserves coupled with a program widening peasant access to
commodity production.153 This is what was to become the Swynnerton Plan, a long-term land
consolidation, redistribution and resettlement program, which was to be implemented before and
after independence. Steps were taken by the provincial administration to issue individual legal
land titles to land. At the core of the program, in the mid-1950s, was the simple consolidation of
scattered fragments of African land into single holdings. Within this agrarian reform strategy,
elite loyalists were to become the anchor of Kikuyu society as solid yeoman farmers and
landowners who knew they had much to lose if they flirted, however slightly, with the passions
of their nationalistic “friends.”154 To this core pillar of the limited reconfiguration of the colonial
political economy was added the responsibilities of employer-landlords. That is, it was hoped
that these new class of yeoman farmers would be able to provide employment to the landless
masses first in Kikuyu region and elsewhere.155
This process was also accompanied and complemented by the introduction of scientific
and efficient methods of production.156 In as far as these measures were concerned, the
“accommodations” involved did not involve extensive settlement of African populations that
were bursting at the seams in their designated reserves. Rather, it was based on the ideas of a
British agrarian “expert,” Roger Swynnerton, about land utilization and the organization of field
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services that were put into practice in Kenya in the mid-1950s.157 According to agricultural
“experts” such as Leslie Brown, it was calculated that, as a whole, not more than 5% of the
African lands was under sound land use. This was largely due to the fragmentation of holdings
arising from inheritance customs which made sound farming a physical impossibility. The
erosion, apparent overpopulation and poverty apparent in African areas were due to these factors
not to the good old hardy chestnut that “Europeans stole all the best land from Africans.”158
With regard to commodity production, the Swynnerton recommendations lifted the
controls and restrictions placed upon the main and most profitable cash-crops grown by Africans
among them coffee, tea and pyrethrum. Tea was introduced on a very limited scale in 1953 in
Nyeri district. The official logic was that land reforms in themselves would not avail much
without provision for the material benefits of increased agricultural production.159 The
Swynnerton Plan envisaged the expansion of African coffee production by some 5,000 acres a
year to some 71,500 acres by 1968; the growth of tea production to 70,000 acres; and pyrethrum
production to 48,300 acres in the same year, with significant increases in the production of
pineapples, wattle and sugar.160 This was to be accompanied by the greatly expanded provision
of credit, research and extension services, substantial investment in the development of soil
quality and water resources.161 It was hoped that the colony’s national income that stood at £107
million a year in 1954, would be increased by £45 million. According to the then Minister of
Finance, Vasey, the basic principle was for 6 million African families to have farming units of
approximately 10 acres a family, and to raise their average productivity in cash sales from ten
British Pounds to £100 a year after providing for their own needs.162
As it has been noted by scholars, these changes did not go far enough to assuage Mau
Mau minds. The Swynnerton Plan, according to Berman, had class significance. It made it
possible for already energetic and rich Africans to acquire more land and “bad,” and/or already
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poor Africans less, thus creating a landed and a landless class. This was tantamount to being the
final colonial nod of approval to permanent dispossession of the landless on the assumption that
they would be proletarianized and be absorbed within their reserves in local artisan production or
as wage laborers.163
Furthermore, it preferred Kikuyu loyalists who had easier access to coffee seedlings,
extension services and credit facilities and an already dominant position in the burgeoning local
production co-operatives. Such access meant that this African class was able to buy more land,
educate their children and set up businesses.164 It also assumed that “middle” peasants would
actually become small capitalist producers, employing labor and tied by common class interest
with the wealthier bourgeoisie whose political leadership they would accept.165 This partial
package of reforms as conceived and undertaken in the 1950s was a chimera.166
While it was meant to demonstrate the colonial state’s responsiveness to the needs of
imperial subjects, it served to further entrench social inequality and historical injustice especially
among the Kikuyu. It did so by providing loyalists with the means to reconstruct networks of
patronage and the moral economy of central Kenya. These structures consolidated the strength of
the loyalist elite long into the postcolonial period.167 As Branch aptly pointed out, economic,
social and political rewards were elongated to, not only sustain loyalism through the final years
of the Emergency, but to become the base for the moderate, modernizing and cautiously
reformist platform within the nationalist movement once the outcome of the military conflict
became clear.168
It is also important to observe herein that it is unfortunate that this agrarian reform was
grossly biased in its implementation. The process was bedeviled by the unnecessary “counterrevolutionary” intention to punish Mau Mau fighters and supporters and reward loyalists. Some
among the former group had their property, including cars and land, confiscated or requisitioned
by the state.169 Mau Mau fighters, their families and supporters were embittered. This was
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especially so because even after independence, this selective, and thus flawed “reconfiguration”
of the state, was not corrected. For them, they had fought the good and just fight and won, but it
was the losing side that was awarded the trophy of the political tournament. This then is what
explains continued postcolonial disillusionment, discontent and dissent. Indeed, it is this
weakness within this centerpiece of the 1950s reforms that watered down accompanying
constitutional and political reforms of the same period. It also undermined the full measure and
meaning of independence much later.
At the time, the African Unofficial Members Organization (AUMO) was at the forefront
of the demand for constitutional and political reforms. This group read the mood of the chaotic
and restless political African opinion in the 1950s. In its demands, therefore, it was radical and
bold. Besides calling for the end of racial discrimination; a halt to further alienation of land and
the repeal of the Crown Land Ordinances; equal pay for equal qualifications and work; an
increase of 33 % in the minimum wage; and the introduction of free elementary education in
Kenya, the group pressed the government to constitute a consultative body to deal with
constitutional reforms in the colony. Failure to do so would only cause greater political
frustration among Africans, it warned. Important components of proposed reforms of
government included demands such as the institution of a common voters’ roll as opposed to a
one based on the different racial communities in Kenya –African, Asian, Arab and European;
and the direct election of African members to, and parity for, Africans and non-Africans on the
unofficial benches in the LegCo.170 Cumulatively, these among other core demands that would
build up in the 1950s, were calls for nothing less than appropriate, proper and far-reaching
reconfiguration and reconstruction of the state and government with regard to suffrage, civil
rights and liberties, and the distribution of political power and responsibilities. They were first
made public on the eve of the arrival, in Nairobi, of the then SofS, Oliver Lyttleton, on 30th
October 1952.
This visit by the SofS touched off what became a series of constitutional reforms at first
aimed at re-centering European white settler and imperial interests in the colony. There was a
blatant but subtle attempt to assure white settlers of their “inviolate” place in the racially tiered

170

Mathu et al., The Kenya Situation, KNA: MAC/KEN/33/4; Committee of the AUMO, Draft Programme on
Kenya, nd., KNA: MAC/KEN/34/1; and Times, 29th October 1952.

190

socioeconomic and political hierarchy in Kenya. Besides the legal illegality that had literally
made land ownership a white man’s privilege, there was a renewed attempt to further entrench
their preferment under the supreme law of the land. Lyttleton, who led this initial attempt that
lasted between 1952 and 1954, spearheaded constitutional “changes” that prioritized the needs
and interests of European settlers at the expense of all other races especially those of the African
majority who stood to be the greatest losers. During these years, with very little consultation with
other races, not that their opinions really mattered, Lyttleton crafted a constitution meant to
placate settlers.171 The so-called Lyttleton constitution was meant to reorganize the Kenyan
executive under a new “multiracial” state that was a euphemism for the continuation of the
imperial status quo.172
Needless to say, under this “new constitutional order,” the demands made by African
members of the LegCo went unmet. The SofS did not grant their wish for three “cabinet”
portfolios and under-secretaries in various ministries.173 In the pivotal talks of March 1954 that
Lyttleton conducted, neither Nairobi nor, and especially London, was ready to countenance
undoing the communal basis of the franchise, which would mean an untimely dissolution of
empire. That was still in the offing in the future as the African insurmountable momentum for
constitutional concessions that reflected the wishes of the African majority gained more traction
in the early 1960s. In the meantime, outraged African politicians and populace had to contend
with “an altered executive” branch of government that consolidated political power in the hands
of Europeans. In addition to the three Elected European Members in government, the Lyttleton
constitution provided for two nominated Europeans who would hold the prestigious portfolios of
agriculture and finance. To Asians he offered two portfolios.174 Overall, the imposed Lyttleton
constitution did little to change the planned racial ratio of ministers in the new council of
ministers.175
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However, the one significant concession granted to African demands, the direct election
of African LegCo members had unintended consequences. One of the unintended consequences
was that it gave the impression that it was grooming future African leadership for take-over of
government responsibilities. Secondly, it seemed calculated to head-off the more radical
demands of African nationalism. Most importantly though, instead of ensuring British control,
this Lyttleton compromise to Africans proved to be the start of the process that led to the failure
of this constitution. It would lead to the more compromising constitution under a new SofS Alan
Lennox-Boyd in the late 1950s culminating in further negotiations in London that opened the
door to independence. However, what is even more instructive and of note, is the fact that the
colonial state’s initial and overall policy and institutional response to Mau Mau resulted in the
strengthening of the colonial state’s institutions.
This is perhaps even truer of the provincial administration, security apparatus and state
instruments of surveillance and control in the 1950s. Lyttleton understood that countries were
governed as much by tradition as force.176 He, therefore, reiterated that not all British territories
in Africa could be governed by force even though this was wished. While the British had force,
its uses were to be applied as far as the restoration of law and order was concerned.177At the
same time, Lyttleton must have realized that the maintenance of a contested “law and order” and
a disproportionate multiracial state that denied franchise to the African majority and elections not
based on a common roll, had to be protected. Such a flawed political system, which also featured
a “reorganized” government that preferred Europeans, had to be maintained by a strong
provincial administration.
This then explains why during his visit to Kenya in 1954, security issues were high in his
agenda.178 It is for this very reason that Lyttleton chose to meet with the colony’s provincial
commissioners only a few days after his arrival. This at a time when Lyttleton demonstrated that
he could afford to pay little heed to African demands.179 The “shooting war” was meant to teach
those who threatened law and order a lesson. Once this war was won though, there was need to
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doubly strengthen the provincial administration. Subsequently, there was a brief period of an
“ultimately illusory renaissance,” during the Emergency, of the provincial administration.180
The strengthening of this sinew of government control in time of crisis was in stark
contrast with the state of this institution at the beginning of the 1950s. The deterioration of the
status and power of the field administration was markedly visible in the years before October
1952.181 This was after the functions and powers of the institution had witnessed massive
expansion during the interwar years. In the context of the Mau Mau, the status and power of
administrators appeared dramatically reversed and even expanded beyond what it had been in the
interwar decades. Under Emergency regulations, administrators had both the punitive powers to
quickly eliminate any opposition from Africans, and the authority to reassert their primacy over
the field operations of the technical and specialist departments. They could do whatever they
pleased.182
This renaissance of administrative power was undertaken through a deliberate colonial
policy of “closer administration.” It was brought to its climax with the reorganization and
substantial expansion of the administrative infrastructure especially in the districts affected by
the Mau Mau war such as Murang’a, Kiambu, Nyeri and others in Embu and Meru country.183
The peak of this reorganization coincided with the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan
around 1955. There were 206 officers in the field in Central Province, 35 in the settled areas of
Rift Valley, and 15 in Nairobi. The process of decentralizing the provincial administration,
which had started even before the Emergency for purposes of closer control, was accelerated. Of
all the state-strengthening reforms embarked upon in the 1950s, this renaissance of the colonial
administrative apparatus was the one counterinsurgency measure more directly linked to statebuilding. It was also the safety valve upon which agrarian, political and constitutional reforms
rested. As such, it was the most pivotal. Indeed, it was the cement that held together “the
bureaucratic-executive state,” which was the ultimate result of the reforms of the 1950s.184
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In what turned out to be the decade of the eve of independence, there emerged a
profoundly unbalanced legal and institutional landscape with regard to the strong sinews of a
prefectural provincial administration; co-option of African elite and sympathetic sections of
society who were rewarded with large farms and positions within the colonial administration; the
creation of a dominant and wealthy African class that owned the all-important means of
production, land, and that was allied to metropolitan transnational capital.185 The colonial state,
therefore, seized the opportunity presented by the Mau Mau war to rejuvenate and morph into a
bureaucratic-executive state in which popular anti-colonial forces and movements such as Mau
Mau were literally disarmed and demobilized. At the twilight of the colonial era, therefore, the
stage was set for the state, and its associated order, to succeed itself even with the granting of
independence. It is for this reason that Branch and Cheeseman observed that the postcolonial
state must be seen as a representation of the interests protected and promoted during the latter
years of colonial rule.186 Some members of the African elite were rewarded with jobs in the
provincial administration and civil service, legislature and farms. It is this group together with
representatives of transnational capital that maintained political and economic control and who
were amongst the chief beneficiaries of independence.187 This was a “successful” stroke of
genius. But it was also a deceptive and blind triumph built on a false premise.
Conclusion
Granted, the government’s punitive excesses at the height of the war; a reconstruction
strategy; and a scheme for the future that rewarded African elites ready to play ball all worked
out. Nevertheless, both short-term and long-term campaigns against armed forces of grievance
and populist forces only succeeded in driving Mau Mau underground and allow discontent to
continue to simmer in the unassailable realm of the mind.
Thus, the colonial and postcolonial governments had succeeded in creating conditions
that enabled the movement to go underground and the resumption and continuation of activities
and dissent at a later date of Mau Mau mind’s own choosing. On the eve of independence, and in
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the period that followed, therefore, the Mau Mau movement, for one, was re-manufactured. Mau
Mau, in the sense of both the original movement and as a legacy of political dissent, continued to
thrive in the immediate period after independence and beyond. Indeed, the postcolonial narrative
of everyday ordinary people is one of the struggle for survival that represents the bifurcated
postcolonial legacy of Mau Mau. In the immediate post-independence period, sections of the
Kikuyu people that had taken active part in the armed struggle and others who had been
sympathetic, were determined that Africans had not fought, suffered or died for the right to pay,
at the prevailing market rate, for land that had been forcibly and illegally stolen.188
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that African problems overlapped whatever part of
the country one lived. African discontent with the colonial order in the 1950s was widely shared
than previously thought or appreciated. As Taita arap Toweet noted in his submission, African
problems were highly complex and all races feared to face the “naked truth and say exactly
what” they felt.189 The opportunity provided by the Dow commission ensured, as Toweet aptly
stated, that each and every party could fearlessly say what it was feeling, compare and empathize
with different points of views and experience and offer ideas about Kenya’s destiny. This, then,
noted Toweet, was the disease of East Africa that had infected the minds of the people, which
required decisive resolution.190
Viewed in this sense, the Mau Mau war was an existential struggle that reflected the
mental torment and frustrations of various Kenyans in the 1950s and long after. The war was the
physical manifestation of private everyday living in colonial Kenya, which was the site of this
struggle for land, basic essentials of life, housing, healthcare and education. The view of the state
of affairs in Kenya offered through the work of the Dow commission was unsettling and a source
of great concern in both London and Nairobi. In its report, the commission observed that the
many problems, which it examined, were highly complex and experienced throughout East
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Africa in a variety of settings. These problems were set against a physical and economic
background which, by western standards, was of “unusual harshness.”191
For this reason, although many were afraid to openly admit it, the fact that white settlers
and the colonial government were locked in an intransigent mental and partly physical battle
with the vast African population, was not lost on them.192 The colonial edifice erected upon
institutional, legal, policy and attitudinal blue print of the idea of Kenya as a white man’s country
was being challenged. Even to white observers, especially those in Kenya, the “whole truth was
that the whole country” was “in flux” and what would eventually come out of it, no one could
say. What was certain, however, was that it would not be the Kenya of 1952.193 In this regard, as
Sir Evelyn Baring would admit years later, the Mau Mau succeeded in breaking the log jam from
the point of view of the Africans in both getting of the land and in defeating the settler idea of
dominating the country politically.194 Thus, it was clear for many that Kenya, at the end of the
Mau Mau war, was going to be a very different place from what it was before it started. That the
country was not going to be the Kenya of the past as striking changes were going to take
place.195 This, unfortunately, as the next chapter and this study argues, did not quite happen.
Kenya continues to be a land of gross socioeconomic inequalities; unresolved historical
injustices, especially with regard to land ownership and landlessness; various degrees of political
oppression and suppression of voices of dissent; impunity; and the unrealized dream for the fruits
of independence.
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Chapter V - Drudgery in Pyrrhic Victory: Whither
the Fruits of Independence?

Preamble
…The seed we planted together with so much faith, hope, blood and tears: where is it now? I ask myself, where is
the new force, what’s the new force that will make the seed sprout and flower?
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Petals of Blood, 46.
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Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, the colonial state seized the opportunity presented by
the Mau Mau war to rejuvenate and morph into a strong bureaucratic-executive state. It was a
refurbished state that solidified, quite intact, the colonial political economy. Independence meant
a “new old” order in which popular anti-colonial forces and movements such as Mau Mau were,
literally disarmed and demobilized. Even with political independence, the agrarian, political and
constitutional as well as administrative reforms of the mid-1950s, enabled the colonial state to
succeed itself after the symbolic, if shambolic, gesture of independence. It was a hasty makebelieve colonial retreat that, however, left telltale institutional, legal and policy footprints.
In other words, the postcolonial state must be seen as a representation of the interests
protected and promoted during the latter years of colonial rule. Disarmed, demobilized and
demoralized forces of grievance and populist forces were, for a very short period of time,
successfully muzzled especially by the promise of freedom. The physical and mental Mau Maus
went underground and waited for the fruits of independence. It did not take long, however, for
popular forces to realize that the system was still grossly rigged against them. Ordinary people’s
independence euphoric celebratory dance was thus short-lived, and their victory over the colonial
state, pyrrhic. As such, discontent continued to simmer in the unassailable realm of the mind.
This, then, is what explains continued postcolonial disillusionment and various forms and
shapes of post-independence discontent and dissent and the push-back from the system and its
ideology of “law and order.” The ensuing see-saw between the former and the latter to forge a
state in which the stakes of all and sundry were adequately catered for forms the subject of this
chapter. In examining these alternate voices and interests vis-à-vis the state, a unique set of
archives have been used in combination to show the sleight of hand by both the metropolis and
an imperialism-compliant post-independence African government.

“Uhuru na Taabu”: Shunted Track to Independence Decried
In the immediate dawn of independence, a general mood of disillusionment set in as
people descended from the foggy and giddy heights of excitement. Early manifestations of the
stubborn spirit for the struggle for the full measure and meaning of independence, mentalité,
were workers’ strikes and devoted members of parliament. There was at this early dawn an
undercurrent of political uneasiness and a strong sense of disappointment. This was underscored
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by a short-lived railway worker’s strike that was feared would trigger widespread sympathy
workers’ strikes.1 This state of affairs was fanned by scathing political statements by
parliamentary backbenchers who saw themselves as the watch-dogs of the people.2 This
collection of radical members of parliament continued their attacks on the government for
disregarding the needs of the poor and landless people. This critical section of people’s
representatives in parliament argued that, unlike government cabinet ministers and senior civil
servants, poor people got nothing out of independence.3
Parliamentary back-benchers became the face and voice popular grievance. This criticism
in early 1965 worried British diplomats who thought it was couched in unusually severe terms.
The fact that the backbenchers had warned that they would throw out the government if it did not
pay more attention to their radical call for something to be done, was thought of as severe
criticism. At the same time though, it was also clear to British observers that President Jomo
Kenyatta, and his moderate base, were getting out of touch with sentiment at the political
grassroots. For H.S.H. Stanley, senior British diplomat, all these things were straws in the wind,
which could blow towards quite serious tension and trouble for the new Kenyan government.
As such, government was well-advised to implement policies that would occupy and
benefit the urban unemployed and rural under-employed. This was difficult but also a
fundamental task for the Kenyan government. Stanley argued that as a government of an
underdeveloped country, Kenyatta’s government had to be seen to be doing something to
improve the lot of the poor majority for whom independence had brought political but not
tangible economic or social advance. Central to this problem was the question of land hunger.4
On 8th March 1965, at a Kenya African National Union (KANU) meeting in Kutus,
Kirinyaga District, the chairman of the back benchers, Henry Wariithi, said that in spite of
independence, many things had not yet changed. Wariithi was loudly applauded when he said,
that thousands of Kenyan citizens had not yet tasted the fruits of independence and some had not
even got the scent of it. Many deserved things such as land, free medical treatment and free

1

Memorandum from H.S.H. Stanley to R.H. Hobden of the East African Political Department, Foreign Office,
London, 10th March 1965, BNA: DO 213/65.
2
Kenya News Agency handout No. 161, BNA DO 213/65.
3
Stanley memorandum to Hobden, 10th March 1965, BNA: DO 213/65.
4
Ibid.

200

education for which people had sacrificed in the struggle for independence, were a mirage.
Neither had these same people been rewarded for their pains with appointments to positions of
chief, headmen and other government positions. Three other speakers, Senators Tom Gichohi
and Romano Gikunju and the Member of Parliament for Kirinyaga, G. Mbogo, stated that
Africans who had been against independence were actually the ones who were now reaping all
the benefits although they had not made any contribution. Another MP, G.G Kariuki, told the
gathering that at the dawn of colonialism, European settlers had not purchased farms from
Africans for cash but had given the conventional small presents such as beads, blankets and salt.
Yet, Africans were now expected to buy their own farms even after “uhuru.”5
Moreover, at the same meeting, the radical politician, former Mau Mau enthusiast MP
and assistant minister, Bildad Kaggia, claimed that he had left the government after seeing that
nothing was being done to meet the needs of the people. Kaggia emphasized that he would
continue to speak out for their behalf until they had the fruits of their hard work. Kaggia
informed the crowd that he would conduct politics the same way as he had before independence.
He assured his listeners that his brand of politics could, and would, not change because they were
still fighting for the same things they had before independence, “farms and wealth.”6 Kaggia
was also known to argue that, unlike the other Kikuyu leaders, he had not been enriched by
“uhuru.”7Another backbencher and a radical like Kaggia and Oginga Odinga, J.D. Kali, who was
also the government whip, told the crowd that independence did not just mean getting a national
flag and singing the national anthem. Rather, it was essential that citizens should get the fruits of
independence which they had won by sweat and after long persecution. A.L. Gaciatta put things
in comparative perspective noting that in newly independent Kenya, there were people who
owned thousands of acres while others were dying of hunger.8
Elsewhere, speaking at the Lumumba Institute in Nairobi on April 7th, Assistant Minister
T. Okelo Odongo stated that the main problem, and the next step, in independent Kenya was to
achieve economic freedom. Odongo said that the Government of Kenya needed to deliberately
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transfer economic power that had been held by foreigners to the African population. He
expressed confidence that this goal was generally agreed upon with the only question being how
this transfer was to be effected and the length of time it would take. However, Odongo was
disappointed by the bickering that attended this debate thus complicating this process. This
happened while the African population who fought for independence and KANU victory got
impatient with waiting to reap the fruits of uhuru while Europeans and Asians were regrouping
and claimed, publicly, their rights as Kenyan citizens within the constitution of Kenya.9
In parliament, the Kaggia-led radicals presented the plight of squatters, which reflected
continued uneasiness over the central problem of landlessness and unemployment. There were
reports of continued oathing among the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley, which derived from the
dissatisfaction that Kenyatta’s government had not produced any substantial benefits from
independence for the poor and landless.10 There was yet another event that suggested that the
Kikuyu were not solidly behind President Kenyatta. A group of leaders, freedom fighters and
former Mau Mau field marshalls, gathered in Githunguri, Kiambu where they slaughtered a
number of lambs and bulls to thank God for having helped the Kenyan people to achieve
independence. The ceremony was held at the site of the former Kenya Teachers Training
College, which had been central in the running of Independent Schools that were so important to
the agitation that had led to Mau Mau. There were also reports of oathings in 1965 being
conducted over a fairly wide area of Central and neighboring parts of Eastern Province.11
Therefore, Kenya, even after independence, remained a difficult country. The
independent government was faced with the task of wrestling with the problem of reconciling
popular ambitions with tough everyday-living economic realities. While Kenyatta had outmaneuvered the Kenya National Democratic Union (KADU) out of existence and reshuffled and
expanded his cabinet in December 1964, there were still perceptible threats in Kenya. Despite the
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new confidence and regained control at the end of 1964, Kenyatta faced increasing discontent
and disillusionment with independence among common people.12
At a meeting held in Murang’a early in April 1965, Kenyatta publicly humiliated Kaggia
because of his constant anti-government stance. Turning to Kaggia, who was seated next to Paul
Ngei, his fellow Kapenguria inmate who was now the Minister for Cooperatives and Marketing,
Kenyatta said: “Kaggia, you are advocating free things, but we, together with Paul Ngei, were all
in jail. If you go to Ngei’s home he has planted a lot of coffee and other crops. What have you
done for yourself? If you go to Fred Kubai’s home, he has a big house and has a nice shamba.
But you, Kaggia, what have you done for yourself? We were together with Kungu Karumba in
jail, now he is running his own buses. What have you done for yourself Kaggia?” Kenyatta then
went on to blame Kaggia for staying idle and advocating for free things.13
What Kenyatta did not mention is that he too had done quite a bit for himself and enjoyed
it all. For example, Kenyatta reveled in a collection of big luxurious cars: a Rolls Royce from
London’s Motor Show, a Lincoln Convertible from American businessmen, and a Mercedes 600.
Old KCA leaders, the unemployed and landless people among them former members of the Mau
Mau, looked enviously at these smart cars enjoyed by the new leaders, which were, they felt, the
fruits of their sacrifices. Also, by the time Kenyatta was released from prison, the colonial state
was already building him a house at Gatundu.14 This is the kind of attitude that proved that
Kenyatta and the moderates were out of touch with sentiment at the political grassroots. This
public rebuke was ignorant of Kaggia’s argument that it is not what political leaders had done for
themselves that really mattered but, rather, what they had done for the people.15
As the then British High Commissioner and immediate former and, indeed, last British
governor, Malcom MacDonald, saw it, radicals such as Kaggia and Oginga Odinga would not
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have had such a persuasive argument and strengthened position, which constituted a threatening
situation, if there had not been large numbers of disgruntled poor people in various parts of the
countryside who had expected to be given jobs, wages and land as soon as Kenya became
independent. Needless to say, these people had received nothing of the kind. At the same time,
such people would have accepted Mr. Kenyatta’s appeals to them to remain patient if they had
not seen numerous other people in Kenya receiving considerable gains from independence.
However, they watched ministers and high government officials riding around in large cars,
buying big houses, and purchasing extensive farms. They resented it all the more because
“irresponsible” local politicians had assured them, in the 1963 General Election, that they also
would receive a share of the good things of life on the day that colonialism was banished from
Kenya. Although considerable sections of the population were already beginning to enjoy that
share, other large bodies of people remained landless, jobless and poverty-stricken. “So,”
MacDonald, wrote, “a situation has arisen in which the Africans in the new Kenya were being
divided into the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots.’” The High Commissioner felt that the government
needed to pursue policies which steadily reduced the amounts of unemployment and landlessness
among the common people.16 MacDonald believed that Odinga and Kaggia and their left-wing
colleagues were exploiting the discontents of have-nots. They were dabbling in a potentially
dangerous and explosive brand of haves versus have-nots politics of which London was quite
wary. But, as British diplomats saw it, such political radicals were harping on irrefutable
everyday realities.
There was thus a groundswell of formidable challenges that faced the people and the
government of Kenya after independence. For most people, independence was akin to rain laden
clouds in the sky, a mirage that was quickly replaced by an empty and hot sweeping wind of hard
times. This is the political imagery evoked by the popular independence slogan of “uhuru na
kazi” (freedom and work) that was replaced by “uhuru na taabu” (freedom coupled to hardship).
After all, there was soaring and searing unemployment and land hunger, and the unquenched
desire, especially among the youths and former forest fighters, for the fruits of independence.17
For instance, on 16th January 1964, a group of about five hundred men demonstrated in Nairobi
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to demand for immediate government action to resolve the unemployment problem. One of the
men addressed the crowd saying that though independence had come, there were still arrests of
the unemployed in Nairobi who were being sent to the reserves against their will. This speech
was received with applause and shouts of “uhuru na taabu” (freedom and suffering). The
speaker further alleged that the government was doing nothing to create jobs and called upon
ministers who owned expensive cars to sell them and distribute money to the poor.18
The euphoria that had greeted independence, therefore, had quickly turned as the
unemployed and lower paid laborers had a rapid change of attitude. This caliber of people was
disillusioned “as the magical changes they had expected under independence” had not occurred
and, was, as a result, very critical of the government and, in particular, Jomo Kenyatta.19 Their
independence hero and leader, they feared, had forgotten them: “Kenyatta has forgotten us,” they
said. Yet, “he and his ministers drive around in two or three cars, whereas we have no food in
our stomachs.”20
As such, an atmosphere of relative deprivation was manifest and pervasive in both rural
and urban settings in the initial years after Kenya’s independence. Kenyans, especially former
freedom fighters, had very high expectations with regard to land redistribution, which were not
met. What they did not know is that before and soon after independence, Kenyan leading
nationalists led by Kenyatta, had promised redress with regard to land. Kenyatta assured white
settlers who wanted to live in Kenya that no radical land reforms were in the offing. This was
back in 1963. At a meeting with about three hundred settlers in Nakuru held on 12th August,
Kenyatta had assured settlers that he subscribed to sanctity of private property and individual
rights.21 Europeans who wished to leave the country after independence were to be compensated

18

Imray to John K. Hickman, CRO London, 25th January 1964, BNA: DO 213/65.
Ibid. After this demonstration, Imray told Hickman, a ban was placed on meetings in Nairobi and other cities so it
was unlikely that the unemployed were able to express themselves in public for a while.
20
Ibid.
21
Murray-Brown, Kenyatta, 309. Commenting on the small number of white settlers that Kenyatta addressed that
day, this author correctly observed that, at the time, they always carried an influence disproportionate to their
numbers. This was because they felt wrongly or rightly it was they and their predecessors who had made Kenya
what it was. That is, the making of Kenya with regard to the deployment of capital and scientific knowledge and
technology with regard to agriculture and the building of a modern infrastructure. However, it can also be argued
that Africans in seeking redress of their grievances the most pressing of which was the return of their land and the
exploitation of labor, also suffered enormous sacrifices that contributed to the making of Kenya. In this regard, it
would seem that the making of Kenya by possession of land and the deployment of capital trumped an equally
important contribution by Africans who paid for the process through dispossession, blood and sweat.
19

205

at the prevailing market value. Those who wished to stay could do so without any fear of
harassment or dispossession. After independence, Kenyatta’s intolerance of extensive
redistribution and land reform meant that the return of lost African land was pure political
rhetoric. Land in post independent Kenya was to be paid for through the fruits of hard work and
bought by aspiring African land owners.22 It was not going to be, as the radicals argued, a free
gift or one of the low-hanging fruits of independence.
After independence, moreover, Kenyatta’s government issued its blue print economic
policy document, Sessional Paper No. 10, crafted by Tom Mboya in 1965. The path that this key
policy paper proffered for Kenya’s economic future was “African socialism.” However, in effect
it was socialism in capitalist garbs. As students of Kenya’s political history have observed, it was
practically a development strategy based on the protection of private property and private foreign
investment.23 Thus, with independence, Kenya became, arguably, a major capitalist hub in east
and central Africa and attracted more foreign investments than any other African country. This
was not lost on politicians like Odinga and Kaggia who soon leveled their criticism of this policy
and Kenyatta’s stance on the issue of land redistribution.
Both criticized the government’s land resettlement policy. It is important to reiterate here
that this kind of criticism was not entirely new. There was palpable and obvious continuity of
this protest with that of earlier colonial times. It was particularly resonant with the anti-colonial
criticism of the late 1940s that heated up in the mid-1950s. So grievance in the early years of
independence, and long thereafter, was like these earlier times. Different African publics and
their leaders continued to hanker for social justice with regard to land and the distribution of
public goods. It was hoped that land acquired by white settlers would be returned and social
services provided. But it is important to draw a subtle and important element of these sustained
expectations and continued demands.
Both during late colonialism and in the early postcolonial period, African opinion was
agreed that land in Kenya belonged to the African people but had been stolen.24 In their
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numerous petitions to the colonial administration and submissions to various land commissions,
Africans across the board had fought for the restoration of land from Europeans with Mau Mau
bringing this struggle to a head. At last, victory had been won with the legal opening of the white
highlands to African occupation in 1959. For many, independence was synonymous with the
actual physical restoration of, and resettlement on, lost African land. This was the single most
crucial prize of freedom from imperial rule to which would be added socioeconomic and political
deliverables from the African independent government. This was the full extent and meaning of
independence for most people.
However, between the outbreak of the bitter Mau Mau war and this victory, the context
within which the land debate was argued had changed radically.25 Although the government was
able to physically crush the Mau Mau movement, during the Emergency, Governor Sir Evelyn
Baring had been forced to undertake far-reaching agricultural reforms geared at land
consolidation. The main objective of the Swynnerton Plan was the reform of the tenure system,
which entailed the consolidation and registration of land formerly held under African traditional
tenure system.26 This is, then, what had radically shunted and shifted the African land problem
and altered the kind of “social justice” meted out by Kenyatta’s government. It was no longer a
matter of making, as Africans saw it, the iron-clad and open-and-shut argument that social justice
and natural law demanded the return of their land.
Rather, with the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan, “social justice” now required
the recognition and respect of the individual right to property and ownership of land. This was in
stark contrast to the high African expectations rooted in their collective experience of land
dispossession at the advent of British colonialism. The principles of natural justice that
demanded the return of land to them without any cost incurred by them or the government had
been flagrantly flaunted. As some of the Mau Mau fighters perceived it, they had won the victory
in a game of well-founded grievance but the trophy had been awarded to the losers. The masses’
dance at the dawn of independence was but a bitter taste of pyrrhic victory. It was not lost on
Africans, and especially forest fighters, that the context within which they had viewed the land
issue on the eve of independence had changed. Now, the key question was no longer the return
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of land from the Europeans to Africans. Instead, the question was to which Africans land was
going to be transferred and on what terms at a market-price rate.27 This only served to further
sharpen, and acutely so, long-simmering discontent and the psychic sense of loss that was now
accentuated by what many people saw as arch political betrayal.
Thus, saying that African hopes and expectations had been dashed would be a serious
understatement. Politicians who criticized this government policy believed that it had totally
failed to deal satisfactorily with the practical question of land. Indeed, the government even
admitted that the manner in which the settlement schemes policy as a whole had been designed
was going to be more beneficial to leaving European farmers than it was to new African farmers.
It was clear to many critics that these schemes settled the problems of European farmers instead
of that of landless Africans. The schemes fell well short of resolving the issue landlessness and
associated problems. Settlement schemes could not absorb former African farm hands that had
been pushed out of the white highlands after 1945.28
For instance, the touted million acre scheme only targeted one type of the scheduled area
of the former white highlands, mixed farms, for African resettlement. A large section of the
lower-potential lands in the former European areas still remained in their hands.29 Moreover,
under the shunted prism of individual property rights and ownership through which the issue of
land was now seen, the huge tracts of land outside the scheduled areas earmarked for settlement
were bought by a small group of individuals, many of them politicians who amassed large
acreages. There was not any form of safeguard or controls limiting the amount of land that
individuals could own. As such, much of the land open for settlement easily ended up in the
hands of a few African individuals who simply stepped into the shoes of former European
owners.30
For this reason, foremost critics like Odinga advocated for land redistribution of
European large land holdings back to Africans as free gifts and fruits of independence. After all,
the land had belonged to Africans in the past. It therefore, did not need to be bought. Rather, all
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that the government had to do was to requisition it as needed.31 Described as a clever and
eloquent, sincere and a passionate extremist, Kaggia also advocated for the confiscation of farms
from European settlers, and the giving of that land as a free gift of independence to landless
Africans.32 On 2nd April 1965, following a motion to set a landholding and ownership ceiling
tabled by another radical back-bencher, the able and independent-minded Z.M Anyieni, Kaggia
made an impassioned speech in support urging the government to do something to prevent rich
individuals, both African and Asian, from buying up former European land. In the speech,
Kaggia reminded the house his view that this land was to be distributed to the landless.33 Kaggia
built on the argument by Anyieni that the independence struggle had been dominated by the
determination of Africans to resume control of their lands.34 This is what independence really
meant as far as they were concerned. Kaggia observed, with great concern, the attitude of a few
money possessors who were buying as much land as possible in the former scheduled areas.
Both, Anyieni and Kaggia, spoke with great passion about the yearning of the landless peasants
for ownership of land adding that the land question remained one of the most emotive of all the
issues which enter into the consideration of the African voters.35
For this reason, it was clear to many Kenyans and foreign observers that even after
independence, the struggle for better living standards, a decent and dignified life, or even
everyday survival was still on. In his letter of 29th April 1964 to Aspin, Stanley observed that it
appeared that it was a strain for the old man in his seventies, to find the right and very likely
politically unpopular answers, and get them through a competitive cabinet. Thus the government
of Kenya still faced formidable political and economic problems. Some of these, like
unemployment, land hunger and the desire of the youth wingers and forest fighters for the fruits
of independence not only drove a wedge between the Kikuyu and KANU but also created
anxiety about the return of Mau Mau.36 Granted, the Mau Mau menace of the 1950s had been put
down militarily; through policy measures affecting land and labor; and legal reforms leading to
independence. This notwithstanding, unmet popular ambitions still threatened the cohesiveness
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of Kenyan society. Therefore, the revolutionary attitude of the 1950s was prevalent and had
really not died away. Indeed, the driving spirit of Mau Mau had not been defeated, an
observation that resonates with the debate of the 1950s of what defeating the movement really
entailed. It was quite clear that the spirit of struggle was still alive after independence and
thereafter.

The Ghost of Mau Mau Lurks: A Tarrying Reverie on Independence’s Eve
No sooner had the Mau Mau movement been put down than it re-emerged as the Kenya
Land and Freedom Army (KLFA). Official correspondence between colonial authorities in
Nairobi and their communication to London was unflattering in making the connection between
the KLFA and the Mau Mau. Although the activities of the former began to be noticed after the
end of the emergency, it traced its genealogy of grievance to early Kikuyu political agitation of
the 1920s. A letter written by an unidentified Kiambu Kikuyu describing the aims of the KFLA
also made this connection. It stated that members of the movement had been unhappy with the
colonial order since 1920 at the time of Harry Thuku, which was characterized by bloodshed. It
also made reference to similar sacrifice that had been made at the time of Chege Kibachia during
a labor crisis in Uplands, probably in the 1940s. The worst experience, however, according to the
anonymous writer, was between 1952 and 1959. After this period, it appeared that the back of
African dissent had been broken. For that reason, there was need for a further step in the
direction of resistance around 1960. After all, the author of the letter reasoned, if the first and
second seed of resistance that had been planted in the 1920s had not yielded fruit in the 1920s or
1950s, it did not mean that people had given up all hope for change.37
This sort of continuity and genealogy of African grievance was corroborated by the
colony’s Director of Intelligence, M.C. Manby. According to Manby, it was clear that the KLFA
was founded upon the ashes Mau Mau. It was intended to be a successor to the earlier
organization. To support this, Manby cited a document dated 28th July 1962 that had been found
at the movement’s Molo divisional headquarters. It stated that KLFA gun-makers would work as
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they had in 1952, and all operations had to be kept secret for once bitten by the hyena, one
needed not be bitten again.38
Moreover, its aims and methods were those of the Mau Mau. The KLFA was made up of
ex-hard core detainees who had changed none of their thinking and methods and continued “to
associate and conspire to achieve their ends by criminal means.”39 The KLFA was for this,
among other reasons, considered by itself to be, and could be proved to be, synonymous with
Mau Mau. For the minister of defense, the KLFA was not “like Mau Mau,” which in essence, it
was. It was a collection of un-reconciled Mau Mau adherents who had changed little if at all
since they first became Mau Mau. It had taken root as soon as the sanctions of the emergency
became less severe in the late 1957 and early 1958 using the land consolidation issue in Central
Province as a means to spread subversion. With the formal ending of the emergency, Mau Mau
members regrouped under various organizations, thus reviving the characteristic spirit of the
movement and its force and bound by secret. Such discrete groups went by various names
including Mutangiri or Atangiri (the care-taker/s), Kiama kia Muingi (Council of the People or
Commoners Council), Ngwataniro ya Muingi (Fellowship of the People), Kenya Parliament, the
Rift Valley Government and the Rift Valley Province Parliament.40
However, the only difference between the two, according to Manby, was that unlike Mau
Mau, the KLFA did not expect to achieve its ambitions until the time of independence or soon
afterwards. According to the analysis of the Kenya Intelligence Committee, Republic Day, which
had been set for 12th December 1964, provided a dateline for those who still thought that
pressure could be applied on the government to provide the reward of independence. As such,
before this particular date, subversive activities by groups affiliated or similar to the Land and
Freedom Army were less in evidence.41 In other words, members of the KLFA hoped to obtain
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revenge on its former colonial opponents and would regard, at Kenya’s full independence, any
Kenya government not of its own making as its enemy.42
The KLFA, therefore, aimed at disrupting the political evolution of the country, which
excluded them from enjoying the fruits of independence. According to Hezekiah Tumbo Mwai,
one of the movement’s members arrested, one of KLFA’s stated objective was to infiltrate all
levels of the Kenya African National Union. The KFLA was ready, if need be, to eliminate
moderates in KANU. KADU was to be wiped out and all the land in the Rift Valley Province
taken over. Even Jomo Kenyatta’s life was not to be spared if he sold the country out.43 In a
secretly distributed pamphlet, Kenya: Two Paths Ahead, the KLFA warned KANU militants and
the popular masses of the possibility of falling victim to Britain’s decolonization strategy.44 After
independence, it planned to force all Europeans to leave the country including those in the civil
service for whom there would no longer be a place in Kenya.
It was believed that genuine freedom as captured by the slogan ithaka na wiyathi (land
and freedom), could only be attained by force through which the movement would take over
government. In this way, there was assurance that Europeans would leave the country after
independence and Africans be responsible for all the land, which they occupied under colonial
rule. According to Njoroge Ngobe, an adherent of the organization from the Ndoswa Division of
the KLFA, if this expression and expectation of freedom was delayed, the call would be given to
fight.
According to Muthathi Njoroge, a KLFA youth winger from Ndoswa, the aim of the
movement was to redistribute land among the people of Kenya after independence hence the
insistence on compelling Europeans to leave and the need to completely drive out the British
government from Kenya.45 Indeed, Two Paths Ahead called for national unity and independence
based on a socialist programme. The KLFA saw the Swynnerton Plan, the colonial land reform
for what it was: a means of rewarding and strengthening the position of colonial order and loyal
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elements in Kenya. They did not see political independence founded on such agrarian land
reform as constituting genuine independence, which for them, barring other things, meant getting
their land back.46
Furnished with KLFA intelligence to this effect, the colonial establishment appreciated
the movement at face value. At a cabinet security meeting, the minister for defense noted that the
basic reason behind the movement was a feeling of insecurity caused by landlessness and doubts
about the imminent future.47 Elsewhere, the minister observed that most members of the KLFA
were professional criminals or racketeers, the chronically unemployed or a combination of such
types.48 In a memorandum dispatched to London in October 1962, the governor expressed fear
that delays in settlement and increased agricultural employment inevitably provided fertile
ground for the spread of the KLFA infection. Unless the colonial administration in Nairobi
rapidly expanded settlement schemes and, as a temporary expedient, transit settlements, the
security situation could deteriorate rapidly.49 Authorities at the eve of independence were
reconciled to, and acknowledged, the fact that even though intransigent, Kikuyu thoroughly
imbued with Mau Mau contrived to seek their ambitions and livelihood through secret
movements.50
This view seems to have been informed by intelligence gathered by a Special Branch
informant who had infiltrated the KLFA Nairobi branch. On the basis of the information
provided by the mole, B.E. Ruck, who was the acting director of intelligence, believed that one
of the issues that concerned the KLFA Nairobi group was the poverty of Kikuyu living in Fort
Hall District. At one of their secret meetings, the Nairobi branch was informed of such a great
deal of hardship that many residents there were unable to buy the necessities of life or even send
children to school. KLFA members agreed that a partial solution to this problem would be for a
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proportion of their regular proceeds through criminal activities be paid to a central fund. This
money would then be used to ameliorate cases of hardship.51
What gave the colonial authorities the greatest headache, however, was just how
widespread and loose the variations of bifurcated Mau Mau under the umbrella of the KLFA
were. In retrospect, the colonial administration now reckoned that the original Mau Mau had
itself been a movement made up of different groups having the same objective but using
different names. It had been succeeded by other organizations, each of which in turn was known
in different areas by names specific to that region. In addition to those previously mentioned
above, bifurcated Mau Mau was known as Tano Tano, Kiama kia Hathara, Kiama kia Mbara,
Kiama kia Ngero and Kiama kia Manyani among many others. These organizations attracted
followers of varying commitment ranging from leading activists, lesser organizers and active
supporters not to mention minor contributors and sympathizers from different parts of the
country including Trans Nzoia, Kiambu, Nyeri, Meru, Fort Hall, Laikipia and Uasin Gishu to
mention but a few.
Moreover, as separate entities from the original Mau Mau, these groups sought to provide
moral and materiel support for fighters who remained at large at the end of the emergency in the
Aberdare ranges, Mt. Kenya forest region and elsewhere.52 Ultimately, they hoped to join
fighters led by Acholi, Field Marshals Mwariama, Baimungi and Salimu who were known to be
in the forest. In readiness, some of these groups prepared through military drilling wearing
badges of rank and carrying home-made firearms or sticks to represent rifles inside the forest or
before gathered crowds on farms. During such drilling, the squads were inspected by leaders of
the “government” and were confirmed as soldiers of the future army by members who regarded
themselves as its leaders.53
Thus, even with independence on the way, the Mau Mau spirit still lurked abroad. As
noted earlier, Kenyatta, who would become Kenya’s first president, was not entirely trusted.
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Agents of these various movements were somewhat kept in touch with Kenyatta who advised
caution or sought to moderate the radical attitude that they held. Manby, the Director of
Intelligence and Security, suggested in a 1961 brief that he, together with the commissioner of
police, be allowed to visit Jomo Kenyatta to show him a selection of revealing documents in the
possession of the police detailing subversive activities. It was hoped by those inside and outside
government circles that Kenyatta, while still in detention, would use his own influence in his
own way to stamp out the idea of subversion and violence.54 In the interim period that Kenyatta
stayed in Maralal before his release, the government even made it possible for him to broadcast
to the people of Kenya to appeal for calm. It is likely that by this time, while governor Renison
did not like Kenyatta one bit, a few people in the intelligence community in the colony, like
Manby, recognized that Kenyatta’s relationship with the European community, and especially
settler farmers, was the key to their secure future in Kenya.55 Kenyatta was the best available
coagulant symbol to fuse the diverse, competing and opposed interests of various publics at
independence. Of course, if he failed or appeared to fail, a remnant British military detachment
was readily available.
Besides giving white settlers assurances of his respect for the sanctity of private property
and individual rights, one of Kenyatta’s tasks just before his release, early in his premiership and
presidency, was to sooth radical sentiments represented by bifurcated Mau Mau groups, coax
members of the original forest fighters of the movement to come out of the forest and surrender
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their weapons and temper the high expectations of ordinary people with his call for Harambee
(pooling/pulling together); his plea for all to forgive and forget the evils and experiences of the
past; and charging people to celebrate and embrace “uhuru na kazi” (freedom and work). This
especially considering the intelligence available to colonial authorities that Republic Day, which
was on 12th December 1964, provided the deadline for Mau Mau remnants to force the
government to provide the fruits of independence. Thus, from the time of his release from
restriction up to this date, Kenyatta was busy visiting various areas of the Mau Mau trouble to
ease tensions and avoid this eventuality. Indeed, Kenyatta viewed the KLFA with deep hatred
and was determined to crush it.56
Kenyatta’s message at a mass rally at Githunguri during September 1963 is a good
illustration of this important campaign and appeals. At this public rally, he said: “If reports in
[imperialist] newspapers that some of you are going back to the forest, making guns, taking
unlawful oaths, and preparing to create war after independence are true, I request all (G]ikuyu to
stop doing such things. Let us have independence in peace. I am requesting you strongly not to
hold any secret meetings or support subversive organizations. We are determined to have
independence in peace, and we shall not allow hooligans [Mau Mau] to rule Kenya. We must
have no hatred towards one another. Mau Mau was a disease that had been eradicated [by the
British] and never be remembered again.”57 This must have been music in the ears of the settlers
who chose to stay in Kenya and caretakers of British interests. It would be Kenyatta’s refrain
before and after independence but how successful it was with respect to those it was tailored to is
in doubt.

Face-off: Kenyatta and the Remnants of Mau Mau Forest Fighters
While visiting Embu in August 1964, eight months after independence, Kenyatta issued a
stern warning to forest fighters who had refused the government’s amnesty and gone back to the
forest. The government, he said, would take firm action against them. Kenyatta added that these
freedom fighters were spoiling the nation’s hard-won uhuru. Using one of his interactive
methods, he got a full mandate from the crowd to bring the forest fighters under the full force of
the law and order. In this Embu speech, Kenyatta also condemned illegal oath taking and
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appealed to people to go back to the land reminding them that if they all did their best, there
would be no unemployment or poverty. Good things like hospitals and road, Kenyatta said,
would not come from heaven, hard work was essential.58 In the course of the Embu public
meeting, Kenyatta received three sheep that had been stolen the night before and bows and
arrows, actions which underlined the background of lawlessness that lurked in the forest around
Meru and Embu.
At a rally in Nyeri, which had been one of the hotbeds of Mau Mau, Kenyatta, early the
next year, warned against subversion. Using his question and answer style, Kenyatta got the
crowd to agree that the government had done more for them after independence than the
imperialists had done in seventy years and to deny that they were being helped by people
speaking against his government. He charged people to work hard and obey the law and not to
drink too much.59 During a similar visit to Meru and as a result of Kenyatta’s appeal to the
population not to help those who had returned to the forest, some of Acholi’s forest fighters
surrendered themselves. After this event, intelligence sources believed that Acholi’s supporters
did not number more than forty fighters. It was also reported that Baimungi, who was still in the
forest, had returned to the Meru side of Mount Kenya but was still in touch with “malcontents”
in Nyeri District who were associated with the Ngwataniro ya Muingi. By this time, the
government had decided to investigate the Ngwataniro as a cooperative society with a view to
deregister it if its books were not in order. Eventually, it was anticipated that with such efforts,
the more sensible freedom fighters would be made to realize that they had more to hope for from
working with the government that by opposing it.60
But Kenyatta did more than just assuage political feelings and check people’s high
expectations before the independence deadline and thereafter. He kept hammering-away at the
shadowy remnants of Mau Mau that must have preoccupied him throughout the presidency as
Kenyatta struggled to show the gains of being independent. Despite the obvious distance that had
grown between him his beloved people, Kenyatta saw his relationship differently. He insisted
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that he had never grown away from the people, saying that he had met Kenyans at massive
public rallies as fellow-men on common ground. For that reason, Kenyatta argued, Kenyans
knew him only too well as he always had been: as one of them. In his speeches, Kenyatta sought
to make Kenyans understand that the country was experiencing the natural growing pains of a
young nation on the road of progress and national unity. There was, therefore, need to learn
resilience. After all, victory in the twin areas of national unity and progress could not be laid
upon the country like spreading a cloth on a table.61
At the same time, Kenyatta did not relent in reminding people to work hard for the fruits
of independence. He shared his personal philosophy and belief that the best way to achieve
worthwhile human ambitions was through hard work. That is what the people’s call, uhuru na
kazi, really meant for Kenyatta.62 He, therefore, cautioned against the deadly sin of slothfulness.
Everyone had his or her contribution to make: after all, it was agreed by all that independence
meant hard work. Progress required sacrifice and discipline. He urged people, especially rural
stock who had immigrated to urban areas, to turn back to the land with this determination
because it was the country’s greatest asset. Kenyatta condemned those who “ran away” from
rural areas choosing to “exploit” their relatives and friends in the big cities. This was akin to
loitering and laziness and living off the sweat of others.63
Moreover, Kenyatta recognized that, before and at independence, Kenyans of all walks of
life: the unemployed; farmers and businessmen; workers and students and public servants; the
parents of the nation’s children had high expectations of the auspicious transition. He assured all
that neither he nor the party had forgotten to address the people’s felt needs and expectations.
Thus, on Kenyatta Day, 20th October 1964, Kenyatta promised that his government would not
rest until victory was won over the burden of poverty, the scourge of malnutrition and ill-health,
the frustration of illiteracy and the demoralizing lack of economic opportunity. But he cautioned
those that nursed high hopes against thinking that the government was not moving with enough
speed towards meeting these goals. After all, Kenya had been an independent state for only ten
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months. Even with the assistance of miracles, it would be impossible to eliminate all past
imperfections and injustices and to meet all modern aspirations and needs in such a short time.
Towards the end of this speech, Kenyatta once again reminded people that the fruits of life were
there so long as they applied themselves and worked to realize them.64
However, the toughest message that Kenyatta had to give, and for his listeners to
stomach, was with regard to how people were to deal with the colonial past especially when it
touched on the delicate matter of land loss. It must have been disheartening for those with high
expectation of the restoration of their lands to hear the president say that Kenyans could not cry
for more land while failing to develop that which they had. In effect, it meant that there was no
more land to be issued arguing that the time for sloganeering and empty words had come to an
end.65 Instead, Kenyatta proclaimed and charged the people that the foundation of Kenya’s future
lay in the theme of forgiving and forgetting. There was no point, the president said, to dwell on
the past and stoking the fires of revenge or animosity and looking back on the scenes of anguish.
Everyone was beholden to the important task of national integrity that was the stuff of the future.
To be sure that his message got home, Kenyatta pointed out that he knew about there being
murmurs in Kenya about the part played by one set of people, or another set of people, in the
struggle for “uhuru.” Talk about the contribution made, or refused, by this group or that. At
times, he said, vindictive comments and fingers of scorn had been pointed at some selected race,
or group or tribe. All this, Kenyatta said with a ring of finality, was unworthy of Kenya’s
future.66 Perhaps, these exhortations were appropriate at the time. Also, they illustrate the fact
that the Father of the Nation, as he was referred, had not lost his sense of idealism that had
fortified and sustained him in the many years that Kenyatta had sacrificed for his beloved
country.
However, for many groups of people such exhortations were a bombshell that spelled
doom. This included long-serving and dedicated veteran agitators like James Beauttah who had
mentored young Kenyatta and his political career; it also included freedom fighters who, upon
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emerging from the forest, found that the land consolidation of the mid-1950s had by-passed
them. Most of them were also landless because of colonial punitive measures to possess their
piece of land for public utility; families, wives and children, who had been left without male
household heads as a result of the war; and, generally people who felt that independence had
been a heavy cloud without rain. For such people, Kenyatta’s messages were propaganda that fell
on deaf ears. To others yet, it was, literally, inspiring music to their ears. Some sections of
society greeted the message with great enthusiasm and went to considerable length to echo it
through composition of music. Such people, usually independent musicians, bands made up of
civil servants or members of the armed forces, internalized Kenyatta’s message that viewed
“uhuru” as a joyful moment as opposed to a somber one; a vigorous one rather than one to ruin
with incessant brooding and unnecessary murmuring. It is important to focus on this
internalization of this ideology of “law and order” by such groups and music.

Onwards Ye “Gallant” Soldiers: Odes to the Colonial Ideology of Order
The Kenya Police band is a great example of how a popular group internalized
Kenyatta’s exhortations. The band composed and belted out the jingoistic song Kenya Nchi Yetu
(Our Country Kenya). The lyrics of this song are instructive and significant not only for the
manner in which they captured and mirrored Kenyatta’s vision for Kenya but also because the
song was composed by members of the police force. The lyrics are as follows:
Kanyaga nchi yako kwa nguvu na raha,
hilo ni hakikisho la raisi wetu.
Zamani tuliwekwa nchi namba four,
Sasa about tani tuko namba wani.

Stamp your land with pride and joy,
Of this, the president is our surety.
In the past, our country lagged behind,
But, alas, about turn, we are now number one!

Nguvu zetu za Kenya ni umoja wetu,
Mzee alibashiri tukahakikisha.
Vitisho hata vipi sote tu tayari.
Haki hatukuomba kwani tupoteze.

Kenya’s strength is in our unity.
Our old man predicted it, we now confirm it.
Come whatever threat, we are all ready.
We didn’t fight for justice only to lose it.

Kenya ni nchi nzuri kushinda zote,
barani hata pwani twavutia kote.
Mashamba hata mbuga ni unono kote,
twaweza kutumia pahali popote.

Kenya’s the best country of all,
from upcountry and our coast.
Our farms and the wild teems with life,
What’s more, they are all open for all.

Pori zetu za Kenya wanyama ni wengi,
Wageni huwaona na donge twapata.
Ni haki tuwalinde wasiharibiwe,

Our national parks are full of wildlife,
attracting tourists who bring foreign currency.
It is important that we protect them from all harm,
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Hiyo sehemu kubwa uchumi wa Kenya.

For they constitute a huge part of Kenya’s economy.

Wako wapi wabeberu waone haya,
Tuliyo yatimiza kwa miaka chache.
Ni hao walisema hatuna akili,
Na huku watunyonya afadhali kupe.

For shame! Where are the colonial ‘nay-sayers?’
They should see our swift achievements.
Yet they said we were inept,
while they sucked our blood: worse than ticks!

This song by the police band towed the line that Kenyatta’s government had done more
for the people in the few years after independence that the colonial government had ever
accomplished. Indeed, it comically pushed the limits of the said success of independence by
alluding that while colonial Kenya had little to show for, it was springing forward among leading
countries. It also implied that the country had made a complete break with its colonial past
characterized by colonial exploitation and subservience underlined by second class citizenship.
What is more is that, in a patriotic expression of unbounded hope for the future, the song
concludes that Kenya had to be the best country of all. With independence, the police band
professed, the richly endowed farms and the general environment was now open to Africans
without and fear of discrimination. This, then, is what called for the stomping of the land with
great pride and joy, a privilege and right that was assured and undergirded by the president. This
explains why it reigned supreme on the Kenyan airwaves thanks to the sole TV and radio station
in the country, the Voice of Kenya (VoK). This was the case even long after independence in the
Moi years. In the Kibaki decade, there was an attempt to recapture this moment when it boomed
on loud speakers on national holidays, but there was an unmistakable hollow ring to it.
In a similarly titled song, another artist, Kaikai Kilonzo, offered up a prayer of
benediction for Kenya, the country that was both a father and a mother to many. In his song,
Kenya nchi yetu, Kilonzo pledged an oath of allegiance to always put Kenya first. The country,
he sang, would always be in the sanctum of his most treasured thoughts. Like the police band,
Kilonzo expressed hope that the newly independent state would attend to his wife and kids. He
entrusted their welfare and wellbeing along with his “taabu na shida” (the difficulties and
troubles of life) to the state. This artiste went further to charge that since both the “matajiri na
masikini” (rich and poor) were equal human beings, strife that was occasioned by boastfulness
and envy was to be avoided at all costs. Lastly, Kilonzo exhibited peculiar confidence of a
simple musician by warning would be trouble makers that they and their plans were known and
were under constant surveillance lest they ruin the country. If this was in a song by the police
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band or the Maroon Commandos, who were a military band, such an eventuality would not have
been unusual or unfathomable.
The Maroon Commandos lend their unrivalled voice to the omnibus rallying cry of their
boss, the commander-in-chief, in the form of a song that became the wakeup call every morning
for several decades when it was aired by the VoK. This was the song “Amka Kumekucha” that
dovetailed seamlessly with Kenyatta’s call to every section of society to make their contribution
to the task of building the nation. The Maroon Commandos were not only playing their role as
soldiers but also were at the frontline of the army of Kenya’s workers as they warned and
appealed in their song thus:
Uvivu ni adui mkubwa wa ujenzi wa taifa,

/Laziness is the greatest stumbling block of the task
of nation-building,
Kwani ndicho kiini hasa kisababishacho njaa.
/Indeed, it is the main cause of hunger and
starvation.
Ewe ndugu yangu we, amka kumekucha,
/So, my brother, wake up it’s dawn,
Kamata njembe na panga twende shamba.
/Arm yourself with your hoe and machete and
go to the farm.
Hata wewe mwanangu, amka kumekucha,
/Even you, son: wake up, it’s dawn,
Kwani hizi ndizo saa za kwenda shule.
/It is time for school.
Hata wewe karani, amka kumekucha,
/Even, you, office clerks, wake up, dawn has
broken.
Kwani hizi ndizo saa za kwenda kazi.
/ it’s time for work.
Jiepushe na uvivu, tujenge taifa…
…Elimu ndio msingi wa maendeleo….

/Let us all avoid laziness, so that we can build the
nation….
/…Education is the foundation for progress….

As noted above, this song lent itself quite well to Jomo Kenyatta’s rebuke against laziness,
appeal for hard work and his call for all to contribute to the task of nation-building. Even more
importantly, in a way, it was also a call to the work force not to look down upon working on the
land as farmers. As such, it was in tandem with the president’s call to go back to the land.
Daudi Kabaka’s song, “Harambee, Harambee,” was yet another song that fell within the
nation-building motif. Like in the police band song, Kabaka shamed those who predicted that
Kenya would become the country of “matata” (or fall into hard times). Instead, Kenyans were
living a decent and dignified life (“watu wote wastarabu”). Kenyans, Kabaka sang, were
contributing to the development of the country enthusiastically heeding Kenyatta’s motto of
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pulling together (“wananchi harambee/tuvute pamoja”). This was the single-minded task that
brought Kenyans together without discrimination (“hakuna ubaguzi”) in a country where
everyone from all races had their pride of place (“kila rangi tunaipenda”).
However, while the above were the most notable songs of the nation-building genre that
emerged after independence, it was the catchy classic “Jambo Bwana” jingle that captured the
euphoric mood and forever encapsulated it a sculpture of song. The upbeat and spirited song
sought to capture the independence spirit of Kenya, a new nation that extended to the world the
warm greeting and invitation to a country where all was as well as one could wish or expect
(“wageni mwakaribishwa Kenya yetu, hakuna matata”). There was no trouble at all, visitors
were assured. The song promised potential visitors that Kenya was, indeed, a great, amazing and
lovely country. Both foreign visitors and Kenyans were assured that all was well in Kenya. As
noted earlier above, however, not everyone was singing along happily that there was no trouble
at all in Kenya.

The Real Voices of Kenya: “Matigari ma Njirungi”
The Ngwataniro ya Muingi, which was based in Nyeri, was one group that did not mask
their continued discontent and disappointment with the manner things were going on in Kenya
after independence. Writing to Kenyatta on behalf of the organization two months after the
achievement of self government, Mahugu Kiogora reminded the president of their meeting on 5th
August 1963 in which he expressed displeasure with the government’s rather tough stance on
forest fighters who still remained in the forest. Kiogora complained that Ngwataniro, even after
twelve years of the struggle that had started in 1952, had known no peace. As far as they were
concerned, they were still under Emergency laws and conditions, which made them really
miserable. They felt sad and apprehensive about the way the country was going among other
things.67 They were particularly disheartened by, and thereby, took issue with, Kenyatta’s rather
high-handed speech delivered at Kinoru Grounds, Meru on 24th August 1964 in which the prime
minister ordered that fighters who still had not surrendered even after independence be shot dead
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on sight and finished off.68 Yet, at the said private meeting with him, Kiogora wrote, Kenyatta
had assured him that as the master mind behind Mau Mau, he would not extinguish its
“matigari” (the remnant of the freedom fighters). Then, Kiogora reminded Kenyatta, that he had
advised that even if only three of his ilk remained, they would never join up with the selfish
money-loving types who were being financed by enemies of freedom and were hell-bent on
destroying the country.69
Such people, “Njuhiga” as he called them, Kiogora informed Kenyatta, had, nevertheless,
taken advantage of the Kinoru speech to continue persecuting young men (“anake”) who were
beginning to emerge from the forest to take their rightful place in independent Kenya.70 Indeed,
it is from this letter that one discovers the real reason behind Kenyatta’s visit to Meru on 24th
August 1964. All hell had broken loose, Kiogora narrated, four months before this visit when a
disturbed state of affairs prevailed in which people were harassed and even killed by the
“Njuhiga.”71 On 27th April 1964, the District Commissioner had summoned freedom fighters
including Kiogora, Mwariama, Salimu and Chui and ordered them to return national flags that
the prime minister had honored them with for the role they had played in the armed struggle for
independence. The DC also demanded that they had to cut their long hair locks and to disperse or
disband from their forest at Mucori. Further, the DC announced that Kikuyu, Embu and Meru
fighters would get land in their home districts to which the young men informed him that the
needy landless people had to be settled as an urgent priority. Baimungi, who was among the
group of young men, asked Jackson Angaine, a Meru politician who also served in Kenyatta’s
cabinet, also present at the meeting whether it was Kenyatta who had asked for the return of the
honorary flag.72 Apparently, Angaine had witnessed the ceremony in which Baimungi had been
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thus honored by the president and had also received a flag from Kenyatta. How, then, Baimungi
posed, could Angaine turn around and dare to demand the flag back unceremoniously: had he
returned his own to the president? That night, Kiogora alleged in the letter, the DC with the
connivance of Angaine and Meru “Njuri Ncheke” (council of elders) who had earlier been at the
meeting, raided the Mucori forest base of the group killing an unknown number of men.
It is for this reason that Kiogora and the “Ngwataniro” felt that the Emergency and
colonialism had not quite yet ended. In a follow up trip to Nairobi on 29th April 1964 to report
this grievous trouble, Angaine demanded that Baimungi cut his hair locks before he took him to
see Kenyatta. After this unfruitful mission, Baimungi returned to Meru, and the Mucori camp,
whereupon arrival he found heavily armed policemen. At this point in his long letter, Kiogora
rhetorically and patronizingly asked Kenyatta, Our dear leader, whoever leaves his children to
be mauled by such sinister hyenas ordering them not to run so that they can be finished? Our
beloved leader, did you honor us with the flag so that it could be a trophy fought over between
the masses and Njuhiga? If he needed reminding, Kenyatta was informed that there was a section
of people for whom his ascendance to power was a most feared ordeal.73 Such people were not
any different from the colonialists. They were trying hard to drive a wedge between Kenyatta
and the forest fighters, wrote Kiogora. Their aim was to completely undo the gains of the
struggle by striking at its very roots. In this regard, they were looking for any excuse whatsoever
to finish off the “matigari.” In actual fact, full of yesteryear’s hatred, these “Njuhiga” even went
as far as boasting that the masses were still as oppressed as they had been during colonialism.74
“Ngwataniro” was alive to the fact that there seemed to be two competing visions and
projections of independent Kenya: on the one hand was that of the selfish wealth-loving and
lying types who had truck, and still did, with the colonial oppressors of the people. On the other,
was that that could make genuine freedom and land a reality. If Kenyatta and his powerful

115. Also, the latter name, Waimiungi, has been slightly corrupted by interchanging letters. Otherwise, the correct
spelling would be Wamuingi, which means “man of the people.” The former name, Baimungi, was perhaps a
nickname to conceal the owner’s real identity. Baimungi is a fake name that demonstrates the ingenuity and reveals
these young men’s sense of humor: in it, the Sikh title prefixed before male names, Bhai was put before the Kikuyu
word Muingi (Bhaimungi).
73
See Kinyatti, History of Resistance, 354 who recounts an almost fictional-sounding dramatic moment of how
Chief Njiiri wa Karanja, the leader of loyalists on the slopes of the Aberdares, reacted upon hearing on the radio that
Kenyatta had been released. According to local gossip, Chief Njiiri, in anger, smashed the radio into pieces saying
that it had lied to him all along that that bastard, Kenyatta, would never be released.
74
In the original, “muingi orugito haria mamaturagia hindi ya wabeberu.”

225

sidekick, Mbiu Koinange who was the minister of state, allowed the former to triumph, that
would be disastrous and a great misfortune that only spelled trouble for the masses.
For that reason, “Ngwataniro” looked up to Kenyatta and Mbiu with great expectations.
Ngwataniro, Kiogora assured Kenyatta, had embraced the call of Harambee.75 They had also
harkened the president’s message of peace, which they were all for. However, the Njuhiga were
courting trouble by using paid spies to gather intelligence about “Ngwataniro.” This was known
only too well because one such would-be informant turned out to be dedicated to the cause of the
masses. He had brought evidence of attempts to be recruited in the form of cash that he had
received from a Special Branch inspector in Nyeri. This was a plausible suspicion because, as
already noted above, the Kenya Intelligence Committee report covering between 7th August and
8th August 1964 had recommended that “Ngwataniro” cooperative society be investigated with
the view of deregistering it on whatever flimsy foundation possible. Kiogora’s letter to Kenyatta
was written less than two weeks later and, therefore, responding to a real and valid cause of
concern.
“Ngwataniro” must have felt the need to present their case more forcefully almost a year
later perhaps because their concerns were not attended to. Kiogora led fifty other members to
submit a more belabored petition, this time closely cataloguing the collective suffering that they
had experienced since 1952 including villigization, detention, providing farm labor in the land
owned by Njuhiga, hanging and castration. Further, unlike before when Kiogora had painted
their grievous trouble visited upon them by the DC and DO in the immediate post-colonial era in
broad strokes, the petition provided 97 names of people who had been arrested. These arrests
took place after Kenya had already become a republic within the 31-days amnesty period and
ultimatum issued by the Kenyatta government for forest fighters to surrender. Before the end of
this period had even ended, fighters trickling out of the forest were received with pointed guns
like criminals, ordinary people were arrested, some war heroes were tried in court and a few

Kiogora signed off the letter with the defunct word “Karambee,” which is perhaps a derivative of the Kikuyu
word “karambi” that means “heave ho.” According to Benson, Kikuyu-English Dictionary, 369 “karambi” is a word
shouted by a leader of a labor gang to prepare them all for the strain and ensure that they were ready to put their
hands to the task at the same time.
75

226

young men killed in the forest. The petition posed, Were prizes in a competition awarded to the
winner or the defeated? Could one’s inheritance be snatched away from him?76
The people who were now demanding their rightful inheritance were the very same black
people that went to the forest to fight in 1952. Yet, even after independence their name and
repute had continuously been under attack and blackened by the “Njuhiga.” This latter group did
so to protect their position of local leadership and influence so that they could pursue their own
selfish interests. Since colonialism had come to an end and a new independent government of
black people established, was it possible to leave behind such exploitation through lies to follow
just reason? If otherwise, the group felt that they had been used badly and yet fallen into
disrepute without the chance to clear their names or explain their point of view.77 They reminded
Kenyatta that he himself had been labeled a leader unto darkness and death by Governor Sir
Patrick Renison: had the latter been right and was that the truth about Kenyatta? They told
Kenyatta that as individuals who had sacrificed for independence for song, neither they nor the
president could accept the despoiling of their selfless efforts. They intimated their grief to see the
same agents of their suffering continue the same things inspired by hatred in colonial times while
accusing them for the role they played. Had Kenyatta decreed that people could not get land
because they had not surrendered? Could they not get loans for the same reason? Or not allowed
to form development societies to buy land because they had not surrendered? These questions,
like those of many others, were unanswered and unheeded.

Petitions and Complaints to the President: A Multitude of Cries from Below
The bitter and painful attempts of Clement Mukui Kimata to be cleared to start small
scale tea farming put the woes of “Ngwataniro” in appreciable perspective. Even the officials
handling the high volume of complaints and petitions at the prime minister’s and later, President
Kenyatta’s office, could not deny that Kimata’s frustrations were a classic example of how the
colonial relics affected the ordinary man of the street.78 Towards independence, Kimata had
secretly planted a small tea nursery of about six thousand seedlings in his small Gatundu farm as
many other people were doing in anticipation of the end of colonial strictures on cash crop
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growing. A month after Kenya became independent on 12th December 1963, Kimata happily
declared the existence of the small tea nursery to the assistant agricultural officer, the district
agricultural officer and the acting tea officer. He sought their expert knowledge regarding tea
farming, upon which all three agricultural officers visited his farm. At the farm, Kimata gave
them some samples of the seedlings for further scrutiny. Soon, they were all praise and declared
that the seedlings were of the best variety. However, Kimata’s dream to start a tea farm was cut
short on 8th June 1964.79
On that date, Kimata received a letter with the police letter head asking him to provide
more information about the origins of his seedlings. Kimata promptly dismissed this demand in a
response that argued that it was unwarranted. After all, said Kimata, had anyone reported his
seedlings missing and suspected that he had stolen them? This was followed by a note of 31st
October 1964 that was directly delivered to him in a government vehicle informing him that he
would be prosecuted. Under the Kenya Tea Development Authority standing laws, he apparently
possessed an illegal nursery. It would appear to him, therefore, it did not really matter whether
laws were made a million years or a second ago: they remained binding. As far as he was
concerned though, it had only been illegal to own a tea nursery during colonialism. Further,
people of good standing in the post-independence government were proud owners of tea farms
but it was perturbing that when the same was done by “a forgotten desperate ordinary street
man” like him, it was then illegal. Kimata attributed his tribulations to “an old colonial stooge
and leading homeguard” also doubled up as some sort of agricultural instructor for both the
colonial and independent governments.80
The said colonial stooge had threatened him that he would never plant any seedling from
his nursery as long as he was in office. Kimata’s life and sacrifice in detention camps during the
Emergency years, he was told, would not help him in that regard. At times when his old detractor
was drunk, he would boast that the power of colonial relics was stronger than that of the
nationalist forces that had brought about the African government. This really affected the man
because his seedlings were doing quite well without any sort of financial support from the
government’s ministry of agriculture. Yet there were those who benefited from agricultural loans
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of Ksh. 1/48 per tea stump and it did not really matter whether the trees grew or died, the credit
facilities were still available to them. Kimata appealed for assistance to help resolve this issue.
However, he said that he was already reconciled to his fate: even if he was imprisoned, he had
tasted it before for the benefits of the fruits which his detractor was enjoying and boasting about
although he had been on the side of the colonial state.81
Similarly, T.K. Kairu, who identified himself as the everyday “man on the street,” wrote
an equally angry letter to the Office of the President. The letter, he said, was his humble
contribution to the noble cause the country was determined to realize: that is, meaningful unity
and, more importantly, the economic welfare of people on the streets. Kairu observed that while
some of his brothers were already enjoying the fruits of uhuru, those who had actually fought for
it were still landless, or left without fathers and homeless. Freedom was a birthright that not even
God, who had created all men equal, could take away. For this reason, he could not understand
why some owned land whereas others like him had to sell their labor to them to earn their daily
bread. Kairu, therefore, felt strongly that Kenya was not a democratic country but, rather, one
steeped in capitalism. The government was led by many “Hungry Hyenas” that did not
remember their children. The government of Kenya, it seemed, had soon forgotten its main
mission and let its people down. Seventy five years of bearing the yoke of British colonialism
had been replaced by one of black imperialism. Kenyatta’s government only helped the rich to
become richer: Indians, Europeans and rich Africans. Kairu asked, how long would it be before
the poor men and women were able to enjoy the freedom that they had suffered for under
colonialism and still endured under an African government? Clearly, it did not think of hapless
widows and orphans. Kairu concluded his letter by saying that as long as he had overcome his
fear to raise his voice to demand his right, he was ready for either rebuke or death.82
Like Kairu, another writer who identified himself as Citizen John Kamau Njuguna, said
that if he had not answered the call to fight for the country for the sake of the welfare of fellow
citizens, he would have been happy to remain “as silent as silent could be.” However, the deep
urge and quest for justice did not allow him that luxury. Quoting Shakespeare, Njuguna argued
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that in so doing, he was not just being another ungrateful murmurer: “the fault lies not in our
stars,” he said, “but in ourselves. That we are underlings.”83 It is telling that Citizen Njuguna
borrowed the words of Cassius to Brutus in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar when the former is
trying to persuade the latter that it was in the best interest of the republic to stop their friend,
Caesar, from becoming a monarch. In so doing, Cassius is torn between his love for his friend
and what he felt was the higher duty to the republic. What is even more significant is the fact that
Cassius went on to point out that as men, they were equal to Caesar, a fellow man. It would
seem, therefore, the sentiment expressed by both Kairu and Njuguna that all born equal before
God was, somewhat widely, held especially by former freedom fighters that had a sense of
betrayal.84
This sense of betrayal was also expressed by another Nyeri based group of Mau Mau
youth wingers from the North Tetu region. This was, probably, the group that had fought in that
part of the Aberdare ranges alongside Dedan Kimathi. Like in many letters that found their way
to Kenyatta’s office, these young men said they were saddened by the rife news of land being
given to the wealthy or those who had worked for the colonial state thus bypassing those who
had sacrificed for an African government. They told Kenyatta that unlike such people with
money, they had given up everything including employment and personal businesses for this
noble cause. As a result, most of them had fallen through the money circulation system when
they chose to go to the forest. Some of them had for this reason not handled money since 1952
because all they had cared for then was freedom.
Yet, when they individually made this commitment winning the cause was not a
guarantee but they still made up their minds. They had resolved to go on with the struggle during
the course of which they had to endure the biting cold, nakedness, hunger, and face the
possibility of death among other hardships all for the sake of breaking the chains of colonial
subservience. In spite of all these, they were witnessing land being allocated to those who had
not sacrificed and carried on with their lives. Such people, at the height of the Emergency, did
business as usual. Put differently, land was going to the rich who would not have hesitated to
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exterminate freedom fighters.85 Some of these people were acquiring parcels of land set aside for
the poor illegally through bribes yet they already were known landholders. Usually, it was people
like the youth wingers who did not have enough money to purchase land or give bribes. Above
this, they were already branded criminals (“kamene”) and, therefore, looked down upon as social
misfits. If this course of affairs involving the rich replacing white settlers continued, what would
become of them? It was pointless, they felt, to have families that they could not support while it
was they that had lit the torch of freedom. For that reason, they beseeched the government to
provide a solution because they were at their wits end in this respect.86
The conglomeration of Nyeri County freedom fighters wrote to Kenyatta about two
weeks after the Ichagachiru youth wingers. They strategically rallied behind General China who
was of good standing and terms with Kenyatta. It was hoped that General China would be their
spokesman and articulate their difficulties with regard to land. They also disputed rumors, which
were circulating about their being against the government. They pledged their loyalty to
Kenyatta saying that it would be tantamount to destroying what they had fought for to rise
against his government. They went on to explain that that was the other reason why they had
chosen General China: that is, to validate their loyalty because he was already working closely
with the government. The usual appeal for more land allocations was made but, more
importantly, they said they were perturbed that the Kenya Youth Service did not take Mau Mau
youth wingers. Instead, it took on younger people who were too young to have participated in
armed struggle. They stated that they were not complaining but were wondering how one could
have fought for Kenya’s freedom and then be easily forgotten.87
There were many people who shared this very sentiment. Four years after independence,
Chege Gathimu observed that it seemed as if his ilk had been forgotten. The deterioration of their
pecuniary affairs was enough evidence. Gathimu alluded to a meeting with the president on 5th
December 1966 in which the fate of former detainees was discussed. It was agreed that those that
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had been released last had been classified “hard core” dissidents by the colonial administration
and thus deserved perks commensurate to their suffering. However, they were facing the greatest
post-independence hurdles. In their job hunting, most of them did not go beyond “hakuna kazi”
(no vacancy) signs at various government and corporate offices. While his group in Nakuru
appreciated that there was to be no free things, the money they had raised was not enough to buy
their ideal piece of land in Subukia.88
However, three Limuru petitioners were not as understanding or as forgiving. Muya
Njomo, Mbugua Wamunyu and Ndung’u Karu stated categorically in 1964 that the people’s
expectation underscored by the promises of political leadership before independence was land
redistribution for all for free. Their attitude was combative and demanding because it went as far
as instructing Kenyatta to build a new Kenya without “ubaguzi” (discrimination) between
“matajiri” and “masikini” (the rich and poor). This, they believed, was the only way to relieve
the misery of the landless. As things stood, however, Kenya was independent but they
themselves were really not (independent). They still lived in the same dilapidated houses they
had before independence. Independence had come only to the rich and famous who were proud
owners of land and businesses. These things were out of reach for the “unknown” poor. The only
way to actuate independence for all was to allocate the poor their own land and extend to them
agricultural credit facilities. Until then, the needy section of society existed only as “watumwa”
(slaves) of the rich. In addition, they asked the government to provide the promised seven years
of free education. It was children of the poor that suffered since the government did not honor its
promise. They asked the same with regard to the provision of healthcare.89
The plight of the Gikundike Farmers cooperative and the Muriithi clan casts the plight of
the Limuru petitioners in sharp focus. This group was locked in a tangle over a piece of land, the
Manyatta Farm in Kabete, which one of Kenyatta’s cabinet ministers, Dr. Julius Kiano, was
eying. At the intervention of people close to the president, Dr. Kiano promised Kenyatta that he
would not pursue the purchase of the land by recognizing that Mbari ya Muriithi had been
engaged in the process of acquiring it that preceded his interest in it. On following up the matter
with Kiano at his office, the cooperative, made up of ordinary people, found that he had changed
88

Chege Gathimu to Jomo Kenyatta, 27th September 1967, KNA: KA/6/14.
Muya Njomo, Mbugua Wamunyu and Ndung’u Karu to the Prime Minister, More and more trouble against
unwealthy and landless people, 10th March 1964, KNA: KA/6/48.
89

232

his mind. This meant that Kiano would not let them buy his farm although it was adjacent to the
mbari’s small pieces of shambas. Moreover, this was despite the fact that it had been owned by
the antecedents of the clan. According to the letter of complaint to Kenyatta, most of the people
involved were jobless and had liquidated all their belongings and means of livelihood in the hope
of recovering the piece of land. They appealed to the prime minister arguing that, unlike them,
Kiano was a man of adequate means whereas only if the land fell into their hands would they be
able to eke out a living.90 This was a situation that was played-out in many similar incidences
across the country as some of the complaints cited above already attest.
However, few petitioners were as authoritative and caustic as the tough questions
directed at Kenyatta by two long serving members of the KCA. One of them, Mathew Muguta
from Murang’a qualified his biting criticism by noting that Kenyatta had won his respect in the
late 1920s. Nevertheless, Muguta went on to remind the president of the deep roots of the
struggle that reached back to the early 1920s and some of the people who were involved before
Kenyatta came into the picture. Muguta’s letter mentions how the KCA was formed and started
its operations in secret in Kahuhia, Murang’a with Kenyatta only joining towards the end of the
1920s. Muguta said that he vividly remembered Kenyatta making his membership payment like
everyone else. Citing Kikuyu wisdom, he reminded the president that it was custom to honor
fathers by naming one’s first born son after them: would Kenyatta thus honor veteran founders of
the struggle for freedom, Muguta wondered. After all, they were the ones who had sent him to
London the first time; while there, they had sent their material and moral support; and they had
offered the same to Kenyatta when he was imprisoned. Why then Kenyatta had forgotten them so
quickly after taking the reins of power? Was it not expected of the president to find after them?
Or was it a case of sticking together in trouble but bolting after he had found his own? Muguta’s
letter was intended to remind Kenyatta about sheathing a club.91
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Similarly, Albert Wakangu Munene told Kenyatta that he was aware of the appeal of the
Father of the Nation that Kenyans forget the past and forgive their former oppressors. However,
Munene categorically stated that there were exceptional cases the nature of which did not allow
for such a blissful dismissal of the past and its scruples. Munene told Kenyatta that as one of the
early members of the KCA, he had been targeted in 1937 for elimination but had survived a
lethal injection, which, nevertheless, rendered him permanently crippled: his left side from the
arm down was paralyzed. As such, his life was reduced to one of poverty and misery. To whom
was he to turn to in his plight? Who would wipe his tears if not the new African government?
What kind of judgment would posterity pass on its leaders if Munene, and many others like him,
were left to weep their lives away into old age and death with only God as witness to their plight
and misery? Would God and the ancestral spirits bless the government if they were left to die in
humiliation and under the oppression of their own sons and grandsons who were leaders of the
independent government that they had sacrificed to achieve?92
Such questions must have also lingered, and played on another veteran founder of the
KCA, James Beauttah’s, mind until his death in old age as he persistently sought redress for
suffering personal loss in property among other pecuniary woes from the Kenyatta government.
In a letter to Mbiu Koinange, Beauttah said that as a long serving freedom fighter since the early
1920s, he was a man deserving praise and honor. Instead, the younger people who had taken
over leadership of the struggle from older men like him, among them George K. Ndegwa and
Joseph Kangethe, had forsaken and forgotten them. Power and honor had gone to people who did
not deserve it at all. To gain favor, Beauttah tried to leverage some of the sacrifices he had made
for the struggle early in life, for example, leaving service as a colonial clerk to liberate Kenya.
He lamented the fact that after this goal had been achieved, he was thrown overboard like a
stinking fish. In the letter, Beauttah expressed surprise that his old friend, Mbiu Koinange, had
not remembered him or the sacrifices he had made during the nomination of the unofficial
members of the county council or even as a member on any board. What is more is that KANU
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had supported Kariuki Njiiri, the son of chief Njiiri who had supported the colonial state, to run
for the LegCo elections in 1961.93
In his wildest of dreams, Beauttah did not expect that Kenyatta would sympathize with
his local opponents like Kariuki Njiiri considering that his father was a loyalist.94 While
Kenyatta had already instructed the appropriate ministry to extend Beauttah a loan, nothing had
come out of it probably, he thought, because some people in government hated him. The
dominant theme in most of his letters, Beauttah laments that in the sharing of the fruits of
independence, he had been completely overlooked by his old comrades with whom he had
fought for a better future.95
Beauttah asked Eliud Mathu, then controller of State House and private secretary to the
president, in another letter, what crime had he committed to deserve such treatment. Kenyatta’s
government, he complained, continued to ignore him. This was despite the fact that Beauttah’s
heart was unchanged and had remained where it stood on February 20th 1950 when nationalists,
among them Kenyatta and Mathu, had congregated in Mbiu’s home at Banana Hill.96 Time and
again, therefore, Beauttah reiterated his struggle credentials in the hope of meriting favor and
government help. In one of his early letters to Kenyatta, Beauttah reminded Kenyatta of the close
relationship that they had enjoyed when they were working for the KCA. It was Beauttah and
Joseph Kangethe who had been sent to receive Kenyatta in 1946 after fifteen years in Europe.
Beauttah also reminded him of the fact that he had served as the vice president of KAU in
Central Province.97 In the event that help was never forthcoming despite his checkered career as
a freedom fighter, Beauttah was afraid, but also reconciled, to follow other unsung fallen heroes
like Johana Karanja, George Ndegwa and Joseph Kangethe with whom he had suffered. These,
he told Mathu, had already gone and he too, would join them sooner or later. Until then, people
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around him were waiting to see whether Kenyatta’s government would treat him like a true
national hero that he was.98
However, these claims and demands for honor and recognition aside, Beauttah wanted
nothing more than either the return of or compensation for 4.6 acres of land that the colonial
government had confiscated from him at the height of the Mau Mau war. At any rate, most of the
land that had been confiscated from the Mau Mau fighters had been returned to its original
owners. Kenyatta had received his land back in Gatundu and his house that had been destroyed,
rebuilt. Beauttah, therefore, could not see any reason why his case was any different.99 This piece
of land had been sold off by the government for a song to the Maragwa County Council, which
included it as part of the trading center. Beauttah argued that he had not accepted the twothousand and thirty shillings the council paid for the land. The transfer of land had taken place
while he was still in detention in Marsabit, which is where the check had been sent.100 As such,
he was in no position to negotiate for a better price.
Moreover, such an imposed sale of land, Beauttah argued, was not legally binding. He
argued that compulsory acquisition of property by the government was subject to adequate
compensation and, as such, the council had acted ultra vires by not giving a proper offer taking
advantage of the Emergency and his vulnerable position in detention. Seeking the help of
Jackson Angaine, the minister for land and settlement, Beauttah said that he would settle for a
firm offer of 50,000 shillings less what the council had already paid. After all, he pointed out, the
council was making almost as much money every month if not more in rents.101 In his response,
Angaine attributed Beauttah’s problem to the complex land consolidation process and advised
him to resolve the issue with the council and not his ministry.102
As already noted, however, Beauttah’s plight was the rule and not the exception. His
woes were among a few documented cases of Africans who had suffered and sacrificed their all
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in the cause of freedom. Mohamed Solano Agufa, a freedom fighter from Turbo, Mautuma
Scheme shared the same post-colonial disillusionment. Agufa recalled, in a letter to Kenyatta,
when the latter had visited Kakamega as the chairman of KAU in 1946. Kenyatta’s car had
gotten stuck and he had then hitched a ride in Agufa’s car. During the emergency, the car was
confiscated by the government and Agufa’s personal driver arrested and imprisoned for six
years. At this point, Agufa had joined the Mau Mau movement only leaving the forest after
Kenyatta’s call for people to surrender. In the interim, however, he had not only lost his car but
had no shoes or clothes. Agufa told Kenyatta that he had nothing left: that he could not even
provide for his family. It was, therefore, very surprising for him to hear Kenyatta say that there
were no free things in independent Kenya.103
Kimani Njuku, another man who was, in February 1952, arrested, convicted and detained
at the Githiga Detention Camp from where he was writing his letter on appeal, was not ashamed
to share his experience of loss. Njuku had lost twenty-three head of cattle, which were
confiscated by chief Wanjii of Murang’a. The said man also owned his land with what remained
of it having been the site of an Emergency village. Moreover, he emerged to find his reputation
tainted especially in the eyes of chief Wanjii.104 Like Njuku and as late as 1967, Njoroge
Mbugua still hoped that the government would assist him to get one of his cherished possessions
that he had lost after he and his brother were detained in 1953: a 1936 Ford V8 truck probably
one of those dispensed with by the British army after the war. Apparently, when he started his
search after his release in 1959, the Criminal Investigation Department had informed him that the
car was somebody else’s property. The attorney general, however, had recommended
repossession by Mbugua. The car had been auctioned in Nairobi by Ismail Auctioneers on behalf
of the government after his detention in July 1955 to a Mugo Njuguna Gichuhi of Thika.
Following the decision by the attorney general, Mbugua sought compensation from the
government. After all, it was the government that had sold it.105
Similarly, Gitao Kago asked Kenyatta to intervene in his favor in an attempt to get his car
that had been taken by a white inspector of police, Moleneux of Thika, after his arrest in 1956.
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Upon his release a year later, Kago embarked on a search for Inspector Moleneux who had since
retired from the police force. Having found him, he had sought the help of the DC in Kiambu
who had written numerous letters to Moleneux to either return the car or pay for it without
avail.106 Livingstone G. Gatumbi from South Tetu also wanted to know from Kenyatta whether
the people whose houses and property had been lost or destroyed during the emergency would be
compensated: would the government, for example, consider building houses for them?107
Apart from such complaints from actual freedom fighters asking for their rightful share of
the fruits of independence or compensation of lost property, relatives of those who died or were
unaccounted for did the same. The best example would be that of missing General Stanley
Mathenge’s family. His son, Peter Mirugi Mathenge, wrote Kenyatta in 1967 telling him that the
general was either lost or dead. Mathenge told the president that the time had come to launch a
complaint to him and the government about the difficulties and troubles that were pressing down
his weak and poor family that had been forgotten after uhuru. As the first born, Mathenge had
tried various ways to earn a living and assist the family but his many attempts were “full of
thorns and darkness.” Times and things were much tougher than they had been before
independence when he had been detained in approved schools and made to suffer on behalf of
his dear father, Mathenge lamented. Then, he had naturally thought it was not for naught that
both he and his father suffered because independence would reward their service “during the
critical times of emergency.” However, considering his position many years later, Mathenge and
his family was severely disappointed. The war that he and his father had joined was succeeded
by another endless war against poverty, which was the “reward.” The family was like pelicans or
homeless owls of the wilderness. Mathenge hoped that Kenyatta would help him get admitted in
the army, the National Youth Service or any other form of employment within the government.
Otherwise, the only other choice available was to resign himself to a life of crime.108
Indeed, crime was something that many young people threatened the president with as a
survival mechanism of last resort. Edward Ngugi Gitao who was eighteen years of age told
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Kenyatta that while his father had tried to give them an education, not all his siblings were able
to pursue studies because his father was poor. Gitao started school in 1959 until 1965 and
matriculated with an elementary certificate despite difficulties. However, he could not proceed
further due to lack of money. Gitao still hoped that he would be able to make a contribution to
the country in the future. In the interim, however, he feared that he would be forced to take to a
life of crime in order to survive.109 James Mugo, who, in spite of passing his elementary school
exams was forced to work as a cook, felt that hard times would force him to succumb to the
temptation of having to steal food.110 John C. Kemiti Kamau wrote the president an eloquent
letter expressing faith that “being the merciful father of” the nation, Kenyatta would not approve
any of his subjects to be compelled to live a life of distress and underserved punishment.
Kamau’s pursuit of medical studies in Yugoslavia had been cut short when the general living
condition there became impossible. This was followed by a stream of unhappy students leaving
the country and other East European countries especially with the promise from the Kenyan
government to ensure the completion of their studies. Once home, however, they faced a ban on
employment because the government feared that they had communist inclinations. Kamau,
therefore, had spent thirty months without work or a means of livelihood and doubted whether
the government had been serious about sending him back to school. Kamau told Kenyatta that no
one could continue to live without food or money. His feeling was he would be no worse off in
prison and that there were real possibilities that he would be tempted to indulge in crime for a
living.111 There were numerous cases of promising students who were forced to drop out of
school and take odd, under-paying jobs.
This state of affairs infuriated many former freedom fighters who felt that uhuru was a
farce. They complained about their children who were “thrown away” by an uncaring
government after their Kenya primary education exams.112 Mt. Kenya Freedom fighters
requested Mbiu Koinange to take at least fifty young men for further studies since not so many
people from the region had ever had such an opportunity. This was despite the fact that Kenyatta
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had promised to sponsor nine young men for further studies. They expressed the hope that the
government would rescue orphans and widows of freedom fighters and provide free education.113
Charles Muriithi Kuikui was such a needy twenty-one year old son of a freedom fighter
who had been killed in the war. Kuikui had successfully finished standard seven and hoped that
the government would award him funding to allow him to pursue his secondary education for
free or award him a scholarship.114 Hailing from a poor and landless family where no one was
employed, Christopher J. Njue and his three siblings were experiencing a similar fate. Njue’s
brother, Phinias J. Ndwiga, had finished his KPE in 1964 but being unable to pursue his
education further, moved to Nairobi in search of technical training and employment without any
luck. He kept being referred to various government ministries but no job offers were made. Njue
had passed his KPE the following year but could not afford the annual school fees that amounted
to six-hundred and eighty shillings. Eventually, he was suspended when he came short of 425
shillings. At this point, Njue sought assistance from Kenya government bursary scheme and was
able to secure only a hundred shillings. In the ping pong that ensued, Njue shuffled between the
Ministry of Education and the Embu County Council in the search for the outstanding fees.
Eventually, the council told him that all secondary schools were under the central government
and that, as such, the Embu County Council could do little to help him. Njue’s attempts to join
Starehe Boys Secondary, which catered for needy cases like him, yielded no fruits. For that
reason he considered a career in the Kenya air force, navy or police.115
Perhaps, it is such perturbation and frustration that prompted a moving anaphoric letter
from the “Four Corners of Kenya” in the same year.116 In this poetic letter, the ruling party was
put in an awkward position in the face of a raft of successive rhetorical questions. Indeed, the
letter was not only found to be provocative and embarrassing but also considered to be a security
concern as did most of these letters that found their way to the Office of the President. “Dear
KANU,” the letter opened: “you are asked by the four corners of Kenya, when will the promises
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be fulfiled [sic] which were made from 1952 to 12.12.64” [sic]. The Four Corners of Kenya then
pressed:
KANU, what did you do after getting the fruits of Uhuru? Didn’t we all agree to share the
fruits thereof between each and every one of us!
KANU, the Four Corners of Kenya hereby asks, ‘can the sweet taste on the tip of
someone’s tongue be transferred to somebody else’s?’
KANU, men, women and children hereby ask you, ‘do you, really, consider the task of
land redistribution to be now complete?’
Consider: children in the village are starving when they leave school. Their
fathers have nowhere to cultivate or even work to do. They do not even have clothes to
cover their bare backs.
KANU, what happened? Aren’t you the one who has the keys of the box bearing the
fruits of independence?
KANU, do you remember the people who were detained; those who were in the forest;
and those who died for the sake of the fruits of Uhuru? If you do, what should you do
with the store of those fruits?
KANU, …see, parents have nothing to give their children…even clothes, food and
shelter.
Our children are now like dogs living off dustbins in the city.
KANU, consider: if a mother has five children and gives food to only two of them
leaving the rest to fend for themselves, would she be said to have, really, ‘shared’ the
food?
Obviously not! The three children would be crying while the other two would have
their stomachs full.
KANU, isn’t that what you did with the fruits of Uhuru?
KANU, do you remember our Freedom Song: the one we sang in ’52?
Oh, what great love we witnessed among children and women!
When a morsel of bean fell to the ground, they split it and shared it equally
amongst themselves.
Oh, how we pray, how we pray and beseech fervently that it would be the same
now as it was then.117
KANU, the blood spilt in the struggle for freedom cries out to you from the ground.
And the voice of those who survived from Nyandarua to Embakasi joins up with
that of the dead saying: ‘don’t you know that we still await the sweet taste the fruits of
Freedom?’

This song was known as “the song of Ole Nguruone,” which was a composition by squatters who worked on
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2010), 126, it was a song of resistance, defiance and, at the same time, one of immeasurable sadness. It was
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KANU, these letter echoes these cries of freedom: please reply to them soon. May be
through radio, may be through the newspapers in order that all the Four Corners may hear
it.118
Torrents of such petitions and complaints poured into government offices, as it were,
from all the four corners of Kenya. They reflected genuine aspirations of the people. They
contained expectations and hope for a better future of independent Kenya. A few years into this
beckoning future, however, apprehension and uncertainty prevailed where once faith and
optimism resided. The torch and light of freedom that had been generated in the crucible of the
struggle of freedom was soon extinguished a few years after independence. Independence
euphoria and good will fast gave way into embers of disillusionment and frustration for most
people. From the ashes of consumed dreams emerged blistering bitterness and a rising din of
nagging questions. Such was the hidden sentiment and anguish in the subtext of the verse from
the Four Corners of Kenya. To the new independent government and even London, which still
firmly held the puppeteering strings, these rising Voices in the Dark were an unnerving knell.
This then, is what prompted letter handlers and senior officers at the Office of the President to
hastily forward such complaints and petitions to, ironically, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the
police department. That was the exact “response” that the rather innocuous poetic letter from the
Four Corners of Kenya elicited in official circles.
Such was the response of Cyrus K. Wanjohi’s desperate note to the president. At a loss of
how to get an audience with Kenyatta, Wanjohi furtively walked along the perimeter of the
prime minister’s official residence, State House, and stuck his letter in the chain link fence where
he was sure someone would notice. In the note, Wanjohi expressed astonishment at seeing
Kenyatta working hand in hand with the people who had supported British rule and opposed him
who were now “enjoying” independence. This, Wanjohi said, was at the expense of those who
had devoted their energy and lives to the independence movement. For this, he wished to
congratulate Britain’s imperial genius.
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At the same time, he was glad that at that point in the young life of the nation, this state
would serve as a good lesson. Wanjohi believed that in the future, people would not accept to
devote their lives to a leader such as Kenyatta who did not even have an iota of pity for people
who had just returned from the forest or had been detained for years who were helpless and
naked. These had struggled together to liberate the country and had been maimed but they were
now “shambaless and jobless.” Wanjohi expressed his mental, social and financial suffering and
accused Kenyatta before the almighty God for his propaganda, which had made many people to
suffer and lose their lives.119 Needless to say, his letter caused great alarm and was immediately
dispatched to the Director of Intelligence for his record and further investigation.
Still, his letter was only one among many others from the four corners of Kenya as
ordinary Kenyans voiced their displeasure and discontent with how things were going. A section
of such letters came from peasant farmers or squatters and farm workers who, even after
independence, were treated with hostility by remaining settlers. Their bitterness measured no less
than Wanjohi’s. It was “just like 1953,” Matindi Ticha from Kapcherop, Kitale opined. The pain
that people bore there was reminiscent of the difficult years of the 1950s. The experience of
squatters had stuck in time because they were being evicted from “seteras” who only gave them a
seven-day notice to do so. Ticha was one of those who had been thus “chassen” by these
“chassers of Africans.” In the hope of swift justice, Ticha fearlessly mentioned R.J Furton and a
“Manjester Medi of Horse Bridge” as two of the leading white settler culprits who were evicting
Africans for no good reason at all. As a result, squatter children were not able to attend school
because of these troubles. Why would the government not send someone like Oginga Odinga to
resolve this struggle?120
Similarly, the citizen-squatters of Leshau were rather surprised by the action taken by
their resident European settler-farmer, a Mr. Lewis, who refused to give them permission to
mark Kenyatta Day celebrations in Nyahururu just a few days before they wrote. This was an
affront that caused them great agony, they said. The said man had done the same during
Madaraka Day, another Kenyan national holiday. Instead, he preferred his African farm hands to
continue work on his wheat plantation. The petitioners were dismayed that the man did this in
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spite of the fact that he enjoyed the protection of the government. What was wheat compared to
Kenyatta Day, they posed.121 Likewise, the Mau Mau War Council in Nyandarua echoed the
same sentiment. They wrote: “although the national flag is flying, we” the “people of Ol Kalou
settled area are so disturbed that we find it difficult to believe that the National flag is really
flying.” They were inconsolable due to evictions of squatters who were being removed from
farms that they had lived on for thirty to fifty years especially after independence. They
demanded that the government find them alternative settlement and allow them to deal with
white settlers by force. Further, they found it rather absurd that in Nyandarua District, land was
being allocated to the rich people instead of the poor. They applauded the words of Josiah
Mwangi Kariuki, a popular politician, MP and a defender of the poor, who had raised similar
concerns at a meeting at Ol Joro Orok on 18th January.122 The struggle for independence that had
started with the Norfolk Hotel shooting had been long and now the people had won their own
flag. Nevertheless, they were just beginning to realize that the flag, really, did not mean anything
anymore.
It was such events that reinforced the prevalent view held by many wananchi that
colonial laws were still in force. Henry Namasaka from Turbo made a claim to this effect
pointing to the fact that a white settler, C.B. Looman of Wattle Co., had destroyed African
houses and forced them to leave his farm.123 Thirteen squatters had met the same fate when they
were forced out of F.D.M. Erskine’s farm in Kipkabus in the Rift Valley after the previous
owner sold it.124
Namasaka’s concerns were echoed by Kamiri Muraguri whose critical letters were
quickly marked “P.A” (Police Action).125 Going beyond the former’s claim, Muraguri insisted
that Kenya needed to end colonial laws. As far as Muraguri was concerned, the government
could little disguise the fact that it was not any different from the previous colonial
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administration in that regard.126 In another of his letters, Muraguri accused some of Kenyatta’s
ministers, like Julius Gikonyo Kiano and Njoroge Mungai, for not living up to policy promises
made to the public; and the public’s expectations.127 This was betrayal of the public, which could
easily execute some these promises, for example, the restitution of African land or compensation
for their loss. The people had resolved that land belonged to them and as such, the government
was acting as a surety to that end. There was no debt that had to be paid to Europeans to pave the
way for the resumption of African ownership of what was theirs by right, Muraguri argued. In
exasperation, he asserted that the people had decided that they would no longer accept to be
removed from the land. Evidently, the subject-issue of this letter, a mass eviction of squatters
possibly at a place called Kamae, had been raised in an earlier letter from Muraguri, his very first
to the president.128 In this first letter, Muraguri asked for Kenyatta’s support in the form of
provision of transport for the “war council” to ascertain if the evictions were true and if so, why
ordinary men there were being mistreated.129
These sentiments were mirrored, and therefore, validated by similar strongly held views
elsewhere in the country. SamsonWafula Wakoli wrote to the Minister for Information and
Tourism, Achieng Oneko, on behalf of the DYM to notify him of the grave danger that was
facing the country. From the “Dini ya Msabwa’s point of view,” colonialism was an ever
continuing and a felt haunting presence, which ran deep roots in Kenya that needed removal. If
these roots were not “smashed,” people still had more suffering to endure even after
independence. As it had done before independence, the society, wrote Wakoli, was still standing
firm to defend freedom, peace, justice and security. Among the Luhya of Western Kenya, such
sentiment as articulated by DYM was not isolated.130
A team of twelve elders representing their locations including South Maragoli, Bunyore,
Tiriki, Isukha, Kisa and Marama turned to the government to secure their survival vis-à-vis the
issue of land. While they had been at the forefront of fighting for land and independence since
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1922, they had not received anything yet.131 In a letter on behalf of the Bunyore, Masinde Abbo
asked Kenyatta to remember all the ordinary people of Kenya who were formerly down trodden.
Abbo warned Kenyatta to be wary of self-seekers who wanted to be “the big bosses over” the
rest of the people. If such people remained in public service, they would defraud Kenyatta and
cheat ordinary people in the process. He, therefore, appealed to Kenyatta to provide opportunities
for ordinary people like him. Abbo expressed faith that justice would be meted out and extended
to Bunyore location where there was need for “quick change” since people had suffered so much
injustice in the colonial era. Even after uhuru, he stated, colonialism still lingered in villages and
the bush country. For example, there were chiefs who regarded ordinary people as a low caste,
which was a stubborn and oppressive colonial dreg that had to be brought to an end.132
Further, reflecting the division among the Kikuyu between those who had supported the
colonial state and its militant opposition, among the Luhya, Peter M. Aliarane wrote a letter to
Kenyatta that was circulated among leading politicians from the region, among them Edward
Khasakhala, Stanley Godia and Jonathan Muruli in support of Joshua Magotsi to be chief in
Idakho Location. Aliarane said that Magotsi was a proven nationalist who had identified with the
Mau Mau cause in 1952 for which reason he had been arrested and sentenced to six monthsimprisonment. He was also the first person from Kakamega to join Maragolians to form a KANU
branch in North Nyanza together with J. Otiende and Seth Lugonzo. Moreover, Magotsi had
fought for the right for Africans to plant tea in the area.133
Notably, a Tiriki writer requested Kenyatta to step in to mediate peace between the
Maragoli and the Kalenjin adding that the struggle for milk and honey and bread and butter had
ended with the termination of years of British colonialism. Unlike then when these things had
been enjoyed by only white people, a time had come for Kenyans to enjoy them together in
peace.134 Another Maragoli group, the Maragoli Hills Farmers Society, requested the government
of Kenya to hand over Maragoli Forest for their use. This land, they said, had belonged to them
before it was alienated without compensation. They appealed for the government to liberate them
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from the chains that had been set upon them by the colonial government so that they could be
able to join the rest of the people in celebrating “uhuru” once this yoke had been laid down.135
In addition to the above narratives of suffering from a cross-section of post-colonial
Kenya society is an important category that needs special mention: women petitioners. Although
these were not many, but women voices were raised for a review of their independence fortunes
leveraging their claims against their contribution to the struggle that had made freedom possible.
Indeed, playing upon women solidarity, one of the few petitions from women was not addressed
to President Kenyatta but, rather, to Mama Ngina, who was Kenya’s first lady. This letter was
written by Wanjuku Wariku on behalf of the Women War Council from Murang’a, Nakuru,
Nyeri, Meru, Nairobi, Kiambu and Nanyuki. Wariku expressed their shock because it seemed to
them that Ngina had forgotten women who had played the crucial role of producing, and
providing and moving food from ridge to ridge to forest fighters at the height of the Mau Mau
struggle. They had been waiting on Kenyatta to whom they had consistently been writing since
1964 with no success. They had, therefore, decided to appeal directly to Ngina in the hope that
she would pass on their petition to the president: perhaps, they feared, Kenyatta had not received
any of their letters.136
Rebecca Njeri, a woman Mau Mau volunteer who had managed independent schools
before the war, had been “instrumental in collecting funds and starting a school for Girls in
Githunguri; and subsequently, had been arrested and later detained for her role as an organizer of
Women’s Wing of the struggle for independence, wrote Kenyatta a long and impassioned letter
for the pardon of Harrison Njoroge Nguyai, her adopted son and “sole bread winner.”
Apparently, Nguyai who Njeri had adopted after the death of his father early in his childhood,
had been arrested and convicted of receiving funds in a suspicious manner following which he
was sentenced to serve a twelve-year prison term. However, after his case was heard by the High
Court of Appeal, the sentence had been reduced to seven years, which Njeri felt was a long
sentence. This meant that Nguyai would no longer be there to help her any more. Having spent
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all her savings and borrowed money to try and provide the best defense for her son, Njeri was
“quite helpless” and unable to support herself or her family that depended on her as their source
of support. The worry of earning a living on account of the impending imprisonment was
attended by health complications. There was no one to help her besides Nguyai in what Njeri
referred to a “struggle of life and death.”137
Further, beside the argument that Nguyai was the sole bread winner for her family, Njeri
leveraged the plea for Kenyatta’s intervention against the insightful observation that most male
contributors to the “Freedom Struggle” had already “got their reward by getting lucrative
positions and other means of income after the attainment of Uhuru.” Since she was a woman,
Njeri argued, she had not yet “reaped any fruit of Uhuru.” Yet, until then, Njeri had not
approached the president or any other department of his government for any favors. This was
despite the fact that she had always known that she deserved some consideration on account of
her role in the freedom struggle. In light of her contribution and service to the nation, Njeri
hoped that Kenyatta would give the matter his full attention and grant pardon to Nguyai.138

University Students: A Tertiary Decibel of Discontent Rejoins
University students were another important source of early dissidence after
independence. For example, following the infamous 1966 KANU Conference in Limuru that
would remove the entire outspoken radical wing of the party, including Oginga Odinga and
Bildad Kaggia, there developed serious student-government conflict with firm roots at the
University of Nairobi. Before long, the subsequent momentum of opposition that germinated and
took root at the time constantly infected the student body. A good case in point was when
students invited Oginga Odinga to address them at Taifa Hall, which the government cancelled.
This led to protracted student protest, which paralyzed university operations and culminated in
the closure of the university.139 In 1966, the Kenya Students Union of the university led protest
against the controversial issue of the acquisition of the mayor’s expensive car. The mayor of
Nairobi was set to incur the exorbitant expenditure of £10,850 for a Rolls Royce. In a letter to
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addressed to Kenyatta’s minister for local government, students argued that dignity alone did not
warrant such wasteful spending.140
Writing at the same time, F.R. Kithinji, a resident of Nairobi, told Lawrence Sagini, the
minister, that such a huge amount of money was not to be spent without the consent of the
public, which was opposed to the purchase. At any rate, millions of Africans were dying of
hunger. The Nairobi City Council could do with a more economical car for the mayor. This
ridiculous amount of money could be used to feed hungry countrymen who could not even afford
shelter or the price for a square meal. The people of Kenya, it was argued, were greatly mistaken
if they thought only of the dignity of a particular person instead of thinking of human dignity for
all. How many beggars, hungry and unemployed people swarmed the very street which this
economic monster would use? Had whoever authorized the spending of this money not at all
thought of the dignity of the less unfortunate members of society? Yet, Kenyatta’s government,
time and again, appealed for self-sacrifice and people responded accordingly. Since this appeal
was directed to everyone, the Kenya Students Union further argued, could not the mayor of
Nairobi also sacrifice by feeling satisfied with whatever car he had at the time? The union
countered the mayor’s justification that the car he had was too old and difficult to maintain: if
that was the case, it was not a bad idea to buy a new one. However, did the mayor purport that
only a Rolls Royce was easy to maintain? Obviously, there were cheaper cars that were not
costly to maintain.141
Further, students stated that it was not enough for the mayor to argue that the Nairobi
City Council had done more for beggars than any other local authority. That, they said, was what
was expected of the council. Moreover, it was many times richer than other local authorities. It
could also not be said that the council had done all that could be done in that regard. The union,
therefore, concluded by saying that there were better ways to use the money earmarked for a new
car for the mayor. For example, it could be spent to feed at least two-hundred people for eight
years. It was even enough to pay one year’s school fees for about three thousand and six hundred
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primary school children. These were the kind of service that was needed to satisfy tax-payers
instead of buying such an expensive car for the mayor.142

Kenya (Re)Imagined: Art in Life, and Life in Art
Besides such narratives of continued suffering, unmet grievances and demands that
reached to the time before independence and grievances and criticism leveled at Kenyatta and his
government, whatever simmering and unspoken discontent that may have existed among
ordinary Kenyans was captured and archived, and by extension, immortalized in creative works
of fiction. The post-colonial Kenyan novel is especially distinctive among other works of fiction
in this regard. This is because no area of a people’s lives, including the very boundaries of their
imagination, is unaffected by how society is organized, the whole operation and machinery of
power.143 As one of Kenya’s leading and veteran novelists Ngugi wa Thiong’o, has argued, a
writer’s subject matter is in itself, really, history. Indeed, writers as human beings are,
themselves, a product of history, time and space. As such, Kenyan fictional writers based their
work on what they observed both before and after independence. Their work, therefore, was a
continuing commentary on their observation of how real people behaved or did; how they were
changing or attempted to transform themselves. Fiction in general, and the novel in particular, is
a form of analysis of the changing relations of production including power relations in a whole
territory of concern to the writer.144 Indeed, as a collective body of work, Kenyan literature
presents the postcolonial historian more and sharper insights into the moving spirit of an era to
augment historical and political documents treating the same moment.
The Kenyan novel in particular, especially considering how steeped it is in its critical
realist tradition, is important in this respect.145 Literature reflects social reality, which Ngugi as a
novelist felt was an essential element of the creative process.146 This is so much so that some
novels written during the colonial period can, and should be, considered to be part and parcel of
the repertoire of the anti-imperial movement. Such work constituted a corpus of knowledge that
could be tagged as “resistance literature” that affirmed the right of a people to, once again, seize
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the initiative in history, recover and, thereby, actuate their lost human agency.147 The social
energy from the political, cultural and the social struggle in the colonial era, as discussed in the
previous chapters, was transmitted into writer’s work. As Ngugi aptly points out, in that era more
so, writers were compelled by the harshness of the system to take a progressive stance: they were
swept off their feet as it were by the dynamic force and vision of total national liberation. At a
public lecture given as part of the department of literature series at the University of Nairobi in
October 1975, Ngugi, in effect, told his audience that even after more than ten years of
independence, the anti-imperial struggle was still on.
Put differently, writers had to join workers and poor peasant struggles that persisted after
independence. The task of the writer, for Thiong’o, was to actively support and reflect the
struggle of the working and peasant masses for “the total liberation of their labor power.”
Creative writing took place against the background of the masses’ hope for a better and more
egalitarian organized state.148 For that reason, writers were supposed to take their position
alongside intellectuals, youth, students, religious leaders, workers and peasants in the
postcolonial era and resolutely denounce and struggle against all the economic, political and
cultural forces that condemned people to “starvation wages,” landlessness, homelessness,
nakedness, lack of adequate schooling and joblessness. Not to do so would implicate them with
those forces, in post-colonial Kenya, that were determined to undermine to betray the spirit of
Mau Mau. According to Thiong’o, Mau Mau was still the guiding spirit of the postcolonial
struggle.149
This then is what Thiong’o set out to do as a novelist. Endowed with an acute sense of
place; a curious and inquisitive mind; and a potent imagination, Thiong’o, at a very tender age
saw, firsthand, the smoldering embers of pre-European African life and society in his village of
Ngamba in the face of what he later came to view as an all-consuming and exploitative capitalist
modernity. Thiong’o’s work of fiction is an autobiographical recreation of the transformation of
life in Ngama in time, space and time experience and the experiences wrought upon its peasant
inhabitants. For example, the environment, life situations and experiences of young Njoroge, the
central character in his second novel, Weep not Child, drew upon and captured the novelist’s
147

Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 73, 74 & 75.
149
Ibid., 111.
148

251

own thoughts, fears and the hopes and terror of the Emergency and the Mau Mau war of
independence, which was the background against which Thiong’o, and people of his generation,
grew.150 The classic Thiong’o novel, therefore, aptly captured the drudgery and experiential
struggle of African workers in Nairobi and, more so, that of rural folk. It explores and dramatizes
the inner lives of real life characters caught up in a historical development of
underdevelopment.151 Put differently, the Thiong’o novel is a fictional archive of narratives of
suffering some of which have been extensively rendered above.
For instance, Petals of Blood, captures how Ilmorog, a remote, idyllic and tranquil and
self-sufficient rural village, is transformed into a forest of concrete building where once of trees
stood. Its single dirt track tarmacked and invaded by grasping outsiders as capital and
concomitant modernity permeated and reworked its socioeconomic structure. The apparatus and
infrastructure attendant to capital and modernity such as stone and glass buildings, roads,
railways and land enclosure unravel both the physical environment and social fabric of Ilmorog.
More importantly, the peasants in the novel represent people that Thiong’o had known while
growing up in his village including his own mother, Wanjiku wa Ngugi. Indeed, according to
Thiong’o, his mother was a good representative of the Kenyan peasantry.152 Growing up, the
novelist recalled how his mother was always saying how expensive “things really were,
sugarcanes, bananas, cloths and flour:” even simple things that the family needed to sustain their
daily lives. Such was life and the experiences of ordinary people in Kenya not only before
independence but also thereafter in the Kenyatta years and beyond.
In Petals of Blood, postcolonial Kenyan society is depicted as empty and anomalous.153 It
was a society where values such as African traditional mutuality and moral obligation, which had
previously bound individuals as a community, had been eviscerated. It was a country where man
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ate man.154 The names given to villains like “Kimeria” and “Chui,” two men who represent the
“priesthood” of capital in the novel belong to meat-eating predators: the hawk and cheetah,
respectively. They presented the “priesthood” of haves in postcolonial Kenya who ensured that
thousands and millions of acres remained in the “two hands of” the priest, “while the
congregation” of have-nots moaned for an acre. Where there was once African mutuality and
moral obligation, the priesthood decreed only “one ethical code: Greed and accumulation.155
Like in the analogy of the hollowed out flower with petals of blood, the manner in which Kenyan
society was structured and organized with the whole operation and machinery of power in a few
pair of hands, ensured that fruits of the process of production and collective industry could not be
shared out widely and/or equally.
Besides Ngugi wa Thiong’o, another Kenyan novelist, Meja Mwangi, excelled in the
1970s in artfully capturing the urban anxiety and disorder of Nairobi, the citadel of power and a
city of contrasts since colonial times. Mwangi’s urban trilogy of novels that includes Kill me
Quick, Going Down River Road and The Cockcroach Dance aptly track the trudge and tramp of
the damned in the context of rapid urbanization that the country experienced since
independence.156 Mwangi captures postcolonial urban disillusionment of ordinary Kenyans
trapped in the city’s marginal spaces such as Eastleigh, Kibera, Mathare Valley, Majengo,
Pumwani among other poor neighborhoods Jericho, Jerusalem, Kariobangi South and Huruma
that have since been encroached upon by the scourge of poverty. Life in these tough
neighborhoods is cast and contrasted by Mwangi against that of wealthy green and shady highincome upmarket homes. As the epitome of the big cities in Kenya, Nairobi is painted in a binary
dichotomy constituting north western suburbs of low density and high income and the south-east
areas of high-density and low-income.
Moreover, Mwangi’s body of work is a riveting account of the constant struggle for
survival that characterizes life in not only Nairobi’s neighborhoods above but also those in other
major cities in Kenya.157 The archetype of the dispossessed, exploited and impoverished man in
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Mwangi’s urban trilogy represented by characters Meja (Kill me Quick), Ben (Going Down River
Road) and Dusman Gonzaga (Cockroach Dance) mirror the lives of some of the real life
narratives discussed above. That is the narratives of suffering emergent in the letters that people
like Njue and his brother Ndwiga and Kuikui sent to the President. Ordinary and everyday
people recognized their plight all so well: they were people like Clement Kimata Mukui and T.K
Kairu who, in their letters to Kenyatta, described themselves as “man on the street.” It is
important to note that people like Mukui and his tea-planting tribulations could easily have ended
up in urban streets looking for work. Men like Kairu who described himself as jobseekers since
1956 could even have gone further to resort to a life of crime. As earlier noted, young men like
the eighteen year old Edward Ngugi Gitao and James Mugo the cook, did not make it any secret,
even in writing to Kenyatta, their intention or threat to turn to a life of crime in order to survive.
Such people are Mwangi’s “lonely boys” and the silent, nameless and faceless ones. In
the urban Mwangi novel, they are street boys and beggars, “chupa na debe” (mobile collectors
of recyclable items such a bottles and plastic containers), the trash merchant, illicit liquor
brewers, shoe-shiners, open air tailors and food peddlers, hawkers, taxi drivers, “jua kali”
artisans, “mama mboga,” (vegetable vendors) and the dark underworld of grime and crime.
These are the milling crowds in the streets who appeared in the MacDonald dispatch to London
as large numbers of disgruntled poor people that wanted to be given jobs, wages and land as soon
as Kenya became independent.
In that dispatch, MacDonald told London that such disenfranchised and powerless people
were envious of the rich who they saw driving around in large cars, buying big houses, and
purchasing extensive farms. Therefore, they were resentful and discontented. In the letter to
Kenyatta, Kairu, for instance, did not understand why some had to sell their labor while others
owned more extensive farms than they could put to use. For people like Kairu, the manner in
which the country was steeped in capitalism was synonymous with the lack of democracy. In his
eyes, Kenyatta’s government was constituted of hungry hyenas that did not remember their
children. What is more is that, such people like Kairu had nothing to lose or fear: in his letter, he
told the president that he was ready for both rebuke or death. MacDonald was correct to observe
that in the hands of the leading radical members of parliament and politicians like Odinga,
Kaggia and Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, men of the street were a tinderbox.
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J.M. Kariuki, in particular, deserves special mention both as the embodiment of the spirit
of Mau Mau after independence and as the voice of the poor in Kenyan national politics.158 JM
was a Mau Mau freedom fighter, the experience of which was the subject of his autobiography,
“Mau Mau” Detainee. In the book, JM wrote about what had moved him and others to join the
movement viz.– the conviction that a stable social order could not be built on the poverty of
millions. JM saw frustration born of poverty as the source of turmoil and violence.159 When the
book first came out in 1963, it had a triumphant ring of hope that rose above the lucid and
restrained tone of its rendering.160 Further, it resonated with the colonial experiences of most
Kenyans across ethnic lines. From “Mau Mau” Detainee emerges a man who was imbued with
the consciousness and understanding that he was part of the spirit and legacy of the history of
resistance in Kenya.161 Even after independence, he emerged as the central figure in the
constellation of politicians, most of them backbenchers in parliament, who continued to talk
about rural and urban poverty and the plight of the marginalized majority in Kenya.
Consequently, Ngugi wa Thiong’o saw JM and his fate in 1975 as a key plank between
the pitfalls of postcolonial Kenya and those of the colonial era. His brand of politics was the
banner than carried the legacy and spirit of Mau Mau into post-independent Kenya. In his
speeches he raised issues of the dispossessed and discontented who, despite land resettlement
undertaken by the Kenyatta government, were still affected by the central economic problem of
land hunger. By so doing, JM was championing the very problems of poverty and dispossession,
which had rallied people around Mau Mau and against the British.162
In the early 1970s, JM led the charge against the small but powerful clique of greedy and
self-seeking elite made up of politicians, civil servants and businessmen who had monopolized
the fruits of independence. This criticism was encapsulated in the powerful imagery in his
famous statement: “We do not want a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars.” This
criticism went to the heart of the problem with the manner in which the social organization of
power and relations of production allowed the whole operation and machinery of power to be
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concentrated in the hands of the few. It also summed up the connection between the colonial and
the postcolonial.163 Such constant attack of the manner the small Kenyan elite ran the country,
blatant accumulation, amassment of wealth and attendant corruption won JM the hearts of former
freedom fighters and the nation at large. It made him the embodiment of the rising tide of
discontent and postcolonial dissent.
JM’s scathing denunciations of high level corruption struck a chord among people. This
was obvious even among foreign observers and analysts of national politics in Kenya. Around
the time when he emerged as the poor’s advocate in the early 1970s, the spirit of harambee that
Kenyatta symbolized in the heady years after independence had already given way to an
unprincipled scramble for power and riches among the new ruling class and surly, discontented
rumblings among the people. As another MP put it in 1972: “There is a wholesale grabbing of
money in Kenya…. These big men steal public funds, and they have friends of influence, and
they get away with it.”164 This was happening at a time ordinary people were hurting as a result
of the rise in the cost of living.
The minimum wage in towns in 1973 had remained pegged to the 1967 cost of living
figures, yet, according to veteran trade unionist Dennis Akumu, it had risen by 40% since then
excluding the rent element. Moreover, as a result of city council rent increases and the rise in bus
fares, the “wananchi” were hit hard. On top of this, the price of bread was going up by 2nd
September 1973 and that of milk later in the month. Akumu mirrored the opinion of most people
in finding the government reaction to this disappointing. Ordinary wananchi blamed the
government in general and Kenyatta’s Minister of Finance, Mwai Kibaki, in particular for not
having done anything to curb rising prices and exploitation by unscrupulous traders. Although,
diplomats at the British High Commission feared that this discontent among ordinary people
consisted a widespread threat in the unions or a serious political factor, the few elite it
interviewed did see them as a serious threat.165
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British diplomats, however, had a good reason to worry in the form of an anonymous
“Letter to the Wananchi” that was forwarded to Information Research Department of the FCO
for analysis. It was received at the British High Commission in Nairobi sometime in the second
half on 1973. It was addressed to the editors of the Daily & Sunday Telegraph who were
believed to have the only original copy with the high commission having received only a carbon
copy. It would later emerge that copies of the same letter, which was described by one diplomat
as a skilled production, were being mailed from Copenhagen to random addresses, for example a
shoe store in Mombasa.166 The Letter to the Wananchi, which was written by the Kenya
“Revolutionary Army,” threatened a “mass massacre in Kenya” at an undisclosed time in the
future that would target the president and some of the members of his cabinet including Njoroge
Mungai, Mwai Kibaki and Daniel Moi among others. According to the Revolutionary Army,
they were slated for execution since they had all sold out to the British, other European countries
and Asians. The letter picked out Kenyatta and Mungai and their supporters whom they accused
for the “death of freedom fighters and, as such, would be tried as war criminals. It went on to say
that “all big Kikuyus in the Government” were war criminals. Further, once the Revolutionary
Army was in power, all agreements with foreign governments would be repudiated, the
constitution suspended, and Kenyan citizenship stripped from all Europeans in Kenya. The
constitution of Kenya, the letter said, was “a pure British paper.” It advised foreigners who had
come to Kenya after independence to leave and invited them to remember the fate of the Ruck
family and the Lari massacre, which were brutal murders at the height of the Mau Mau war.167
Moreover, the letter stated that Africans in Kenya would not allow a small group of
people to impose themselves by shutting the mouths of the opposition, detention without trial
and the imprisonment of those who openly expressed their political views. Kenyatta was a tyrant
and was a traitor together with his small group of followers. Kenyatta, it added, switched his
stance and joined Europeans, Asians and Africans who had fought the struggle for freedom. He
had brought back British colonial rule with an African stamp on it yet Kenyatta had been
entrusted with leadership of Kenya with the expectation that he would bring about revolutionary
changes. Instead he accepted bribery from the British government and white settlers and Asians.
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It noted that Kenya had a military agreement with Britain and the country, therefore, continued
to be under the colonial yoke. The Revolutionary Army reminded Kenyatta that independence
was achieved by Africans and not by him as he was wont to claim. In fact, Kenyatta had done
nothing. The letter claimed that on 20th October 1952, more than 500 leaders were arrested and
350,000 freedom fighters lost their lives in Kenya’s independence war.
The army’s stated aims and reforms included removing loyalists and their sons and
daughters from the national and local government; releasing all political detainees; confiscating
Kikuyu home guard properties and restoration of those lost by freedom fighters including land;
honoring and rewarding heroes of the independence struggle and compensating them for
sacrifices made during the Mau Mau war.168 The group was railing at what they saw as the
perpetuation of the corrupt colonial system founded as it was on criminal but “legal” and unjust
foundations. It did not help much that the Kenyatta government was also perceived by many to
be corrupt due to several allegations of grand profiteering and pilfering of state coffers.169 One of
the most outspoken critics of the government, JM, who was also the face of popular forces from
below, disappeared mysteriously, and later was found dead under highly suspicious
circumstances.

JM’s Demise at the Altar of Graft
Grassroots support for President Kenyatta and his government had sunk to unprecedented
depths as the letter from the Wananchi Revolutionary Army attests. While this “anonymous”
letter threatened radical action of military nature, the high cost of living hit many ordinary people
hard and was experienced widely. The Kenyan economy in the early 1970s was poor, which
significantly added to the resentments of many workers whose wages were increasingly falling
behind the rises in the cost of living while the rich and powerful continued to prosper.170 As a
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result, such feeling of discontent was widely shared across the country. However, the well to do
could rest in the safety that at least some of the discontented people could help themselves
because small scale corruption would become an accepted way of life but, fortunately, still far
less than in many other countries. Moreover, most people were not ambitious for wealth or
power. They simply wanted to live reasonably well in a state which they considered due to them.
They could still grumble when others continued to amass wealth but they would not be driven to
the sort of despair that inspired revolutions unless this process was clearly connected and seen as
being responsible for worsening their own lot.171
Nevertheless, one thing could not be taken for granted. While Kenyatta’s fortunes were
waning, the popularity of JM was ever on the rise from the beginning of the 1970s. During this
time, Antony Duff, the British High Commissioner, described JM, then an assistant minister for
tourism, as a politician of boundless energy and formidable charisma for the simple people of all
tribes. Duff saw JM as a man who, “undoubtedly,” aspired to the presidency. It was believed that
JM’s popularity in the army was such that Kenyatta could not hope to survive if he dissolved
parliament and attempted to rule with army support.172 Further, he pointed out that JM was one
of the very few Kikuyu other than Kenyatta himself who could work outside tribal boundaries.
However, because of his radical, if not yet militant, stance on the gap between the haves and the
have-nots, Duff thought that JM was some sort of a “rogue politician” with “muddled ideas” and,
as such, a professional enfant terrible.173 The politician’s sudden demise under highly suspicious
circumstances is testimony that JM was seen as an irritant by others apart from the British High
Commissioner especially considering his constant attacks on high-level corruption and populist
advocacy for the down trodden.
The politician’s “mysterious” disappearance and confirmation of his assassination soon
after, early in March 1975, came close at the heels of unusual events in the country’s history and
what was, perhaps, one of the greatest corruption scandals of the Kenyatta era. As earlier noted
above, the difficult economic situation in the early 1970s, and especially in 1973, was
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pressing.174 This is the background against which the Letter to the Wananchi should be seen.
According to Antony Duff, Kenya’s difficulties increased even more in 1974 but, in his view, the
country remained one of the most stable and prosperous countries in Africa in a year that many
countries fared much worse. However, the country’s problems were pressing in, and far from
setting out to confront them, Kenyatta’s government allowed itself to drift and, moreover, did
nothing to check the frightening speed with which greed and corruption were spreading through
its own ranks and through the establishment as a whole. While most Kenyans were proud of
what they had achieved since independence and wanted to build steadily on this, the government
was yet to give a clearer lead for the future especially with regard to the question of how
prosperity could be achieved for the benefit of all. If this state of affairs continued, the more the
revolutionary attitude would continue to gain ground.175
In London, Duff’s assessment was met with cynicism and criticism. For example, a
senior diplomat at the East Africa Desk of the FCO, Desmond Wigan, countered that in a year
when strikes were banned, the university closed for two long periods and parliament prorogued
indefinitely and without explanation on the day it was assembled –and even critically, without
passing the Finance Bill- Duff’s analysis seemed to be “a strange assertion.”176 Moreover, there
were other worrying events and trends that had taken place in the course of the year including
government taking over the control of maize distribution, devaluation of the Kenya shilling and
university riots in April and August. The effect was that the public attitude toward the president
continued to cool. Kenyatta’s speeches were increasingly backward looking and struck even less
response from the crowds than they had done in 1973.
It is worth noting that before Kenyatta Day celebrations in October 1973, Vice-president
Daniel arap Moi had organized, through a parliamentary motion, for demonstrations of loyalty to
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take place on the material day. This was as a result of growing apathy and lack of interest in such
political events from ordinary people: pre-event public rallies were designed to serve the
complementary roles of a demonstration of loyalty and act as an insurance against
demonstrations of apathy as well as securing a good turnout at the national event presided over
by Kenyatta. During the course of the speech at Uhuru Park, Kenyatta dwelled upon recurrent
themes such as national unity and stability. In his Swahili speech, he attacked critics citing
government achievements like government’s announcement for incentives for farmers in the
shape of raising wheat prices per bag. Hall, a British diplomat saw this as something which was
no doubt also calculated to incentivize himself as a wheat farmer. Soon, in the course of his
speech, the president started to repeat himself. At this point some dissident members of
parliament at the back of the dais started to stream out. According to Hall, it was misadvised to
hope that the same old dialogue formed from, more or less, the same old speech could captivate
his audience. By the 1970s, this old repertoire must have been suffering from over exposure.177
This was exacerbated by increasing understanding of Kenyatta’s failing abilities and awareness
of his acquisitiveness and that of his family. Respect and affection was not entirely diminished
amongst the populace as a whole, but they were weakening and the process was accelerated by
the strong criticism that was being expressed more and more freely in private by educated
Kenyans.178 By this time people in Kenya were literally wanted something new in the form of a
break from difficult hard times: something that was affordable and ease their lives.
Yet, there was no reprieve. General malaise at the top and the self-seeking of the
privileged few continued. In British diplomatic circles, it was feared that this state of affairs
could lead to the breaking of the storm as the mass of Kenyans, who witnessed rampant
corruption at the top, continued to be asked to await the less attractive economic future that
appeared to wait for them. As a result, objective observers of the situation in Kenya were struck
by a feeling of disquiet.179 At the beginning of 1975, this concern was heightened by a series of
unusual violent events. The year had started with JM Kariuki and his friends stepping up their
criticism of the government. JM continued to draw public attention to the increasing gap between
the rich and the poor and to excessive land acquisition by individuals. He even went further to
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advocate for reform, efforts which attracted support in many quarters. Although the president
responded with counterattack, he was finding it increasingly difficult to control the National
Assembly, which was influenced by the dissidents led by Martin Shikuku and Marie Jean
Seroney. In February for example, two bombs exploded in Nairobi: one went off at the Starlight
Club on 16th and the second one at a tourist bureau near the Hilton Hotel four three days later. As
the second bomb went off, JM was making a major policy speech in the national assembly.
Around the same time, the president’s seven hundred acres of wheat in Rongai went up in flames
and some of his cattle were killed. On 1st March, 26 people died in a third bomb explosion at a
Nairobi bus station. A few days later, on 6th March, a train derailed on the Mombasa-Nairobi
track at Voi an act that was believed to be sabotage.180
These events took place against the background of rising discontent and government
criticism, a political storm that many feared would break into an active subversion leading to a
revolutionary situation before long.181 The situation was such that even the British High
Commission toyed with the idea of intervening. Some diplomats contemplated possible ways of
trying to persuade Kenyatta directly or indirectly that the self-seeking of the privileged few was
in danger of creating serious tensions in the country.182 There was no organized movement as a
result of discontent, but there were military elements, communist sympathizers and disaffected
Kikuyu, among them former Mau Mau, who felt that they still had not had their dues. The root
cause of these incidents was seen as internal dissatisfaction especially emanating from Kikuyu
discontent. It was thus expected that the government would find itself facing growing difficulty
not only from the usual critics but also from an increasing section of the population as a
whole.183
The bomb attacks were accompanied by a widespread antigovernment leaflet campaign,
which was soon blamed on a clandestine group, the Maskini Liberation Organization a.k.a, The
Wananchi, constituting ex-Mau Mau, university students, unemployed workers and landless
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peasants, and by extension JM, implicitly. Although the Maskini Liberation Organization was
not believed to exist or known to have publicized its aims, it was believed to be an attempt at
freeing the poor from their poverty.184 While JM was hardly directly connected with the said
“terrorists,” if indeed they existed, it was his constant criticism summed up in his warning that
Kenya could end up as a country of ten millionaires and ten million beggars that did.185 Some of
the leaflets, which were being distributed in bars in Nyeri District, called for the assassination of
the president and Mbiu Koinange.186 On 2nd March, JM was trailed and picked up by, among
others, a senior member of the security apparatus and a few weeks later, his badly mutilated body
was found and identified.
JM’s assassination served to add fuel to the flames that were raging in 1975. University
students from the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University College went on a rampage to
protest JM’s murder. Lectures were cancelled as students staged minor demonstrations. By so
doing, they gave expression to the mood of defiance in the country at the time of his death.
British Imperialist Forces Out!,” shouted students of the University of Nairobi. They denounced
lies and sang poems to the continuing struggle voicing their determination to take up the fallen
sword of JM. They pledged themselves to continue the struggle against inequalities in Kenya.187
Expressing solidarity with parliament and condemning JM’s murder, the University Guardian,
called for the resignation of the government. This document accused Kenyatta, whom they
referred as The Monarch, of receiving 70 million Ksh/- as compensation from the British for the
time he had served in prison. They saw this as part of the reason why the president had no mercy
for former detainees and “our man J.M.” The University Guardian saluted, Total solidarity!
Power to the people! Down with oppression!188
By April, it was clear to some observers that it seemed that the president had lost the will
to govern and it was feared that it was only a matter of time before the establishment collapsed.
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The consequences of JM’s assassination were rising tensions in the country, especially in
Nyandarua from where he hailed, Nairobi and Nyeri. The people most affected by his demise
were the underprivileged in society from all communities in Kenya who regarded JM, in some
sense, as a champion of their rights who was prepared to challenge the establishment openly.
Another section that affected was non-Kiambu Kikuyu who were now more aware that Kiambu
Kikuyu were determined to prevent any rivals building up a position from which their political
dominance could be challenged.189
In spite of open displeasure with the government, the Special Branch fed the president
false information about the feeling of the “wananchi” both within and outside Nairobi: that all
was well and that people were angry with other politicians for causing unrest in the country. The
truth of the matter, however, was that the people were angry with the president, which was a
potential source of serious trouble.190 According to rumors that did rounds in Nairobi, when Moi,
on behalf of the government, tried to speak about the feeling of the people and the gap between
them and the government, Kenyatta had stopped him at once and told him that no one could tell
him about the “wananchi.” Kenyatta told his vice-president that the “wananchi” supported his
government. At the cabinet meeting where the exchange had taken place, everyone else had sat
on their hands in gloomy silence. By some curious process of old age, the president had
convinced himself that he was in touch with the public feeling and that all was well.191 It was
clear to most observers, however, that the remarkable stability that the president had managed to
superimpose on Kenya since independence was already breaking up especially over the crisis
over the unexplained murder of JM, which was only one facet of the deepening chaos. Instead of
addressing the root causes of growing discontent, Kenyatta’s able, and mainly Kikuyu, ministers
stifled them.192
For example, a leaflet written by “Ex-Freedom Fighters” with an angry tone surfaced in
Nyeri at the end of March. It urged the people of Nyeri and Kenya to ponder and think more
critically about the gangsters in power who had killed JM and wanted to cling onto power at all
costs. They said that the people in power had driven the country into the open hands of Britain.
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Further, the writers of the letter said that this group of people would steal money and bank it in
Europe where they would run if things ran out of hand leaving the country in trouble. These
people talked and sang “harambee,” which meant stifling opposition and criticism directed at it.
The short history of independence after the British “left” only proved that they were “doublefaced turn coats.”193 They singled Kenyatta out and they called him “a money maniac …a
criminal …a gambler…a leader to darkness and death.” The ex-freedom fighters went on to say
that JM had been killed because he was from Nyeri. People from the region were, therefore,
insecure as long as “Kamau and Kissinger” remained in power: the letter hailed, out with traitors
and renegades of independence!194 The freedom fighters had resolved to denounce Kenya’s “socalled ‘independence’” and start fighting again in the streets and farms attacking all foreign
troops stationed in Nyandarua and Mt. Kenya. Secondly, all employed people, farmers and
workers in offices were called upon to go on strike. After all, “Kamau” had done nothing for
them except selling them.195
Just before he met his death, JM was at the center of one of the greatest corruption
scandals of the Kenyatta regime. Just days after the politician disappeared, on 5th March, customs
officials at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport confiscated up to 4,000 kilograms of an
ivory shipment worth $140,000 due to be flown to Hong Kong. Due to the relentless attrition of
the Kenyan jumbo, a group of white conservationists commissioned a private investigation,
which was done by Ian Parker who was known for his passion for the protection of elephants.
Parker launched into the investigation with great relish. Casting his net wide, Parker analyzed
East African and Hong Kong custom excise departments in an illegal poaching, ivory export and
corruption network that also involved people in Europe. He estimated that the Kenyan
government might have suffered a monetary loss during the years 1962 to 1973 of some £12. In a
detailed report, Parker implicated several members of the Kenyatta family, Dr. Mungai, Paul
Ngei and the attorney general in the scheme.196
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This was a damning and authoritative document bearing statistics that left little room for
argument for those mentioned in the ivory smuggling and export in Kenya. The circulation of the
Ian Parker Report in Kenya was kept very tight and the government and British diplomatic
circles hoped that there would be no intentional leaks to the press.197 However, foreseeing
attempts to kill the story, Parker placed a detailed copy of the report in the safe of a prominent
Kenyan businessman, probably Tony Dyer.198 Parker also tipped the Los Angeles Times, which,
aware that their circulation in Kenya was limited, shared the story with The Observer of
London.199 There were only two copies of the report in Kenya: apart from the Dyer copy, one
had been given by Parker to the head of the Special Branch, James Kanyotu to deliver to the
president.200 However, the existence of the report was fairy widely known in influential circles in
the country. For example, JM and Bruce McKenzie both knew about it. Officials at the British
High Commission also had reason to believe that the US Embassy had, in fact, leaked
information about the existence of the report.201 The report that showed the way corruption
started at the top and what Tinker called, the Kenyatta Royal Family, contributed to the uneasy
state in Kenya at the beginning of 1975.
In August 1975, The Sunday Times ran a critical trilogy of articles entitled, “Kenya on the
Brink,” that were a vicious attack on perceived corruption of Kenyatta and the so-called, “Royal
Family,” almost opening a diplomatic row between Kenya and Britain. The articles simply
spelled out what many people in Kenya had been saying for some time though with additional
detail. The first article of the trilogy implicated Koinange in an illegal land transfer. It alleged
that Agricultural Finance Corporation loan aid funds were being used by prominent people to
obtain mortgages with which to buy British mixed farms.202 In addition, the articles revisited the
subject of the involvement of Margaret and Ngina Kenyatta in the illegal export of ivory. When
the out-going British Commissioner, Antony Duff, went to Mombasa for his farewell interview
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with Kenyatta, he found James Kanyotu with the president who had in front of him two of the
Sunday Times articles. Kenyatta dismissed the articles as nonsense, rubbish and “stupidities of
the press.”203 Although the government tried to confiscate copies of the offending newspaper, the
British High Commission received numerous requests for the article even as a brisk trade in
illicit copies sprung up. As a result, the articles became a major talking point in Kenya that
month.204
There were many rebuttals made on behalf of the president by senior members of the
Kenyan diplomatic corps. The Minister of foreign affairs for example, lashed out at those who
had written the “exaggerated articles.”205 An even more telling and fascinating one came from
the minister’s deputy, Mwamzandi, who said it was quite wrong that vicious attacks should be
made on Kenya and the head of state by foreigners. Mwamzandi had then reminded Mansfield
about the large amounts of land that was still in the hands of Europeans in Kenya.206 In a another
humoring rebuttal, an aide memoire prepared by the ministry argued that The Sunday Times had
chosen to exclude from the public eye that members of Kenyatta’s family tree were people of
humble beginnings who had had to “struggle hard, together with the rest of the population in
very difficult circumstances to emerge from the servitude of the past to lead a more dignified
life.”207
Further, it added that Kenyatta’s extended family had not had the privilege to inherit
accumulated wealth and titles or to enjoy exclusive education or automatic succession to the seat
of power, which was a thinly veiled slight of the British monarchy. The memoire concluded by
pointing out that the Kenyatta family was made up of ordinary people leading ordinary lives and
earning their living through hard work. As such, they were not an exceptional lot and certainly
not a Royal Family.208 Another senior officer from the ministry, L.O. Kibinge, told Mansfield
that it was preposterous that the Sunday Times articles had said nothing about Lord Delamere’s
vast acres or the unfair balance of trade between Kenya and the UK. In the letter detailing the
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conversation in which this matter had come up, the Assistant High Commissioner scribbled that
in terms of greed, the Kenyatta family was more uncontrollable Delamere to any reach.209 This
meant that unlike, the embodiment of white settler acquisitiveness, the greed of the Kenyatta
family was far much worse and unbridled.
The Sunday Times trilogy, however, was neither the first time, since JM’s death, that the
government and Kenyatta came under considerable attack over corruption charges nor was it the
last of the year. Indeed, it would seem that the elimination of JM had served to attract scrutiny
from both within and from the foreign press corp. For instance, Hart referred to new angles on
corruption that had been uncovered by three members of parliament who furnished him with the
details.210 A good example cited was the fact that corruption in agriculture was having grave
effects. Maize was rotting in storage in the western part of the country when people were
starving in Eastern Province. This was because the maize could not be moved in bulk without a
permit and permits could only be obtained corruptly. At the same time, maize prizes to the
producers were too low and farmers were going over to cash crops like coffee and pyrethrum
which were more profitable.211
At the same time, there was, in the same ministry, a big grading racket. It was caused by
the president’s insistence on getting a good price for his wheat. One of his ministers, Angaine,
was also said not to be willing to accept the true wheat grade. Angaine had sold some wheat
from his farms near Timau, which was graded III but he had demanded that it be graded as I.
While the Minister for Agriculture, Jeremiah Nyagah, had supported his grading officers in their
decisions, this was overruled by Angaine’s invocation of the president’s authority. This kind of
over-grading for big people meant that ordinary farmers received lower than justified grades to
compensate. This was certainly the case with regard to small scale pig farmers. The bacon and
pork factory at Uplands was in trouble over the same reason of over-grading. Big people got
grade I for their pigs while ordinary farmers got much lower grades. This caused many farmers,
particularly in Nyeri district, to get out of pig farming causing the factory to suffer from
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shortness of supply. The Kenya Meat Commission suffered for the same reason because there
was a lot of slaughtering of pigs and cattle outside proper channels as a result of corruption.212
To make matters even worse, there was a food racket at Kenyatta College that involved
Mama Ngina. Milk and vegetables had to be bought from her and sometimes the milk was
already skimmed. Indeed, more vegetables than were required were sent, and those members of
the college who dared complain were swiftly sacked. Such was the fate of Charles Rubia who,
although an assistant minister, was removed from the college board when he protested. Also
noted was Kenyatta’s habit of not paying bills, which affected among others, the East African
Power and Lighting and Benbros. Kenyatta did not pay for a large order from Benbros though he
had made a vague promise to discuss the debt with them. As a result, the Treasury had been
forced to compensate such firms out of public firms. There was also the well-known fact the
president used three hundred prison workers on his farms free of charge.213
In addition, casinos owned by Kenyatta or members of the family were also a problem.
One of the president’s sons, Peter Kenyatta, was a partner in an International Casino and his
father in the Casino de Paradise. Both were, allegedly, run by rival mafias: the son’s by the
Italian mafia and Kenyatta’s, by an American-Korean gangster. Hart concluded by saying that he
was of the impression that there were many previously profitable ventures that were being spoilt
by the greed of the Kenyattas and their associates, a situation that, in the main, could be
politically unsetting.214
High level government corruption was rife. John Keen who had been an assistant minister
for works in Kenyatta’s government, told a Reuters correspondent that he knew enough about
corruption to write a fourth article for the Sunday Times. In his former position, Keen had been
well placed to know what was going on in government circles. Keen said that the ministry of
works had a debt owing of 8 million shillings for work done on Kenyatta’s farms. This had been
on the books for three years but had been moved around to conceal it from public discovery.
Keen also added that 1.7 million Ksh/- of Treasury money had been spent by Kenyatta on his
Casino de Paradise. Further, Kenyatta had given three choice plots near the Stag Hotel to
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Mathenge, the Mayor and the town engineer. When the president had demanded them back after
trying to undo the agreement under which they had been transferred, Mathenge refused at which
point Kenyatta struck him with his walking staff in a fit of rage. Mathenge and others agreed to
transfer their plots and were given poorer ones in a back street for compensation. A bank
building started being built on the original plots soon after.215
The fact that the president, his family and their supporters were amassing some of the
best property and agricultural land was a matter of private and some public comment. The
president even went as far as putting pressure on foreign owned companies to employ his
relations in top jobs at inflated salaries.216 Udi Gecaga, the president’s close relation, was in a
stockbroking company in the city and also on the board of Lonrho, the latter position of which he
had secured through the application of Kenyatta’s influence. The owner of the stockbroking
company, Joseph Sebag, raised questions about Gecega’s external yen account since such
accounts were apparently rare, if not normally non-existent.217 Njoroge Mungai, another close
relative and a government minister, was said to have started private profit making clinics with
funds given in the USA to establish free clinic upon his return to Kenya from his studies
abroad.218
This state of affairs, when juxtaposed with Kenya’s disturbing economic trends and
social problems characterized by a population that was rising by an estimated rate of between
3.5% and 4.1% annually, created severe pressure in land, water, housing, education and
employment; an economic growth that that was being devoted to urban rather than rural areas;
and, as a result, with a mass population that still lived in villages with a low standard of living;
all problems of which were rendered both more serious and more urgent as a result of the
increase of oil prices and inflation in the developed world, makes for a grim contrast.219 On the
one hand were rural peasants and a wage earning sector that was pressing for higher wages to
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meet increasing prices and, on the other, a group of privileged few politicians, cabinet ministers
and civil servants who were far removed from the everyday realities and hardships of the people
whose welfare was their responsibility to oversee. The enjoyment of the fruits independence,
symbolized by the famous photograph of the Kenyatta, Tom Mboya and Kibaki victory-dance in
the streets, was experienced by only a few in Kenya. This is well-captured by the words of
Bertolt Brecht’s poem, A Worker Reads History: at whose expense was Kenya’s political and
economic elite’s victory dance? Kenya’s local and national politics can be explained in terms of
the arising tensions that were the result of continued socioeconomic inequalities, which were in
turn the manifestation of distorted power structure and relations that reached back to the colonial
era.

Conclusion: Mau Mau Bread and Circus Affair as a National Political Staple
The JM assassination in the mid-1970s was a poignant and significant moment in
Kenya’s history. An understanding the circumstance in which he was assassinated is
fundamental to comprehending distributive politics in both the colonial and postcolonial era. JM,
both with regard to local and national politics, was caught up in this crucible of tensions between
the haves and have-nots that had dominated in colonial and postcolonial politics in Kenya and
preoccupied the minds of many. Indeed, regardless of who was behind his elimination, his
demise can and should be seen as a sacrifice at the altar of a new and popular Kenyan state for
which many others since the dawn of British colonialism had dedicated their lives to. An
understanding of the circumstances surrounding his demise, therefore, presents a unique insight
into the nature of politics in the country.220 Besides the more popular explanation that JM was
killed by the “Kikuyu tough crowd” from Kiambu, it was his brand of politics, a scion from the
Mau Mau main stem, that so irritated the base of power which cost him his life. This can better
be appreciated by looking at his personal past, regional politics in Nyeri and how this dovetailed
with the national struggle that faced the majority of Kenyans.
As noted, JM was one of a very few former Mau Mau who rose to the heights of power
after independence. He was a particularly notable one considering his level of education, keen
powers of observation and eloquence. This history and stature did not endear him to some in
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Nyeri where JM had a huge following. His political adversary and contender for the
parliamentary seat there, Peter Nderi, was the son of colonial chief Nderi who had been executed
at the height of the Mau Mau war. One of his brothers, Ignatius Nderi, had been rising fast in the
police force since in 1968 when he was only an assistant superintendent. In fact, Nderi rose
through the ranks to become the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department. There was,
therefore, naturally, like in many locales around the country, bad blood between the Nderi
brothers and ex-Mau Maus like JM. Ignatius Nderi had a reputation, according to Nyeri locals, of
having been unhinged by his father’s death and of being very violent.221
Nyeri politics, which pitted former loyalists like the Nderis and supporters of Mau Mau
reflected the old primary hallmark of Kikuyu politics since the awakening of the community’s
political consciousness especially in the third decade of the 20th century. This central distinction
and conflict that, was at once both dynastic and generational, was aptly captured by Clough’s
book Fighting Two Sides.222 It is this characteristic of Kikuyu politics that marked the dividing
lines between loyalists and Mau Mau supporters and the attitude of which was carried down to
the murder of JM in 1975 in which it was believed Ignatius Nderi played a leading role.223 It is
this ghost of JM’s, and therefore Mau Mau, brand of politics that continued to dominate and
haunt Nyeri politics a few years after his death. It also cast a long shadow on Kenya’s
postcolonial political history. Local politics in Nyeri, in this sense, was a microcosm of national
politics as it represented the same division between the haves and the have-nots that caused
dissension in that region in 1952. This same divide was replicated and accentuated in national
politics posing a risk to national stability.224
It is, therefore, not only possible but also appropriate and important to cast these divisions
that existed within Nyeri society, historically, upon a wider national political purview. It
represented other Kikuyu regions like Murang’a and Kiambu, which, indeed, had more than “a
dynastic Montague versus Capulet” element.225 This societal tension and conflict was undulating
and was the experience of millions of Kenyans caught up in local and national electoral battles.
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Local politics dovetailed with national politics during electoral cycles that played on historical
feelings and played up divisions that ran equally deep. As such, it is quite impossible not to see
the wider divisions that spanned entire regions, provinces and the country at large. It is these
divisions that JM and his Nyeri followers, such as Waruru Kanja and Joseph Mungai, tapped
into. Indeed, these were same sentiments that had been previously exploited with marked success
by Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia who had taken the side of the majority against the more
privileged minority. Thus, on the one hand, Kenyan politics could be seen as a dynastic, factional
and even generational game.226
This view of Kenyan politics takes cognizance of the vast crowd of virtual spectators who
threatened, time and again, and especially in the early and mid-1970s, to leap over the barriers
and invade the pitch as they were encouraged and invited to do frequently by their wilder spirits
among the players. Such people not only included radical politicians but also writers such as
Ngugi wa Thiong’o. Such folk were perceived as inciting the crowd in this manner. Ngugi was
feared to do so through his books and plays, which explains why he was detained, in January
1978, by Kenyatta. His novel, Petals of Blood, which had just been published, was thought to be
able to inspire a future revolution. According to some, it described Kenya’s history in Marxist
terms and ended with a revolution against the established system. The government was
“fortunate” that the novel’s Kikuyu setting could very well mitigate its effect on other tribes.227
The irony of the said government “fortune” cannot be missed when one considers the fact that
Kenya’s national politics was, and still is, Kikuyu or local politics writ large.
The political awareness of the crowd, and the inherent explosive potential of mentalité,
was appreciated by Kenyatta’s attorney general who, speaking at the Royal Commonwealth
Society, made it plain that people like Ngugi wa Thiong’o belonged in jail. According to Hart,
Charles Njonjo may have as well added that such “dangerous agitators” would be killed as was
Kariuki because their detention was regarded politically impossible. But the main point is that
Njonjo was under no illusions about the dangers of the crowd joining in.228 Anyone who knew
Kenya then, or purports to do so now, would do well to acknowledge and grasp the same fact. It
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is not important to establish whether or not the Maskini Liberation Organization was a real
movement of the discontented.
By the same token, it matters little if this was the government’s bogeyman to instill fear
among the people. The bottom-line, and the political lesson that it underlined, as Njonjo’s
announcement made clear, was that there was palpable crowd-phobia among the ruling elite.
Overall, it suffices to observe that this fear, that reigned supreme since the early 1950s,
confirmed that the central fact of Kenyan politics was, and still is, the struggle for everyday
bread and butter among ordinary people. Ironically, this fact of Kenyan politics is what then
enables the leadership to win and retain the support of the potential mob. By so doing, the vision
of the poor crowd, the Mau Mau minds of 1952, on the destiny of Kenya, was, and continues to
be, effectively checkmated. Otherwise, there existed, and still exists, in Kenya, a potentially
explosive situation.
This, then, has been the victory dance of the elite few: the triumph of the ideology of
“law and order” over the exasperated popular vision of Kenyan statehood that ordinary people
aspire to from below. With this triumph, the less-than-satisfactory power relations and
experiential drudgery of yesteryears became a fossilized element and fixture of politics in Kenya.
So was popular dissent that traced its roots to the 1950s and beyond: the spirit of Mau Mau lived,
and continues to live, underground in Kenya’s political soil.
Even Sir Evelyn Baring, in 1969 admitted in an interview that the Mau Mau war was
motivated by psychological grievances. In effect, that the movement and what it represented was
very thrusting. The people behind it were ambitious. They were up against Nairobi with all its
wealth and luxury. These, by their views, fruits of modernity and independence from which they
felt cut out. Baring pointed to the glaring fact that as long as there was a visible permanent
European population in Kenya, people never believed they could ever get independence.229 This
attitude among Kenyans, in view of the foregoing, did not change much even after independence.
Whereas Baring had overseen a comprehensive and expensive agricultural reform of land
consolidation that also included the introduction of cash-crop farming, irrigation farming and
European-type cattle for Africans for the first time, changes that were complimented by political
229
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rights and privileges and upon which the independence government whose centerpiece was the
Million Acre Scheme, built a vast swath of the people in Kenya remained landless, unemployed,
and poor.
Thus, while Baring among many other people in Kenya and Britain expected Kenya at
the end of the Mau Mau trouble to be a very different place from what it was before they ever
started, the country more or less, even after independence, was not different enough for and to
all. Even independence and an African-led government had not brought the kind of striking
changes that most ordinary people had hoped for. As such, the Mau Mau struggle was still on: it
was not yet “uhuru.” Not with Kenyatta and, after the first president died in 1978. Not even
under Kenya’s second President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, going forward.
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Chapter VI - Matigari ma Njirungi: Bifurcation,
Atomization and Survival of the Mentalité of
Struggle

Preamble: From Mau Mau to Mungiki –
The Mungiki movement and sect has its origins in the early 1980s. It emerged to protect the
interests of farmers in Central and the Rift Valley Provinces. It was also an expression of
discontent with the manner in which the parents of the sect’s young members were treated by
Jomo Kenyatta even after they had made enormous sacrifices in the struggle for uhuru. It is for
this reason that the movement referred themselves as Matigari ma Njirungi. That is, the heirremnants of Kenya’s freedom fighters.
Peter Mwai (translated and paraphrased), “Maelezo Kuhusu Asili ya Mungiki,”Taifa Leo, 6th March,
2009.1*

1

*This Swahili title loosely translates thus: “Origins of the Mungiki Sect.”
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Introduction
This chapter concerns itself with a discussion of discontent and dissent in the Moi years
between 1978 and 2002 against the background of worsening economic difficulties; the
disastrous drought of 1984; and increasing political problems. It argues that the locus of
grassroots resistance against the Kenyan state shifted from the out-spoken criticism of the
government to discrete expression of opposition by elite embodied by public intellectuals at
universities, church leadership and a young crop of politicians and professionals in Nairobi
especially after the attempted coup of 1982 by the Kenya Air Force. It points out that after this
abortive coup, President Daniel arap Moi sought to mute all forms of dissent with relative
success. This discussion asserts that despite constant and deliberate attempts to atomize all
opposition, the mentalité of struggle prevailed. This “matigari” (remnant) of the Mau Mau spirit
of struggle inaugurated by various anti-colonial, contra-state control and anti-status quo
movements before and after independence, was carried on and dominated by underground
movements such as Umoja and Mwakenya and equally, quite literally, found expression in song
between the mid and late 1980s. Church leaders played a particularly significant role especially
towards the end of the 1980s and thereafter, which needs close attention. This persistence of
public criticism of, and struggle against, the state paved the way to the heated and open clamor
for multipartism and call for democratic reforms in the early 1990s.
This struggle, covering the Moi years, is the core subject of this chapter that is organized
in three overarching sections. The first broad section discusses and lays out the political and
economic situation when Moi ascended into power in 1978, his brand of politics and political
philosophy. The second analyzes political dissent between 1980 and 1992. The last focuses on
“matigari ma njirungi” or isolated and muffled voices following the near-successful muzzling
and bifurcation of progressive forces in Kenyan politics from the mid-1990s to 30th December
2002, when Moi left office. Besides underground dissent and the role of pulpit in the 1980s, a
discussion of the symbolic silent protest of coffee farmers who cut their trees during in the
1990s, is attempted. Put differently, this chapter introduces a period of Kenyan political history
characterized by either organic bifurcation or forced atomization of dissent in the country during
the Moi era, which is discussed further in the next chapter.
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As noted above, to fully appreciate how or why dissent was forced underground in the
1980s or the emergence of bifurcated political and workers’ opposition of the post-1990s, there
is need to preface the above discussion with the following: one, the state of the national economy
during Kenyatta’s twilight years and Moi’s early days; his populism encapsulated by his political
slogan Fuata Nyayo and political philosophy of Love, Peace and Unity; the impact of the
drought of 1984 on the country’s collective psyche; and the intellectual debate around the topic
of what was happening to the Kenyan peasantry that was led by radical intellectuals such as
Mukaru Ng’ang’a, Apollo Njonjo and Anyang Nyong’o in the early 1980s.

Moi –early days: the political and economic situation
When Daniel Arap Moi ascended to the helm of power, most people in Kenya greeted his
presidency with a kind of spontaneous enthusiasm that contrasted sharply with the regimented
respect that used to greet Kenyatta. Partly, this public acclaim is explained by the general
welcome of the change of guard but, more so, as a protest, to some extent, against the Kenyatta
legacy of the betrayal of post-independence rather than, necessarily, a positive expression of love
and approval for the new president.2
For some, Moi seemed to exude a less forbidding charisma than Kenyatta. For other
observers yet, he had none at all. But he cut the image of a brother to Kenyans where Kenyatta
was a father and, towards the end, that of an apparently benevolent grandfather. While
Kenyatta’s Swahili and Kikuyu speeches were sometimes almost gibberish, he had delivered
them with a spellbinding cadence and style especially when his blood was up. On the other hand,
Moi’s speeches were said to be as attractive as the barking of a large woolly dog, honest, and
gruff but not in any way charismatic. Moi, therefore, lacked the aura that surrounded Kenyatta as
freedom-fighter and founding father. He also had nothing of his predecessor’s education or
sophistication.3 His manner and bearing was described as dignified and Moi, certainly, looked
presidential even if he did not sound the part of president.4

2

Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners in Kenya (CRPPK), Repression Intensifies in Kenya Since the
August 1st Coup Attempt (London: Rye Express, 1983) 18-19; also see Norman Miller and Rodger Yeager, Kenya:
The Quest for Prosperity (Westview Press: Boulder, 1994), 98, who observe that the first five years of the Moi
presidency encompassed a period of relative goodwill.
3
Galia Sabar, Church State and Society in Kenya: From Mediation to Opposition, 1963-1993 (London: Frank Cass
& Co. Ltd., 2002), 177.
4
Christopher T. Hart to Anthony J. Longrigg, 15th March 1979, BNA: FCO 31/2557.

279

A populist from the first instance, Moi liked how Kenyans responded to his new
leadership during the early days of his presidency when he dashed around the country with
restless energy.5 In his speeches, Moi demonstrated that he understood that Kenyan politics had
increasingly become a bread and circus affair. He, therefore, made populist pronouncements in
his bid to strive to retain the support of the potential mob.6 Thus, it was clear to the new
president that it was most crucial for him to be seen to be standing with the public and their
political leaders.7 Instincts of self-preservation also caused the various ethnic political elite in
general, and specifically the Kikuyu, to extend him support because they foresaw what could
happen if his presidency failed. The political class understood that such failure would ensure that
the vision of the poor have-nots, the 1950s mob, would at last triumph.8
Nevertheless, this honeymoon period was declared over by the Weekly Review not so
long thereafter. An article published by the authoritative news magazine noted that the economic
difficulties that were facing the country were beginning to hurt Kenyans as early as the
beginning of 1979. Luckily for the new president, his political popularity had not yet diminished
downwards. After all, most Kenyans, particularly the poorer ones, still regarded the president
with marked affection. This favorable public perception that Moi enjoyed was based on the
conviction among ordinary Kenyans that he was doing his best in difficult circumstances, and
therefore, deserved the benefit of doubt. According to some observers, this trust was based as
much on a superfice as on substance but was, nonetheless, important.9 The general political
attitude in Kenya was optimistic in the initial months of his rule. Kenyans showed little interest
in a political debate built on issues. Rather, they wanted leaders in parliament, or better still in
the cabinet, who would see that their ethnic regions got their full share of the national cake,
particularly the development of water, roads, electricity and social projects that could transform
their everyday lives.10
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This sort of expectation, mixed with Moi’s brand of populist politics, worked wonders as
people clung to the promise of hope for better times ahead. One of the people initially impressed
by this populism in as far as it targeted corruption was Koigi Wamwere, a dissident thorn on the
side of the previous Kenyatta regime, who president Moi had just released from detention.
Wamwere is reported to have said, “It is now our hope that all the powerful and the rich
individuals who have been elevated above the law will now be subjected to justice.”11 This praise
came to Moi even before he had shown any indication to move against some of those who had
been closest to Kenyatta personally. As such, Kenyatta’s family eventually escaped prosecution
for their former malpractices.12
But as heady as these early days, weeks and months were, the strong political medicine
that was Moi’s brand of politics begun to wear off as tough economic times soon hit Kenya hard.
The country was still faced by more basic challenges of sustaining real economic growth in the
face of a population explosion; corruption was still a problem with the Harambee system
encouraging practices that had dangers; and the level of consumer prices in Nairobi went up by
8.4% in 1979, which was, however, a lower rate than in the previous year when they had been
12.3%. These rises were sharpest for those of the upper income groups, with the price of fuel,
electricity and transport services increasing by more than the average. In rural areas where most
Kenyans still lived, prices rose more rapidly, perhaps indicating a less efficient trading system
there. Indeed, between 1978 and 1979 there was a deepening economic recession that was
accompanied by increasing illicit economic activity that became commonplace and official
corruption proliferated.13
Worse still, 1980 opened inauspiciously for Kenya’s new government with a combination
of shortages of basic cereal foods that went unalleviated in most urban areas and repeated power
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cuts principally affecting the manufacturing and industrial sectors as well as tourism to some
extent, all of which were sufficiently damaging in and of themselves.14 During the first half of
the 1980s, coffee and tea prices on the world market were falling, manufacturing and tourism, no
less due to the energy crisis, had slowed, and there was a maize shortage to boot. Moreover,
during 1980 the country registered an economic growth rate of less than 4 percent. The official
index of consumer prices rose, over the first three months of 1980, at an annual rate of 23%,
11%, and 16% for the Nairobi lower, middle and upper income groups, respectively, with the
sharpest increases again being for fuel, electricity and transportation. Official estimates quoted
the rate of inflation of 15% for 1980.15
For its part, the government continued to rely on price controls for a wide range of
consumer items considered necessities and there was continued debate about both the
effectiveness of these controls that, in some places led to a black market, and the way they were
administered, leading to some undesired market distortions. In particular, demand for milk and
milk products outstripped supply. Generally, the question of food became common with the
short-fall in harvest being shored up by emergency imports of grains and milk at a cost of £35
million that year alone. Indeed, the producer and retail prices of milk were increased by 42% and
23%, respectively in an attempt to alleviate the milk shortages. The economic picture would
grow even worse as retail prices rose dramatically affecting in addition to milk, fuel, sugar, rice
and meat. The cumulative effect of a worsening energy crisis, scarcity of foreign currency, rising
interest and food prices, inflation rates, mismanagement and blatant self-ingratiating graft was a
faltering ability of ordinary Kenyans to feed themselves.16
Further providing evidence that the country was going through a bad patch, the food
shortage became even more severe during 1980. Maize, the country’s staple food, was in short
supply with reports of some deaths from starvation in remote areas. It was clear to analysts and
observers that a large quantity of maize in the region of 300,000 tons had to be imported before
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the next maize crop was harvested in August and September of that year.17 The government was
not even certain whether the purchase of such a large supply of maize was possible but what was
certain was that there was going to be serious transportation and distribution problems. The
government responded to this crisis by explaining that the shortage had been caused by the
failure of the rains. In some circles, it was believed to have been actually man-made: that it arose
from errors in pricing policy following a previous maize glut, which gave few incentives to
farmers to plant. One of the effects of this food shortage was that the country experienced a
series of strikes and threatened strikes by doctors, students, bank employees, and even
professional musicians.18 For instance, there was student discontent with the catering
arrangements at the University of Nairobi, which was closed in March 1980 following riots in
the streets.19 Further, there were revelations about thefts of grain reserves and evidence of serious
mismanagement in the provision of agricultural credit, storage and transport.20 In some circles, it
was even alleged that the cause of the shortage of maize was as a result of highly placed officials
and ministers close to Moi illegally exporting maize supplies for personal gain.21
Moreover, the rationing of electricity supplies that started at the beginning of the month
of April was publicly attributed by the government to low water levels in the dams but it was
also thought to be partly due to inadequate maintenance of equipment together with silting up of
water dams caused by the failure to enforce soil erosion measures resulting in damage to water
turbines. The ultimate effect of the electricity cuts was a serious fall-off in production: according
to an estimate, this fall-off was as high as 30% and, in turn, it was expected to lead to further
shortages of local manufactures and the need for more imports at the end of 1980. This
electricity shortage was more serious on the coast where the tourism industry was concerned at
the large number of cancellations that had been received.22
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Rather than address these issues and explain them in an open way to wananchi,
government ministers and the president himself did not take the electorate into their confidence
on the shortages. It was even doubtful that ministers themselves were properly informed about
shortages, and, as a result, the government and the president lost credibility. Indeed, Moi first of
all said that there was actually no food shortage apart from that created by hoarders and
profiteers.23 Not too long after this assertion, however, he assured the nation that overseas
supplies would be brought to tide Kenya over until the next maize harvest. In his appeals for
further external help, Moi did recognize this as the way to break Kenya’s difficulties.24 In the
meantime, long maize queues in the capital city, Nairobi, continued. If there is one thing that
wananchi expected of a president, it was that he should not allow them to go hungry.25
While the issue festered, Moi was firmly in the saddle and had abandoned his cautious
approach to questions on ethnic arithmetic. The Kikuyus for their part were becoming resentful
of the way in which Moi was beginning to show favors to his own Kalenjin people with regard to
official appointments and land allocations. Suffice it to say that with regard to the performance
of the government in dealing with arising socio-economic problems or even explaining them
properly to the electorate, it was not impressive.26 Indeed, the country’s dire economic straits
were aggravated by inept government handling of the problems ranging from manifestly
misleading statements by the president himself through public quarrelling among senior
ministers to sudden arbitrary reversals of policy decisions notably about commodity and fare
prices.27 For this reason, foreign political observers were afraid that 1980 could well have been
the year marking the end of Kenya’s steady progress since independence, signaling a period of
stagnation characterized by a drop in general living standards and increase in internal
dissension.28 British diplomats in Nairobi and London were alive to the fact that what Moi saw
as foreign appeals to relieve economic hard times would ultimately not aid a recovery national
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economic recovery or the process of development, which the president described as essential for
national stability.29
If the government response was unimpressive, uncoordinated and a little more than
clumsy, officials were all but completely ignorant about the worrying economic situation. There
was some saving grace in that official thought was given to the government’s five-year
development plan, which these difficult times had slowed down. The Kenyan government
acknowledged the country’s economic difficulties and arising consequences, including that they
would seriously increase before they started waning; these would result to a fall in low but
slowly rising living standards and lead to increased unemployment.30 In the White Paper on
Economic Prospects and Policies (Sessional Paper No.4), which was published on 14th May
1980, was a succinct analysis of Kenya’s economic problems and guidelines for their remedy.
Even in diplomatic circles, Sessional Paper No.4 (1980) was thought to be encouraging for the
realism with which the country’s various problems were admitted and presented. Indeed, the
frankness with which they were given expression was unusual and indicative of a renewed
confidence within the government. What is more is that the paper was mercifully brief and
admirably clear.31
Thus, this fundamentally encouraging publication, with fortitudinous honesty, admitted a
whole range of government and national failures including reduced growth in the economy;
falling agricultural production vis-à-vis high population growth, increased unemployment; and
reduction in the share of the budget allocated to housing, social services, health, as well as the
agricultural sector. The paper noted that agricultural policy faced two important challenges, the
most immediate being to cope with an impending shortage of basic foods. The second and longterm challenge was to increase production and employment opportunities in agriculture in order
to meet the needs of the country’s rapidly growing population. Furthermore, the government
admitted that during 1980, domestic production of food would not meet all the country’s
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requirements for maize, wheat, rice, milk and meat. This was attributed to dry weather as the
main reason occasioning the shortage in production.32
All these were seen as potential areas of discontent and possibly even national instability.
But what served to either irk and bemuse or cause mirth in British diplomatic circles was that in
the section on Food Policy, the paper perpetuated the myth that drought was the basic cause of
food shortages. Whatever the case, this was seen to be as disappointing as it was false: the
British were gravely concerned and afraid that even prominent Kenyans could fall victim of their
own propaganda. An excellent example of government officials believing their own lies was that
of the permanent secretary of industry who felt it necessary to describe in some detail to Sir
Kenneth Clucas, who was the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Trade in the early years
of the Thatcher Government, the impact of inadequate rains in 1979: it was the sole cause of the
food shortage. This political refrain was easily dismissible, especially considering the fact that
1979 was a year of above average rainfall! The absence of commentary on the truly significant
causes of agricultural shortfalls deemed dismissively as “other contributory causes” such as
wrong pricing, failure to implement projects and even the change in farm tenure pattern was, for
Massingham, disappointing even ominous. Further, the report did not contain anything that was
surprising or new. What government officials like that permanent secretary had to say about the
economic situation in Kenya was, by 1980, a familiar litany to foreigners as well as to
Kenyans.33
Indeed, the report was somewhat a rehash of the Government Sessional Paper No.4 of
1975 which five years earlier announced the grim economic realities that Kenyans faced. Indeed,
this particular paper assumed a worrying tone of determinism about the country’s economic
prospects. It was also fateful. The paper, which appeared early that year, was founded on the
theme of the inevitability of adverse effects on the rate and pattern of the government’s planned
development and, thus, called attention to the need for a program of austerity more severe than
Kenya had yet experienced. For that reason, this particular paper outlined a strategy of a reduced
rate of development, which paled in comparison with the country’s previous high rate of
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expansion; curtailment of imports; promotion of exports; and restraint in wages and domestic
prices amongst other measures.34
Although with the same dark projection of Kenya’s future, the report of a commission
constituted by the European Economic Community on the Kenyan economy between 1979 and
June 1980 captured the accompanying sense of gloom. The report put literacy levels at 46%
(1976); life expectancy at birth at 51.2 for males and 55.7 for females (1977); and GDP per
capita of US $390.9 (1979). Further, 1979 showed an economic downturn after the relative
prosperity of the previous few years spurred by the coffee boom of the early 1970s. Although the
price of coffee turned upwards in the second half of 1979, the volume of production recorded a
fall. Tea, Kenya’s other main export, was produced in larger quantities, but sold cheaper. This
trend resulted in the strict implementation of measures taken at the end of 1978 to restrict
imports so as to restore a more desirable balance of trade. By December 1979 foreign exchange
reserves soared to 75 per cent higher than the previous year, which permitted a relaxation of
some of these import controls. Lack of agricultural incentives, however, resulted in much lower
production of some foods resulting to shortages of many basic foodstuffs. Overall, domestic and
external indicators for the second half of 1980, according to the Europeans, were discouraging.35
Although the outgoing British High Commissioner expected the International Monetary
Fund and IBRD to step in and save the day to enable Kenya to meet its economic needs and
secure national stability, Fingland was not as optimistic as the Nairobi group of European
commercial counselors. He expected the country to continue to face two difficult years ahead up
to 1983. In what would, in years to come, be a self-fulfilling prophetic observation confirmed,
Fingland also stated that a reduction of corrupt practices was an essential part of a much needed
improvement in administration, especially economic management if things were to be turned
around. Further, he viewed corruption as constituting a latent political time-bomb. As noted
earlier above, the steep dip in Kenya’s economic fortunes less than twenty years since Mau Mau,
and before its ghost was reckoned to be fully at rest, was a considerable cause for political
concern. The economic realities of the day and such gloomy predictions led to fear that the end
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of Kenya’s steady progress since independence and the beginning of a period of stagnation and a
drop in general living standards could easily usher in and increased the likelihood of, political
dissention.36
In fact, this level of political insight and acumen, which characterized the British
diplomatic corps analysis on the situation in Kenya, is not only impressive, but also with the
benefit of hindsight, of outstanding precision. In his valedictory dispatch in which he bid
farewell to Kenya, Fingland indicated that he did not think that the dire socio-economic
condition presented as great a challenge to Kenya’s future as did “a younger generation of
politicians” who would try “to break out of the KANU single-party mould.”37 The outgoing high
commissioner noted that at the time of Moi’s first elections, there wasn’t any cohesive group that
posed an open challenge to his government on such issues of policy or principle. This validates
the argument that Kenya’s national politics was, as in the Kenyatta years, Kikuyu or local
politics writ large. That is, it was a game characterized by dynastic, factional and even
generational politics that threatened to “destabilize” the country according to pro-status quo
forces.
Nonetheless, the president and his immediate colleagues seemed concerned that, in a new
parliament likely to have a substantially changed membership, there could be such possible
groups that would constitute focal points of political disharmony although not in the form of a
formal opposition or threat to his government’s prospects. Former nationalist leader, Oginga
Odinga and his supporters were thought to present such a threat. It was feared, both in British
diplomatic, and in Kenyan political, circles that he was a possible communist agent who could
become the focal point of dissent about Kenya’s economic system. If not that, it was feared that
Odinga could easily galvanize and exploit the Luo political anti-government sentiments.
Further, for this British diplomat, while economic problems and, therefore, systemic or
fundamental challenges presented, by far, Moi’s greatest long-term difficulty, the other attendant
and even greater challenge would come from a younger generation of politicians with more
radical aims sailing and dependent on a wave of populist appeal. These would try to break out of
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the KANU mould of enforced political unity under a single party without any ideological or
policy base. This, for Fingland, was even more likely as economic difficulties became direr.38
To weather the tough economic times and feared consequent national political instability
that tested the legitimacy and effectiveness of Moi’s government, the new president used various
devices. As noted above, the more the national problems mounted, the more personal pressure
the president must have felt, thus his need to wax lyrical taking his populism to dreamy heights.
In the face of pressing difficulties that must have occupied his waking and sleeping time in the
first few years, Moi, in a masterful stroke of political genius, coined the Nyayo philosophy and
slogan, which, with passage of time, he refined into the vision of a new Kenya guided by
elaborative pillars of love, peace and unity.
In addition, to be seen to drink what he preached and deliver to Kenyans his promised
political Canaan, Moi, from time to time, gave well-timed but unplanned, or ill-planned-for,
directives that surprised or shocked civil servants who scrambled and scrimmaged to implement
such sudden decrees. To deal with mounting criticism directed at how his young government was
managing Kenya’s economy and his poor record, Moi superficially announced or authorized the
introduction of measures designed to reinforce his political decision.39 These essentially populist
measures were not necessarily appropriate ones given the economic climate into which the
country was moving.
A good example was on 12th December 1979 when he decreed that paid employment
should be increased by 10%, a popular gesture that ignored, or could have exacerbated, the
generally unfavorable economic factors.40 As with similar promises, the danger always was that
the president raised people’s expectations beyond the government’s capacity to fulfill them. In
this instance, there were already about 118,000 applications that had been received by labor
offices for the “new jobs” announced. Obviously, many must have been disappointed, since the
most optimistic assessment at the time envisaged the creation of less than 60,000 new vacancies,
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of which at least 25,000 were in the already over-large, over-expensive and under-efficient
public sector.41
Further, as the president’s political spine firmed up, Moi begun to show signs of character
as he emerged as his own man and, thus, could no longer be regarded as a puppet. One of the
ways this manifested itself was Kalenjinization, a tendency that asserted itself notably with the
appointment of Shadrack Kimalel as high commissioner and J.M. Sawe as deputy to the army
commander and by J.K. Nzioka who was Kamba. In so doing, he overlooked many qualified
better candidates from other ethnic groups leading to a feeling of marginalization and
disaffection among them.42
In addition, Moi’s restlessness, as exhibited in his many travels, was an asset.
Domestically and abroad, he was seen as doing whatever was possible to alleviate the economic
hardships in person. Nevertheless, these travels, mostly, were seen as a negation of duty as the
accumulation and growth of problems piled up from the Kenyatta’s last years. Trips were seen as
delays tackling them, thus magnifying some of these problems, especially the economic and
social ones. At the same token, perhaps, Moi needed to regularly get away to temporarily ease
his mind, but the more time spent away abroad while problems increased and multiplied at home,
could only cause the country’s opinion of him to sour.43
Moreover, Moi’s government was pursuing a policy of rearmament at the expense of
economic reforms such as devaluation in the wake of economic hardships.44 To consolidate
political power and retain control of the state and apparatus of government to effectively keep
the lid on the potentially explosive situation, Moi strictly applied legislation restricting political
activity through police activity; using the threat of the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU)
or even the army; and by avoiding the exciting of the population either by government politicians
or their opponents. Some politicians, perceived to be “young upstart radicals,” like Martin
Shikuku, G.G Kariuki, George Anyona and Jean Marie Seroney, among others, were able to
break the rules as Odinga had before them.45 Considering these devices and strategies, it was
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clear that there was, in place, what was described by Hart as a hard but thin line of control. It
was, as such, probably unlikely that chaos could be prevented if this line was broken. This was
especially so in view of the new factor considered by observers to be the new source of potential
disquiet: the growing ability of the armed forces to seize power if civil control looked like
breaking down.46 Indeed, it was the Kenya Air Force branch of the armed forces that fired the
first warning salvo that announced that all was not well in Moi’s Kenya.

Flood Gates of New Dissent Open: The Attempted ‘82 Kenya Air Force
As noted above, the mood in Kenya, as captured by British diplomatic correspondence,
against a background of tough economic times and hardship was one of desperation tinged by
rising and palpable tensions. If foreign diplomats observed and described the situation as
“potentially explosive,” poor economic management and inefficient administration as
constituting a latent political time-bomb; the potential for the 1950s mob to pursue the vision of
the poor-marginalized; and the real possibility of a military take over that was more likely than
Professor Ngugi’s peasant and workers’ revolution, these were not abstract approximations of
the political situation in Kenya. Rather, they were insightful analyses of not only the practical
political reality but an accurate description of the everyday experiences of ordinary Kenyans and
precise anticipation of what action such desperation might lead. It was clear that Kenyans,
especially those of the younger generation, were getting agitated and restless about the economic
situation, corruption and what they saw as maladministration and even the arrogance of Moi’s
government. Put differently, political instability paralleled and mirrored the economic slide:
there was a marked withdrawal from the patron-client system as it hit lower levels and, as such,
discontent increased.47
In view of the foregoing, senior British diplomats like High Commissioner Stanley
Fingland were correct in suggesting that a discontented younger generation presented a great
challenge in Kenya’s future. Bearing more radical aims and deliberately assuming populist
appeal, this restless generation would try and break out of the KANU mold of an enforced
political unity under a single party without any real ideological or policy base.48 However, these
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British assessments of the situation and subsequent fears did not go far enough because disquiet
and opposition was not restricted to only the young political class. In this particular regard,
Christopher Hart, who foresaw the likelihood of military rule, was more accurate. Young men of
the Kenya Air Force (KAF) would, on the morning of 1st August 1982, not only try to take
matters in their hands, but, quite literally, take over the running of government itself.
With a force of just under 3,000 strong, the attempted KAF coup d'état became, for a
short duration, the embodiment of Kenya’s fears and future hope that was reminiscent of the
heady 1950s. Indeed, in staging this coup attempt, it was, in many ways, a microcosm of the
1950s colonial struggle played out within a much shorter time.49 This explains why so many
people were arraigned, in the aftermath of the coup, with the charge of prematurely celebrating
the fall of the regime.50 Although supposedly professional men of uniform, the young junior
officers involved were not, in any way, shielded from witnessing and experiencing the serious
economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, they, like other Kenyans, must have
felt and were egged on by the sharp point of what was seen as the beginning of the end of
Kenya’s steady progress since independence signaling the start of a period of stagnation, a drop
in the general standards, and an increase in internal political dissension.51 Although at the core
of KAF attempted coup were internal issues such as poor pay and living conditions; the declining
quality of services; growing corruption in military procurement; Kikuyu dominance in the KAF
leadership, Luo sentiments that went back to events between 1965 and 1969, which is when
Kenyatta and the Luo kingpin Odinga parted ways; and a tinge of Odinga’s socialist, antiwestern and redistributionist political ideals, the rebels cited rampant corruption, tribalism,
nepotism, repression and disenfranchisement of the masses, particularly of the Luo, as the main
drive behind their actions.52
When, in the morning the airmen stormed and temporarily took over VoK broadcasting
station, the following statement (with my emphasis in italics) which echoed the call for social
49
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justice and framed their actions in the language of grievance that harked back to British colonial
days, was broadcast:I announce…the overthrow of the corrupt regime of Daniel arap Moi by
the patriotic forces of our country. …Our country is firmly under the control of
our armed forces. Every care has been taken to make the revolution as bloodless
as possible.
Over the past few years this country has been heading from an open to a
closed inhuman and dictatorial society. The fundamental principles for which
many of our people sacrificed their lives during the heroic struggle for
independence have been compromised in the interests of a few greedy and
irresponsible bandits.
Over the past few months we have witnessed with disgust the imposition
of a de jure one-party system without the people’s consent, arbitrary arrest and the
detention of innocent citizens, censorship of the press, intimidation of individuals,
and general violation of human rights.
This ruthless oppression and repression is reminiscent of the past colonial
days which Kenyans thought were buried at independence. A gang of local tyrants
has emerged whose only function is to terrorize and intimidate with senseless
warnings. Rampant corruption, tribalism, nepotism have made life almost
intolerable in our society. The economy of this country is in shambles due to
corruption and mismanagement. The cost of living in Kenya today is among the
highest in the world. Wananchi (citizens) can no longer afford to meet the basic
requirements of life, due to exorbitant prices of basic necessities such as food,
housing, housing rent, transport. Above all, Kenyans are among the highest taxed
people in the world.
Wananchi, under these circumstances our armed forces have heeded the
people’s call to liberate our country once again from the forces of oppression and
exploitation in order to restore liberty, dignity and social justice. In doing this, we
have proved to the rest of the world that no individual or group of people can
permanently subjugate or take away the freedom which our fathers and
grandfathers so gallantly fought to bring to this country. Like the British
imperialists, the same fate will befall whoever attempts to stamp out our
freedom….53
After the coup ended in utter failure and with an unofficial estimate of between 600 and
1,800 dead and over 2,000 others in detention, a deeply shocked Moi returned to the seat of
government, and immediately began his bid for a better and stronger grasp on political power
and cracking down on all forms of dissent. Almost 2,000 air men were detained and 900 others
court-martialed.54 Among those affected before and after the coup attempt included junior air
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force officers among them Hezekiah Ochuka, Pancras Okumu Oteyo and James Dianga;
university students among the very first arrested being Titus Adungosi Oloo (Chairman of the
Students Organization of Nairobi University), Paddy Onyango, Francis Kinyua, Thomas Mutuse,
Muga K’Olale, Onyango Oloo, Joseph Hongo, Oginga Ogego, Johnstone Simiyu; journalists like
Otieno Mak’Onyango who was the Assistant Managing Editor of the Sunday Standard;
politicians like Koigi Wamwere (MP, Nakuru North), Mark Bosire (MP, Wanjare, South
Mugirango), Mathew Onyango Midika (MP, Nyando) and George Moseti Anyona (MP); lawyer
John Khaminwa; intellectuals like Mukaru Ng’ang’a, Willy Munyoki Mutunga, Maina wa
Kinyatti, Kamoje Wachira, Edward Oyugi, George Katama Mkangi, Al Amin Mohammed and
Alfred Vincent Otieno; and Wang’ondu Kariuki, a civil servant in the Ministry of Health ,an
activist in the peasant marketing cooperatives and editor of Mashambani, which was a Kikuyu
language farmer’s monthly magazine.55 According to Kinyatti, some of the lecturers above were
Marxists who were persuaded that imperialism and its Kenya ruling class corollary could never
relinquish power without an armed revolutionary struggle. In the mid-1970s, they had formed a
clandestine party, the Workers’ Party of Kenya, to enable the Kenyan people to be free by
controlling the forces of production. They added to their numbers in the early 1980s.56

Besides arresting those it suspected to have been behind the attempted putsch, the shaken
Moi regime went even further. Although most Kenyans hesitated in fear when news of the coup
broke out, the Air Force announcement on the VoK had been greeted with celebrations around
the country.57 University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University students came out on the streets to
show solidarity with the young junior officers. Some civilians joined the KAF’s revolt and
punching the air with clenched fists, which was a sign of defiance and shouted the slogan,
“Pambana!” (confront or struggle-on!).58
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After the coup, people , across the country from Mombasa to Kisumu, were variously
brought to court on charges of rejoicing sometimes framed as “creating a disturbance in a
manner likely to cause a breach of the peace” because they prematurely celebrated the radio
announcement of the fall of the Moi regime. There were at least seventy cases in the town of
Kakamega, some of them including local councilors and former assistant ministers.59 The extent
of the Moi-regime’s massive arrests and detentions affecting professors, students, lawyers,
politicians, peasants and workers was, in itself, testimony to the widespread unpopularity of the
regime throughout the country.60 The coup attempt had revealed, especially to Moi’s young
romantic government, the full extent of popular dissatisfaction.

The two leading institutions for tertiary education, University of Nairobi and Kenyatta
College, were shut down for a year and even more professors, lecturers and students put behind
bars. Naturally averse to academics, Moi’s anti-intellectualism after the coup attempt was
reinforced and oppressive measures against them were reflected, spread and felt throughout the
country’s social strata. Moi then embarked upon the process of deconstructing the Kenyattacentric state dominated by Kikuyu elite and weeding out dissent that riddled the political elite
and the security forces, thus setting the country in a new historical direction characterized, for
the next decade, by extreme political oppression.61 The attempted putsch was the result of a rare
mixture of the political elite, intellectual and security strands of dissent, with or without a tinge
of socialist influences that had heretofore operated underground. Since this time in Kenya’s
history, such a show of solidarity has proved elusive. This is with the exception of the short-lived
push for political pluralism in the early 1990s. This is because the president systematically
proceeded to establish a surveillance and police state paralleled only by colonial times. Further,
atomization of all forms of opposition was high in his political arithmetic of divide and rule and
state control. Moi’s response to the coup attempt forced discontent underground.
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Pambana: Academic Debate on Kenyan Peasantry and the Mwakenya Decade
By the end of the first decade of independence between 1973 and the mid-1970s, as
earlier noted, there were critical national debates that saturated the classrooms and corridors of
academia, which were radiated throughout the rest of the country. This was a result of a
pervading disillusionment with national independence and those who took over power on the eve
of independence.62 It was a particularly depressing time for academics that ended up at
University of Nairobi’s Senior Common Room as early as eleven o’clock for a cup of coffee that
would extend to one o’clock. After a short afternoon session of teaching they would stream back
in by five o’clock to socialize over alcoholic and other beverages until long after dinner.63 The
revolutionary writing of Ngugi wa Thiong’o traces the political division created in the Kenyan
state, community and family right from the beginning of colonialism. This polarization was
consolidated by 1920. In the post-colonial state, familial, communal and political division was
strengthened by even more increasing class conflict. This is a theme to be found throughout
Thiong’o’s work. As such, the literary landscape painted by the author is underlined by the
theme of betrayal.64
However, Thiong’o was not the only intellectual talking and writing about, and against,
political betrayal. There were many voices, especially at the end of the 1970s and 1980s, who did
the same. Constituting the ranks of these academic voices, were young intellectuals who were
cutting their teeth in academia. The conservative intellectual Benjamin Kipkorir described them
in his memoirs as “a crop of young radicalized academics fresh from the University of Dar es
Salaam” many of whom did not have Ph.D.s and “who seemed to accept Marxist axioms as
articles of faith.” For Kipkorir, these were Young Turks who espoused Marxist views and were
vociferously opposed to everything institutional.65 But in the ranks of this fresh academic blood
were mid-level intellectuals, such as Micere Githae Mugo, who considered themselves
revolutionary rebels as epitomized by Ngugi wa Thiong’o. These intellectual rebels saw
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themselves as positioned at the battlefront of contending ideas and clashing frontiers of
knowledge. For them, scholarship, research and learning were not neutral processes.

Rather, the generation of knowledge was a significant component of a deliberate agenda
specifically designed by the system in power to support its economic base. Instead of
succumbing to this propagation of the status quo’s controlling ideas, these revolutionaries
viewed themselves as advocates of the rights of ordinary people. Most of them were, as
expected, influenced by Marxism-Leninism as an ideological framework of reference and, as
such, saw themselves as “the vanguard” for revolutionary change in Kenya.66 Amongst others,
these group of intellectuals included Peter Anyang Nyong’o, Apollo Njonjo, Mike Chege, E.S
Atieno Odhiambo and Mukaru Ngang’a who were joined, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, by
Mike Cowen and David Rosenburg in the exposition of the all crucial but intractable discussion
of “the peasant question in Kenya.”

With regard to the peasant question in Kenya, these scholars aligned themselves with the
suffering, disillusioned and struggling masses and, by so doing, considered themselves their
advocates. As such, working under the Marxist theoretical framework, these scholars sought to
mend the psychic dismemberment wrought by colonialism and neo-colonialism.67 They had
attended either mission schools or colonial/neo-colonial government schools where they imbibed
education for domination and were taught to think without the people while thinking about them
for the ulterior motives of domination and control. Nonetheless, these scholars purposed to tackle
the question of the Kenyan peasantry in order to be able to adopt a certain political line, a certain
program of action towards the urban poor but, more so, rural peasant farmers.68 Their intellectual
and practical agenda was socioeconomic and political transformation of pauperized rural folk
and the urban proletariats that they rubbed shoulders with in the city.

The educated African elite, therefore, refused to be conservative neo-colonial intellectual
scions. This was despite the fact that they had been reared in an academic environment patterned
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along foreign cultural paradigms, which naturally alienated from their own people. In their
personal and professional lives, they refused to live as if the life experiences of the suffering
masses did not touch or affect them.69 Unlike Western-oriented conservative scholars, these
radical intellectuals identified themselves with, and were imbued by, the spirit of struggle of the
majority 50% of the population involved in agricultural production in the Kenyan peasant
economy. For these revolutionary Marxist scholars, knowledge was useless until it was
incorporated with the struggle of the masses against their oppressors.70 Put differently, they
refused to be cut off from the social body by the neo-colonial ideology of self-abnegation
characterized by a spirit of distancing themselves from Africa.71

As such, in their investigation on what was happening to the bulk of the Kenyan
peasantry between 1978/79 and what had happened to it in the past, they aimed at praxis by
bridging theory and political practice. They argued that if the social dynamics and social
structure of rural life in Kenya could be laid bare, then it would be possible to develop a specific
political program of action for the liberation of the peasantry.72 In this social inquiry of the
question of the peasantry, these friends of rural dwellers turned to Marxism as a theoretical tool
that would enable them to unveil Kenya’s prevailing social reality clearly. They sought to
unmask appearances, utopian, adventurist, demagogic political programs and intellectual
deceptions although they did not mention them in name as Kenyatta’s Harambee or Moi’s Nyayo
philosophy of love, peace and unity in their academic papers.73 Far from outright criticism, theirs
was the pairing of social analysis to a political program that was indispensable weapon for the
liberation of the politically oppressed and economically exploited class in a world in which
bourgeois outlooks continued to mystify social processes. They were inspired by theory that
would unveil a clear path for political action that would change society.74
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Furthermore, in engaging in social analysis, this group of scholars saw themselves as an
intellectual vanguard that would facilitate the onset of class consciousness by empirically
providing evidence about the existence of a peasantry in Kenya. From this class consciousness,
they argued, would then spring political action for social change thus making it possible for this
section of society to be able to realize its socio-economic and political interest. This
preoccupation with the peasant question had been conceived in the course of a series of
discussions on industrialization and agriculture in Africa at the Department of Government,
University of Nairobi in the 1978/79 Academic Year. It resulted in the publication of this debate
in the early 1980s, which in itself could be considered to be one of the fetal stages of the selfdeclared vanguardism for political change by this group of radical intellectuals. Following the
laying out of a persuasive social analysis, the ruling class would then be made aware of the
existence of classes; the politically oppressed; and the economically exploited awakened to a
class struggle and, thus, enter into political battle with other classes for themselves.

The role of this intellectual vanguard, therefore, was to instigate this latent confrontation
embedded in colonial and post-colonial contradictions that were now, however, framed within
Marxist-Leninist terms. These scholars hoped to successfully ferment political action through
concrete organization giving the peasant masses agency and a decisive role in history thus
bringing about the desired political and socio-economic social change. This fit with precision the
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary template that Moi’s government was going to not only to frown
upon, but also baulk at every turn and rout out short of using violence. In the global Cold War
environment, in which Kenya, especially under Moi, allied itself to the West and Britain in
particular, these intellectual Mau Maus were bound to fail even before they got started.
But before dealing with the government’s stubborn reaction to this group, it is important
to note its shortcomings. One of its greatest shortcomings was its romantic and poetic
preoccupation with Marxist theory in particular and theorization in general. Thus, while its
deduction of Kenya’s social reality was proximate to the spirit of existential struggle for the bare
necessities of life: clothes, food and shelter in Kenya, for some of them, revolutionary
consciousness, as Micere Mugo observes, was just an intellectual game. According to Micere
Mugo, they did not go to the fullest extent. They only went as far as cultivating personalities and
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lifestyles that defined what they perceived to be “revolutionary.” Mugo argues that a number of
them were even known to intimidate those around them with arrogant and alienating elitism
while parading as saviors of their worlds. She charges that their personal idiosyncrasies aside,
their pompous theorization generated knowledge and articulated experience that often failed to
touch real living individuals. For that reason, this body of supposedly liberative knowledge
remained the abstract monopoly of the learned.75

In other words, while this debate was timely, reflected the deep-seated concerns of
Kenyans at large and encapsulated the intellectual hunger in the country, the highfalutin Marxist
language in which it was cast meant the vanguard message was decoded making it difficult for
everyday rural and street folk to decipher. Arguably, the analysis of everyday social reality
estimated and fit the mold of the Mau Maus of the mind struggle of colonial and post-colonial
Kenya. However, considering the fact that it was framed or packaged within Marxist-Leninist
social analysis meant that it was lost to the majority of people in the country. Admittedly, this
group sought to espouse a “persuasive social analysis,” which would have been effective in its
aim of, not just awakening peasant and working class consciousness, but rather, at least capturing
it within limited and partial Marxist confines. But it failed even in the latter sense because it was
not simple or clear enough. Instead, social reality of everyday socio-economic and political
struggles in Kenya were encoded in abstract theoretical and fancy Marxist terms that parceled it
out, such as mode of production and articulation between various modes of production; control
of the means of production; alienation and articulation, and extraction of (surplus) of labor;
historical determinism; proletariatization; penetration of capital in pre-capitalist social
formations; and survival of some of pre-capitalist modes of production. There was, as such, a gap
between this Marxist theorization of social reality and lived everyday reality of Kenyans.

As a result, theory and practice was not bridged. There was little, if any, practical impact
in terms of their transformational agenda, made by this category of intellectuals on Kenya during
the 1970s, and the 1980s in particular. What all this debate amounted to was these rebels just
making noise among themselves on the campuses and other academic avenues ensuring that the
government, for the most part, remained unperturbed. But real trouble for the government started
75
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when these scholars, following the example of Thiong’o’s staging in 1977 of the peasant play
Ngahika Ndeenda, started organizing around and outside the university, crossing the academic
fence in order to reach out to the community. This turned into a threat against the status quo and
the integrity and monopoly of the ruling elite on the Kenyan state by outsiders. As a result
political persecution and harassment became the order of the day.76

Like Ngugi, who had been detained by the Kenyatta government towards the end of
1977, this group was seen as crossing boundaries beyond which the government had not allowed
or granted. Some of them awakened to the understanding that beyond their theorization, the
people and students they taught were their constituent matrix and not mere objects of thought.
This was the action-oriented category of progressive intellectuals who went all out to demystify
their ivory tower status.77 They decoded their language when teaching their students and talking
to members of their constituent communities in organized symposia in schools and colleges;
when they initiated community projects and devised research methodologies that ensured the
participation and the empowerment of the people. In so doing they were not just rebels in
thought and in theory only but they became rebels in the practical sense.78

As Micere Mugo notes, however, they were naïve and already over-exposed to the state
and its machinery. Thus, they easily succumbed to the state’s widening net of repression, denial
of academic freedom, censorship, gross human rights abuse and downright terror. Mugo sees this
as a tactical and strategic failure on their part: she argues that progressive intellectuals failed in
their capacity as Kenya’s liberators because they failed to learn guerilla warfare tactics to avoid
self-exposure. Heightened persecution of progressives and a number of detentions accompanied
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by torture, nevertheless, is what taught the rebels that they were dealing with a tyrannical system
and needed new tactics. Like the Eneke bird that learned how to learn to fly without perching
because men had learned to shoot without missing, under a repressive neocolonial atmosphere
and hostile conditions, this progressive intelligentsia had to become guerilla intellectuals.79

Before they were arrested like their comrades, some of them, like Micere Mugo, Ngugi
wa Thiong’o and Shiraz Durrani, flew like the Eneke bird to exile from where they continued to
be advocates for the rights of ordinary people. From the safety of London (Ukenya), the USA,
Scandinavian countries, Australia and elsewhere, they stayed in touch with a few courageous
intellectuals who managed to cling onto their jobs and stay out of jail to continue the struggle
through underground publications such as Cheche Kenya (1981); Pambana –an organ of the
December Twelve Movement; Kenya: Register of Resistance (1986); Mwakenya: Draft
Minimum Programme (1987); Mpatanishi –(The Arbiter) an underground newspaper, which was
also the official central journal of Mwakenya; Mzalendo Mwakenya –the mass newspaper of the
party; Pambana: legacy of resistance (a Unity Conference paper); and From Kimathi to
Mwakenya: resistance in Kenya today (1987) among many others.80 Thus was born the
underground movement Mwakenya and from its little known predecessor, the December Twelve
Movement that carried the intellectual banner of what the Mau Mau movement, as the symbolic
and violent embodiment of Mau Maus of the mind of anti-British colonialism, had championed
in the 1950s.81

Mwakenya, the underground phase of what had been open intellectual dissent inside and
outside universities, is an important strand of Matigari ma Njirungi or the multifaceted critical
publics against the Kenyan state. As an underground dissident and critical public, Mwakenya
was tactically preceded by the December Twelve (12) Movement with its publicity organ,
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Pambana in the early 1980s. The December 12 Movement surfaced at the beginning of Nyayo
era. It derived inspiration from the struggles that led to the historic breakthrough of 12th
December 1963 hence the name “December 12.” According to the first issue of Pambana,
December Twelve, 1963 was the day most Kenyan masses united with the hope of a new
national reality, true independence. Unbeknownst to them, this was not to be. For the December
12 Movement, therefore, this signified betrayal and the continued need to push for a new higher
unity and a revolutionary rebirth of the nation.82 Thus, it viewed itself as having roots and
connections with the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (Mau Mau) of the 1950s.83

Further, it noted in its first issue of Pambana that this successful publication was a major
milestone and even a turning point in Kenya’s history because it was the first truly peoples’
newspaper. This, it argued, constituted a step towards creating the people’s own voice and
institutions that served them. After all, the government controlled, foreign-owned press and “the
laughable Voice of Kenya” always lied and misrepresented Kenya’s reality and praised “every
crime and evil act the ruling class” committed. In addition, these state organs apologized for the
ruling class and continually attacked the people’s struggles or at best ignored them. They only
sought to sow confusion and disunity in their attempts to put a lid on trouble. This issue laid out
the movement’s stated aim, which was to tell the state that while the government was attempting
to keep the people of Kenya down, they yearned for change, and not just any, but revolutionary
change.84

Echoing this omnibus rallying cry for revolutionary change, moreover, Pambana stated
that it would not accept any apologies for oppression or thievery and warned that it would
forcefully represent the truth as seen from the majority poor and dispossessed Kenyans who had
been completely ignored. It pledged itself to be militantly and proudly partisan in conveying the
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views of the majority. It argued, in spite of their high expectations, that Kenyans had been
massively betrayed. The revolution that they had launched with blood had been arrested and
derailed. The Movement observed that almost twenty years after a fake independence was
negotiated, the broad masses of Kenya were materially and politically worse off than ever
before.85 Instead, the criminally corrupt ruling clique, sanctioned by KANU, had isolated itself
from the concerns of Kenyans daily life and had, thus, committed a crime among many others,
more brutal than any that British colonialism had: that is, they had silenced all opposition and
deprived the people, forcibly, of the very right to participate in Kenya’s national affairs. The
sacred rights of expression and association had been cast aside.86

Further, the paper charged that KANU and its government had disorganized all spheres of
economic production, scattered all communal efforts at organization and sowed unprincipled
discord and enmity among the people of Kenya. Moreover, the government was looting
unspeakable sums of money and national wealth and had sold out to international imperialist
forces, all in the name of progress and prosperity and inane smatterings of “love, peace and
unity.” This, The December 12 Movement charged, was “NOT independence.” Rather, it was
neocolonialism at its worst form, yet Kenyans had fought many battles in order to precisely put
an end to a similar situation in the past. As far The Movement was concerned, the symbolism of
the fight for freedom was eloquent: the people did not wage war in order to end up worse off
than they had been before. In that regard, it had been a serious error after independence not to
thoroughly cleanse the people’s ranks of pro-colonial elements that later regrouped, took over
leadership and derailed the struggle to where it was in Kenya of the early 1980s.87 But the lesson
had been learned and building on the experience of this post-colonial disillusionment and
betrayal, the same mistake would be avoided in the future as the cost was too great.88
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After all, independence for the Pambana group was sacred. It was, or should have been,
revolutionary. It meant making a clean break and a new and unfettered start from the oppressive
machinery of the past. It meant the establishment of a fiercely vigilant nation led by a strong
peoples’ organization that worked with the peoples’ initiative in building a new society with new
forms and new modes of thought. True independence would and should have released
unbounded new energy and creativity. But this had never happened, and, as such, Kenya had no
independence. Instead, the country was more dependent in 1983 than it had been before 1963.
Despite Kenya’s considerable wealth, its people were starving, in debt and bankrupt. For that
reason the struggle was still on: Kenyans had no alternative but to begin anew to continue the
revolution that had been frustrated. This first issue of Pambana, therefore, urgently called
Kenyans to marshal forces and prepare for a protracted counter-attack that would salvage and
reconstruct their nation. This meant war: the movement’s members were under no illusions that a
class war was in the offing.89

Lastly, the newspaper made it clear that its message was tailored and targeted at all
genuine Kenyan organizations and individuals that were fighting any and/or whatsoever aspect
of local or imperialist reaction and specifically:
1. Small farmers and producers against government and “co-operative” theft and
mismanagement;
2. Workers against IMF-enforced low wages and anti-strike controls;
3. Millions of unemployed in their right to employment.
4. Small businessmen against foreign monopolies;
5. Indigenous professionals against fake expatriate “skills;”
6. Teachers, students and pupils against irrelevant; authoritarian colonial
education;
7. Committed intellectuals and journalists against official muzzling;
8. The poor and the landless in their demands for land reform
9. All poor people against ever-increasing rents, prices and declining real
incomes;
10. The entire dispossessed population against a corrupt puppet government and
89
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its ever-repressive police rule.90
Demonstrating that it was fairly well-informed with respect to some of the allegations,
The December Twelve Movement leveled against the government, Pambana narrated stories in
its “national news” section detailing some of these charges. For instance, it cited the sowing of
ethnic and civil strife in the Nandi/Kakamega border area where Moi, apparently, dissolved
many legitimate land transactions and suspended the Land Act and the respective clauses in the
constitution for some sections of the Rift Valley, particularly Nandi, Trans Nzoia and Nakuru.
Further, he proposed an elders tribunal to deal with all land disputes in the area thus setting
affected communities on a collision course marked by chaos, bloodshed and death in Chepsanoi,
Kapkangani, Moi’s Ridge and Segero.91

In addition, it pointed to co-operative theft that affected many rural areas of Kenya,
which were engulfed in protest as a result. Peasants and small-scale farmers, it argued, were
thoroughly disgusted by the blatant theft of their farm income by co-operative and government
officials. Some were reported to have uprooted, burned and not harvested their cash crops such
as sugar in Nyanza; pyrethrum in Kisii; and coffee and tea in Central Kenya.92 In the case of rice
in Mwea, farmers in 1981 refused to deliver grain to the rice mills because of low prices and
non-payment of past dues. In many cases, small farmers fought off officials and the GSU was
deployed to rough them up. This was a charge corroborated by historical production records.

According to Hornsby, the 1980s saw instability in the coffee industry although it
remained to be the country’s largest foreign exchange earner until 1989. The Kenya Planters
Cooperative Union that was collectively owned by the farmers continued to be the sole processor
and main miller and the Coffee Board the sole marketer and regulator.93 Kenya was overproducing coffee and was rewarded during 1984-86 by a second spike in world coffee prices that
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exceeded the 1976-7 boom, but 1986 was the end of this chance-profitability.94 Not only did
world prices fall but farmers became increasingly dissatisfied as payments were “eaten” by the
chain of coffee organizations, including county councils, local cooperatives, the KPCU and the
Coffee Board.95 With regard to sugar, the sector was riddled with difficulties. In 1988, the
Ramisi factory in Kwale collapsed as did Miwani in Kisumu. There were widespread problems
including allegations of malpractice and misuse of funds from cooperatives, which especially
affected the Kikuyu in Central Province, where they were best developed and contained about
one-third of all rural cooperative members. With growing delays in the payment to farmers
reflecting profitability and liquidity problems within the marketing chain, several cooperative
unions collapsed.96

Further, sugar production in the country was inefficient and return to farmers low,
despite the fact that retail prices remained well above world market prices. What is more is that
this industry too was marred by a corrupt administrative environment with sugar imports being
organized by insiders considering the wide gap between local and import prices.97 The Uplands
Bacon Factory and the Kenya Meat Commission, that were both state-owned processers,
collapsed in 1985 and were placed in private hands.98 Lastly, pyrethrum went through a period of
boom but then went bust. Pyrethrum production peaked in 1983 at nearly 30,000 tons. However,
in the same year, both world prices and demand collapsed, and the Pyrethrum Board was unable
to pay growers. As a result, output would fall to 6,000 tons in 1986.99

Its criticism of cooperatives and specific political exposés of irregularities,
maladministration and corruption in various agricultural sectors, shows that the December
Twelve Movement was alive to everyday concerns and difficulties that small-scale farmers,

Ibid., 434-435 & 365. International Coffee quotas, reimposed in 1980, limited Kenya’s coffee exports to 83,000
tonnes, which was below its actual production. As such, there was a mounting stock of unsold produce and little
encouragement for further plantings.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid., 370.
97
Ibid., 436. According to Hornsby, this state of affairs was in part because European and the American preferential
trade system depressed world prices and some producers exported surplus sugar at below cost. As a result, Kenya’s
demand exceeded supply and from 1985 onwards, despite two decades of investment, Kenya became a sugar
importer again.
98
Ibid., 437.
99
Ibid., 365.
94

307

workers and unemployed had to contend with: it was not just the fruits of Uhuru that were
trapped at the top but also that of their post-independence labor. As one of the leading
clandestine critical publics that acted as the voice of the people in an increasingly hostile
environment, the December Twelve Movement was excelled by, and/or rivaled by, Mwakenya.

Indeed, the exact nature of the relationship between the two is yet to be understood,
although Mwakenya is believed to have been an offshoot of the shadowy December 12th
Movement.100 What is known, however, is that as underground outfits both were contiguous and
overlapped in terms of membership and shared ideals of struggle although the name Mwakenya
entered the national political arena in the mid-1980s. Even former activists within the movement
do not agree on the exact dates or the origins of Mwakenya. Nevertheless, it is significant to note
that there was contact between underground movements operating in Kenya and political
activists and exiles abroad. They recognized the task of forging a united front and unity of all
patriots to bring about political change.101 The strategy that Mwakenya deployed to this end was
the publication and distribution of its underground literature aimed at the education and
conscientization of the general public. The organization’s main theme was to expose the regime
and mobilize people for action.102 Although said to have been active as early as 1981, the name
“Mwakenya” was not known to the general public before 13th February 1985 after which date a
series of hard-hitting publications critical of the government followed.103 One of its earliest
publications attributed to Mwakenya was Mpatanishi (The Arbiter) that was the movement’s
central organ established by 1982.104
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Alongside Pambana, Mpatanishi played a crucial role of educating the masses about the
nature of the struggle. They defined the ideological path of the struggle and identified what they
saw as the enemy of the people.105 In its Draft Minimum Programme published in 1987,
Mwakenya proffered the most far-reaching outline of the vision to guide resistance against
Nyayoism and neo-colonialism. It stated the tasks and challenges that were facing Kenyan
people in their struggle to realize what it described as the second and third stages of the National
Liberation process. In essence, it laid out the central objective of the movement as bringing about
a national democratic revolution as the spring board for meaningful social change.106

Furthermore, it saw its work as fostering the dramatic development of democracy as
embodied in the emergence of worker/peasant based underground groups. For this to happen, the
movement believed it needed to begin articulating an ideology that fully reflected the workers’
struggle and, as such, become the real voice of the Kenyan people.107 In so doing, intellectual
progressives and political activists saw themselves as fitting into the Mau Mau tradition of
resistance in an ongoing struggle of the people for social justice and economic liberation.108
Indeed, Mwakenya’s stance reflected the same anti-capitalist, anti-foreign, egalitarian, socialist,
pro-Mau Mau strand of thought that can be traced from Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggia, J.M.
Kariuki to Ngugi wa Thiong’o.109 Overall, therefore, early Mwakenya publications of 1980s
sought to capture and provide as close a picture of the situation of the country as it was felt and
experienced by the majority; to provide a barometer of the state of class struggle in Kenya; and
to challenge the ideology of the ruling class.110

Besides these two leading underground movements, there were vocal organizations in the
USA and Britain. Umoja, operating in London, was one such organization put together by
Kenyan intellectual and political activists. In one of its signature publications, Umoja, which also
styled itself as United Movement for Democracy in Kenya, put together a detailed summary of

105

Kinyatti, History of Resistance, 433.
Umoja, Moi’s Reign of Terror, 3.
107
Mwakenya Draft Minimum Programme, 13, as cited by Durrani in “The Other Kenya,” 80.
108
Kinyatti, History of Resistance, 434; also see Durrani, “The Other Kenya,” 80.
109
Hornsby, A History Since Independence, 415.
110
Durrani, “The Other Kenya,” 80.
106

309

what it termed a decade of Moi’s Reign of Terror and crimes against the people of Kenya.111 In
it, it criticized the celebration, by the Moi regime, of a decade on Nyayoism during which
Kenyans were persistently urged to stand on their heads with shouts of “Nyayo juu” (Power to
Nyayo). Umoja saw this celebration as a mockery of the struggle, which had inspired December
Twelve movement. Nyayo’s ten years, the group pointed out, had seen the most concerted efforts
at colonial restoration with Moi as the colonial governor issuing orders from State House. In
Moi’s Reign of Terror, they supported this charge by arguing that the Moi government had
surrendered the Kenyan economy to foreign Western control thus turning the country into the
private property of a few foreign companies reminiscent of the Imperial British East African
Company days; by outlawing all forms of political, social and cultural organizations that were
people-based as in the days of Governor Sir Evelyn Baring around the same time Moi served as a
member of the LegCo; by introducing the queue system of electing political chiefs (otherwise
known as “member of parliament”); and by re-introducing the 8-4-4 system of education.112
It was on this basis, then, that Umoja, criticized Moi’s symbols and conception of power
and his vision of Kenya’s future, which according to the movement, was derived from the
colonial past that underpinned his ideological inclinations. It was no wonder, Umoja pressed, the
first ten years of his rule had been a decade of economic, political, social and cultural crimes
perpetrated against ordinary people.113 It labeled this period of Moi rule as “ten years of
economic misery” even though the economy was hailed by backers in the west as an economic
miracle specifically because there was an environment that was extremely favorable to foreign
investment enabling multinational corporations (MNCs) to reap enormous profits. Yet, behind
the façade of tall buildings lay the reality of the country’s economic misery.114 Since
independence, Umoja argued, Kenya had pursued an externally-oriented development strategy
that had been inherited from colonialism. It relied on private enterprise and production for profit
as the engine for growth. It also enriched a small class of Kenyans, but this strategy failed to
meet even the most basic needs of the majority of Kenyans.115
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Furthermore, Moi promised, when took power in 1978, to stop corruption but the
evidence of his ten-year rule, noted Umoja, demonstrated what he really meant: as far as Umoja
was concerned, Moi stopped corruption in as far as it enabled his close associates to engage in
corrupt activities.116 This is an observation validated by other observers. According to Hornsby,
while Moi’s government promised to rid Kenya of corruption, it was worsened by his take
over.117 Thus, corruption of the late 1980s was a little worse than in the 1970s. Moi followed
Kenyatta’s grabbing footsteps and overtook him by far.118 Elephant herds were decimated under
Kenyatta not Moi. But the 10 per cent kickbacks of the Kenyatta era became 25%-50%, sinking
some projects, while others appeared constructed primarily for the rent-seeking opportunities
they gave.119

While the principle of elite corruption had been established under Kenyatta, Moi
practised it on a grander scale, and could not have stopped it even if he tried. After all, his
survival rested on fragile corruption based elite alliances, and to have broken these would
probably have destroyed his government within months.120 Corruption had ended only in as far
as the nexus of accumulation started, by 1982, shifting from the Kikuyu to the Kalenjin and with
Moi himself rapidly acquiring assets, generally using other names. Like Kenyatta before him,
Moi increasingly diverted resources into the off-book and parasitic sector of the economy in
which insiders extracted resources from the state for private benefit via bribery, abuses of
procurement and perks of office.121

Yet, while grand corruption was on the rise, Kenyans faced mass starvation in 1980 as
the country could not feed itself, a contradiction that Umoja did not hesitate to highlight. Umoja
pointed out that this was the first time since independence that Kenyans had been forced to queue
for maize. Yet, they had corruption to thank for all their woes as it emerged that highly placed
officials and ministers close to Moi had exported maize supplies for personal profit. In 1982,
116
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alleged Umoja, Moi’s most trusted lieutenant, Nicholas Biwott, was implicated in a corrupt $15
million South African maize deal.122

In addition, the Moi government was reported by the controller and auditor-general to
have lost Ksh. 420 million in hosting the 4th All African Games in 1987 due to irregular tender
awards, award and variation orders for construction and game facilities. A company owned by
Ketan Somaia, a close business associate of Moi, was awarded a controversial transport tender
during the games for which it was paid Ksh. 29.5 million. Although the company was paid the
money in full, the controller and auditor-general reported that it did not provide enough vehicles
and the games committee was forced to spend more money in hiring other vehicles.123 It is worth
noting that between 1985 and 1991, Somaia’s Dolphin Group grew to national prominence, with
contracts to supply military equipment, computers and other goods. From a humble twenty-six
year old shop-owner in Kisumu, Somaia acquired significant interests in a large number of
companies including Firestone, Marshalls, Kobil Oil, Fox Theatres (East Africa Ltd),
Commercial Bank of Africa, Royce Motors, Danny Construction, Rift Valley Hatcheries, Lima
Limited, Transnational Bank, Trust Bank and Siginon Freight.124 Somaia was reputed to have
secured procurement forms from the Office of the President with the spaces for prices left blank
to be filled as he wished.125

Therefore, it was clear to government critics such as Umoja that the Moi regime was
guilty of misusing the county’s hard-earned foreign exchange for the acquisition of private
companies. Umoja pointed out the fact that the illegal drain of Kenya’s foreign exchange
reserves had dramatically increased under Moi. The movement cited figures that it attributed to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that observed that foreign currency deposits abroad had
risen from Ksh. 14.8 billion in 1982; to Ksh. 67.5 billion in 1985; and Ksh. 80.6 billion in 1986.
According to the said IMF figures, it was estimated that more than $4,000 million were held in
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overseas accounts. Further, Umoja cited World Bank estimates that in the first six months of
1988 alone, Kenya lost over $175 million.126

All the while, Umoja further stated, land hunger was on the increase in Kenya. In
absolute terms, there was more land hunger in Kenya than there had been during the colonial
period. Millions of peasants continued to exist on small holdings, many on marginal land as land
ownership continued to be skewed in favor of the wealthy. Ten per cent of Kenya’s population,
claimed Umoja, owned 73% of the land. 1.6 million hectares of land were estimated to be under
plantation agriculture that was predominantly foreign-controlled by companies like Del Monte
and Brooke Bond. One Greek landlord owned more than 13,000 acres in Taveta while many
Kenyans were forced to be squatters there. Most land in the Coast Province was also owned by
absentee landlords who purchased the land for speculative purposes.127

In light of this gross inequity and inequality, Umoja accused the IMF and World Bank of
overseeing the misery of Kenyans, the majority of whom were poorer under Moi’s rule. During
his reign, shortages of basic foodstuffs and vital items like kerosene, and cooking gas became
endemic. The 1980s saw food shortages, rising prices, foreign exchange crises, budget shortfalls
and growing debt.128 Kenya became a nation overburdened by debt, which increased from
around $250 million in 1979 to $650 million 1985.129 Umoja alleged that by 1989, it was
estimated at over $4 billion.130 As a result, 32% of the national income from exports went to
service this growing debt. Yet, by October 1985, Moi continued heavy borrowing from the IMF
having been extended Ksh/= 12,118 billion credit. This loan brought with it IMF officials to plan
and direct Kenya’s economy, which resulted in loss of independence with regard to the national
development priorities. The result was frequent devaluations of the Kenya currency that were
undertaken under pressure from the IMF and World Bank. The Kenyan shilling was devalued in
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128
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1982 by 15%, which was the third devaluation in a matter of a few years.131 At 24 to the dollar in
1990, the shilling was worth less than a third of its value when Moi took office.132

Consequently, there was a decline in government spending on social services like health,
education and housing. As a way out, the Moi government by the late 1990s was talking of the
introduction of cost-sharing in these areas. Under Bretton Wood institutions economic
prescriptions, anti-worker measures such as wage freezes, the privatization of state parastatals
and the removal of price control of basic food items that led to worsening conditions for ordinary
Kenyans were resorted to.133 As a result, housing remained a dream for millions of Kenyans.
More than 30% of the population in Nairobi and Mombasa, Umoja argued, “lived in cardboard
shanties” of Korogosho, Mathare, Majengo and other informal settlements or slums.
Furthermore, 8.8 million Kenyans were too poor to afford adequate nutrition. In a decade since
the beginning of Moi’s rule, life expectancy declined from 57 to 54 years. Kenya was also
classified by UNICEF among countries with high infant and child mortality rates and 30% of
children suffered from malnutrition. Each year, more than 100,000 children under the age of five
died as a result of poor food or lack of adequate medical care.134

As such, Umoja concluded, the Moi regime had proven itself incapable of meeting the
meeting the basic needs of Kenyans, a huge section of whom lived under the most deplorable
conditions deprived of food, clothing and shelter. They suffered from miserable wages that could
not meet the most minimum needs such as clothes, food, transport, rent and school fees among
others. Even professionals, like teachers and middle-ranking civil servants, had been hard-hit.
Hospitals went without adequate or essential medical drugs and conditions got so bad that two or
three patients were forced to share beds and mothers in maternity wards delivered on hard
cement floors.135 Moi, as Hornsby observed, had inherited a slow-motion economic crisis not of
his own making, but which his initial expansionary and inclusive policies had worsened. This
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coupled with his increasing personal insecurity that led to the strengthening of the bureaucraticexecutive state only increased his critics. This was especially the case as the economic situation
continued to nosedive in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The church in Kenya, that had been
quiet, stirred and ratcheted up its criticism adding to the rising crescendo of political opposition.

Jolted into Political Action: The Church as a Critical Public
In the early Moi years, the church in Kenya, like the rest of society, was indeed at the
forefront of embracing the president as the defender of the poor, a fighter of corruption and the
savior of non-Kikuyu from Kikuyu exploitation.136 A member of the African Inland Church
(AIC), Moi identified himself as a devout Christian and defender of Christ. Building on this
natural personal strength, Moi sought to use the church in Kenya as a crucial instrument of
legitimization and invited it to play an active role in managing the country. As Moi saw it, it was
the role of the church to help the government to maintain peace and order. Indeed, the church
was part and parcel of the government a position that was affirmed by his vice-president who
asserted that politics and religion were inseparable.137
For that reason, it would seem that the church did, initially, accept Moi’s invitation at
face value.138 After all, Moi apparently seemed to offer a less corrupt alternative and a leader
with the will to spread the country’s wealth to those who had been neglected and underprivileged
in the former regime.139 Obviously, the idea of the country being ruled by a devout Christian who
respected the churches and was guided by the philosophy of love, peace and unity was
appealing.140 At best, the church seemed to have taken a wait-and-see stand in the early years of
Moi’s rule, and, perhaps, was even deluded by his Christian populist posturing.141 Thus, the
churches seldom objected publicly to the Moi regime’s growing coerciveness especially between
1980 and mid-1982 when he embarked upon an increasingly oppressive course.142 Sabar aptly
catalogues the path to this course:
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He limited the freedom of debate in parliament by threatening to ‘take
disciplinary action,’ including use of the police, against KANU members who
crossed the line between acceptable and unacceptable speech. He increased his
personal control of KANU by promoting his supporters and not calling meetings
of the party’s governing bodies. He undertook a campaign against dissidents and
‘political splinter-groups’, using tactics such as rumour-mongering, false
accusations of corruption and selective dismissals and appointments. He
threatened and harassed journalists and editors, university students and faculty,
and leaders of the Law Society of Kenya and other professional organizations
who criticized…. He reintroduced detention without trial –a measure that he
himself had suspended when he came to office in 1978…. He set in motion the
process of making Kenya a de jure one-party state.143
Yet, through this all, the church in Kenya was largely silent with only a few lone voices
being raised against these patent abuses and, even then, not very loudly.144
But, according to Sabar, this apathy cannot only be explained in terms of Moi’s
devoutness, brotherly demeanor or his attempts to co-opt the church. Rather, what she refers to
as the Kenyan church’s ambiguous and ambivalent mediative role in Kenyan politics ran much
deeper in the country’s history and, especially, the Kenyatta years. At independence, the church
complimented the state by providing social services in the areas of education, healthcare and
economic development. While it started speaking publicly on social and economic issues of the
day and take a more critical stance in the 1970s, the church was never engaged in any in-depth,
or comprehensive consideration of its overall role in society or vis-à-vis government.145 Rarely
did the church challenge the overall structure of power and, at times, it seemed oblivious to the
flawed socio-political structure.146
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However, the coup of 1982 was a turning point that radically altered this lethargic
stance.147 The coup jolted the church, which now woke up to the dual threats of chaos and of
military rule as well as the restrictive measures that Moi instituted in its aftermath, which dashed
all hopes and expectations that the president had aroused when he first took office.148 Indeed, the
church had gradually started to stir from its political slumber a little earlier when, in August
1981, Henry Okullu, who had been a thorn on the side of the Kenyatta government, hinted at an
analogy between the greed and corruption of South Africa’s rulers and Kenya’s.149 It is quite
notable that the church had taken a non-committal stance. It is possible that it may even have
been deluded by Moi wearing his Christian credentials on his sleeves. However, the election of
Manessas Kuria as archbishop in 1979 and Alexander Kipsang Muge as bishop in 1983 meant
that the Anglican Church of Kenya, at least, was readying itself to play a more active role in state
affairs.150

Before the coup, moreover, there is further indication that the church was changing its
attitude. This is to be found in a document produced by the Anglican Church of Kenya in 1981,
Recommendations on the Mission of the Church in the Changing Society.151 It was the outcome
of the church’s conference of thirty-six delegates. They declared both evangelism and socialpolitical involvement as part of Christian duty. Moreover, it stated that the church had a
prophetic ministry to the state, in which it was to act as the conscience of the people, declaring
God’s will and rebuking error.152 This was a more radical statement of the church’s role than
previously enunciated. The document acknowledged the partnership between the state and the
church with regard to development, education and health. However, the fact that it went as far as
asserting that the church had to do everything possible to encourage the catering of the poor,
famine stricken, refugees, the sick and all who were victims of unjust social structures meant that
it was questioning the configuration of socio-political power in Kenya.153
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But after the coup, the church emphatically stamped its role as a spokesman for the
ordinary folk who were so caught up in the struggle for subsistence and survival in their
everyday lives or so effectively politically gagged and cowered by the Moi regime, to do so
themselves. Indeed, by so doing, it was ironically responding to the Moi government’s invitation
for the church to play a prominent role in Kenya’s politics. In the aftermath of the coup,
increasing rebukes of the state’s abuse of power by the church dovetailed with intensified calls
for nyayo by Moi who expected it to propagate the philosophy and, thus, build support and
legitimization for his regime, to produce a new critical theology.154 The Church got a chance to
layout this new theological stance when Moi asked the conglomeration of Christian
denominations, operating under the umbrella of the National Council of Churches of Kenya
(NCCK), and the Catholic Secretariat, to work together with the Ministry of Education to teach
nyayo alongside religious education.155

Consequently, in 1983 the NCCK produced A Christian View of Politics in Kenya: Love,
Peace and Unity.156 Rather than provide the regime with the theological legitimization it
expected, the preface of the book posed, “Whose nyayo is the nation to follow?”157 In answering
this question, the writers stated that the only human leaders in whose footsteps it was right to
follow was one who was an imitator of Christ. This suggests that when it came to taking political
positions lay people were to look to the church for direction. At the same time, noted the book, it
was the duty of the church to assist, guide and encourage the president so that he could fulfill his
duty of being a good imitator of Christ.

However, it was in addressing the three pillars of the nyayo philosophy of love, peace and
unity that the church demonstrated this newfound and bold critical theology. In its interpretation
of the love component of the philosophy, it posited that the ruling party, KANU, would have
154
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aptly modeled this nyayo call by opening the party to all who wanted to vie for its various
organizational positions, in government and parliament. Further, it argued that Kenyans needed
to be allowed to demonstrate their love for Kenya through active and responsible participation as
opposed to perfunctory involvement in public affairs that only served to rubber stamp the
existing authorities.158 The proper and practical application of nyayo philosophy of love was to
be embodied in a participatory society in which Kenyans of all stations and circumstances were
actively involved in the building of a true community.159

Moreover, with regard to the peace component of nyayo philosophy, the NCCK argued
that this required the state to meet its obligations to the poor, needy and oppressed. Further,
peace was to be structurally embedded in legal and judicial systems that were honest and just.160
It was suggested that there was no peace when opponents were sacked by the regime for
supposedly being anti-nyayo.161 After all, peace in politics was exemplified by the free exchange
of ideas and fairness in the political process.

Lastly, the book advocated for national unity built on celebration of diversity rather than
a unity founded on the idea of the leader becoming consciously or unconsciously identical to a
god, and his words, regarded as celestial decrees. Further, it argued that discrimination in job
distribution and educational opportunities was detrimental to national unity. It was in this chapter
espousing what unity meant to the church that the NCCK mentioned the abortive coup. While it
did not censure the attempt, it did suggest that there may have been good reasons for it.162 This
resonated and reinforced the call for a more just division of wealth and the renewal of Kenya’s
commitment to socialism and democracy that was published in a Roman Catholic bishops
pastoral letter not very long after the attempted coup.163

So, even though the NCCK did not directly mention Moi, the church in Kenya had
theologically crossed and/or bridged a significant historical threshold. Here was an official
158
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document critical of the Moi regime and one that was intended for widespread circulation.164
Further, the church pulled no punches with regard to how the government was managing public
affairs. Hereafter, the church plunged onto the national political stage taking on the government
when and where other public actors, professionals and individuals were content to fight
anonymously underground. This, also, came at a time when the bulk of the Kenyan population
were effectively muzzled or simply cowed into political silence. Boldly, the church treaded into
matters of electoral politics and other issues in the narrowly defined political realm.165 As Sabar
notes, the NCCK, in this document and later sermons, emphasized the right and duty of Kenyans
to participate in political processes and the need for the unimpeded expression of criticism.

Moreover, it took on an unapologetic tone. Rather than cooperate with the government to
preside over a euphemistic peace and order and, thus, keep a tight leash on popular discontent,
the Church emerged as the foremost dissident.166 Speaking behind the sacrosanct shield of the
altar made the pulpit to emerge as a forum for the restoration of the government to correct order,
right rule and back to and for the people.167 It was not lost on Moi that there was a sharp
divergence of his expectations and those of the people as voiced by the church. But before he
frantically attempted to shut the door of biting criticism that he himself had inadvertently
opened, there was a deluge of righteous admonitions. Urged by the Anglican Church, the
Catholic and Protestant churches joined the fray. Pastoral letters calling for a public campaign
against corruption and calling for political pluralism as a pillar of truly democratic system were
published.168 As a result, the Church became the omnibus for legal protest, political expression
and civic involvement.169 It also provided Kenyans with a radical alternative to nyayoism and,
further, acted as the final bulwark of increasingly circumscribed political space.170

By so doing, the Church acted as the sacred preserve and refuge of the Mau Mau spirit of
Kenya’s enduring liberation struggle. It was, literally, a vital plank, cornerstone and last line of
164
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defense against the onslaught of individual freedoms and human rights restricted by Moi’s
oppressive government. One of the crucial battlefronts was the debate that preceded the
controversial queue-voting system dubbed “mlolongo” (lining up) introduced by Moi for the
1988 election year.

Mlolongo –Moi’s Electoral ‘Stroke of Genius’: The Long-winded Exit
The “mlolongo” system, if it can be so dignified, was conjured by Moi to exorcize
political undesirables from the ruling party and parliament, replenish sycophantic talent and,
hence, drown and blunt the din of growing public criticism by surrounding himself with a small
but extremely loud group of party hacks and lackeys who competed to outdo each other in nyayo
songs of praise.171 By sneaking-in the “mlongo” system in which voters were expected to stand
in a line behind their preferred candidate for parliament or his/her portrait, in party-level
elections conducted in that same manner, Moi single-handedly shifted and shaped political
debate in Kenya for the rest of his presidency. The call for political pluralism, constitutional
democracy and respect for human rights and freedom now took center-stage displacing everyday
concerns and struggle appertaining to poor socio-economic conditions.

This shift of political priorities and demands reflected renewed optimism and, by
extension, a new strategy for social change amongst Kenyans who reasoned that, perchance, if
the political structure on which society rested could be amended, they could, at last, enter the
promised kingdom that had been elusive since independence. The mlolongo debate, and the
shambolic elections of 1988 that followed, marked the beginning of the long end of the Moi
presidency. While political and constitutional gains were made after 1988; throughout the 1990s;
and right up to Moi’s exit from power in 2002, Kenya’s economy floundered miserably and
regressed. Dwindling economic fortunes squeezed large sectors of the population who did not
benefit from state largesse or who were excluded by the government’s pork barreled allocation of
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social services dictated, as it was, by political retribution, ethnic discrimination and nepotism of
both blood and opportunistic political elite-ties.172 It is also not surprising that 1988 was the
turning point in the country’s politics characterized by multiple voices and mass protests staged
in literal political spaces such as the Kamunkunji grounds, Uhuru Park, city streets and empty
work places that became theatres of grievance and anti-government opposition. After the rigged
elections, popular loathing of Moi was widespread and barely contained especially in Central and
Western provinces.173 But, more importantly, an informal culture of defiance gripped the
country.174 Mass protest for political reforms and bifurcated sector or profession-specific airing
of socio-economic grievances gradually squeezed through the closing political gates held open
by the timely Samsonian involvement of the Church in politics towards the end of the 1980s.

“Pambana!” With one Voice: The Veil of Multiparty Democracy and
Atomization of Opposition
As already noted, the Church, towards the end of the 1980s, was virtually the only
organization in Kenya that could fearlessly bear the banner for Kenya’s second liberation.175
Even as early as the 1970s the outspoken Anglican cleric Okullu advocated for the church to step
back from society in order to make an independent and objective contribution in building a stable
and right body politic. Besides criticizing the comfortable relationship between the church and
the state; what he saw as the church standing alongside the powerful and the rich against the
weak and the poor, Okullu, from early after Kenya had become a de facto one party state,
stressed the importance of a multiparty system. As far as he was concerned, democracy meant
there always being an opportunity provided for alternative government.176 Although Okullu had
conspicuously been long silent over the issue of multipartyism since the early days of the
republic, he compared the one-party dictatorships in Africa to those in Eastern Europe in a
December 1989 sermon at a time when the latter were being assailed by street protests and were
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on the verge of collapse. In his sermon, Okullu predicted that just as Nikolai Ceausescu had been
overthrown in Romania, so too would African dictators be ousted out power in East Africa.177
This touched-off one of the most heated eras in Kenya’s political history dubbed the “Second
Liberation” struggle. Mau Mau songs made a comeback as new songs of/for a higher liberation
and resistance against the Moi state were composed and flourished in the underground Nairobi
music scene.178
Although the church’s criticism had waxed hot and cold through the years, critical
election-years seemed to provoke bold stances. Like most other Kenyan elections, the general
elections of 1983 were rigged as Moi continued to rid himself, the party and the government of
Kenyatta’s men among them the powerful Charles Mugane Njonjo. Blatant and targeted rigging
occasioned accusations of the elections as a fraud: they were assailed as mismanaged, unfair and
unfree. Archbishop Kuria went as far as arguing that although Kenya had been politically
independent for twenty years, it was important for Kenyans to ask themselves whether social,
economic, and intellectual freedom had been obtained: were Kenyans free? As Sabar points out,
this became a common refrain that rose to a new crescendo in the run up to and after the 1988
mlolongo elections.179 After this and other monstrosities of the 1980s, the country was entering a
new political dispensation and tide that even the self-styled strongman Moi could not turn back.
Kenya, at the end of the tumultuous 1980s was poised to enter into an even more turbulent
decade of resistance against the state characterized by chaos, bloodshed and confusion as people
agitated and milled to enter a socio-economic and political Canaan, which, they believed could
be heralded by constitutional and political reforms. Evidence of this widespread discontent was
everywhere for Moi to witness.180 In late 1989 and early 1990s, there were student
demonstrations at the University of Nairobi, which turned violent and a workers’ strike in Ruiru
a peri-urban industrial town a few miles outside Nairobi.181
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This era of chaos and confusion was inadvertently captured by Bishop David Mukuba
Gitari’s sermon of end April 1989 entitled, “God of Order, not of Confusion.”182 Talking to his
flock in Kirinyaga, the cleric pointed out that the process of selection of leaders was very
important. Gitari told his listeners that for leaders to command respect, they had to be chosen in
accordance to constitutional stipulations; and that leaders had to have the interests of the people
at heart. Moi, he said, had demonstrated that he could respond to Kenyans’ hardships: for
instance, when the president realized that coffee farmers had not been paid anything for six
months, he had directed that Ksh. 1.2 billion be paid out to them at once.183

This, the bishop noted, had come as a great relief to those families whose children had
been suspended from school because they were unable to pay school fees. In like manner, leaders
needed to show a genuine concern for the poor, oppressed and the hungry. Further, they were not
just to be obeyed unconditionally: obedience was to be merited in all things lawful. They were
not to be obeyed when their actions and decrees were unlawful. Gitari also remarked that local,
regional and national election chaos left no doubt that there was a leadership crisis in Kenya.184
In concluding the sermon, no doubt leaving his audience guessing whether he was referring to
election-meddling administrative officers or their boss, the president, Gitari said: “when one
individual thinks he has the indisputable mandate to determine people’s political destiny, thus
denying us the opportunity to exercise the very rights for which Kenyans fought and won at
independence, we get very confused. We are being tossed about by the political whims of one
person …this is confusion; and our God is not a God of confusion.” Boldly, Gitari told his
audience that there was need for peace in Kirinyaga and the nation: this, he added, was not the
passive acceptance of things. Rather, it was a path to peace that called for the confrontation of
situations and seeking to correct things where they had gone wrong.185 As Hornsby aptly
observed, an increasingly angry and loud voice was emanating the pulpit and in particular
Gitari’s altar, as the church in Kenya edged closer to a call for open resistance to the state.186
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A week later, Gitari told another congregation that peace would not come if KANU was
evaded. He told his listeners that he was ready to wear his red cassock and the clergy in their
black robes would escort him to appear before the party to air their concerns regarding recent
developments within it. This statement came at a time when the country had witnessed one of the
most blatant election malpractices in the full glare of national publicity. In September 1988
Kenneth Matiba had been rigged out of Kanu chairmanship in Murang’a in favor of Joseph
Kamotho. In a forced by-election in Kiharu, Murang’a held in December of the same year, the
incumbent MP, Matiba, was rigged out in favor of KANU’s choice, Gidraph Mweru.187 As a
result, Matiba dramatically resigned his cabinet post and was subsequently expelled from
KANU. Facing-off Mweru in February 1989, a visibly shaken Julius Gikonyo Kiano was seen on
television when Mweru was announced the winner although it was evident that far fewer people
had queued to support him than the number who supported Kiano’s line. The latter received over
90% of the queue vote only to be declared the loser, in an election that epitomized the Moi
regime’s contempt for democracy.188
But, Gitari did not specifically speak to this controversy. Instead, in his sermon of 9th
April 1989, he chose to espouse on the meaning of shalom, peace. The bishop taught his
congregants that peace meant welfare and well-being at their best and at their highest. It was one
of the beatitudes and all those who did anything to increase the well-being and welfare of the
world were blessed. Participating in social transformation, Gitari said, was God-ordained: this
was through various ways. It included scientists seeking for a cure for HIV/Aids and other
deadly diseases; toiling on the land so that the hungry could be fed; and when tea farmers cried
out that they were losing many kilos of picked tea-leaves because of delays in delivery to the
factories, and someone heard those cries and responded positively, wasn’t that the way of
peace?189

Another critical voice coming from the church around this time was that of the Rt. Rev.
Alexander Kipsano Muge. Unlike Okullu and Gitari, he was not viscerally opposed to single-
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party politics but he wanted to see the ruling party clean itself up. Muge was adamantly opposed
to corruption and land-grabbing.190 Witnessing soaring prices of essential goods such as maize,
sugar, rice and meat beyond the reach of poor Kenyans and the resultant dovetailing between
arising discontent and political dissidence between 1988 and 1990, Muge was worried about the
temper of the times and the direction that Moi and KANU appeared to be headed in this
regard.191 Moi and KANU had countered demands for political pluralism, opening up democratic
space and human rights with increased political repression, and economic corruption continued
unabated, which brought the country to the brink of looming disaster. The din of political protest
was emerging from its underground years to reach unprecedented decibels in the late 1980s.
However, this coincided with the apogee of a culture of governance that rewarded sycophancy,
loyalty, and subservience and punished innovation, merit, critical analysis and independent
thought. It had roots in the colonial era although it was refined and reinforced in the Kenyatta
and Moi eras.192 As a result, the mood in the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s was sour
as the consolidated status quo forces alloyed by British economic and geopolitical interests
faced-off a loose but uniformly angry and frustrated groundswell of political protest.
For his part, Muge was convinced that there was no one in Moi’s cabinet who was for
change and political reform. Nevertheless, rather than bring change without the Moi regime, he
was ready to entrust Moi’s government with badly needed rectification of the country’s socioeconomic and political situation.193 Giving his testimony before the KANU Review Committee
that was chaired by Moi’s number two, Vice-President George Saitoti, Muge demanded an end
to corruption and land grabbing by powerful government figures; advocated for a two-term limit
on presidential tenure; and restoration of the independence of the judiciary. Before this
testimony, Muge had published his modest net worth and asked other cabinet ministers to follow
suit. Muge had also warned the government of famine in West Pokot, which was part of his
Nandi diocese, but the government denied this charge that was only part of a bigger cyclical
regional crisis affecting the north-west and north-eastern Kenya.194
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To this Anglican voice was added that of Rev. Dr. Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian
Church to whom preaching radical political sermons was not new. In a New Year’s Eve sermon
in 1989, Njoya conjoined Okullu when he observed that the events in Eastern Europe
demonstrated that one-party states failed to meet the needs of their people; were “matigari”
isolated as there were from popular opinion; and were, therefore, inherently undemocratic. Njoya
then made a direct call for the repeal of Section 2A of the Kenyan constitution, which had been
enacted after the attempted Air Force coup of 1982 making the country a de jure one-party
state.195 For Njoya, it was only a matter of time before the changes that had occurred in Eastern
Europe could be seen in Kenya.196 Like Okullu and Gitari, Njoya called for the reintroduction of
a multiparty system.

However, it is important to linger here to note that the Okullu-Njoya reference to the
general events in Eastern Europe and, more specifically, the dramatic execution of the
Ceausescus on 25th December 1989 must have caused Moi a great deal of anxiety. Njoya’s
timing of this comparison must have struck raw nerves and aroused panic in both Moi and his
political cohorts coming, as it did, only a short six days after this climactic spectacle of the
bloody Romanian Revolution. Although there exists no evidence for it as yet, Moi, like most
leaders around the world including in the West, had succumbed to Ceausescu’s foreign policy
genius of openness towards the rest of the non-Communist world and had made a trip to
Bucharest in 1988. Indeed, it was after this visit that Moi returned to Kenya to declare that
KANU was baba na mama (father and mother) thus elevating the ruling party above all national
institutions and organs of the state with him as pater patriæ, the ultimate patriarch at the head of
the table of an informal national patron-client network and embodiment of the authoritative
allocation state largesse.197

Thus, the Okullu-Njonjo comparison was not farfetched. For Romanians, Ceausescu was
a political tyrant and a disaster economically just as Moi had managed to become in a matter of
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one decade. Parallels drawn by both clerics were made, perhaps, because Moi, like Ceausescu,
had, in a very few years, elevated himself to the status of a deus homo, a man-god who lived in
amplitude at the expense of the majority of suffering and struggling ordinary Kenyans.198 Like
other Western-leaning African strong men, among them Mobutu Sese Seko, who nurtured
various degrees of admiration for the personality cult around Ceausescu, the disgraceful fall from
power, must have caused Moi great concern, anxiety or both.199 The Ceausescus, with whom
Moi had dined only a few months before, had been hurriedly tried, convicted and executed by a
firing squad all on Christmas Day 1989 for presiding over an oppressive regime, “genocide” and
criminal abuse of power. In all probability, Moi, his sycophantic following and state intelligence
organs, did not take the comparison between what was happening in Kenya with the democratic
wave of change sweeping through Eastern Europe and certainly, not with revolutionary
Romania, lying down or lightly. Even worse, the fall of the Ceausescus, after twenty-four years
at the helm, had inadvertently started in a provincial city where a protest by the parishioners of
an obscure Calvinist pastor somehow exploded into the nationwide revolt that in nine days ended
in their execution.200 Hence, to hear and face similar criticism and comparison coming from the
church had to be more than just unnerving: the writing on the wall in Romanian revolutionary
blood invoked by the two clerics was not a political analogy that the Moi state could afford to
ignore.

But the Church was not the only source of the demand for radical political reform and
protest. There was both individual and collective organizational and institutional activism and
resistance of urban middle-class lawyers, especially those involved in defending detained
political dissidents among them John Khaminwa, Paul Muite, Gibson Kamau Kuria, Kiraitu
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Murungi, Martha Karua and Gitobu Imanyara, university professors and students, sections of the
business community, journalists, the “jua kali” sector and street vendors and human rights NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs).201

But, besides this concerted effort and convergence of voices and political resistance
against the postcolonial state, there is the little understood and underappreciated role of a
member of the Moi cabinet in the late 1980s: Robert Ouko. Ouko, Moi’s minister for Foreign
Affairs, was the one exception to Muge’s conviction that there was no one in Moi’s cabinet that
was self-critical about how the country was being ran. Indeed, both their tragic and mysterious
end of lives was for more or less the same reasons.
Ouko’s mysterious disappearance and the discovery of his badly mutilated body was, by
its own merit, a driver for political change in Kenya.202 It was also reminiscent and similar to the
disappearance and murder of J.M. Kariuki who had, in the early 1970s, emerged onto the
national political stage as a leading and ardent advocate of the poor; as a lone voice in the
wilderness warning against class formation in Kenya, and, therefore, against the emergence of
ten millionaires and ten million beggars.203 Although not nearly as popular as JM, Ouko cut an
image of a well-polished politician with a cultivated sense of responsibility expected of an able
public administrator that he was. However, he had acquiesced in the excesses of the 1980s
although he had not personally benefited from them in a particularly obvious manner.204 To date,
two outstanding questions about who killed Ouko and why remain, and his heinous murder, as
such, is one of Kenya’s unresolved political mysteries.

As might be expected, many explanations and conspiracies of the Ouko assassination
abound. However, one of the more eloquent explanations supporting that his elimination was not
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the “work of anti-government forces” is the silence, omission and failure of the government of
Kenya to honor and respect a senior cabinet minister by flying the national flag at half-mast
despite his suspicious death coming at least two weeks after being part of the president’s
unofficial visit to the U.S.205 This, then, is what lends credence and weight to the theory that
Ouko was murdered because he had met privately with President George H. Bush and/or James
Baker when Moi was not accorded the same privilege; accusations leveled against him for
having been given special security protection while in Washington, DC; and having taken over
the press conference in Washington at which both the president and Ouko had appeared. Most of
all, however, the main accusation was what state secrets had Ouko revealed to the Americans.
Whatever the reason/s for his assassination, a more central question has become, “what did Ouko
know?”206
In this regard, Ouko’s sister noted that, upon returning from the formally private trip for
the annual Congressional Prayer Breakfast in Washington, Ouko appeared agitated, very
distressed and depressed. Ouko is said to have even commented that the corruption allegations
and US press interviews would kill him.207 According to Detective Superintendent John Troon,
who led a Scotland Yard investigation team into the murder, a corruption dossier on which Ouko
had been working regarding the rehabilitation of the Kisumu molasses plant that adversely
mentioned his cabinet colleague Nicholas Biwott and Moi by extension was key.208 Ouko and
Biwott, apparently, had clashed over the demands to BAK, an Italian-Swiss consulting firm, for
large commissions over reviving the factory.209 The Italian-Swiss bank had been cut out of the
deal. It is said that angry exchanges between Ouko and Biwott in which mutual threats were
made had followed.210

More importantly for Cohen and Odhiambo, it is not the apparent revelations of
corruption or the threats thereof that consumed Ouko’s life. Whatever allegations of corruption
he had against his colleagues, the main issue, as Muge insightfully estimated, was that he had
205
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been, and was, until his fallout, an insider. In his experience working in Moi’s cabinet, Ouko
garnered, experienced and, therefore, knew first hand, and perhaps more and understood better
than any of the regime’s critics from without, “a vast array of contexts,” the language of
comprehension of the state and of state power as constituted in almost innocent and everyday
realms of appointments, bank deposits, commercial deals, contracts, conversations, franchises,
friendships, locks and keys and what is expected in the economies of relations among servants
and masters and among patrons and clients.211 Ouko just knew too much and was, as such, a
liability to the Moi regime.

Even without a political spat about an international investment deal gone awry, the
slightest indication that Ouko would break ranks and resign as a highly placed government
official with such inside knowledge made him a credible threat. Ouko’s knowledge was more
potent than any critique of the Kenyan postcolonial state that had come, overtime, from the likes
of Oginga Odinga’s Not yet Uhuru or the collective works of Ngugi wa Thiong’o.212 Such
critiques from within the postcolonial left, or other critical publics for that matter,
decontextualized and removed observations of the inner-workings of the state and state power
from a conjecturing-distance had no purchase or value against the kind of knowledge that Ouko
had. His was a far-reaching and detailed knowledge of textured practices of managing state
administrations, development projects, foreign investments, consultations, commercial agencies,
bank accounts, and so forth.213 Ouko possessed extraordinary details concerning international
contracting, finance, transnational clientelism and such.214

As noted above, Ouko did not have the monopoly of this knowledge since different
sections of society ranging from the Kenyan underground opposition, which was criminalized or
exiled, and the Kenyan church, that was warned to keep off politics, had long railed against
grand government corruption and maladministration. Such critical publics had dedicated
themselves to this Mau Mau tradition of postcolonial state critique. But Ouko had an insider’s
view of just how highly conventionalized, naturalized and systematized such corrupt practices,
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through which men and women in power in Kenya sought to extend their power and amass their
wealth.215 Ouko had been a small fish that had swum in the murky-black shark infested liquid
mass of local, national and international fiscal networks gnarled by corruption that has its
headwaters in the criminal foundations of the colonial state, the structural and attitudinal edifice
of which ordered social and political life in Kenya, and affected and dictated the country’s
collective psyche.216

Such precise and textualized knowledge in the form of file folders and briefcases, records
of faxes, photocopies of official correspondence, account numbers, formal and informal
conversations and other carefully detailed histories in the hands of a renegade government
minister was damning.217 As a new or late convert to this critical Mau Mau mold of mind and
postcolonial resistance against the state, Ouko discovered, a little too late for his own survival,
that such thickly layered and rendered knowledge in his hands was far more deadly than the
fulsome postcolonial critiques that had led so many of his fellow countrymen and women into
detention, torture, and asylum.218

But the clamor for political change in Kenya in the early 1990s was about to depart the
well-trodden and, more often than not, self-sacrificial path of direct postcolonial critique of the
state couched in the language of grievance ideologically and genealogically tied to the Mau Mau
liberation struggle. Hailed by his platitude-effusing cronies as a politician with a giraffesque long
political neck that could see far back in Kenya’s history and into the country’s future, Moi deftly
recalibrated this distraction from the demand for basic human rights or “maisha mazuri” (the
215
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good life) for all: instead, he pushed subsidiary political rights and constitutional reforms into a
debate about regionalism (majimboism) and divisive ethnic politics.

At the same time, Moi seemed to know that the US and Britain trusted him, as a longtested ally, more than the little known youthful political dissidents, popularly referred to by the
media as Young Turks, who were of unknown quantity and quality. Even the meddling and, thus,
self-acclaimed rogue American ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, preferred the more
cautious path of a decent regard for other people’s lives by finding an evolutionary rather than a
revolutionary solution to the country’s pressing, and potentially explosive, socio-economic and
political problems.219 Hempstone’s attitude, which approximated the U.S-Africa foreign policy
stance regarding the democratic wave that swept throughout Africa in the early 1990s, was trying
to work with what was readily available in terms of political leadership before trying to overturn
the apple cart.220 But totter, the cart did, as this wave of democratic change swept across the land
and more and more people believed it was time to stand up and be counted. The streets, and other
hallowed spaces of resistance struggle against state oppression, corruption and hard economic
times, became sites of enactments of people-power and political agency.

Saba Saba Days and After: Amplified Voices for Political Reforms Betrayed
The well-laden apple cart of British national interest, which had successfully been
protected since the historic hoodwinking of the nation through the granting of political
independence in 1963, had to be safe-guarded against Mau Mau “politics of bread and circus”
taking hold in Kenya of the 1990s. During the heady political days of bloody running street
battles between state security apparatuses and political masses agitating from multipartyism and
constitutional reforms that started in earnest on 7th July 1990, hence”saba saba” (seventh of the
seventh month), hand-wringing British diplomats in Nairobi and London did not yet utter a word
against the government’s rather high-handed deployment of state violence.221
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According to Hempstone, the white population in Kenya, made up mostly of Britons who
chose to settle in Kenya after independence, and the educated elites, while aware of Moi’s warts
and wens, and alarmed by the anger of the masses, increasingly accepted Moi at his own
evaluation, as their one shield against three days of violence and chaos in major cities and towns
in Kenya: Nairobi, Nakuru, Thika and Nyeri, which left no less than a hundred people dead.222 In
as far as they were concerned, Moi was not the principal cause of unrest because of his rigidity
and heavy-handedness. Rather, their greatest fear and threat was the savagery of the rioting
African have-nots at the behest of “upstart” political dissidents.223 It was this sort of attitude that,
even in the sullen silence and tight lips, emanated from the British High Commission in the
midst of the sour political mood in Kenya. After all, Britain had a far greater economic stake in
Kenya than the U.S, with $1 billion in investment to the former’s $200 million, and a much
greater volume of trade to lose if things spiraled out of control.224 So, for Britain, the status quo,
and “law and order” that was well-guarded since independence, had to be protected. Rowdy and
“destabilizing” politics of bread and circus had to be avoided at all costs.
As such, Sir John Johnson, the British High Commissioner, preferred “order” to
freedom.225 Despite the fierce and bloody state response to popular agitation in the Saba Saba
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riots that were a critical moment in the fight for multiparty democracy revealing the groundswell
of anger against the Moi-Kanu regime, Britain did not immediately and/or openly reprimand the
government of Kenya. It is also probable that British diplomats in Nairobi had a low opinion of
political dissidents and felt, “quite naturally” that it was safer to have political change come only
through president Moi. This differed from the American position as articulated by its ambassador
who felt that change had to be brought about despite Moi, especially if he dragged his feet if an
explosion was to be avoided.226

Further, according to Ambassador Hempstone, London feared that if the British
government stood up to Moi, whom it had always supported, he could, like Idi Amin in the early
1970s, expel the 40,000-strong Kenyan Asian community most of whom were eligible to seek
refuge in Britain.227 The British, therefore, had ample reason to be worried about the political
state of affairs in Kenya. While Moi was certainly their preferred man to bring the country back
to ‘order’ and manage democratic political and constitutional change, they did not admire the
crude and deadly manner in which Saba Saba-type of street protests that characterized the early
1990s were handled.

Towards the end of 1991, therefore, as Hornsby notes, the British began to question their
stance. They too soon joined many Western diplomats who supported the loose federation of
forces that was coalescing around a new popular movement, the Forum for the Restoration of
Democracy, that brought together lawyers, academics, clergy, journalists and politicians and
embodied the wishes, dreams and aspirations of the people.228 Early during the clamor for
multipartism in 1990, the lessons of the dawning reality of the end of a bipolar world were too
fresh or a little too complex for the tough Moi regime to decipher. The “party-elite’s bubble of
invincibility and infallibility” guarded by Moi’s state intelligence and security agencies enabled
the president to warn FORD supporters that the outfit was an illegal organization whose
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members were liable to arrests.229 For Moi, those advocating for multipartyism were
scatterbrains who had “something missing in their heads.”230 In 1991, Moi called on his security
apparatus to crush FORD’s supporters like rats.231 As such, although FORD support was
widespread, it had remained underground at first. This explains why Kinyatti, a hardened and
long-suffering intellectual and political detainee of Marxist persuasion, viewed professionals and
clergy joining the chorus for political pluralism as latter-day progressives that, in the troubled
1980s, had been stranded on the banks of the river of cowardice.232

Further, for Kinyatti, seemingly betraying more of his enduring Marxist political-activist
persona than his academic thinking cap, FORD, initially spearheaded by Oginga Odinga, had the
support of the constitutional reformist, petty-bourgeois intellectuals.233 Such a loose collection of
people, as far as Kinyatti was concerned, was not prepared to go far enough to bring about
political change. In as much as these democratic agents agitated, their campaign was not for the
abolition of the oppressive neocolonial system, but, rather, for mere political pluralism and
constitutional reform.234 Their bid served only to add to the flavor already featuring other
ingredients such as human rights organizations and NGOs as well as international financial
institutions that were ‘imperialist’ and supported the neocolonial state and order. In Kinyatti’s
opinion, their hidden mission in supporting political and constitutional reforms was to dilute and
jettison a more fundamental democratic and social revolution. Kinyatti insightfully concluded
that this would end up perpetuating Moism in Kenya without Moi.235

At any rate, the British and other Western capitals had taken note and followed the cue
provided by international financial institutions (IFIs) that had, for years, tried to persuade Kenya
since the early 1980s to fix Kenya’s problems by reducing corruption, liberalizing the economy
and cutting the civil service through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).236 At some
point in the 1990s, IFIs came to view Africa’s problems not as primarily economic but also
229
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political. Kenya, among other African states, required democratic politics . By 1989, the World
Bank was arguing that political legitimacy and consensus were a precondition for sustainable
development, and this in the 1990s became a prerequisite before the West could undo its foreign
aid purse strings.237

Throughout the 1980s, the patrimonial Moi-state responded grudgingly to this external
international financial stimulus. The Moi government wanted to protect its own interest and
leave intact its patronage network, which, apparently, was the president’s only formula for
steering and controlling a “unified” and “orderly” nation. So, by 1987, the government had sold
only 20% of Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) and another 10% in 1990.238 But, unfortunately for
Moi, the end of the Cold War, which was also a triumph of international liberal capitalism,
coincided in a timely way, with the internal call political pluralism in 1990. Moi now had to not
only deal with IFIs but Western governments that strengthened the position of the former on the
conditionality of loans and financial aid on the opening up of democratic space in Kenya.
This was the end of the road for Moi’s decade-long dictatorship: his little game plan was
up. The IMF, the World Bank and Kenya’s foreign paymasters had caught up with him and
checkmated his government. No longer could he utter the magical word (often a ruse)
“communists,” a label used to mute, criminalize and, therefore, detain and suppress lawfully,
legitimate voices for social justice, democratization and peace as he had before 1989.239 Moi’s
government could not, hereinafter, get away with its highhanded and oppressive ways of the
1980s. The West prioritized political and economic reforms as a condition for aid.240 The
conditionalities were the reintroduction of political pluralism; respect for human rights and
freedom of assembly; liberalization of the marketing of agricultural products especially cash
crops; extensive privatization of government parastatals and removal of their politically
appointed managers; budget cuts; civil service reforms; limiting of the number of teachers; and
cracking down on government corruption, all of which would come to be referred to as
237
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constituting “good governance.”241 Denmark froze new aid to Kenya in October 1991after the
discovery of gross anomalies: Ksh. one billion to aid development projects was found not to have
produced anything over a period of 17 years.242 A month later, Britain linked, explicitly, aid to
Kenya to democratic progress.243 The informal Paris Club, which has served as a central pillar of
the international fiscal architecture since the mid-1950s composed of the world’s strongest
economies met for the second time in a year in November 1991 to decide Kenya’s fate.244 At
their November 1990 meeting, the Club had considered cutting aid because of human rights
concerns, but despite the Saba Saba crisis and political detentions, they decided that the
country’s economic performance was satisfactory and extended US $1 billion for 1991.245

However, by this second meeting bilateral and multilateral donors had had enough,
especially as far as their twin yardsticks for aid, political reform and economic management,
were concerned. The donors, therefore, suspended balance of payments and rapid disbursement
of aid to the government of Kenya’s surprise.246 According to Hornsby, this suspension caused a
fiscal crisis. The Ministry of Finance reported that the government was short Ksh. 12.2 billion
during 1991-2. Kenyan leadership was shocked by this decision and psychologically affected.247
The head of state was in a spin as his “Kenya according to Moi” that had lasted less than a
decade was quickly unfurling before his very eyes. But, the extent to which this measure,
alongside increasing diplomatic pressure brought to bear on Kenyan government changed the
culture is disputed.

Nevertheless, what is clear is that, not so long after this decision, the government eased
restrictions on, and political harassment of, FORD leaders. At a Kanu national delegates meeting
held in Kasarani in December 1991, Moi surprised the nation by decreeing the “annulment” of
Section 2 (a) of the Kenyan constitution, thus reintroducing multiparty democracy. By this time
FORD, which was originally constituted a the informal alliance of lawyers and academics who
241
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gathered around veteran politicians Oginga Odinga, Martin Shikuku and Masinde Muliro, among
others, with the support of members of the clergy had already dovetailed with the Matiba-Rubia
1990s popular movement. Towards the end of the year, Mwai Kibaki who had been demoted
from the position of Vice-President launched his own party, the Democratic Party of Kenya.
There were also other smaller parties as 1992 rolled around: the Social Democratic Party and the
Kenya Social Congress. Ominously, in an interview with the BBC, a few days after repealing
Section 2 (a) Moi stated that multipartyism would never produce stability in Africa.248

Meanwhile, the Kenyan economy, suffering from perennial structural weaknesses and the
freeze on donor aid, was in an all-time doldrums. Between 1989 and 1990, the standard of living
of the average Kenyan slipped by 16%. Over the same time, unemployment skyrocketed to an
estimated 40%; Kenya’s trade deficit rose to $1.3 billion; foreign investment was stagnant and
domestic investment was in decline with capital flight reaching $2.6 billion, which was more
than twice the amount earned annually for all Kenya’s exports. Inflation was soaring at 25%
annually.249 Kenya’s import volume of all items including goods and services was at an all-time
low and export of items including goods and services was at 6.5%.250 During the same time, the
population in the north eastern region of the country was facing mass starvation. Livestock losses
by inhabitant pastoral communities in the region, who are largely dependent on their animals for
food, after a period of twenty-one months without rain, exceeded 90%. As a result, about 75% of
children as young as five years old were suffering from malnutrition.251

By mid-1992, with government food relief trickling into the region from Nairobi, the
population there was plagued by epidemics of measles and dysentery among others leaving
people without anything to hope for and very little to fear.252 Visiting the region in space of
twelve months between June 1991 and June 1992, the U.S ambassador saw firsthand what he
termed ‘a slice of hell.’ A senior local dignitary, Sheikh Abdullah, told Hempstone that it seemed
as if it was Allah’s will for the people to face death by starvation, a fate to which they were
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prepared to submit. After all, their livestock were all but gone; there was nothing in the local
shops to buy; and, in any case, they had no money to buy anything with. Their future was
bleak.253

But, what people like Abdullah did not know was that the Kenyan economy in the early
1990s had suffered a severe and long-lasting damage affecting the very poor in society.254 This
was as a result of the suspended donor aid and the negative impact of SAPs administered to
liberalize the economy, a situation that was compounded by the Goldenberg corruption scandal
in which at least US $400 million was funneled from the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). This
bleak situation was exacerbated by politically instigated ethnic violence before and after the first
multiparty elections in December 1992. This violence was experienced in different parts of the
country but particularly intense in the Rift Valley Province, which is Kenya’s breadbasket. Due
to poor rains and ethnic violence, there was a 4.5% drop in agricultural output, which would fall
further in 1993.255 As a result, Kenya’s central pillar of export service and, thereby, by far the
largest foreign exchange earner, tourism, was negatively impacted, this further contributed to this
dire economic straits. For the first time, Kenya defaulted on its foreign debt.256 Kenya was a
socio-economic and political basket case.

With regard to the foregoing, the Western governments-supported and international
finance-administered SAPs were a bitter pill for Kenya to swallow. Initiated by the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund in Kenya since 1988 and especially the early 1990s, SAPs
transformed many aspects of everyday life of ordinary Kenyans.257 These programmes further
exacerbated the economic condition. SAPs, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, were linked to the
high rate of income inequality, inflation, unemployment and mass retrenchment of civil servants
and thus further accentuating the low living standards especially with regard to basic material
resources of half the country’s rural and urban families.258 Over and above the problem of
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inflationary pressures, structural adjustment programmes contributed to the marginalization of
the poor in the distribution of educational and health benefits.259 The Government of Kenya was
forced to introduce cost sharing for social services, a measure that was unpopular among
Kenyans.260 Outpatient charges were imposed for medical services at most hospitals and between
1991-2, the government stopped paying full tuition fees for university students.261 The
implications of such drastic stipulations, hastily implemented, were long-lasting structural
damage. The health sector had continued to be under-financed reducing its ability to ensure an
adequate level of healthcare for the population. Even at the turn of the 21st Century, among those
Kenyans who were ill and did not choose to seek care, 44% were hindered by cost. Another 18%
were hindered by the long distance to the nearest health facility.262

With that said, the government, to its own credit, was not blind to such hardships facing
the country especially in as far as they touched upon budgetary and implications for state coffers.
Indeed, the very survival of the Moi government, considering the groundswell of domestic
opposition, relied upon quick-thinking and ingenuity. With foreign aid cutoff, a new source of
badly-needed government revenue had to be devised to survive the international fiscal onslaught
and local political opposition. At the same time the government faced-off with the Bretton Wood
institutions and the Paris Club between the 1990-2, someone at the Central Bank of Kenya,
government circles and business community drew attention to the growing volume of gold and
precious jewels passing through Nairobi’s black market and other goods coming from Angola,
Sudan, Rwanda and the Congo.263

In a master stroke of sheer genius, it was decided that if, with all due diligence, this black
market export of gold could be made legal, it could easily rival government revenues from
indirect tax imposed on the coffee boom of the 1970s, even when tea earnings of the same period
were factored in (approximately valued at KSh.9.5 billion in 1977).264 But there was one slight
problem: illegal dollar earning from black market gold sold abroad could buy more shillings than
259
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legal ones.265 This initial hurdle was, however, quickly resolved when one of the key proponents
of this great idea, the twenty-five year-old Kamlesh Pattni, got the rare opportunity to share it
with the president himself. The gap between the foreseen disadvantage of the legally good dollar
over the bad with regard to the purchase of the badly coveted Kenyan shilling was sealed with
the simple but authoritative brandish of the president’s “fimbo ya nyayo”: Moi agreed to increase
the level of export compensation on these precious items from 20% to 35% to stop the bleeding
of clean money from the legal exchange rate.266 This new venture was afloat and in business as
Goldenberg International Limited with a monopoly of gold and diamonds by 1990.267
Unfortunately, the Export Compensation Act, which regulated the compensation for nontraditional exports was never adjusted from 20%, which meant that the compensatory payments
made to the company for the legal export of gold and precious jewels, was illegal.268

This notwithstanding, since Goldenberg had somewhat been able to guarantee the
government a minimum annual earnings of US $50 million, it was business as usual. But, to
further complicate the legal implications of this scandalous looting of state coffers in the making,
not only did the government authorize the secret increase in export compensation by 15%, by
mid-1991, Goldenberg was falsifying invoices, massively overvaluing the gold being exported in
order to gain extra export compensation. Indeed, towards the end of the year, the company was
illegally importing gold in order to re-export at inflated prices. Ultimately, even the falsification
of invoices was found to be rather unnecessary and the illegal importation of gold logistically
cumbersome and involving. There was no need to export any gold at all in order to claim import
compensation; to keep records documenting payment of custom duties; or to prove that buying
companies in Switzerland or Dubai actually existed. It was a free for all scheme to print money
with the result being the ‘exports’ of gold reached Ksh.13 billion (US $400 million).269 Fiscal
wisdom, conventional leadership and management principles, and ethical norms such as
responsibility and accountability had been pushed to the margins or simply ignored. As a result,
the margins of universal norms were pushed to the limit and ruptured with impunity. Inflation
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became ever worse as the shilling was debauched. As a result of Goldenberg, all Kenyans were
made 30% poorer, and the country’s gross domestic product slashed by 10%.270 But, what
mattered was that the government was somewhat able to circumvent the turning off of foreign
investments, and the urgent domestic imperative of triumphing over the growing political
opposition.

After Surviving Woes Foreign and Domestic With Cash: Politics of Atomization
and Bifurcation
Now the Moi regime had a war chest full of dollars to fund and fight in the first general
elections after a decade of one-party rule in 1992. Moi’s team had stumbled upon a winning
political strategy: manufactured, or better still, conjured-up, money was aplenty to campaign for
Kanu candidates around the country and to ensure that the party retained the presidency. Besides
this financial arsenal Moi needed more political ammunition to come out at the top. He and his
political generals found a ready weapon in an enduring political debate and concept that he had
helped forge back in the second half of 1961. This was majimboism: the idea of regional
autonomy that had been frustrated and extirpated from Kenya’s independence constitution
in1964.

As earlier noted, Moi in a BBC interview had, even immediately after returning
pluralism, stated that multipartyism would reignite ethnic tensions in Kenya. This was not to
suggest that there had been no latent structural ethnic tensions simmering beneath the calm of
independent Kenya politics. Besides the obvious mainstream challenge discussed above, as
articulated by various critical publics, regarding the unfinished business of the need to address
poverty; landlessness springing from the central issue of historical legal, and therefore, structural
colonial, and perpetuated postcolonial, injustice; unemployment and gross economic inequalities
in Kenyan society, Moi had either been pragmatic enough to stir the murky waters of the
dysfunction instituted by the imperial misconstruction of the Kenyan state or had simply waited
to exploit it himself at an opportune time.
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Nevertheless, both Moi and his predecessor had ably, with both personal verve and the
iron fist of security apparatus, managed to keep the country united despite the obvious tensions
regarding redistribution of the former white highlands, which was compounded by postcolonial
land resettlement schemes that papered-over the social justice issue restoring for free stolen
ancestral lands during colonialism underscored by the principle of ‘willing seller, willing buyer.’
This policy favored colonial Kikuyu migrant labor that formed land-buying companies to
purchase parts of the former White Highlands. It also meant that those able to buy land could do
so anywhere in the country. People could, therefore, buy and settle in land that did not
necessarily “belong” to them ancestrally or as an ethnic community. The postcolonial state was
structurally and ethnically fissured due to this perceived intermixing. Deliberate or calculated
misunderstanding of what majimboism entailed was a potentially divisive and explosive issue.
Moreover, the country had been kept “united” despite the unresolved imperial loose ends
regarding administrative geo-ethnic boundaries that most ethnic groups in Kenya expected to
coincide with the habitual ancestral communal land as it existed at the dawn of British
colonialism. Whereas Moi had been pragmatic in this regard and content to suppress opposition
by criminalizing it and branding it “communist,” the shift of the measure of his geopolitical
utility in the post-Cold War era, which strengthened political discontent and dissidence
necessitated dividing the country up in order to retain power.271 This strategy was aimed at
breaking up the old colonial political nightmare for minority ethnic groups that had haunted Moi
and his allies who shared the same fear of postcolonial domination of the Kikuyu and the Luo,
the two biggest communities. Central and Nyanza regions were the two regions that harbored the
deepest dissatisfaction and hostility to the Moi regime and provided widespread support for
FORD. Throughout 1992, the government tried to play up ethnic tensions between the two
communities, which had long-parted ways in the late 1960s.272

Whether intended or not, this ethno-political strategy meant to weaken the opposition as
well as win the 1992 elections spiraled out of control and ignited embittered waters of simmering
grievance in ‘Mau Mau minds’. Instead of holding itself accountable for demarcating acceptable
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geo-ethnic administrative units or restoring lands ‘stolen’ during colonialism thus approaching
landlessness as an outstanding pan-ethnic and shared national issue of contention, the state
allowed long-standing discontent of the imperial and immediate postcolonial eras to be vented
and addressed against ‘foreign’ settlers who were legally or otherwise not living in their
communal ancestral lands. As far as the Moi state was concerned, it was not the long
outstanding structural issues of historical injustice with regard to land that were in question.

Rather, it was multipartyism that was unworkable in multi-ethnic societies such as
Kenya. Moi and Kanu were instigating old geo-ethnic fears and rivalries: the psychological
ground for the planting of this seed of hatred and discord had always been fertile since colonial
times. The Kalenjin had long suppressed their desire for the former white highlands, which they
considered to be rightfully theirs ancestrally; in the Mt. Elgon region, pro-Kanu Saboat and Teso
were set to remove pro-opposition Bukusu; whereas at the Coast, pro-government elements were
poised to eject “watu wa bara” (upcountry people) who did not belong.273 Thus, instead of
heeding the plea in the 1970s Christian song, The Water is Bitter, to render the water consumable
through a Mosaic healing act of systematically resolving historical injustices, president Moi
authored confusion and disorder as a strategy of political survival.274 According to Branch, this
political strategy had first presented itself at parliament where a close ally of Nicholas Biwott
and MP for Wajir, Noor Abdi Ogle, in a speech in July 1991 explicitly linked implementation of
majimboism with the survival of Kanu and the one-party system.275 According to Ogle
majimboism would meet most Kenyan’s demands for change and at the same time remove
popular support for multipartyism.276

Not long thereafter, Joseph Misoi, a Kalenjin politician and (Keiyo) Uasin Gishu MP
echoed the same sentiments. During the remaining months of the year, there were a series of
mass rallies in the Rift Valley demanding the reinstitution of a federal political system. Fanned to
the limit, ethnic tensions burst out into open violence on 29th October after a series of “majimbo”
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rallies when local Nandi ganged against a mixed group of other communities who had lived in
Metetei Farm, Nandi district since the 1970s. In a matter of a few weeks, Metetei Farm violence
spread to other former White Highlands multi-ethnic settlements in the district finally spilling
into Kericho where Luos came under attack. The trouble also spread to Trans-Nzoia with attacks
on the Luhya. By December, ethnic violence spread its tentacles to Mt. Elgon in Bungoma
District where the Bukusu came under attack from the Saboat and Teso. In this region, like in
Meteitei Farm, tensions went back to the 1960s.

At the beginning of 1992, the violence in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia was particularly
intense as the Saboat and Pokot who had allegedly been ejected from their lands in the first years
of colonial rule resolved to recover their “stolen lands.” Moi who had been aloof all this time,
broke his silence in January 1992 and told Kenyans and international media that the tribal
clashes were as a result of the reintroduction of pluralism.277 In a popular anecdote that started
doing rounds in hushed conversations in the streets, it was said that while flying in a military
helicopter in the Rift Valley, and witnessing plumes of smoke from burning huts, Moi casually
dismissed the deplorable destruction of life and property with a single sentence in Swahili,
“wacha wajikaange na mafuta yao wenyewe” (Oh, well, let them deep fry in a problem of their
own-making).

With literal ethnic fires alight in Kericho, Nandi, Trans-Nzoia and Bungoma, between
March and April, two more natural flashpoints were engulfed: the multi-ethnic settlements of
Molo and Olenguruone in Nakuru District. After rallies in February 1992 by William Ntimama, a
Maasai leader and Kipsigis hardliner, Kipkalya arap Kones, the tribal clashes spread to the
Narok-Kipsigis-Kisii border where the Gusii community, which had lived in the area since
independence was the main victim. At a previous rally in 1991, Ntimama from Narok District
and a Maasai “big wig” warned the Kikuyu residents in Maasai communal districts of Kajiado,
Narok and elsewhere to “lie low like an envelope” or else they would suffer the consequences.
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Kikuyus and other communities that supported the opposition were “madoa doa” (spots) that had
to be cleansed or expunged violently.278

Rather than do anything about the escalating violence, there was no government
response.279 Although the violence abated towards the December 1992 elections, it reemerged in
the same flashpoints and spread elsewhere in the country. For example, in the coast region after
the Kanu hawk Sharif Nassir indicated that he supported majimboism.280 Indeed, ethnic clashes
became a nasty Kenya tradition surrounding the spectre of electoral cycle with the exception of
2002 and 2013. This political nightmare for especially affected families in some of these regions
repeated itself prior to and after 1997 and reached the anti-climax in hotly contested elections of
2007. A blow by blow account of this political violence and its various manifestations has been
ably written about by Hornsby and Branch. But the individual thoughts and reactions of Kenyans
who were watching this tragic unfolding political drama of 1990s from a distance is yet to
complete the picture.

The People’s Voice After Political Atomization and Bifurcation
As observed, FORD was a loose federation of disparate individuals with regard to their
ethnicity, political evolution and experiences and age. This amalgam of elements did not blend
together. It was not even united enough in its hatred against the Moi-Kanu regime. It was a
fractious coalition from the beginning. It also faced the grueling demands of consolidating and
organizing a united front against the Moi regime. As a result, it soon disintegrated into a threeway leadership struggle between its politically ambitious lights including Oginga Odinga
(supported by Paul Muite and Gitobu Imanyara); Masinde Muliro; and a coalition formed with
Kenneth Matiba and Martin Shikuku at the helm. Towards the of 1990, Mwai Kibaki announced

278

Hornsby, A History Since Independence, 490. According to the Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial
Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, July 1999), 50-51, at
a KANU mammoth political rally in Narok held on 28th September 1991, Ntimama said that FORD, the NDP and
multiparty politics was buried. All Moi’s men, ministers and KANU party leaders, had resolved to fight together and
follow the president together. “Majimbo “had existed at independence and had been done away with; if “majimbo”
ended, multiparty politics was also supposed to end, or else, “We will use rungus [cudgels] if this will be the
effective way of ending talk about this multiparty. This I have said on this platform and I am repeating it: the
violence of saba saba was not a mild drinking party.”
279
Hornsby, A History Since Independence, 481 & 490.
280
Branch, Between Hope and Despair, 198.

347

the formation of the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP). Opposition parties thereafter would
continue to reproduce and splinter with every election in amoebic fission fashion.281

It is important to underscore that this multi-fission of opposition parties was not pegged
on issues or based upon differing political ideals about social justice, land reforms, and thus
incongruent alternative visions of Kenya’s future. Yet, ordinary Kenyans continued to quest for
prosperity and looked up to them to deliver the Promised Land. Rather than document individual
rivalries involved in the breakup of opposition parties and their competition for state power,
which dominates historical debate of the political history of Kenya in the 1990s, I have
endeavored to focus on isolated people’s voices from below (“matigari ma njirungi”) with
regard to their thoughts and attitude towards elite politics; their continued quest for nationhood,
national unity and prosperity; and their enduring pleas for issue-centered politics revolving
around basic human needs and rights.

While political big wigs locked horns, as African proverbial wisdom goes, the people
understood that they were the grass upon which their ethnic kingpins painfully trod. People
celebrated and appreciated the opening up of political space in the early 1990s, since they,
relatively, had little to fear compared to the oppressive 1980s when they had to look over their
shoulders before speaking about anything politically sensitive. Unlike the oppressive phase of
the Moi years, parents no longer warned their children what was spoken between mutually
trusting relatives and friends in the safety and privacy of their family house and other gatherings.
Professors at universities, while they continued to be cautious in the 1990s, did not have to fear
as they did that if they misspoke or were not understood, intelligence agents disguised as
students would get them into trouble.

Thus, people were glad that multipartyism had opened many mouths that were otherwise
shot with fear.282 Quite a number of them wrote to various mainstream print media to participate
in the democratic process and make political commentary on various issues. Some of these
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letters to the editors of leading national newspapers reflected the public’s disillusionment with
political pluralism. This disillusionment was reflected in a myriad of letters sent to editors
expressing puzzlement at the turn of events: writers asked many searching questions about the
state of society and where Kenya was headed. Lonsdale also aptly captured another reaction
besides the general sinking feeling at the deep end of the curve of the euphoria of multiparty
politics in 1992 and the end of the Moi years in 2002. It is not so much that Kenyans have been
disillusioned. Rather, after being on an unpredictable roller-coaster and cycles between hopeful
highs and despairing lows, and many false-starts, ordinary people had become “unillusioned”
cynics.283 This political attitude, when it does not consign individual Kenyans to political apathy
and lethargy, provoked scathing commentary directed at various objects of criticism.

One of these objects in the 1990s was expression of disappointment with democracy and
the democratic process itself. Some Kenyans felt that greedy opportunists had hijacked
pluralism. It was felt that the birth of multipartyism was mocked by a culture of intolerance that
made it impossible for democracy to take root. As a result, it was felt that ordinary Kenyans had
to be forgiven for being skeptical of multiparty politics in the manner in which it was being
implemented.284 Indeed, some writers questioned the very meaning of democracy itself. Either
Kenyan democracy as experienced in Kenya was a still birth or the political elite did not
understand that it meant government for the people through their elected representatives.285 The
representatives of the people as mid-wives of democracy, the leaders had shirked their role, to do
right by hopeful ordinary Kenyans. They had let down the electorate and faithful followers
simultaneously killing multipartyism. Democratization had fallen far out of what most perceived
as the superior Western template.

As a result, the objects of democracy, such as justice and freedom that ordinary Kenyans
still had within their sights, had been sidelined. Representatives needed to go back home and ask
people what it was that they needed.286 Otherwise, multipartyism was of no benefit if it did not
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address rampant unemployment; improve education, health, water and other welfare services
such as fighting the introduction of Value Added Tax, which reduced the purchasing power of
wananchi; and people’s poverty. All people witnessed on the national political platform were
wrangling defections and by-elections.287

Other writers yet were dismissive of the ruling class in general. Historically, it was felt
that, collectively, Kenyans’s greatest failure was their inability to contemplate their leaders with
the distrust and suspicion that they deserved. According to Victor Kimani, Kenyans, since 1963,
had nurtured high hopes and faith in their ability to govern themselves prudently. Their common
future was securely in their hands. Unfortunately, they had placed too much trust in certain
institutions and forgotten that human nature was essentially selfish and greedy.288 Kimani,
contributing to The Nairobi Law Monthly further observed:
…Whatever peace we have is due to the foresight and good will of the common man who
pays his tax without questioning how it is misappropriated; who lives with heaps of
garbage in the city without demanding that he elects the councilors; who pays toll charges
after wrecking his vehicle in pot-holes. Kanu is not the author of peace. In fact we had
more peace when Kanu was dormant since we had less dissidents, subversives, sedition
and no foreign masters.
Power inspires strange ideas in the hearts and minds of men. Those who rise to giddy
heights, almost always through the unfair influence of fate, attribute their positions to
exceptional intelligence, hard work and acute foresight. Very few of them ever look back
to contemplate their humble beginnings and ordinary endowments. Filled with
outrageous misconceptions, they regard themselves as superior and infallible, and will
not accept wise counsel or learned opinions. They become the ultimate authorities on
every subject under the sun.289
Although Kimani was writing before the advent of multiparty politics, his critical sentiments outlived the oppressive one-party era.
Kimani’s sentiments were echoed soon after the general elections of 1992. Writing to the
Daily Nation in January, Chrispine Oyuga stated that it was about time Kenyans did away with
its crop of politicians for the sake of the country’s future. After all, it was an open secret that
political leaders in both Kanu and in the opposition misunderstood the essence of democracy.
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This was laid bare in the defections and re-defections from one party to another. It was clear that
most of them did not care about party manifestos and policy issues. Instead, they followed their
own egos. Greedy ones were simply bought-off by Kanu. Oyuga went as far as suggesting that
Kenyan society had failed to produce great statesmen who were true nationalists and patriots.
The country needed new blood. Most leaders were engaged in destroying the achievements of
decades of self-rule even as the economy continued to deteriorate at their greedy hands. There
was something wrong with the political elite. The majority of politicians represented nobody but
themselves. The state of the country was such that there was very little to show for since
independence. One could be right to say Uhuru had not yet arrived.290

Indeed, the ideals for which Mau Mau fought for were far from being attained. Dedan
Kimathi was most assuredly turning in his grave, while Kenyans were celebrating a hollow
independence.291 The personal agenda of the powers that be continued to suppress the benefits
that could be achieved through the creation of democratic institutions. Instead of concerning
themselves with serving ordinary people, politicians were bandying words over majimboism,
tribal supremacy, rival ethnic alliances, who “ate” and who controlled what, all of which were
distractions that were bad ingredients for any nation working towards the betterment of its
people.292 Those who selflessly fought for independence were to be highly regarded. They had
qualities unsurpassed by any contemporary politician. They endured pain and suffering to give
ordinary people and posterity “a life of joy and freedom.” When one visualized the dreams
freedom fighters had for the country encompassing the improvement of their children’s
education; security and prosperity for posterity; a moral society; freedom for all irrespective of
tribal, religious and economic differences, all calculated to make Kenya a better place, and
compared them with the prevailing reality, it was difficult to hold back tears of
disappointment.293
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But for a selfless self-declared “Septuagenarian” writing from Nairobi, the problem of
leadership started at independence. This writer admitted that s/he “hated politicians from the very
early days of independence because I saw the first seeds of corruption which I knew would
eventually destroy our country….”294 This contributor also admitted to not having been to any
church since 1947 despite being a Christian. There were just too many “hypocrites consummate
sinners.” Most people who entered the corridors of power after independence were Christians of
sorts but they succumbed to corruption and lost all sense of honesty, uprightness and probity.
With time, they became progressively worse in their quest for even greater power and wealth.
Their lust by the 1990s had reached insatiable levels. Just like a leopard could not change its
spots, these time-worn politicians and demagogues could not change their ways and nothing
good could ever be expected from them. They thrived on corruption, which was the root of all
the problems and hardships Kenyans were experiencing. It was the height of naiveté to expect
them to eradicate this since all they cared for was the selfish pursuit of personal wealth.295 It is
not difficult to imagine that Septuagenarian had president Moi and Goldenberg in mind as he
penned this scathing criticism. Ironically, despite the enormity and economic impact of the
scandal, Moi continued, all things considered, to claim to be not only Christian, but one who was
born again.296

In fact, the person of the president bore the brunt of most of the criticism as did his party
and government throughout the 1990s. One writer defended the Catholic Church’s criticism and
wise counsel to Moi’s government as forthright, truthful, far-sighted, constructive and
progressive. The church had found the Government in the “out-patient unit” but as time
progressed its “health” had deteriorated and both “the Government and the country” were “in the
intensive care unit, very sick!” 297 This analogy of the country having been rendered a “sick”
basket case was prevalent especially when people recovered their voices in the early 1990s.
“Kenya is sick,” an emotional letter contribution from Nelson Tenia of Eldoret, was particularly
eloquent and poetic:
Kenya is sick and naked! Yet our leaders both in the party and Parliament are
zealously singing in praise of its own wonderful progress unsurpassed anywhere in the
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world. Kenya is sick and naked! Witness resolutions parrot-like “passed” [sic] by
illiterate and semi-illiterate Kanu delegates that recently met at Kasarani. The President
said anyone except criminals, bankrupts[sic] and the insane can run for elective posts ….
Kenya is sick and naked! What is Mr. Fred Gumo’s mission at the City Hall? To
supervise accumulation of garbage in each estate of Nairobi? To ascertain that each road,
street, walk, alley, lane and close is made just impassable by pot holes? Kenya is sick and
naked. Witness …civil servants from the top to bottom their apathy!
Kenya is sick and naked! Look at the state of our roads in the country side, yet
wananchi especially farmers pay taxes promptly, with a smile! Where does toll money
go? What about V.A.T and sevice charge? Is it any wonder that corruption is now
institutionalized? Is it any wonder that grabbing of land by the mighty is carried out with
the blessing of the Government? Does the cry of the weak and voiceless wananchi mean
anything in Ukambani and elsewhere?
Kenya is sick and naked! ….Our so-called representatives in Parliament and
outside have resorted to condemnation of Mr. Jaramogi Odinga, Bishop Timothy Njoya,
NCCK, CPK, LSK and advocates of multiparty. They have resorted to name-calling –
“disgruntled elements,” “lackeys of foreign masters,” “Jimmy Rogers,” …etc. Yet our
cities and towns are rotting with garbage, our roads are near impassable, our graduates
are jobless, our farmers cannot afford inputs –in general our country is falling to pieces!
Kenya is sick and naked! Our foreign currency –earned with our sweat- has been
stashed away by the mighty rulers in foreign banks- talk of stooges!
…Our leaders both small and big are blind. They are unaware that their deeds are
leading this country to the brink of destruction. Their greed and wealth and power have
made them blind and insensitive. Even some clergy and lawyers have joined the
bandwagon of looters –they say; “We are all in the same boat, so let us all share the loot.”
The loot? Where is patriotism our so-called MP’s profess to us? …
Kenya is sick and naked. Development of our country is lop-sided. Power,
construction of tarmarc roads, telephone services are places where they are least needed
because X or Y or X are Nyayo followers, so they must enjoy the loot to their
constituencies ….
Who says Kenyans will fight if many parties are introduced but sick minds! I am
a Nandi and I live side by side with Kikuyus, Luhyas, Luos and Turkanas and we are all
happy building a prosperous Kenya. We have intermarried. We do business together…
What …do we do to save Kenya?
What do we do to clothe it?
…Let us have a convention of lawyers, teachers, student leaders, women
representatives, workers unions, councilors and MPs.
Let them sit down at a big round table and seriously, intelligently, impartially,
cooly map out the ‘Kenya we Want.’
We need…change. We need meaningful change. A change that will take us into
the 21st Century where [sic] educated civilised and leaders with ideas at the helm of our
nation.298
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It was also around this time that the Peter Kigia, a musician who composed and sang in
his vernacular Kikuyu, lodged a bitter denunciation of the Kanu-Moi regime, Reke Tumanwo,
which echoed the sentiments above.
Umuthe ndauga reke tumanwo
Akorwo wi witu, reke tumanwo
…Ihinda ria muriano riu ni-ithiru

/I declare today, ‘We must part ways’
/Even if we are once one, we must part ways
/You cannot prey upon us any much longer

Ndira hiya hiya, ngacura,
Ngatheka theka, ngarira
Ni-kuimbirirwo ni marakara
Kurwo ndihinya ingiagutandika
Nginya ugunde ujathimure

/I’m burning, burning: burning to char,
/I start to laugh, but then I cry,
/Because of the exploding anger within
/If I had the power, I would beat you up
/To give you a taste of your own medicine
–that would make you sneeze

Unduirie irima-ini ria nduma
Ndageria kwiruta ukajokia ukwo

Njiragwo daguire na ngoi

/You consigned me to a dark dungeon
/Every time I tried to pick myself up,
you kicked me back down
/You treat me like Lazarus by the rich man
/Subjected to eat breadcrumbs off your table
because I am a lesser being
/All explained with, ‘You were born fool.’

Ndirabogotha thiomi njeru,
Ndukone ta-thukite mutwe
Nongu-kwira uringi, Ndirakwihoka
Uhana Judasi wakunyaniire Jesu
Akimwendi thendi mirongo etatu

/But now, I am speaking a new language
/And don’t you think I have gone crazy
/It’s just to tell you again, ‘I don’t trust you’
/Because you are like Judas who betrayed Jesus
/Sold for thirty pieces of silver

Uherithagia ta Gitonga Lazaro
Ndiyage u-ruiteki nie Wanyakiumba

…Harusi yetu na ‘yekeke’
…Imevunjika…!

/Let’s get a divorce
/It’s over!

(Sings in new unintelligible ‘new tongues’ with only a few Swahili-Kikuyu words discernable)

…’Na-koma rungu-ye,’ …
… ‘Pole,’ …na-turungi bila sukari

/.…I have been sleeping on the cold floor under
your bed….
/…You say, “Sorry,” but I still drink my usual
sugarless black-tea .299

But while most of such biting criticism was directed at Moi and his government,
members of the opposition, especially Members of Parliament, were not spared. With high
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expectations from the new parties, public opinion was that the opposition had failed. Most people
pointed out correctly that it was not enough to heap on Moi for everything that was wrong in the
country. Members of the opposition failed to embrace moderation to enable them to press issues
objectively for the general welfare of society. To the contrary, they prioritized scandalizing the
president in order to boost their own public profiles.

Further, it was argued that hatred directed at the president would not propel society to
success, especially when it was at the expense of the hard work of nation-building; integrity;
professionalism. “Moi-must go” slogans, sponsoring motions of no confidence in parliament and
hindering government-sponsored motions was not enough.300 Moi’s removal was a non-issue.
The question the court of public opinion wanted answered, especially in the mid-1990s as the
country was poised to hold another election in 1997, was “Who” told the opposition “that
President Moi” was “a problem to Kenyans? Why should they waste time on such an issue?”
There were perceptive minds that understood that Kenya’s socioeconomic and political problems
were fundamentally structural and historical in nature. Many Kenyans, therefore, were audibly
wondering whether there was any higher purpose other than the mere removal of Moi from
power that motivated apparent opposition unity, much spoken about in the 1990s but never
actuated. 301 Like the ruling party Kanu, the opposition was not issue or longue durée oriented in
terms of thinking of resolving the country’s problems. Instead, talk of opposition-unity was
mainly over dislodging Moi from power that many considered ridiculous and laughable. The
main opposition parties lacked a concrete agenda on which to build an alliance ahead of the 1997
general elections.302 This specter was self-immolation by the opposition.303

In fact, most of them had been ardent Kanu turn-coats who joined the opposition only
after falling out of grace. After decamping they derailed the democratic process since the
undemocratic gene of the ancien régime characteristic of post-independence governments was
deeply ingrained in them. As a result, this group of individuals betrayed the process of change
that millions of Kenya wanted. They spoiled the opportunity, in 1992, to remove Kanu from
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power constitutionally. This failure was because of the blind lust for power.304 The idea of
opposition unity was a wisp because Kenyans did not expect them to compromise on settling on
any one leader: they all wanted to be president and were, therefore, not expected to give each
other a chance. Moreover, internally, the parties were undemocratic.305

While the opposition was thus engaged in an elusive quest to form a strategic alliance
against the Moi-Kanu regime, the people were scattered like a flock without a shepherd. There
was no credible opposition party or leader to offer direction. Even if an alliance was
forthcoming, it was observed that the prime movers driving such a bid would ultimately fail to
accommodate groups that had tirelessly advocated good governance and justice. These included
NGOs, churches, academics, farmers, unregistered parties, human rights activists and students
among others. Yet, without such sections of society, any such coalition of opposition forces was
inadequate because it discounted “the participation of all people who had fought” were “still
fighting for the liberation of Kenyans from the claws of the neo-colonial monster.” 306 It was a
sea change that was expected of the opposition and not merely a matter of fielding a single
candidate to propel somebody to State House. It is a real cure to the suffering of the helpless
hungry poor “lumpen proletariat” or “marginalidados” that was expected.307 What Kenya needed
was “a surgeon to clean the wounds of decay and inject a new sense of values to match the ideals
advocated by the Mau Mau freedom fighters who spilled their blood to liberate the common man
from exploitation by a small clique of colonialists.” 308

What the Common Man Needed: Liberation by Surgeon Mau Mau Freedom
Fighters
The mwananchi, the common man, understood democracy. Ordinary people understood
that change had to come from citizens themselves. Some Kenyans writing to newspapers in the
1990s demonstrated that they had internalized the ideals of democracy. Indeed, they improved
Nyakwara, “Opposition Leaders Must Act Now.”
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upon the original Mau Mau language of grievance elevating it with an appeal to the adherence
and satisfaction of basic human rights. Some letters pointed out all men are created equal and
were, therefore, endowed with certain inalienable rights. Among these, argued Isaac Babu
Gitonga from Mombasa, included life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It is for this precise
reason that governments were created among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the people. If then the government was ‘destructive of these ends’ it was the people’s right to
change it and institute a new government. Otherwise, imposing changes from the top was
dictatorship.309

So, whereas there were voices of despair, there were others more enduring that
understood the inner working of democracy. What was needed was an organic or bottom-up and
popular movement where society had a core leadership that articulated the burning issues of the
day and their solutions.310 Such a movement would not be the outcome of a “single event” or
constitute one. If this was not clear, the vivid lesson of post-Uhuru, Kenya whereby bystanders
stood over the reins of power after successful but bloody liberation struggle, would be lost. It
was for this reason why after independence, “democracy” took a wrong turn. The “fundamental
ideals” of independence, namely getting rid of poverty, disease and injustices under colonial rule
were shelved.311 Instead of waging war against “the imperialist,” a new drama unfolded: power
struggles, social injustice and the misappropriation of public funds.

Therefore, what was needed to turn things around was an emergent generation of young
leaders that was credibly nationalist and democratic; that was committed to a new and
democratic constitution; the rule of law; the elimination of social inequalities repeal of all
oppressive laws; rejuvenation of educational and health systems, among other imperatives.312

Put differently, Kenyans needed a better more compassionate and responsive
government. The public had the good sense to know that there was something fundamentally
wrong in a society that emphasized the work ethic and yet failed to provide jobs for those willing
Isaac Babu Gitonga, “Change Must Come From Citizens,” Daily Nation, 12th December 1994.
Kabando wa Kabando, “New Political Thinking a Must,” Daily Nation, 7th May 1995.
311
Reverend Moses Akuku, “Hard Road to Democracy,” The Standard, 25th May 1993.
312
Ibid.
309
310

357

and able to work.313 Beyond this structural malaise, it was felt that there was “a serious
breakdown of…norms” that governed society. This was to be found in the general feared trend
towards a pervasive psychology of self-interest that left no place for national and public good. It
was a society where people seemed to be governed by the principle of survival for the fittest:
this, unfortunately, also meant that everyone had to bear their own cross. Since this was the case,
what chance did poor Kenyans have under the country’s economic condition?

Further, this also meant that Kenya was a country for the rich where the poor continued
to get poorer while the wealthy amassed even more creating a chasm between them.314 There was
too much emphasis on individual rights in Kenya at the expense of communal obligations. As
such, some Kenyans expected a little too much with regard to their own individual satisfaction,
which was pursued without the obligation to give anything back to society in return.315 Surely,
the people had endured “the State’s painful bruises.” It was about time that the government did
something to spare them more injustices.316

The vision of, and therefore what the mwananchi expected by looking up to the state
from below, was best summed up in the following letter excerpt:
Good governance is in large measure the appropriate and productive use of a
country’s resources with the full knowledge, and for the benefit of, the nation’s citizens.
The wananchi are entitled to know, either through public information (the media), or their
elected representatives, how the government performs its functions, how tenders are let,
for example, or how public money us safeguarded and spent for the good of society
without being diverted to private use. Citizens are also entitled from their government
certain guarantees of security from arbitrary arrest, extralegal restraint of the media,
marauding bands intent on burning houses and chasing them off their land. Finally, good
governance carries with it a certain commitment to provide services for the common
good of society; fair elections, education, healthcare fiscal accountability and
transportation infrastructure, to name a few.
The above list is far from exhaustive. It is, rather, a general disposition on the part
of the government to look out for the welfare of the wananchi as a whole and not just a
select few. Every elected official who lives up to his or her oath of office to serve the
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people of Kenya is exhibiting good governance, …. Ultimately, good governance places
the responsibility of the government in the hands of the people who in turn hold the
government accountable for its policy decisions and actions.317

Conclusion
When Moi came to power, many hailed him as a God-fearing Moses who would lead
them to the Promised Land of socioeconomic prosperity, a life of civic virtue and civil liberties.
He cut the figure of a compassionate and responsive political statesman. This image and
expectations, however, were soon dashed. It’s a fact that president Moi had inherited an
economy already experiencing a downturn in difficult international economic times. But his
initial expansionary and inclusive policies worsened the situation. Economic misdemeanors and
mal-administration characterized by grand corruption brought the country’s economy to its
knees.

This, without fail, stirred unstinting political opposition from various quarters including
the intelligentsia, the Church, the professions and ordinary everyday citizens who bore the brunt
of the harsh economic times associated with the Moi era. The attempted coup was the stimuli
Moi needed to show his true colors. For the most part of the 1980s, the country was thrown back
to times not very much unlike colonial days. State security apparatuses were strengthened and
Kenya, by every measure, became a surveillance and police state. The Moi regime then ran
roughshod on people’s subsidiary political rights and basic rights. Whereas the tide turned
against the regime in the early 1990s, Moi managed to cling onto power. On the one hand, he
implanted the recommended SAPs that worsened an already bad economic situation, which
fueled his opposition. On the other, to survive and remain at the helm, like in the colonial era,
Moi used divisive politics along ethno-regional lines, turning people’s bitter frustrations against
each other. Moi, “without much effort,” had managed to turn the clock back. Rather than resolve
the longstanding problem of land ownership and use, the president used this as a tool for political
manipulation. Organized political opposition did not, itself, withstand this device of control, and
coupled with individual ambitions and raw power hunger, was atomized and trounced in two
elections.
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-10th 1993.
317

359

But that was just as well because, the political class seemed to have lost sight of what
really mattered to ordinary citizens: the rule of law and repeal of oppressive laws; the elimination
of social inequalities; the rejuvenation of educational and health systems, proper infrastructure
among other basic human right imperatives of day to day life. Although in the minority
throughout the 1990s, there were a few perceptive minds that kept the flickering light and
mentalité of struggle on. Although isolated as “matigari ma njirungi,” they understood that
Kenya’s socioeconomic and political problems were fundamentally structural and historical in
nature. This was the spirit with which Kenyans went to the 2002 polls that removed Moi.
Although, once again, elite divisions and political bickering put a damper on it, this attitude of
ongoing struggle remained alive in the first decade of the 21st Century under the new
administration of President Mwai Kibaki. Although manifesting itself in various ways, and not
always acting in accord, the mentalité of struggle survived the worst of times, in the 1990s, and
thrived in the Kibaki years of “bado mapambano” (the struggle is still on).
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Chapter VII - Bado Mapambano, Solidarity Forever:
Latter Day Travails of Critical Publics

Preamble
Inchi yetu ita filisika na ufisadi
Na tusipo chunga, ni sisi tutaishi kwa umaskini
Bado mapambano, Mapambano
Si ni aibu katiba itufiche haki zetu
Serikali imeshindwa kutimiza wajibu wake kwa wananchi
Bado mapambano, Mapambano
Twende sote!
Maneno yao matamu, laikini bila matendo
Kilicho na mwanzo haikosi mwisho
Hawajui kwamba sisi ndio tegemeo,
viogonzi wa leo.
Simama dada…vijana msilale
…Bado Mapambano…
…Kenya ni yetu….

/ Our country, Kenya, will be impoverished by corruption
/and if we don’t watch out, we will live in poverty.
/The struggle is still on, struggle-on.
/Isn’t it a shame that the constitution is blind to our rights!
/The government has failed to fulfil its obligation–
to the public.
/The struggle is still on, struggle-on.
/Let’s all join in!
/Their lips drip sweet words, just idle words without action.
/Little do they know, every beginning has an end
for we are the hope,
the leaders of the day.
/Rise up sister…don’t slumber young people
…the struggle is still on…
…Kenya belongs to us….

“Mapambano,” by Inka, Youtube Video, Published 16th July 2012.
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This chapter begins with an overview of the general state of the Kenyan economy after
the Goldenberg scandal and the last six Moi years. This background analysis is extended to the
Mwai Kibaki years (December 2002 to April 2013) during which there was economic growth but
half the country’s population remained trapped in poverty. Unfortunately, even after Moi’s
departure, government was marred by corruption scandals that eclipsed Goldenberg. This period
of Kenyan history has elicited mixed views with some seeing the country as being back on the
path of progress and the future.1 Others have argued that despite this transition, “nothing actually
really changed.”2 The political and socioeconomic continuities and discontinuities are already
engaging historians and other public commentators and observers in Kenya and abroad. Be that
what it may, the everyday experiences and struggles of ordinary Kenyans remain the litmus test
of whatever change, or the lack thereof, has impact on their lives.

The crucible of socioeconomic hardship, as experienced by various cadres of public
employees ranging from university lecturers; elementary and high school teachers; doctors and
nurses; and, with all due concern, disaffection in the ranks of the country’s police force, is most
eloquent on this score. Thus, the discontent in these, among others sections of Kenyan society
and the formal and informal sectors of the economy, as expressed through perennial strike
action, serve a common thread that runs, not only between the Moi and Kibaki years, but also
one that harks back to the anti-colonial struggles embodied by the Mau Mau war. This, then, is
what forms the subject of this chapter. In addition, this discourse extends to the mushrooming of
rural and urban militias as well as rampant crime, which is another manifestation of economic
and social malaise. The entire spectrum of such youth groups is beyond the scope of this
discussion. However, it is important to point out that of the over thirty or so militias banned by
the government, most of them were client-patron private armies engaged by rival politicians for
election campaigns and “security.”
Nevertheless, three movements stand out because as they do not fit within this mold. They
are Mungiki, a movement that, despite tracing its roots to the early 1980s, reached its zenith in
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the mid-2000s, the Saboat Land Army in the Mt. Elgon region and the Mombasa Republican
Council (MRC) both of which can be traced to the intermittent post-election violence during the
two multiparty election cycles in the 1990s. Generally, militias are a result of the poor state of
the economy, which is the foremost source of risk for youth according to a World Bank report.3
Constituting the majority of new entrants into the labor market with approximately 500,000
young people joining the labor force every year, only a small portion of them are able to secure
employment in the formal sector due to poor economic growth.4 While this is true of these three
groups, they developed directly as a result of the deep-seated, unresolved problem of land.
Secondly, while from time to time the Mungiki and the MRC have been courted by politicians,
they emerged independently of the political class. The nurture and roots of their discontent is
explored as part and parcel of economic and social malaise.
Lastly, an important aspect of investing the impact of the poor state of the Kenyan
economy on the population is scrutinizing pop culture in Kenya. Art and music, especially, have
become acutely socially and politically conscious. The harshness of socioeconomic life is
reflected in various art forms. This examination of the production of popular culture from the late
1990s to 2013 will be limited to the music of various Kenyan artistes including Kalamashaka,
Eric Wainaina, Ukooflani Mau Mau, Just A Band, Lisa Oduor Noah, Jahcoozi, Jaguar,
Necessary Noize and Watumwa among others. In addition, graffiti, photography and cartoons
will be examined. Further, analysis is extended to the emerging politics of social communication
through platforms for political action provided by social networking sites (SNSs) like Facebook
and Twitter. Kenya has caught up with the global explosion of the World Wide Web, technology
that in recent times has been used to bring pressure to bear on the government by teachers,
doctors and nurses or Kenyans themselves expressing solidarity with strikes. The radical
secessionist MRC, constituting the technology savvy youth, promoted its objectives through their
Facebook page.
However, there are virtual protest movements and critical publics that champion various
causes through SNSs. These include the Wanjiku Revolution, Pawa254, Bunge la Wananchi and
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Unga Revolution. Individual Kenyans and groups have also put to use e-Petitions, especially the
globally available GoPetitions site.5 Together, these new virtual avenues of protest and political
agitation that are contiguous with the actual physical reality play out in everyday spaces of
historical struggle including the Freedom Corner in Uhuru Park, Nairobi streets and Parliament.
Despite this interconnection, they are herein treated as manifestations of eDemocracy at work in
Kenyan crowd politics from below. The emerging sociopolitical discourse dovetails with other
categories of formal and informal critical publics above, all of which collectively decry
socioeconomic inequality and marginalization, injustice, the poor state of the economy,
corruption and political repression. Put differently, the mentalité of struggle encapsulated in the
single Swahili words “matatizo” or “mashaka” (problems/uncertainty).

An Economy on Its Knees: Moi’s Twilight Years and After
Kenya’s structural reform programs since the 1980s guaranteed substantial capital flows
from the IMF, the World Bank and Western donors, but controversial political developments and
continued human rights violations in the second half of the 1990s put these in jeopardy.6
Although Kenya continued to be the most industrialized country in East Africa during this time,
agricultural production remained the cornerstone of the economy. In this period, the sector was
contributing close to 30% of total output, employed over 70% of the labor force in primary and
secondary activities, and was contributing more than half of the country’s foreign exchange
earnings while providing a substantial part of its food requirements.7 Small farms contributed 7080% of agricultural GDP. In 1995 tea accounted for 18% of merchandise export, while coffee
contributed 15%. But it was tourism that was Kenya’s most important foreign exchange earner
bringing $486 in 1995.8 In the 1990s, tea superseded coffee as the country’s most important
cash-crop and export earner. Indeed, this trend started much earlier in the 1980s.9
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However, in contrast, the hallmark of the second half of the 1990s was the pauperization
of small coffee farmers and general doldrums for the sector. Coffee price regulation based on
future markets in 1990s coincided with declining national production volumes. Producer prices
were cut by half without commensurate decrease in overhead processing and marketing costs.
Coffee production was in decline for five consecutive years after 1988.10 This decline was more
pronounced in smallholder farms where it declined by 47%.11 Although prices reached their
highest since 1977 between 1995 and 1997, Kenya’s global market share was marred by
preference for less acidic coffee and technological disadvantage.12 This, coupled with incomplete
and incompetent liberalization of the coffee sector was attended by misappropriation; halving of
coffee prices, between 1999 and 2002, meant farmers were paid less than they spent raising the
crop; drought conditions; poor road infrastructure; currency devaluation and inflation; and debt
incurred by farmers to buy inputs, advance payments, factory development and finance crop
picking owed to the EU and World Bank all spelled doom. Thousands of smallholders uprooted
their coffee trees and opted to grow food instead. Others who retained their coffee farms
neglected them resulting in abject poverty in coffee growing areas. The effect in Central
Province was particularly severe, with poverty, crime and social problems on the increase. The
gross margins per farm were not enough for family sustenance let alone enough to send children
to elementary and high school.13
Moreover, for more or less similar reasons, including market dynamics affecting pricing,
drought, liberalization and deregulation, maize, rice and wheat production stagnated and was
barely enough to meet the demand for food in Kenya.14 The situation was compounded by El
Niño flooding phenomenon in 1997-98 explained as a symptom of global climate change
together with increased population growth and general environmental degradation. This resulted
in intermittent food shortages and even famine in some regions.15 Between 2.5 and 3 million
Kenyans faced starvation between 1997 and 2011. For example, President Moi declared drought
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conditions in Northeastern, Central and Rift Valley provinces a national disaster at the end of
January 1997.16
At the same time, prospects for economic growth were dwindling. Whereas economic
recovery and growth had been projected at 5% in 1999, it was revised downwards to 3.5%. This
was due to El Niño effects, continued stagnation of export volumes and a slow recovery for
badly hit tourism revenue and a boom in imports.17 But the state of things was even gloomier as
a result of expected slippage in macroeconomic discipline in the run-up to the second multiparty
elections of 1997. This was reflected in rising inflation, monetary growth and government
expenditure.18 It was estimated that between 1991 and 1997, the government lost Ksh. 475
billion (US $9 billion) in fraud, theft and illegal spending.19 A politically intense general election
year, 1997 witnessed attendant ethnic cleansing. One of the violent incidents occurred during the
marking of the seventh anniversary of Saba Saba riots of 1990.

On 7th July 1997, a series of major rallies were held across the country on what was the
anniversary of the Saba Saba riots that accompanied the pressure for a multiparty system. The
police and security apparatus in Nairobi attempted to suppress any demonstration, occasioning
pitched battles in the city. As a result, more than fourteen people lost their lives. This was
followed by more violent confrontation between protesters and police on August 8th during a
one-day national strike held to press for reform. The most serious disruption occurred in Nairobi
where hundreds of youths went on a rampage and confronted the police. On 13th August, the
violence shifted to the coastal region where between 70 and 100 people were killed.20 A
thousand Mijikenda, including people with military or para-military backgrounds who had been
in training preceding the event, raided a police station in Mombasa.21 In November, there was
similar ethnic violence in Trans-Mara District far away from the coast.22 Ethnic clashes
16
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continued in various parts of the country even after the 1997 election and in spite of Moi’s
promise in his swearing-in ceremony that his new and last term would be more “peoplesensitive.”23 Unabated violence bore serious implications not only for the Kenyans trying to
grapple with life but also the economy.
These political developments and gross abuse of human rights jeopardized foreign inflow
of capital in the form of aid and foreign investments and negatively impacted the tourism sector.
Due to concern over the budget deficit and inflationary tendencies, the second tranche of the
IMF’s $216 Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) had not been released as scheduled
in 1996.24 In 1997, however, the IMF simply suspended ESAF further undermining investor
confidence and adding even more pressure on the currency. This combined with the tense and
unstable political atmosphere to produce negative repercussions for the country’s economic
outlook. Economic growth was anticipated to drop to 3.1%, which was below the rate of
demographic expansion for the first time since 1994.25 The health sector was seriously affected
by this economic downward spiral. Expenditure on pensions, health care and social benefits fell
from 2.6% of GDP in 1990 to 2% in 1996. By this time, as Hornsby appropriately observes, the
minimal safety net against poverty, ignorance and disease promised in the 1960s had long ago
frayed away.26 As a result of a combination of factors including the spread of HIV/Aids,
population growth, economic stagnation and SAPs, life expectancy in Kenya fell from 60 to 52
years. The rapid spread of HIV by 1996 affected between 7.5 and 8% of Kenyan adults; and
increasing cases of malaria, especially due to El Niño rains, were major contributing factors.27
The government was culpable and accountable for the bad times because it did precious little to
mitigate the situation. Furthermore, grand corruption and poor management of public affairs
were still the order of the day during this period.
Indeed, government corruption was on the rise. Various government parastatals were
funneling funds to political accounts.28 It was on the management of public land that corruption
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was particularly rampant. In the capital, the Nairobi County Council grabbed and sold virtually
all open space or public institutions including road reserves, cemeteries, school playing grounds
and community parks.29 In the Mau Forest Complex and Karura Forest, legal and illegal
excisions were allocated. Parastatals were forced to buy such land at inflated prices from
middlemen with the accruing difference feathering elite fiscal nests.30

New Government, Same Old Systemic Rot: Kibaki’s Elusive Mop-up
Moi’s old number two in the 1980s, Mwai Kibaki, ascended to power, thus becoming the
country’s third president on the emphatic multi-ethnic support and goodwill forged in the lastditch pre-2002 elections strategic political alliance.31 While his ascendance to power triggered
the imagination that anything and everything was now possible with Moi’s exit, Kenya’s
economic woes and government corruption continued. To his credit and that of his
administration, however, Kenya’s economic growth rebounded from 2002 levels to about 7% by
2007. Kibaki’s government also made strides towards judiciary and constitutional reforms
crowned with the promulgation of a new Constitution of Kenya in 2010. Other modest successes
included civil service reform, free primary education and improvement in the availability of
drugs and health provision.32
Kibaki enumerated the successes of his first and second administrations based on
voluntary or forced multi-party coalitions when he led Kenyans to celebrate forty-nine years of
independence. On this occasion of Jamuhuri Day celebrations on 12th December 2012, Kibaki
reminded Kenyans of the serious economic challenges the country was facing when he came to
power. Despite this, he said that his government was able to keep the GDP growth rate between
7% in 2007 and 5%. This economic record rested on the twin blueprints of Economic Recovery
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Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation and the Kenya Vision 2030, inaugurated to
transform the nation into a middle-income country. Under this economic development strategy,
the agricultural sector recovered from a -3% growth rate to 6%. This, according to the speech,
had reduced national poverty levels from 56% to 46% and buoyed food security levels. Kibaki
was also proud of efforts to reduce over-reliance on rain-fed production through the
rehabilitation of irrigation schemes such as Bura, Hola, West Kano, Mwea, Nzoia, Ahero and
Katilu, all of which increased the area under irrigation by 150,000 hectares. He further stated that
his government had created new schemes in the swamp in Yala, Turkana, Kibwezi, Masinga and
Kiambere.33
In addition, Kibaki showcased the expansion of the national tax revenue base. In 2002, he
said, the national budget was Ksh. 250 billion yet tax revenues stood at Ksh. 180 billion. The
Moi government had plugged in the shortfall with the help of foreign donor funding. By 2012,
tax revenue had increased significantly to Ksh700 billion, thus enabling the government to fund
over 95% of the national budget, which meant relative economic independence. Further, he
pointed to attempts to rehabilitate and expand the road and railway transport system and energy
and telecommunications infrastructure to ease the movement of goods and people to increase
production and trade opportunities. With regard to electricity connections, the president pointed
out that since he took the reins of power, these had increased from 600,000 to over 2 million.
Towards the end of his administration, Kibaki unveiled the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia
Transport project that includes the laying of a railway track from Lamu to Kenya’s two
neighbors in the north. His government had also acted to increase the capacity of the old port of
Mombasa in addition to the construction of a new one in Lamu.34
Another centerpiece that Kibaki mentioned was the fact that in ten years mobile phone
users had grown from less than a million to 30 million; and internet users from 250,000 to 14
million. There were more radio and television stations during this time: the former increasing to
81 and the later to 19. The president also mentioned an interesting economic achievement that he
described as “financial inclusivity.” He explained it in terms of increasing the number of people
with access to financial services from 1 million people to over 20 million Kenyans. This referred
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to people with access to capital and credit facilities to pursue different entrepreneurial ventures
through the revolutionary mobile telephony solutions and the expansion of the banking
industry.35 Whereas the veracity of these figures of financial inclusivity go unquestioned, the
intensity of agitation for more pay from various formal professional and informal sectors, and
popular culture that offer a rare snapshot of the experience of everyday socioeconomic realities
tell and constitute quite a different narrative.
Moreover, systemic government corruption proved to be quite a different kind of animal to
slay in a decennary fell swoop. Despite the new government’s commitment to the fight against
corruption and for openness, there was an insatiable demand for money to feed the political
machine which undermined this bid.36 Indeed, as Branch aptly observed, for all the rhetorical
boasts of change and reform, the new government was unwilling to fundamentally address
corruption.37 Hornsby made the same observation going further to point out that Kibaki’s
government had adopted the same kleptocratic attitude to state funds as its predecessors.38 These
remarks are in reference to the Anglo-Leasing scandal, which rocked the Kibaki administration
hardly two years after it took over the running of government. The details of what it entailed
have been exhaustively discussed in Michela Wrong’s book, It’s Our Turn to Eat, which is the
story of how Kibaki anti-corruption tsar, John Githongo, uncovered a corruption scandal in
which the government and the people of Kenya were set to lose from $700 million to over $1
billion.39
In a nutshell, Anglo-Leasing was “a Moi-era horse” entailing an “unsavoury picture of
bloated procurement.”40 It was the product of old corruption networks into which Kibaki’s new
men in government eased themselves in or adopted although some of the malfeasance was also
new.41 In a speech entitled “Some Bread and Butter Questions,” that the British High
Commissioner delivered to the British Business Association in July 2004, Sir Edward Clay
accused those in government who were eating “like gluttons” when it was hoped that corruption
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carried over from Moi-years would not be rammed into people’s faces. This, he said, was out of
a combination of arrogance, greed and panic. The top British diplomat went on to add that while
those involved expected that people would not see, or notice, or would forgive them a bit of
gluttony, they could hardly expect people not to care when their gluttony caused them to vomit
all over their shoes.42
In all, the scandal involved at least eighteen contracts from various government
departments, including finance, transport and internal security. All were described as “sensitive”
or security-related and included a digital multi-channel communications network for the prison
service; new helicopters; a secure communications system, computer and video equipment and
security vehicles for the police; a state-of-the-art frigate built in Spain for the Kenyan navy; a
data network and internet service satellite link for the Kenya Post Office; a top-secret military
surveillance system dubbed “Project Nexus”; a forensic laboratory for the Criminal
Investigations Department; an early-warning radar system for the meteorological department
etc.43 Most of these contracts were based on the principle of debt financing and, therefore, did
not require parliamentary approval.44 Twelve of these contracts were master-minded by someone
in the former Moi regime but, as noted, he had found a cozy home under the Kibaki government.
As such, they followed the Goldenberg formula whereby the government of Kenya was set to
pay tripled-up prices to a legal but non-existent British lease finance company, Anglo-Leasing.
Investigations also revealed a web of other fake companies, which were linked to Indian business
families that worked with the Moi-Kanu regime.45
All said, these contracts “were worth a gulp-inducing 56.3 billion shillings ($751
million).”46 This everyday struggle, like government corruption, was carried over, unbroken,
from the Moi into the Kibaki era and took on different faces depending on where it was played
out and by whom. Needless to say, meantime, it was ordinary Kenyans struggling to eke a living
who stoically bore the brunt of grand government corruption. Most Kenyans were not going to
watch from the sidelines and not criticize the government for grand corruption, the increasing
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cost of living and gross socioeconomic inequalities and social inequity. Indeed, the mentalité of
struggle usually associated with the rural and urban poor sections of society, gripped
professionals who would, otherwise, be thought of as a “privileged” group. But they too,
including university professors, elementary and high school teachers, doctors and nurses, felt the
pinch of increasingly hard economic times. Imbued by the spirit of the struggle of everydayliving, they turned to public criticism of the government in boardrooms, staff-rooms and the
streets. This harvest of workers’ strikes can and should be understood in light of the hard
economic times that started falling upon Kenyans from the early 1990s. They deserve close
scrutiny because their case illustrates that very few in Kenyan society have been left unscathed.

A Harvest of Workers’ Strikes: Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU),
Teachers, Doctors and Nurses
Since late 1993 when UASU went on a protracted strike to protest against the
government’s decision not to register their union, the organization that represents faculty from
Kenya’s public universities has in numerous instances engaged the government over the issue of
decent emoluments commensurate to their service in shaping the country’s best minds and future
workforce. The union’s existence was predicated upon the improvement of the terms of service
as well as the improvement of the relationship between its members, each university council and
the students.47 The government’s response had been to move to prevent academics from
organizing themselves into a trade union. This uncompromising stance was seen as partly a
product of the then prevalent conception by the state of the nature of trade unions. As perceived
by the state, trade unions in Kenya’s highly stratified society stood as the number one threat to
the status quo.48 Not only was the state, at the time, the employer of public university teaching
and non-teaching staff, but it assumed the right to control those who worked for it; the right to be
the only voice; and the right to demand complete allegiance from them especially in the era of
multiparty politics. From the government’s point of view, the idea that any group of government
employees could organize a trade union to better bargain around the terms of service was an
anathema.49
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But such demands were not unwarranted, especially in light of the adverse impact of the
1980s and 1990s cycles of SAPs on the education and health sectors. Like most state employees,
professors, doctors, pharmacists, registered nurses and teachers suffered the consequences, as a
result of SAPs, reduced budget spending and welfare expenditures, freezes on wages, inflation
and numerous devaluations of the national currency, among other economic hardships.
Education’s share of government recurrent expenditure fell from 35.9% in 1985/86 to 34.9% in
1995/96.50 Moreover, whereas the American dollar was worth about eighteen shillings in the
1980s, in 1993, the dollar was about eighty Kenya shillings.51 These, among other measures, led
to a massive laying-off of non-teaching staff and a disgruntled, over-worked teaching staff who,
as a result of SAPs, had to contend with an increasing teacher to pupil ratio, which was
particularly high at tertiary institutions.52 Staff salaries and their purchasing power were
considerably affected.53 Furthermore, discontented professors had to contend with an astonishing
state of disrepair of institutional facilities. There were recurrent problems relating to water
shortage in the halls of residence and teaching buildings, electricity shortages and a general
shortage of resources necessary to run universities.54 Overall national economic downturn and
the issue of improvement of welfare put UASU on an intermittent fight with the government that
has lasted twenty years since the first major strike in November 1993.
Although most universities resorted to partial privatization by initiating Module II
(Parallel) degree programs through which privately sponsored students could register for courses,
the income thus generated did not go far enough to stem institutional problems. As a result,
UASU and affiliated teaching and non-teaching staff unions at various public universities were
part of a wave of labor unrest experienced in 2012, plunging the education and health sectors
into turmoil. During this strike, eleven-thousand teaching and non-teaching staff downed their
tools. This included four-thousand lecturers from 19 public universities and colleges.55 UASU
officials, having earlier succeeded in bringing the government to agree on a four year Collective
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Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in 2008/9, resorted to industrial unrest to force the government to
honor its part of this deal to double basic pay and improve allowances. The union officials felt
that theirs had been a history of failed promises and vowed to no longer tolerate dishonesty.
One of the officials, Charles Mukhwaya, the secretary general of the Universities Nonteaching Staff Union (UNTESU), accused the government of being insensitive to the plight of its
workers since it was unmoved by their cries. They argued that the government and university
councils were dodging two pending CBAs of 2010/11 and 2012/14, and demanded that the
parties return to the negotiating table.56 Further, the union demanded a new salary structure that
would double the basic pay of lecturers and improvement of allowances by more than 100%. A
return to work formula was reached when the unions signed a Ksh7.8 billion deal towards the
end of September 2012.57
Their elementary school teachers union colleagues in Kenya National Union of Teachers
(KNUT), who settled on a 1997 Salary Agreement were, however, not so fortunate. On 29th
August 2012, after a KNUT advisory council meeting, the union called for a strike set to
coincide with the opening, on 3rd September, of the third and final term of the year. This was
amid resolute singing of the characteristic Bado mapambano chorus associated with striking
workers in Kenya. In fact, the struggle for Kenyan teachers ran deep in the country’s history.
Indeed, it mirrored that of anti-colonial movements since the first seed of organizing teachers
under one organization was planted through the initiative of James Gichuru and Eliud Mathu in
1934. Their organization and KNUT’s precursor, the Kenya African Teachers Union (KATU),
quickly fizzled out under the pressure of British colonial authorities.58 Although Makerere and
Kagumo colleges produced high caliber teachers enabling the proliferation of Christian
denominational or provincial unions, they were not allowed to form or organize a representative
national body. This state of affairs was noticed by a member of the LegCo, Daniel Moi, who had
been a teacher himself. In 1957 he sponsored a LegCo motion requesting the government to help
teachers to form a national body, which led to the formation and registration of KNUT as a trade
union in 1959. For a while, the foremost policy demand in the 1960s was a single employer for
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all teachers.59 A series of strikes led to the establishment of the Teachers Service Commission in
1967. However, it is notable that the most enduring pre-independence demand behind the
unionization of teachers, pay increment and teachers’ pension, has remained a constant refrain.
Since KNUT’s fourth strike, staged from 4th to 11th 1969, all future strikes were dominated
by calls for better remuneration. The 1969 strike was as a result of the government’s initial
unwillingness to implement the recommendations of the Teachers Service Remuneration
Committee, which the government had instituted to negotiate several issues that teachers had
been raising over the years.60 The national teachers’ strike of 1997, in which they demanded a
300% pay increment, coincided with general elections. The president, who during the early years
of his presidency was fond of styling himself “Teacher Number One,” accused his political
opponents of instigating the strike. As a re-election tactic Moi and Kanu quickly acceded to this
demand and also agreed to the payment of pensions due to 1997 teacher retirees.61 This deal was
sealed and weighted by the Legal Notice 534 of 1997.
This deal was signed, on government side, by the head of public service, permanent
secretary (treasury) and the solicitor-general. It guaranteed the raising of salaries between 150%
and 200% following the recommendations of the Teachers Service Remuneration Committee.
This was to be undertaken in five installments staggered or paid in five phases and was set to
cost the government Ksh. 47 billion. It also covered various allowances. It was, however, not
registered with the Industrial Court as demanded by the law, which compromised its legality. At
any rate, the government soon reneged on the deal, and by October 1998, the teachers were on
the streets yet again. The Kibaki administration inherited the intermittent problem that on
occasion brought learning in elementary and high schools to a grinding halt. Teachers issued a
strike notice towards the end of 2000 timed to coincide with the opening of schools in 2001 but
called it off. This was not the case in October 2002 when there was a two-week strike demanding
that the 1997 salary increment deal be honored. The teachers complained that they were living on
starvation wages while politicians continued to award themselves hefty salaries.62 At the time,
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MPs were earning more than half a million shillings (US $6,330) a month after they hiked their
wages with little due regard to the state of the economy.63
The out-of-step advance-retreat dance between KNUT and the government continued. As
it did, it was increasingly characterized by a rising crescendo as elementary and high school
teachers’ union reminded members not to sleep. After all, the struggle was still on (bado
mapambano). By September 2011, Kenyan teachers were still in the trenches of continued
struggle lamenting inadequate staffing especially in light of the influx of students since the
introduction of free primary school education in January 2002. This was repeated yet again in
September 2012 reinstating their demand for a 300% pay hike and responsibility allowance of
between 30 to 50% for senior, deputy and head teachers. During this strike, the then KNUT
secretary general David Okuta said that it was clear that teachers never earned an increment
without “sweating.”64 Okuta went on to add that it was not that teachers loved going on strike.
Rather, strike-action was testament to how badly teachers had been treated “since time
immemorial.” Yet, there was no need to even have to negotiate for a salary increment since it
was a right, Okuta said: the government had taken teachers for granted for far too long.65
But, teachers were not alone. It would seem, regrettably, that renderers of essential public
services were, generally, being taken for granted because the health sector too had over time not
been spared by strikes. At the end of his second five-year term, president Kibaki was unable to
stem the downward spiral that came at the heels of the SAPs. At the beginning of September
2012, when there was labor unrest led by teachers and workers in public universities, doctors in
public hospitals also announced that they would stop treating patients. Doctors were demanding
that the government rescind the suspension of 303 trainee medics at two Nairobi hospitals.66 This
protest, nevertheless, was quite mild considering the “myriad of bedevilments to the health sector
in Kenya” precipitating a dire situation facing the country.67
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With the adoption of SAPs from the 1980s, access to better healthcare remained elusive to
many Kenyans.68 As of 2012, there were, in Kenya, a total of 8,000 doctors of whom only 2,300
were in the public hospitals to cater for the majority of the country’s population of at least 40
million. This left the country in a desperate situation as far as meeting the World Health
Organization (WHO) recommended doctor-patient ratio of 1:1000 is concerned. This means that
no less than 40,000 doctors are required to meet this WHO ratio.69 Besides this sorry state of
affairs, the introduction of user fees as part of SAP reforms meant ignominious death for poor
people who could not pay the steep cost of medical services. The withdrawal of external support
that necessitated government cuts in its expenditure on social services, compounded by massive
corruption and mismanagement of resources, overall, caused an unprecedented deterioration in
public health services and diversion of medication and equipment to private clinics.70
For instance, Treasury allocated only 15% of the national budget to healthcare in the
2011/2012 financial year.71 As a result, the quantity and quality of medical services has
deteriorated substantially, negatively affecting Kenyans in general and particularly the poor and
other vulnerable groups.72 For over twenty years, therefore, doctors had felt the need to influence
the running of the health sector and improve health services in Kenya.73 Their concern over the
years was expressed through the need to unionize to be better able to engage the government
with regard to various health sector policy challenges. In Kenya’s history, there has been no
union to stand up to the government to agitate for better terms of service or better funding of the
health sector.74
The dream for a union was realized after two grueling years of determination and
resilience in August 2011.75 The Kenya Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and Dentists Union
(KMPDU) immediately set about to engage government on outstanding demands and concerns
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by organizing “the most successful doctor’s strike in the history of Kenya” in December 2011.76
It decried lack of health facilities citing the fact that radiotherapy for various types of cancer was
only accessible in the capital city while dialysis was available in selected few centres in the
country, which was out of sync with the high number of patients requiring such intervention. The
union also complained of inhuman working conditions of residents in the Kenyan teaching
hospitals including working long hours, day and night when on call for no pay, which is
something doctors interpreted as nothing else but slavery.77 Doctors felt that they were not only
underpaid but also overworked.
Further, they attributed the movement of the majority of trained doctors from public
hospitals to the private health sector or immigration abroad to seek a better life to poor
remuneration by government. Indeed, in the wake of the December 2011 strike, the government
acknowledged that up to three-quarters of doctors usually leave the government payroll three
years after joining the public health sector. After all, new graduate medics entered public service
with a basic salary of $350 dollars per month. Up to 80% of doctor attrition in public hospitals
was due to resignations as they sought greener pastures.78 Such demands and concerns reflected
and foreshadowed the self-sacrifice and suffering of other healthcare workers.
Between 1997 and December 2013, there were no less than five nurse strikes demanding
for better pay or, like teachers, the implementation of agreed-upon salary increments and the
improvement of services in the country’s ill-equipped public hospitals. Three of these strikes
were within months of each other in 2012. One of them, the health care workers strike of
September 2012, coincided with the general labor unrest in the country. In the course of the
strike, health workers called to attention gross inequalities in public service emoluments. They
pointed to the fact that politicians made about $130,000 a year while doctors earned $ 36,000 a
year.79 Besides the thinly veiled call for the harmonization of salaries across the board in the
government wage bill, the country’s 25,000 nurses continued to protest at the end of the year that
the government was adamant with regard to the issues raised. One of these was its refusal to
register the Kenya National Union of Nurses (KNUN) to make it possible for the organization to
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enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the government on behalf of workers. Nurses
argued that this was in clear violation of the nurses’ constitutional rights.80
By the end of the Kibaki era, the demands of nurses and health workers remained unmet.
“Aluta Continua,” charged a blog posted on the KNUN website against the background of yet
another strike in December 2013. The message thanked members for their solidarity and support
urging them to gather on 16th December to solidify KNUN demands and push further calls.81 At
the same time, a day after the country celebrated 50 years of independence, another message on
the KNUN portal called on members to attend the alternative meeting to protest Kenya being
“sick@50.”82 Worker’s strike focused on emoluments and working conditions are a
manifestation and an illustration of deeper seated social malaise. This is more so considering that
they represent a relatively well-to-do section of society. When one pries deeper into this bitter
trunk of protest, one finds an even more bitter struggle underneath the surface that has direct or
indirect connections with historical injustices of the colonial era. The Mungiki, Saboat Land
Defense Force and the Mombasa Republican Council represent prime examples of such a farreaching genealogy of grievance and social protest.

Neo-Mau Maus of the Mind: Mungiki, Saboat Defense Force (SLDF) and the
Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)
The stability and future survival of the Kenyan state is in question in the 21st century more
than at any other time in its history. This is especially considering the country’s worst political
crisis since independence between 30th December and the end of February 2008. At least 1,500
people were killed in what was dubbed post-election violence (PEV) following a hotly contested
presidential election. Thus, at the local, regional, national and international levels this climax of
inter-ethnic violence that has manifested itself since reversion to multiparty politics in the 1990s
was explained in terms of shifting historical ethnic rivalry between the Kikuyu, Luo and the
Kalenjin among other groups allied to them. This, however, is a gross oversimplification of the
complex, intractable and yet unresolved historical issue of land ownership and distribution in
Kenya. As such, if violence is to be prevented from escalating into an even greater catastrophe,
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the deep historical springs of ethnic conflict over the issue of land, among other public resources,
needs to be addressed.
Land continues to be both a popular desire and a source of divisions in Kenya.83 It
continues to present the greatest challenge to any administration since independence. This is not
least due to the fact that the land demarcation and registration process that was begun in the
1950s is still incomplete.84 To further complicate this issue, there exists no national policy.
Drafting one would be a daunting task. The matter of a national land policy is delicate as there is
the possible risk that it would, more likely than not, reopen every major land-related problem in
Kenya’s history from the British conquest through the settlement schemes of the 1960s to the
ethnic clashes from the early 1990s to 2007/08.85
While the political elite have avoided addressing the issue of a national land policy, some,
if not most of them, have not left “untouched” public and trust lands some of which have been
un-procedurally and, therefore, illegally appropriated. A commission appointed to investigate
land abuses of the past in 2003, the Ndung’u commission, “was political dynamite” when it was
reluctantly published by the Kibaki government in December 2004. This report indicted virtually
every senior KANU leader, including Moi, his family, politicians, civil servants and military
officers for profiting from illegal government land transactions, housing allocations and forest
excisions.86 Thus, while land rights and land laws remain a tinderbox, state and communal trust
land has continued to be stolen.87 This then is what has been at the heart of the intermittent
“ethnic clashes” that are thought to be expressions of spontaneous bursts of political action at the
behest of elite ethnic kingpins.88
As noted above, however, this is superficial and, as referred to by Edward Oyugi et al, an
instrumentalist assessment of the problem. Different ethnic groups especially, the Kikuyu,
Kalenjin, Mijikenda and Maasai from central, Rift Valley and coastal regions continue to suffer
from the centennial effects resulting from British land alienation at the onset of colonialism in
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the 1900s. It is not surprising then that these regions have become theatres of continued agitation
and, at times, violent opposition to the state. At other times, organized youth groups have not
only opposed the government, using intimidating and thinly veiled violent rhetoric, but also
warned rival ethnic groups perceived to be threats to their socioeconomic well-being. Although
the Kenyan government has banned at least thirty five such vigilantes in rural, peri-urban and
urban localities, only the most problematic ones have been selected for brief discussion herein.

Mungiki: Scavenging the Interstices of the State
The Mungiki movement and Kikuyu spiritual sect has its origins in the early 1980s. It
emerged to protect the interests of farmers in Central and the Rift Valley provinces. It was also
an expression of discontent with the manner in which the parents of the sect’s young members
were treated by Jomo Kenyatta even after they had made enormous sacrifices in the struggle for
uhuru. It is for this reason that the movement referred themselves as Matigari ma Njirungi. That
is, the heir-remnants of Kenya’s freedom fighters.89 The group perceives itself as the real
daughters and sons of Mau Mau.90 It originated around the prophecies of their charismatic leader,
Maina Njenga, who advocated for a return to a traditional Kikuyu way of life.91 According to the
founder, he among others saw visions in which they were commanded to call upon the Kikuyu
and all Africans to go back to their roots thus forsaking the ways of the white man.92
Lexicographically, the movement derives its name from the Kikuyu word “muingi” that
refers, generally, to “the masses,” “community” or “general public.” It is a derivative of the
Kikuyu word for “many,” “much” or “more.”93 By adding the suffix “ki” at the end of the word,
it takes on a whole new meaning of “totality or fullness of all imaginable public-measure” thus
implying the total mobilization of everyone and everything in the community: “muingi-ki.” This
usage and conception of “community” has generated and lent the language a new derivative or
mutated word “mungiki.” The term “mungiki” is, therefore, not just a mere description but an
action word with profound political implications since it could also refer to “the people’s
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uprising.”94 As such, it is a powerful and intoxicating, if illusory, conception or connotation of
the inherent and unstoppable agency of the masses. In effect, it means that once society has been
mobilized and has its political consciousness awakened, it cannot be contained. This then is far
from the benign and inert “mass of people” to a dynamic movement of the public towards a
stated tangible objective.
Originally, the group started as an innocuous and even idealistic commune in the Rift
Valley region out of the diasporic Kikuyu who worked there, first, as farm hands in the second
decade of the 20th century, and in the 1960s as part of the million acre settlement scheme. In the
early 1990s, the group was somewhat militarized in the face of the cyclical violence threats
calculated to remove Kikuyus from the region by the Kalenjin during the 1992 and 1997 election
years. From 1995, however, Mungiki gained political notoriety in the collective public mind
when it was accused by the High Court of oath-taking in the region’s Laikipia District.95 Since
the mid-1990s, Mungiki, “as with their Mau Mau grandfathers,” quickly gained a negative
reputation as a lawless and, therefore, criminal secret society that was atavistic in nature.96 This
was in reference to their belief in traditional Kikuyu practices including “baptism,” taking
religious oaths and female genital mutilation (FGM) among other backward rituals.97 Like the
Mau Mau antecedent, Mungiki as a social science and historical subject is already arousing
potentially controversial academic discourse about how it ought to be approached.98
As important as the question of “methodology” is concerned, it is crucial to understand
Mungiki against the broad historical mentalité of struggle continuum. In so doing, this social
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malaise is no less different from the DYM and the Mau Mau anti-colonial movements that were
returning the imperial gaze or retorting to a racialized and, thus a hierarchical, modernity that
was exclusive in nature. In addition, the movement is not different from other rural and urban
contemporary movements behind the ethnic clashes in the Mt. Elgon region, which “matured”
into the Saboat Land Defense Force (SLDF); the attack on upcountry people in the coast region
in the early 1990s that fomented into the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC); and similar
electoral cycle violence in Trans Nzoia and Bungoma in the 1990s. While the common
denominator with intermittent rural ethnic-cleansing violence is marginalization of the youth and
land hunger, Mungiki is unique in considering its urban base and perennial nature.99
Put differently, Mungiki is a microcosm of the resultant social ferment when electricity,
education and cleaned tap water, all epitomes of modernization among many others, are
exclusive to a few in society and remain undelivered to the marginalized majority of people.
Some among its ranks have argued that they have felt the duty to mobilize and bring economic,
political and social changes in society so that the masses can control their destiny.100 For his part,
Maina Njenga sees Mungiki as providing a voice for the demands of the poor for good
governance to attain justice and prosperity, according to Branch. There cannot be peace when
people are jobless, the founding member of Mungiki observed.101 Neglected and ignored by the
state in ungoverned urban and peri-urban areas where the presence of the state is remote, the
movement usurped unto itself “state power” in an underground extortive economy.
As far as Mungiki was concerned, the urban poor, especially the youth who lived in
ghettoes, were reduced by the state to nothing. For this reason, Mungiki leaders mobilized them
to recognize the need for welfare in the face of the common problem, poverty, since the
government did not meet this need.102 The aim behind imposing protection and operational fees
on public transport was, therefore, explained by the need to eke an “honest living” of troops of
termini, bus-stops and public vehicle-routes collectors.103 Besides this, members of the
movement provided rural “road-repairs;” provided “security” to slum dwellers at a fee of Ksh. 30
99
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per house; provided electricity tapped unbeknownst from the Kenya Power & Lighting Company
for Ksh. 300 per month per bulb; and also provided clean tap water in some areas without the
knowledge of the Nairobi Water Company.
Thus, the movement was effective offering something that the government did not provide
to the poor living in informal slum settlements.104 Moreover, in a classic image of scavenging the
ungoverned crevices of the state, hordes of poverty-stricken Mungiki employees rummaged
through the enormous toxic heap, the Dandora waste landfill.105 In a tour of the site arranged by
ranking members of the group, Ross Kemp was informed that up to a thousand people scraped a
living sifting through the rotting waste. According to his Mungiki guide, one kilogram of plastic
recyclable material fetched eight pence sterling (Ksh. 10). The aim of the movement, Kemp was
told, was to target the collection of half the country’s 55,000 tons of such waste, which could
yield up to $2300.106 According to the journalist, excepting the movement’s horrid use of fear,
violence, murder and intimidation, Mungiki seemed to offer not only hope but also jobs for the
marginalized.
This notwithstanding, by the start of the 21st century, the group had run afoul with the
state. It had imitated the state in spaces without the stamp of government authority to an
intolerable degree. Furthermore, by 2002 the group had increased to between one and two
million-strong making it a formidable political movement. It did not help that the group’s cause
served to attempt the mitigation of the huge gap between the rich and the poor. The latter had
been ignored by the ruling elite since independence with wealth remaining in the hands of a
small group of people. This left the vast majority of the population in abject poverty that the
Mungiki attempted to make bearable while spinning-off profits for the organization. But the
more it became powerful, the more politicized and political it became. With increasing
confidence, it was possible for ranking members to argue that Kenya was really not free. It was
not surprising that there was a rapid rise of members of the group who claimed to represent
millions who felt that they had been ignored by successive regimes.107 It is at this point that the

Kemp, “Kenya Special.”
Ibid.
106
This is as per the present author’s calculations based on rough estimates of figures mentioned in the Kemp
documentary.
107
Kemp, “Kenya Special.”
104
105

385

government saw the movement as a threat to security, especially considering the group’s
growing revolutionary change rhetoric and fervor.
Furthermore, as a violent Kikuyu-focused group, Mungiki raised echoes of Mau Mau.108
Besides being banned in 2000 and following sporadic resurgence and continuation of its mafialike activity, Mungiki was forcefully clamped down in 2007/08. Criminalized like its Mau Mau
Kikuyu antecedent, Mungiki in the Mathare, Dandora and Kayole of Nairobi was suppressed
especially by often retaliatory and punitive police and GSU exercises reminiscent of Operation
Anvil in the 1950s. Thanks to its religious and political “chameleonic” behavior that has seen the
movement involved in high-level presidential campaigns in 2002 on the side of Moi’s preferred
successor, Uhuru Kenyatta; conversion to Islam; and later Pentecostal Christianity; and
rehabilitation of the founding member, Mungiki has found a degree of relative political
validation. This has been accompanied by temporary rapprochement between Mungiki and the
establishment and a security crackdown reprieve.109
In spite of this beguiling lull, it remains worrying that the state has dealt with Mungiki as a
security threat. That is, under the assumption that Mungiki only contributes to a violence that
filled the space or gap left by the state. Following this under-appreciation of the socioeconomic
and historical springs of the movement, it is assumed by state security decision-makers that the
movement will disintegrate every time there is a police “crackdown” and after its extortive
income stream shutoff. As such, it is erroneously thought that the movement, among many other
similar organizations, is not to be dealt with through complex and long-term state policy.110 Both
the state and the media err, as the British did in the 1950s, by criminalizing the threat posed by
the movement. It is forgotten that Mungiki sees itself not as a “crazed” criminal gang, but as an
alternative socioeconomic and political force for a new order. This is a new order that will sweep
away the degeneration, economic theft, corruption, and two-timing of the West that has afflicted
Africa.111
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Like Mau Mau, which imitated the colonial state and sought to criminalize British
administration in the 1950s, members view the establishment of the day and political elite as
corrupt.112 In this light, government crackdowns, in their estimation, are out of fear that the most
neglected people in society have realized that, together, they can do something to help
themselves by providing security, food, housing and hope.113 In addition, it remains an
uncomfortable fact that, despite their crude and violent methods, the Mungiki movement is
highly organized and has done what the government has failed to do. That is galvanize the poor.
For close observers who have taken interest in the phenomenon like Kemp, the countless efforts
by the government to wipe Mungiki out are self-serving. This notwithstanding, the movement
seems to be growing stronger. Kemp aptly notes that, as Kenya stands in the throes of the 21st
Century, this is an important time in the country’s modern history. This is in the sense that
Kenya seems poised for a revolution of some kind.114 What is certain though is that people, such
as Kemp met and interviewed, are prepared to sacrifice their own lives for the chance for
something better. One such person is a former prostitute and Mungiki women coordinator who
went by the name Florence. She said chillingly, “…Even if they take away my baby…kill my
baby…. I will never go back …never [sic]!”115

The Sabaot Land Defense Force: “All the Men are Gone”
In its activities, the SLDF, which is an armed group that emerged in and around the
December 2002 elections, is very similar in its activities to the majimboist groups that were
armed by the state in 1991-92 and again in 1996-97 to drive out non-Kalenjin groups (mostly
Luhya) from Mt. Elgon.116 According to a Human Rights Watch report, the SLDF, like many
other armed groups in Kenya, served twin purposes: it was at once land-related and also
furthered political aims of its local leadership beneficiaries. Historically, the land issue was
touched off in December 1991 when pro-ruling party Kanu Sabaot and Teso allied against the
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pro-opposition Bukusu who had bought land in previously Sabaot areas on the mountain.117
According to Hornsby, Saboat politicians in the early 1990s called on the community to drive out
others and on 24th December they began to burn the houses on non-Sabaot. This violence
perpetrated against the Bukusu worsened in the first few months of 1992 with the small region
having one of the highest death tolls in a period of Kenya’s history characterized by ethnic
cleansing. The Sabaots were armed with bows and arrows and occasionally guns. But this
violence was neither sudden nor spontaneous as it was deeply rooted in colonial history. At the
dawn of colonial rule, claimed the Sabaot and Pokot, they had been removed from Trans-Nzoia
and had remained determined to recover their “stolen lands.”118
The region in dispute is on the slopes of Mt. Elgon, which is Kenya’s second highest peak.
The region is, or was, primarily inhabited by members of the Sabaot community but also has
other inhabitants including the Ogiek, Bukusu, Teso and Sebei among other Kalenjin and
Nilotics and Bantu-speaking groups.119 Originally, the area was inhabited by the Sabaots from
whom the British colonial government appropriated land for settler farms in the 1920s and
1930s. They were resettled in Chepkitale and Chepyuk but the Sabaots, never losing sight of
their original land, presented grievances to the Kenya Land Commission in the early 1930s.
According to the HRW report, while the British acknowledged their case, as they did in many
others, they discussed a compensation package that was never implemented.120
The problem was compounded in 1968 when the independent government reduced the
area available for the expanding population at Chepkitale by designating it as a game reserve
thus forcing a second removal. Once again, this violation was undertaken without any
consultation or compensation.121 When the Sabaots petitioned the government in 1971, the state
initiated a resettlement program in Chepyuk where a group from the first colonial removal
already was living in squalid conditions due to population growth and without official land
titles.122 The HRW report points out that the government was trying to force the inhabitants of
two villages into an overpopulated area already occupied by other settlers. To further complicate
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this matter, the resettlement exercise was left in the hands of local chiefs, local land officials and
provincial administrators, councilors and MPs, many of whom were accused of corrupt practices
in the process.123
Thus, the original Chepkitale Sabaot, who were uprooted with no place to call their own,
were still disgruntled at the end of the 1970s and most of the 1980s. Yet, the Moi government in
the late 1980s would attempt to evict both groups in a settlement scheme known as Chepyuk II.
At this point, the Chepkitale group, like they had done in 1979, attempted to return there in 1988,
but they were forcefully repulsed by the police since the area was now a game reserve.124 This
then is the background against which the issue was touched off in the majimbo-motivated ethnic
violence surrounding the multiparty elections in 1991/92. In 1993, Moi annulled the Chepyuk
settlement scheme and ordered the creation of a third, Chepyuk III. But then the population had
increased even further and people had been living for more than a generation on land whose
status had not been formalized. Like earlier settlement attempts, Chepyuk III was controversial
and complicated. As such, it was never fully implemented and it remained a dormant but emotive
and divisive issue throughout the 1990s. The original problem occasioning land hunger and
exacerbating suffering was unresolved and anger was growing.125
The majimboist ethnic cleansing strategy to remove non-Kalenjin groups from the region
failed both in 1992 and 1997 election cycles. Thus, in the run-up to the 2002 election and the
2005 referendum on the constitution, the Chepyuk settlement was a major political campaign
plank. Chepyuk III was implemented, but, according to a Kenya Land Alliance report in 2007,
the process was again marred by massive irregularities.126 The SLDF was already in place and
started carrying out its first strikes in 2005/06 in the wake of the implementation of phase III of
the resettlement program.127 This fresh wave of organized military action was aimed at resisting
government attempts to reallocate land and/or evict squatters in the Chepyuk area of Mt. Elgon.
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In the process, the Sabaot militia killed more than 600 civilians and terrorized the local
population though physical threats, assaults, levied “taxes,” meting out their version of justice,
and seizure and destruction of property.128 Taking advantage of either felt or assumed
government absence in the region, the militia became the administering authority with the
exception being that their laws were, reputedly, crazy.129 Indeed, in its operations and methods,
the SLDF was reminiscent of the Mau Mau and its affiliated Kenya Land and Freedom Army
(KLFA) and Mungiki. Its leader, Wycliffe Matakwei, who would later be killed in the counterstrike by the state, and Benson Chesikaki, a local leader, went around recruiting boys to join the
SLDF. They said all young men had to go for training. Many of them did not and had to flee to
save their lives.130 In its recruitment campaigns, the SLDF broke into homes and kidnapped
males at gun point and told women that they would not see them again. Many of them actually
were never seen again. There were numerous media reports of prominent politicians, chiefs, and
others supposedly executed in broad daylight by the SLDF. A February 2008 operation
uncovered mass graves in the Mt. Elgon forest, apparently victims of the SLDF. The group was
also known to round up livestock and seize property including land.131 Not only did the militia
kill hundreds perceived to oppose them or their objectives. They also tortured and maimed
inhabitants who broke their code. They also forbade alcohol drinking. Taxes were imposed on all
with a regular income including civil servants who paid between Ksh. 3,000 and 10,000 per
month ($50-150) depending on their rank. But more so, the armed group attacked individuals
already locked in landownership disputes with allies of SLDF or those who hired the group to
resolve outstanding issues. During this time, land theft was rife.132
In its retort, the government launched a Kenya Defense Force (KDF) military operation
dubbed Okoa Maisha (Save Lives). Despite its apparently innocuous title, its counterinsurgency
methods, including arbitrary mass arrests and detention, extra-judicial killings and torture,
mirrored that the government’s handling of the Mungiki threat and also British colonial
administration measures against the Mau Mau. When the KDF was deployed in March 2008,
local residents initially welcomed attempts to deal with the rebellion. But scores of witnesses
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later told human rights organizations that the army pursued the strategy of mass flushing out and
roundup of all males under the age of 15 years in the region. Once rounded up, they were
“screened” at the Kapkota military base in Cheptais division of Mt. Elgon district. Part of this
“screening” exercise must have involved various forms of torture. HRW interviewed mortuary
attendants who were receiving bodies that they believed were coming from Kapkota. HRW
learned that the bodies showed visible signs of torture such as welts, bruising, swollen faces,
broken wrists and rope burns around the wrists. Preliminary investigations by these organizations
suggested that the military detained thousands, tortured hundreds and unlawfully killed dozens of
people.133
As a result, a total of at least 116,222 people were displaced in Mt. Elgon and neighboring
districts, which was almost the entire population of Mt. Elgon.134 As a result of SLDF chaos and
violence and the KDF operation “Save Lives,” women complained that there was no a man left
on the mountain. Mt. Elgon was a mountain of women. All the men had gone.135 Operation Save
Lives only served to botch up and complicate even further an emotive and intricate matter of
historical colonial and post-colonial injustices grafted, as it were, intricately upon each other.
This did not go unobserved as some in the media noted that the inadequate, late, and
unfortunately, military response as opposed to well considered policy resolution had all the
hallmarks of other lawless state clampdowns including unexplained illegal killings of Mungiki
suspects in 2007.136 After apparent “successful” crushing of the SLDF and Mungiki, the Kenyan
state continued to bumble over another outstanding land-related issue pertaining to the coast
region, the Mombasa Republican Council.

MRC: The Secessionist “Pwani si Kenya” Campaign
The MRC is a popular movement and composed of mainly “Costerian” youth that
burgeoned in the aftermath of Kenya’s bungled and violent 2007 elections. Unlike the Mungiki
and the SLDF, it is distinct in that it aims at exploring the use of civil society channels to
formalize their grievances related to land and exclusion from employment.137 There is evidence,
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that, initially, training a youth militia did figure in the MRC strategy and remains an active
option conditional on how the state deals with the group.138 This is even more likely considering
MRC’s incendiary and violent rhetoric on SNSs like Facebook, which buttresses letter-writing
and petitions as the group’s preferred modus operandi. Indeed, the potential for violence being
touched off is high and the problem of ethnic antagonism problematic in the prevailing
conditions since the 2007 elections characterized by violence around the country.139
Although the group disputes it, the MRC, like the SLDF, emerged from the immediate
background of the majimboist rhetoric and violence of the 1990s. MRC leaders deny any link
with past gangs and militias like the Kaya Bombo attacks of 1997, and those of the present.
Statements by some MRC members indicate that this de-linking strategy is more about method
than objective since the movement, like other expressions of discontent in the region, pursues a
historical injustice agenda that reaches back to 1895.140
The MRC traces its “Pwani si Kenya” (Coast is not in Kenya) campaign back to the 1895
and 1963 agreements between the Omani Sultan of Zanzibar who controlled the ten mile strip off
his Zanzibari suzerainty, the British and the independent government of Kenya. In the first
instance, in 1895, the strip of land that was under the dominion of the sultanate of Zanzibar since
the 1820s was transferred to the British imperial control and administration. The region became
part of the British East Africa Protectorate. In the eyes of the critical public in the coast, this
agreement was always considered a form of bribery designed to facilitate colonization of the
interior.141 At any rate, this agreement, the British colonial office later argued, was made by the
Sultan not in his personal capacity. Rather, it was in his capacity as sovereign. It was, therefore,
binding on the Sultan and on all other constitutional authorities in Zanzibar irrespective of any
constitutional changes.142 Needless to say, the British government, by virtue of the agreement,
administered the coastal strip, for all purposes, together with the protectorate and later colony as
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a single political unit.143 This external rule was marked by primary colonial resistance that lasted
until the second decade of the 20th century. Although the coast legally remained as a protectorate
administered by the British on behalf of the Sultan even after Kenya became a colony in 1920,
the imperial experience by Africans was uniform.
Like elsewhere in the country, indigenous African lands in the coast were alienated
through a series of imperial ordinances. Similarly, affected communities joined other British
colonial subjects in presenting their land grievances to the Kenya Land Commission, which ruled
as follows: “There is a strong feeling on the coast that the needs of its people have received scant
attention from the Government in Nairobi. The coast people complain that land development,
communications, social welfare…have lagged very much behind their counterparts in the
European Highlands and African reserves.”144 Despite this, lost lands were neither compensated
nor restituted. Attention to the issues of the coastal economy and society, like elsewhere in the
country, slipped into the background.145 But still the coast was, unlike the rest of the British
colonial holding, a protectorate, a situation that presented an imperial headache on the eve of
decolonization.
On the eve of independence, the British, not wishing to leave the potentially incendiary
matter of the coastal strip to an untested independent government, appointed Sir James
Robertson in 1961 to carry out an inquiry concerning the issue. The commission was charged
with the anticipation of the problem of integrating the coastal protectorate into an independent
Kenya.146 From the onset, its findings were a foregone conclusion. The prevalent attitude in both
Nairobi and London was that the only practicable alternative is for the coastal strip to be
integrated fully with the rest of the country if the country as a whole was to progress.147
However, it was acknowledged that there were/are circumstances peculiar to the coast and these
had to be safeguarded. The provincial commissioner in the early 1960s, for example, felt
strongly that to meet the legitimate and very real anxieties of the coastal minorities certain
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safeguards had to be given them. One such peculiarity was the fact that in the region Islam was
not only a faith but also a way of life.148
But, importantly, in fulfilling his mandate, Robertson also recommended that “A code of
human rights…be ‘entrenched’ in the Constitution safe-guarding the exercise of all those rights
universally regarded as the heritage of all inhabitants of free and democratic societies.”149 It
advocated the establishment of a coast land board to guide the government and legislature on
land policy in regard to, among other things, the disposal and use of public lands; the best use of
uncultivated privately owned lands; the settlement of disputes between landlords and tenants;
and the transfer of land owned by local coastal people to persons from outside the strip and
foreigners.150
Furthermore, the report documented the greatest fears that coastal minorities, including the
Swahili, Asians and Arabs, had expressed. That unless their titles were acknowledged and
preserved, their lands would be invaded and taken from them by squatters and invaders from upcountry. Despite numerous pleas from sections of the public that the commission and the British
consider the preservation of a large measure of coastal autonomy by members of the Coastal
League and Citizens of the Mwambao, this call was rejected.151 This is the background against
which the 1963 Memorandum of Understanding between the Sultan of Zanzibar and Prime
Minister Jomo Kenyatta was reached. This agreement formally transferred the sultan’s
sovereignty over the coast to independent Kenya along the outlines of his original agreement
with the British in 1895. Of course, this transfer was on the assumption that Kenya would pay
due heed to provisions and safeguards of the Carter and Robertson commissions.152
This was the end of ambitions for internal self-rule for the region that gave way to
unprecedented increase of unmitigated anxieties. Coast minorities’ fears had motivated them to
join Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), a political alliance constituting of minority
ethnic groups advocating for majimboism on the eve of independence. Notably though, and
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instructively, while KADU advocated for majimboism, it was not secessionist. Nevertheless, at
the time, some form of autonomy from the mainland was all they could hope for. However, with
their failure to separate the coastal strip from the mainland, the fear of losing control of land and
key economic resources gradually became real especially in the decades following
independence.153 Despite the fact that the Mau Mau movement had highlighted the volatile
nature of the land problem in central province and elsewhere, the new Kenyatta government soon
dashed the hopes and aspirations of Kenyans.
In the Mau Mau mind, which was a pervasive general expectation in Kenya, independence
meant the restoration or redistribution of stolen lands. People across the country who had
petitioned the colonial government, and made numerous submissions to different commissions,
anticipated the independent government would meet their popular expectations. But there still
existed the erroneous notion and colonial template that Kenya was an economy largely based on
estate agriculture, the prerogative of which government was charged with protecting.154 So, like
in the colonial era, in postcolonial Kenya, land was treated as a primary factor of economic
production. This was at the expense of, and counter to, the expansion of land under indigenous
cultivation.155 It was, therefore, possible for a few individuals to own vast tracts of land without
any set limit, and as absentee landlords to boot, especially at the coast. Kenyatta’s denial of the
relevance and even the existence of the Mau Mau movement, which was emblematic of popular
expectations, was a symbolic subversion of the same.156 This betrayal was a crucial precursor to
the steadfast appropriation of large tracts of arable land throughout the country in order to
solidify elite positions as wealthy land barons.157
As noted elsewhere herein, the three-tiered policy of dealing with the issue of land in the
immediate post-independent period did not go far enough. In the first two programs of the
Million Acres Scheme, land was allocated to yeoman farmers and peasants who received 12 to
20 and 8 acres of land, respectively. The former received the best lands whereas the latter were
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settled in less favorable areas. But, importantly, most of the profitable estates in the coffee and
tea producing areas were transferred to the new political elite loyal to the Kenyatta regime, and
Moi later.158 In the coast, as in the Rift Valley, surplus land provided valuable resources for elite
patronage. As such, various settlement schemes in the coast provided a vent for landless peasants
from upcountry and, once in place, the upcountry settler-base encouraged the migration of family
members, kith and kin.159
According to Paul Goldsmith, 57% of the 12 hectares plot allocations in the Kwale
Settlement Scheme went to Kambas and only 33% to indigenous Mijikenda; the Lake Kenyatta
Scheme in Mpeketoni Lamu was used to resettle landless households from Kiambu; Kikuyu
expelled from Tanzania in 1978 were settled on the Diani Scheme; and the Shimba Hills Scheme
raised issues when title deeds ended up being awarded to outsiders while indigenous farmers
were left out.160 By the early 1970s, the cumulative layers of historical injustices perpetrated
against indigenous people of the coast were being openly voiced in parliament but there was no
redress. With intensification of problems resulting from real and perceived biases, a special
commission was formed to investigate these land issues in 1978.161 The commission reported
that there were between 75,000 and 100,000 squatters occupying some 6.5% of state and private
land on the coast as follows: 61.5% in Kilifi; 18.8% in Kwale; 12.8% in Mombasa; and 6.9% in
Taita.162 The greatest failure of the report was the claim that landlessness in the region started
before colonialism.163 But one thing was clear. That is the growing market for land driven by
non-agricultural interest undermined peasant agriculture.164
Despite more settlement schemes, like the ambitious Magarini Scheme, the long-standing
land conundrum there persisted.165 The perception by locals is that such schemes are vehicles for
importing even more upcountry settlers. But research also reveals that this is just more than a
perception. From 2001 to 2011, in-migration to Lamu district by outsiders alone is estimated to
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have contributed to population increase by 18%.166 Legal small land holders in the region also
face other impediments such as agricultural costs, which add to their sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and due to unemployment, there is lack of off-farm income to buttress on-farm
investment. Such socioeconomic obstacles then segue into other issues of poor education
facilities and real and perceived biased access to opportunities that exacerbate the plight of
coastal communities.167 In 2011Goldsmith observed that the overall result is that the peasantry
has found itself “caught in a deepening cycle of poverty and deprivation. Landlessness and social
exclusion form a volatile matrix in a region where outsiders dominate economically.”168
This is the historical context against which the ethnic and electoral Kaya Bombo violence
broke out in August 1997. The spate of violence in the Rift Valley in 1992 was widely assumed
to be the template for political violence in the coast.169 The exact regions affected were Likoni in
Mombasa and the adjacent Kwale District. More specifically, places hit by the violence in Kwale
included Kubo, Kinango and Matuga.170 Others included Mshomoroni, Kongowea, Kisauni,
Mtwapa and as far out as Malindi and Taita Taveta where “watu wa bara” as upcountry
residents are called, and their property were attacked.171 Among those affected were Kamba
farmers in the Shimba Hills some of whom also worked in holiday beach hotels; Kikuyus, most
of whom were business people scattered in small towns and some were also land owners; and
Luos concentrated in quarries and stone-cutting industries.172
Of course, the violence was perpetrated by Wapwani as coastal people refer themselves,
especially the indigenous youth, who were, on the whole, unemployed, idle and hungry: this
constituted a fertile ground which was waiting to be exploited politically to wreak vengeance
upon the perceived upcountry oppressors.173 There was a deep seated feeling among the
Mijikenda people that their land and jobs had been stolen, first by Arabs in the precolonial era
and upcountry people in the 20th century.174 As noted above, they are one of the most
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economically disadvantaged of rural Kenyans with little political influence and few cash-crops,
and their major asset, the coast itself, had long been lost to the political elites.175 The region is
perhaps the only area in Kenya where one can find international opulence and African poverty
separated by a mere 500 meters.176 Indeed, four of the six coastal counties rank among the 15
poorest districts in the country.177
At the time, the anti-upcountry sentiment that swept the region was useful for the Moi
government. The Kaya Bombo violence, like other ethnic cleansing campaigns of the 1990s,
exemplified how the government of the day used discontent to promote its own political
agenda.178 At the same time, as Hornsby aptly ventured, the violence was “part of a broader plan
to reassert “mwambao” –coastal autonomy- as in the run-up to independence.”179 It is in this
light that the violence that accompanied the 2007 polls should be seen and interpreted. After all,
the flashpoints of the second spate of violence overlapped with the same places where it had
broken out in 1997. Apart from Changamwe, Magongo, Bamburi and Bombolulu that were new
to violence, places like Mshomoroni and Kisauni had already had a foretaste in 1997. Kilifi,
Kaloleni and Malindi which had experienced the 1997 violence remained relatively calm in
2007.180 It should not come as a surprise that some of these locales were the epicenter of MRC
support, which include the peri-urban area of Mombasa. MRC presence was also felt as far as
Taita-Taveta and Lamu where the volatile land and social exclusion matrix runs deep.181 The
attempt by the MRC to delink itself from the Kaya Bombo 1997-violent vision of the coast is
therefore, weak.
Nevertheless, it is appreciable that the MRC correctly recognizes that Kaya Bombo was a
case of state-driven violence and that incitement by government ministers and leaders was
responsible.182 The MRC’s attempt to de-link itself from the Kaya Bombo violence is more about
method than objective: in any case, the vision of restoring the layered historical sovereignty of
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the regions still remains.183 Like the Coastal League and Citizens of the Mwambao call for
autonomy, the MRC strategy centers on the Pwani Huru or Pwani si Kenya campaign.184 It
echoes the early 1960s call for secession, which represents “a holistic view of post-independence
trajectory.”185 According to Goldsmith, this secessionist campaign has created a kind of gestalt in
that it subordinates the host of grievances and problems that are typically debated on their own
basis to a single point: the historical injustices are ever so eloquent and, naturally, commend
themselves to the MRC cause.
However, one thing that has changed is the method of working towards the longstanding
vision. Since the problem of the coast is rooted in ill/legal historical agreements, the MRC has
resorted to the use of legal challenges to defend coastal interests. They group places a high
premium on “the contested legal agreements approach” while at the same time demonstrating
understanding of its implications across the wider social and political spectrum.186 This explains
why letter-writing, petitions and reliance on SNSs are the preferred method for the MRC. All
these methods are a natural extension of the formality of their court cases; grassroots
mobilization campaign; awareness-creation; and currying favor in the court of public opinion for
their cause. One of their petition-related publicity stunts was their announcement that they
intended to send, in June 2012, a delegation to the British queen. This plan to send a delegation
to Queen Elizabeth II coincided with the queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebration.187 The said
delegation was intended to deliver a memorandum about their land grievances dating back to
British colonialism era and secession cause.188 According to the MRC secretary general, Randu
Nzai, to goal behind the ambitious mission was to present treaties signed with the British
colonial government in their possession to the queen, and thereupon, state the case of the
historical injustices that the coast region had suffered since independence.189
Despite the potentially swaying moral rationale behind their struggle, the MRC cause was,
unfortunately, lost before it even started.190 This was because of various reasons. Foremost, the
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fact that the coast is an intrinsic part of the nation’s identity that features prominently in the
campaigns to promote Kenya’s tourism industry.191 Even more important than this is the extraterritorial nature of economic state assets such as the port of Mombasa that is connected to the
rest of the country and the Eastern African region by the Mombasa-Kisumu railway; the Mzima
Water Pipeline; and the Kenya Petroleum Refinery and Pipeline.
In addition, the region is militarily pivotal. It is home to the Kenya Navy. It is also
significant in terms of global geopolitics. Furthermore, unlike the MRC, the state has an
institutional memory in criminal investigation department records and surveillance by the
National Security and Intelligence Service that complement the work of regular police. Whatever
evidential linkages that such state security apparatus have fly in the face of the convenient
dissassociative strategic stance that the MRC has taken vis-à-vis the Kaya Bombo and 2007
spates of violence. Furthermore, it does not help the movement’s cause, and this is supported by
reports in Kenyan press, that the movement dallied with the idea of violence as a vehicle for its
cause. It is on record that the training of a youth militia did initially figure in the MRC strategy,
which remains an active option.192 Thus, while the movement is avowedly non-violent and
evidently pursues its cause through the legal channels, such impediments of public and state
perception are difficult to shake-off.
This state of affairs is complicated due to the religious composition of the region. The bulk
of the population in the coast is Muslim. Quite naturally, a significant portion of its 100,000
strong members and millions more of its general support base are Muslim. This religious
composition and the timing of the Pwani si Kenya campaign against the backdrop of “the
growing assertiveness of Islam worldwide” has not augured well for MRC.193 It also goes
without saying that MRC’s secessionist agenda has coincided with the global “War on Terror” of
which Kenya is seen as an ally by the West. This has further served to undermine the cause of
the movement.194
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In light of the foregoing, the government did not find it difficult to criminalize and heavily
crackdown on the MRC. The movement was one of the “gangs” banned by the government in
2008, albeit the only group to successfully challenge this in a court of law.195 In mid-October
2012, the government embarked on an operation that left two alleged MRC members dead and at
least 35 members arrested and arraigned in court. Among those arrested was the MRC chairman,
Omar Mwamnuadzi and his wife, supposedly after a gun fight with security forces. Mwamnuadzi
was charged with fire arms possession and incitement to violence.
Following a wave of arrests in Kwale, two more people were killed on 28th October 2012
including a Muslim cleric in police raid in Mombasa. As noted above, there are genuine fears of
internationalization of grievances and continuing tensions in the coast. While nothing suggests
any overlap with the Al Shabaab extremist and terrorist group, there are suspected cases of
individual linkages with Islamist organizations. However, there is no evidence to prove that the
MRC actively supports Islamist or jihadi groups in Kenya.196 Despite initial success that resulted
in a temporary suspension of the ban on the MRC, its legal status is amorphous although it is still
in existence and, as ever, attuned to its search for justice. Official government redress remains a
gaping hole and a veritable powder keg. In the title of his paper published in 2010, Mwandawiro
Mghanga, a political activist since his undergraduate studies at the University of Nairobi and a
former MP from the region, aptly summarized the prevailing situation with reference to classical
Swahili wisdom: “Usipoziba ufa utajenga ukuta” (meaning: proper and timely redress of an issue
averts catastrophe).197
Indeed, it is appropriate that the complex and intricate historical problem in the coast is
encapsulated in a simple nugget of Swahili wisdom. African societies are particularly verbal as
they communicate and preserve their experiences through oracy. The MRC has grown and
thrived mainly through word of mouth forming a thick, if impregnable, canvass of entangled
informal relations of friends and neighbors.198 The region’s Taarab music is a unique cultural
tradition that young people, not necessarily associated with the MRC, have used to preserve the
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memory of their collective experience of socioeconomic suffering and political struggle.
Whatever the fate of the MRC, the mentalité of struggle in oracy will survive as long as
grievance persists. This reality is borne in the functional rendition of “Bado Mapambano” song
used especially in workers’ strikes discussed earlier above.
In the Taarab coast version that was part of the 2007 elections, young people archived
their suffering by singing, “We have suffered from extreme poverty; from unemployment; we are
denied passports to travel abroad, even national identity cards; we are barely surviving in this life
of hardship. We want majimbo, (and) not that we want to evict others on the basis of tribe or
race. People of Mvita, unite as one; don’t you slumber Wapwani, don’t even dare, the struggle is
still on.”199 Such archiving of the attendant struggles of everyday life are not unique to the coast.
Urban youth in the marginalized neighborhoods that are the hotbed of the Mungiki express a
high level of awareness of the gap between the rich and poor through hip-hop poetry.200 In some
of these impoverished ghettoes in the periphery of the cityscape, a Mau Mau mentalité has
emerged expressed in the spoken word. When young people here gather informally to dance,
sing, talk and gossip against this background of hardship, “a new permutation of Mau Mau
ideology through poetry” that is hugely popular and fashionable has emerged.201 Popular culture
is a notable trend of expression of everyday experiences in a language that, directly or indirectly,
alludes to the original struggle of the 1950s in the 21st century. For this reason, it warrants not
just listening but also critical intellectual attention. Indeed, policy makers in government need to
sit-up and listen even more closely. It is imperative, therefore, to focus on the spirit of struggle as
expressed in popular youth culture.

“Matatizo” in Popular Youth Culture: Music and Social Change in Kenya
The Kenyan art scene and the verbal and performing arts including drama, music, myths,
legends and family histories are going through a renaissance.202 Binyavanga Wainaina, a
promising writer who has been part of this literary revolution, has observed that these creative
impulse marks the indigenous expressive power of the Kenyan people.203 Indeed, oracy, which is
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the art or communication skill of using the spoken word either in verse, poetry, song or even
conversations, is a verbal tradition that constitutes the main heritage consumed by the majority of
African people.204 It permeates throughout African societies as they narrate stories and histories
of their everyday experiences. As such it constitutes a corpus of verbal texts of history, law,
philosophy, politics and economics.205 Oracy, therefore, is a living archive of the everyday life
experiences of people.
But more importantly, this verbal art of oracy bears even more significance when
productively used by highly skilled communicators with a functional purpose. Some politically
conscious verbal and performing artists have employed their functional creativity to deliberately
preserve and communicate complex and, at times, controversial historical realities.206 Put
differently, while adhering to the utilitarian and aesthetic prerogatives various oral genres,
skillful artists have incorporated socioeconomic and political commentary to targeted audiences
and especially the youth. When they are not the artists themselves, young people, especially
those in the margins of society, are the target of lyrical political empowerment through verbal
art. In recent times, scholars in Kenyan literary discourse have noted this new and potentially
radical trend.207
Of particular interest is the nature of popular culture which has opened it up for literary
analysis. Skilful verbal and performing artists in Kenya have been noted for their ability and
compulsion to cross generic and formal boundaries and to effect the syncretic combination of
elements from various forms of expression.208 According to Rosenberg, they have problematized
the conventional academic understanding of literary form due to their employment of “hybrid
and recombinatory” techniques. This has changed the understanding of the ways in which
intertextuality, hypertextuality, and transtextuality are carried out in Kenyan contexts.209
The most remarkable aspect of the renaissance of the orature is the mutual interpermeation of literary and verbal texts while playing-up the rich canvass and continuum of the
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historical context. This is such that it is futile to attempt to divorce the historical and literary
from the art of the spoken word. This is especially considering that communication in Kenyan
society is mostly oral, technology notwithstanding.210 Indeed, this is a characteristic of Kenyan
life that has been bolstered by the internet and telephonic revolutions. Now, more than perhaps
ever before, Kenyans are transacting themselves orally; imagining themselves in an oral way;
and especially in the way they write and sing.211
This signature aspect of contemporary in life in Kenya should be brought to the service of
the task of writing the country’s history. This corpus of inter-permeating texts provides an
avenue for the scholar of Kenya’s modern history to enter vicariously into the often bitter
everyday life experiences of ordinary Kenyans.212 It offers a rare and unique window into the
mentalité of struggle that imbues Kenyan society. After all, the spoken word and the performing
arts act as experiential reservoirs. Within them is encapsulated the zeitgeist of the land of slightly
more than a century-long. This is especially true of the music scene since the end of Moi era in
2002.
Before then, people, due to political intolerance and repression, were effectively muted.
There developed, particularly in the Moi years, a culture of silence.213 It is not that Kenyans
completely lost their signature oral transactions of themselves. Rather, the language, songs,
dances and mannerisms were evolved to express the cult of presidential worship.214 According to
Micere Mugo, the president was omnipotent, and this was reinforced by a culture of sycophancy
and groveling worship that called for absolute obedience and submission. Moi was a living deity,
“Mtukufu Rais” (the Almighty President); “the Father of the Nation;” “Teacher Number One.”
During this time, creativity in general, and songs in particular, swelled with flattery. Some
of the songs were transmogrified Swahili church songs of praise and supplication which were
now directed to a human deity on the presidential dais. At a passing out parade at the Kiganjo
Police College in Nyeri in the 1980s, the resident police choir sang, “Macho ya Moi ni makali
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sana. Yanaona Waalimu/Madaktari/polisi, ni makali sana” (meaning that Moi had sharp
piercing and watchful eyes that roved back and forth observing teachers, doctors and the police
among other government workers).215 The police choir was actually only one of many mass
choirs of school children, college students and employees of public institutions formed
nationwide under the government’s orders when Moi took the reins of power.216 These were
invariably coerced into publicly reiterating, through song and dance, the eternity and invincibility
of Moi’s dictatorship as part of divine providence.
Masolo observes that these choir groups and their direct political evocations of their songs
intensified after the 1982 coup.217 One such song was “Tawala Kenya” (Rule Kenya) composed
and directed by Mwalimu Thomas Wasonga and performed by his Mombasa Teachers’ Mass
Choir. In this song, Moi’s leadership was validated and affirmed and his name worshiped.218
Professor Arthur Mudogo Kemoli of the Kenyatta University Choir composed a similar song in
praise of “Fimbo ya Nyayo” (Moi’s traditional cudgel signifying authority and leadership). Moi
is reputed to have a great passion for music, which was behind the establishment of the
Permanent Presidential Music Commission in 1988 with offices across the road from State
House. It was charged with the preservation, development and promotion of all aspects of music
and dance; to spearhead the growth and development of the industry and contribute to the
understanding of Kenyan musical arts and expression.219 Mwalimu Wasonga left teaching to
serve this commission rising through the ranks to Deputy Director by 2012.220 The importance of
music and dance was, therefore, not lost on the Moi regime.
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However, a new generation of Kenyan performing artists emerged in the post-Moi era.
These artists are intent on creating musical works which reflect and define what it really means
to be Kenyan, which is a radical break from the culture of silence of the past.221 Such artists have
been insisting on a holistic conception of reality as opposed to the compartmentalization of
phenomena. The text of their work is progressive as opposed to reactionary. It expresses
sensitive concerns such as human rights; homelessness, ghettoization and hunger and people’s
general quality of life; and expresses outrage against corruption and obnoxious, illegal,
individualistic accumulation of wealth. In engaging in the composition and performance of
competent verbal texts of history, this generation of artists is bringing great skillfulness in
imaginative, technical and organizational abilities to bear.222 These “socially significant
performers’ do not happy to just entertain.”223
Rather, using entertainment, they frequently aim and are sometimes able, to raise the
awareness level of their audience in order to teach and educate. Their compositions and
performances evoke and organize collective memories and present experiences of place with
intensity, unmatched power and simplicity.224 In their hands, the verbal texts become powerful
and profound expressive artistic tools.225 According to Masolo, such music and performances
transcend “the oppositions of time together with their respective social orders.” Put differently,
this kind of collective work presences the past while at the same time familiarizes the present.
Being entertained by such musical performances becomes a means for transcending
geographical, political, cultural and social limitations. The audience re-engages with, and feels
that they are part of, the creative work “as the words of the music reconstruct an imaginatively
familiar world complete with its historical structures invoked by the meanings in the lyrics of the
songs.” Masolo further insightfully observed that, specific songs stir conversations of specific
reminisces through which identities are then constructed or socially and historically decisions
made. 226
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Rosenberg aptly captures this delicate process of creative work in his remarkable
investigation of the creation of the song “Joka” by Parselelo Kantai and Eric Wainaina.227 “Joka”
represents progressive and integrated social action predicated upon fictionalized historicity. As a
creative writer, Kantai researched the historical problems experienced by people who were
brought, on the Uganda Railway or winding colonial roads, to Nairobi from the rural areas with
the promise of work; a promise of a decent place to stay; and the promise of a better life.228 In
what demonstrates hypertextuality and transtextuality, both artists produced reciprocal
narratives: Kantai produced his celebrated short story, “Comrade Lemma and the black
Jerusalem boy’s band,” while Wainaina recorded the poetic and musical work, “Joka.”229 Kantai
and Wainaina collaborated, after copious research, to create a song that ‘if a historian should
happen to listen…they will say, “Yes, that’s true.”’230
In writing “Joka,” Wainaina deliberately made it an objective to tap into the collective
memory of Kenyans and, in so doing, also presence the past in a way that made the present
familiar. To approximate the lived experiences of Kenyans as accurately as possible, he studied
recording artists that were active and had an impact on the formulation of Kenyan society in the
1970s. In a sense, he entered into the mindscape of 1970s Kenya through the doorway of the
intellectual environment of musicians.231 This provides ample evidence of the ability of music to
penetrate a people’s mentalité. Or, as Rosenberg describes it, the manner in which music and
song function as aesthetic praxes while simultaneously providing sociocultural insights about the
communities from which they emerge.
In “Joka,” Wainaina lifts his listeners, through its performance, from the 21st century
Kenya to the society of 1970s Kenya.232 Indeed, perhaps to an even earlier time. His listeners
travel back to the dawn of British colonialism, when the Iron Snake, the Uganda Railway,
became the bane of soon-to-be colonial Kenya British imperial subjects. In its wake, after
climbing and winding from the low-lying eastern plateau from the coastal plain; through
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scattered shrubs, hills and elevated formations of Taita Taveta, Kasigau, Machakos, and Kitui;
through the swampy Nairobi plains; on the lush side of the Aberdare Ranges while making its
precarious way down to floor of the Rift Valley towards the Mau Escarpment; through the fertile
highlands to the western Uasin Gishu plateau; and all the way to the shores of Lake Victoria, the
Lunatic Express, Wainaina’s Joka, left a bitter exploited people bereft of their land, labor and,
most of all freedom. They were transformed by “Joka” into colonial subjects who could no
longer be authors of their own destiny. The Iron Snake, “Joka,” blighted the land and herded
workers in Nairobi, which was “kambi ya utumwa” (camp of slave labor).233 One cannot listen to
“Joka” without a new appreciation of various informal settlements that dot Nairobi like Kibera,
Mathare and Sinai among others, as modern-day and postcolonial slave camps.
Such is the seriousness that Wainaina brings to the entertainment industry. The prolific
artist, handily one Kenya’s best and African’s finest musicians, pulled back his “Love and
protest” album delaying it for three years. He was determined to put out a record that completely
reflected what it is he wanted to say musically and lyrically.234 Perhaps, to be able to breath life
into some of the everyday encounters and experiences affecting him or people he knows. In a
blog piece on his Website, Wainaina narrates such a heartrending incidence. He recounts how a
young child died at a “leading” government/national hospital in Nairobi because there was no
meningitis medicine to treat him. His parents were too poor to afford the treatment that cost
about $210.235 Further, the artist stated:
The problems we face in Kenya are huge. We need to make quality healthcare affordable
or free for all Kenyans, we need to reform our education system, we need to improve
housing on all levels, we need to guarantee food security, we need to invest in renewable
energy, we need to safeguard the peaceful coexistence of majority Christians and minority
Muslims. The task ahead and presently with us is vast.
…The government is the great equalizer between those who are born into privilege (and
who probably work hard too) and those who are born into situations that beleaguer all
attempts at self-improvement.
Right now, if you are born poor in Kenya you will probably die poor. But a domestic
worker needs to know that when she shows up at her local clinic her baby will get the
attention it deserves. A rape victim needs to know that the courts will provide justice. A
233
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university student needs to know that a lecturer will turn up to class, teach him and judge
his efforts fairly. The debate …is about building … structures that will outlive individuals
and provide for citizens in perpetuity. It’s not about Uhuru. It’s not about Ruto. They
are… irrelevant to this debate. I can’t overstate it. I can’t shout it loudly enough!! [sic].236
These are some of the reflections and observations that must have inspired most songs in all of
his three albums: “Sawa Sawa” (2001), “Twende Twende” (2006) and Love and Protest (2011).
Songs in these albums can be grouped into three archetypal categories that are microcosms of
politically conscious music in Kenya. There are songs that invoke the memory and spirit behind
the Mau Mau struggle in what is an unbroken continuity with the present; songs that are
receptacles of the collective trudge of Kenyans’ crucible of experience of life as an everyday
struggle; and lastly, songs that seek to empower and mobilize people, especially the youth.
Among the time-warping artists who evoke and organize collective Mau Mau memory of
struggle and present experiences of Kenya with intensity, is the group Ukoo Flani Mau Mau. Its
very name is a political riddle. While it could mean many things, it could basically refer to the
artists being an extension or clan of the Mau Mau freedom fighters. The name of the group
literally translates to (We are) a certain clan, Mau Mau. Their song, and especially the music
video that dramatizes it, “Angalia Saa” (Look at the Times), is a classic example of the
transcendence of the opposition of time. At the beginning of the song, the group dedicates it to
all Kenyan heroes who struggled against British colonialism but have never been honored. The
music video performative subtext suggests that although chronological time has moved forward,
the hard and harsh times embodied by the Mau Mau struggle remain. That the times have not
changed.
To demonstrate this, video clips from colonial government department of information
propaganda films against the Mau Mau in the 1950s are juxtaposed with contemporary street
riots.237 Black and white footage from the 1950s, used in the “Angalia Saa” music video, shows
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British military operations “underway” in the rural areas and in Nairobi. There are also video
images of arrested Mau Mau suspects in the open ground but behind barbed wire fences waiting
to be screened. With the help of actors, Ukoo Flani Mau Mau dramatizes these screening camps
in the present. They recreate such a camp and perform the song in the restricted space effectively
delivering their message: the times have not really changed. As the story unfolds, Ndungi
Githuku, a human rights activist, actor and poet who styles locks like a Mau Mau fighter,
watches, hides and runs from an unfolding rural anti-Mau Mau operation in the 1950s.
A video text, “1982 coup” pops up as a crowd of Kenyans are herded by anti-riot security
personnel with their hands up. Like at the height of the Emergency period in the 1950s, they too
are screened. Another text, “People’s Power –NOW” appears against the background of more
images of street arrests. Towards the end of the video, Githuku is no longer running from antiMau Mau British colonial military operations in the 1950s. Instead, his furtive run has brought
him to the present in which he is evading arrest by anti-riot police and the GSU in the streets of
Nairobi. At the end of the video, the audience discovers that this main actor, Githuku, is playing
Dedan Kimathi. Like the leader of the movement in the 1950s, he is arrested. In a powerful
visual subtext, Githuku dramatizes the moment captured in the Kimathi photo that was taken not
long after his arrest. The photo is the enduring image seared in Kenya’s collective Mau Mau
memory.
The photograph shows Kimathi lying on a stretcher with a white man alongside showing
the jacket of leopard skin and cap that he was wearing when he was shot and captured.238 This is
the moment that Githuku re-enacts. But even more than this, using special effects, the two
bodies, Kimathi’s and Githuku’s, are visually overlapped. But the latter’s image, faded perhaps
to symbolize Kimathi’s or Mau Mau spirit of struggle, rises out of the former. This powerful
imagery synchronizes the “distant” event in the past, which was the moment of both Kimathi’s
personal defeat and that of Mau Mau, with the present. Both, Kimathi and the Mau Mau struggle,
are thus symbolically liberated. In this sense, it is also a transformative artistic gesture. This
gesture also presences this historical moment of defeat while simultaneously familiarizing the
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present by asking the audience to Look at the Times. It demonstrates that times have not changed.
Moreover, it powerfully suggests that the struggle is still on.
In point of fact, the lyrical critical public in music embodies this struggle in a flawless time
continuum. Indeed, musicians trumpet the latter day travails of other critical publics among them
university professors, doctors and nurses and teachers. Eric Wainaina’s “Nchi ya kitu kidogo”
(Land of bribes) in collaboration with the group, Reddykyulas, which popularized political satire
TV theatre at turn of the 21st Century, laments systemic corruption that pervades throughout all
levels of society. The song is preceded by a plaintive but angry rant by one of the Reddykyulas’
three artists, John Kiarie, as Demethiu from Muthurwa.
The explosive rant expresses exasperation with all the hardships occasioned by the rot of
corruption that engulfs society. It poses the big question that dominates the Kenyan mindscape,
“Kitu gani hii?” (What is this all about?). In this plaintive monologue, Demethiu complains of
waking up in the morning to “double-rationing” of electricity and water meaning that his house
has none of the two essentials; a once tarmacked road resembles clods of freshly cultivated land;
police on the beat want small bribes, so do chiefs (authorities in charge of the small
administrative units) but bigger, social service providers too and thieves who usually want
everything once they get you.239 “How was he to carry on?” Demethiu poses at the end.
Building on this lament, Wainaina gives a list of most likely places people are expected to
give small bribes, including issuance of road licenses and national identity cards; having a child
admitted to a public school; and even courts of law. Meanwhile, there is no medicine to treat
patients at the Kenyatta National Hospital; hospital workers there go unpaid for months on end
and resort to selling marked hospital beddings to survive; and other poorly paid urban workers
try to spread their meagre wages to buy food, shoes and school textbooks. All this, he concludes,
serves to hinder progress. This is more or less the same theme he treats in his “Who is to blame?”
song.
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In this song, Wainaina once again deploys Reddykyulas’ political satire and empathizes
with other critical publics. The track is preceded by yet another generic tax-exhaustion rant that
struggling ordinary Kenyans find familiar. The rant, “T.A.V,” which stands for the sarcasmloaded ‘Tax Added Value,’ is against a slew of unnecessary taxes that make no sense.240 It puts
the blame on government connivance in devising taxes that cannot be understood among them
“pay as you earn; earn as you pay; marriage tax; pedestrian tax; zebra-crossing tax; traffic lights
tax; value added tax; and tax added value” all culled from meagre wages. At the end of the day,
all that one is left with is the salary-slip, the ranter complains. It humorizes otherwise real and
bitter everyday experiences of life. It augments the picture the artist aims to paint using words. It
identifies with the historic struggles of university students who choke on mounting frustration as
they mourn the sorry state of the nation that politicians deny. Wainaina laments that, to survive,
school teachers are forced to run small businesses trying to make an extra shilling or two.
Otherwise, total devotion to excellence at their place of work when there’s no bread on the table
or money for shoes, would be impossible.
Apart from such songs, there is a category of music that is a collective register of struggle.
Mejja, whose songs lie in between comic theatre and music proper, dedicates his “Majengo” to
various marginalized urban neighborhoods in Nairobi. Indeed, the term “majengo” is a generic
reference to informal settlements that have historically mushroomed in major cities around the
country. If you like, these are Eric Wainaina’s slave camps for cities’ cheap manual and casual
labor in “Joka.” “Majengo” pays tribute to all who live in such places and make a living doing
odd jobs such as pushing cargo-ladden carts called “mkokoteni,” hawkers, “chupa na ndebes” or
those who eke out a living by collecting recyclable metals, bottles and plastic containers, and
even petty thieves.241 This is quite a significant number of people since about three quarters of
the Nairobi’s population live, usually without land tenure, in Huruma, Mathare and Kibera
slums, which is less than 5% of urban land. In addition, they have no access to clean water,
“T.A.V” is a play on the acronym, “V.A.T,” for “value added tax.” This could mean nothing at all although it
could, at the same time, be a particularly subtle way of implying that in Kenya everything is taxable. That those in
authority are able to conjure up and contrive any manner and number of taxes. It is another way of saying, “taxes are
invaluable.” Thus, for those who collect, taxes are everything. For those who have to pay them, they have to dig to
the very bottom of their pockets and give everything.
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proper plumbing, healthcare and other basic services. Slum residents are more susceptible to
crime and violence.242 They also suffer a great incidence of disease and higher rates of mortality.
According to the Anna Tibaijuka, the Under-Secretary of the United Nations Human Settlements
Programme (UN-Habitat), 150 out of every 1,000 children in such neighborhoods die under the
age of five. 243
Mejja’s song captures the plight of the people, especially the youth, who live such
precarious lives. In “Majengo,” the listener peers into a day in the lives of this urban population.
The artist provides the rationale behind urban crime. Mejja presents the dilemma that faces
impoverished youth especially when they are unable to sell their itinerant wares, scrap metal and
recyclables. Usually, this means that they and their families spend the night with an empty belly.
It all boils down to making the option between doing an odd job, vandalizing various public
installations or downright stealing. The artist dramatizes petty burglary arguing that it is
impossible to sleep hungry yet there are people who seem to live well in plenty. In between the
cryptic sheng (a Swahili-based cant and slang that is a mixture, mainly English and other Kenyan
languages) rap, Mejja actually says that such crime makes sense. It ensures that the petty thief
and peers “survive” by making ends meet. Such a person becomes the superstar of a life spent
hustling.

242
243

Generator 21, “Chukua Hatua,”an unattributed and undated article published by the online magazine.
As quoted, Ibid.

413

Figure 7.1: Mkokoteni pushers pulling an old car to sell as scrap metal244

The aggressive pursuit of informal and at times shady and illegal business deals is a
thematic fixture on the Kenyan hip-hop scene as in the West. The songs “Salary,” “Shillingi ya
Kenya” and “Bless My Room” by Nameless, Daddy Owen and the group Necessary Noize,
respectively, illustrate this. The visual text at the beginning of the “Salary” music video invites
the audience to “a day in the life of a hustler.” Like “Majengo,” it is dedicated to matatu crews,
shoe-shiners, farmers, market mamas and the working blue-collar class in general who go about
trying to eke out a living. “Salary” is not so much about formal employment as it is about a
paying day job to put a meal on the table. It is a precarious livelihood that necessitates one to live
on a prayer as people struggle to find their way through the day.245 It exhorts the blue-collar
working class to work hard to feed their families. It is a theme espoused by Kevin Wyre and
Nazizi Hirji of the group Necessary Noize in one of their early tracks, “Bless My Room.” The
song is actually part prayer of ghetto youth. They are asked to pray and “watch all their problems
fade away.” Perhaps influenced the Rastafari movement, the group attributes the struggle to put
food on the table on the “Babylon system” that brings about such “sufferation,” tension and
oppression in the nation.

Sagepage Uncolonized, “The Mkokoteni Economy.”
The song strikes a chord with Bon Jovi’s “Livin’ on a Prayer” in which Tommy, a dock worker out on a job
because of a union strike has to depend on Gina, his lover. Tommy is out of luck and life is tough. Gina, therefore,
spends all day working at the diner working for her man and brings home her pay for love.
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Indeed, observation of extreme suffering brings secular artistes to the point of prayer. This
is illustrated by the group Kalamashaka in their song “Niokoe” (Save Me). It is interesting no
note that the group’s name, Kalamashaka literally translates “To Eat Trouble,” referring to an
intense experience of hard times. The song “Niokoe” complains that a life of such trouble
without means is not one worth living. Yet, it is not because of lack of trying and working hard.
After all, so the artists profess, they are university educated but still find no employment.
Venturing out every day in the morning is intimidating and frustrating because of the suffering
that awaits them out there, including police harassment. The artist Daddy Owen in “Shillingi ya
Kenya” simply revolts against the monetized-living spent in the futile cyclical chasing after the
Kenyan shilling. It plays up the mentalité of struggle populated by street hawkers and
“mkokoteni” cart pushers and ends up with supplication for a break.
In music, therefore, what seems to be unmitigated suffering produces an almost fatalist
attitude towards life. In the music video “Matatizo” (problems) by Just A Band, the actor Eric
Thimba, bids farewell to his brother before he is tortured to death. It transports the audience to
the dark years of the Moi regime by revisiting the infamous flooded and dark dungeons of Nyayo
House of the 1990s where Thimba is undergoing various forms of torture. Thimba tells the
brother not to worry and stoically “assures” him that he is at home whatever happens. After all,
he was “matatizo”-hardened because suffering comes to all without warning. It was normal to
have to struggle. In the end, Thimba dies.246
This fatalism is also reflected in Wainaina’s “Mashaka” (uncertainty). “Problems just
follow me,” he sings. Wainaina paints different life situations occasioning vexing suffering that
people in the informal economic sector face. These include the forceful removal of hawkers from
the Central Business District; lack of employment despite the official government principle that
“nothing is for free”; homelessness; and hunger and general lack of peace of mind. In spite of the
engulfing darkness, sadness and madness of it all, he believes that the struggles are going to end
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The Nyayo House basement torture chambers was where Moi detained most of his political opponents,
proponents of a democratic political system, human rights activists and those who were courageous enough to speak
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someday. This glimmer of hope is echoed by “Msoto Millions” (Innumerable Troubles) by Ukoo
Flani and Jahcoozi. Despite being unable to earn their keep; the lack of bread and butter; children
dying of malnutrition; and official denial of the prevalence of such “matata,” the artists urge,
“struggle on.” This spirit of fighting on is also evident in “Room For Me” by Lisa Oduor, Just A
Band and Jahcoozi. They ask the world whether it can feel, see and hear them: does it have a
little room? If everyone is eating, “can you please bring my plate?” they pose. Although the
struggle is tiring and the fight rough, there is determined resolve to choke-hold on reality and
onto hopes and dreams. Behind this fighting spirit, therefore, is determination not to wallow and
succumb to allied odds in life through individual and group agency.
As such, it is not all gloom. Kenyan artistes recognize that the poetry of music can break
open locked chambers of possibility, restore numbed zones to feeling and, thus, recharge desire.
Music has reflected upon the long and unbroken history and lineage of grievance since colonial
times, and acted as a reservoir of memory of Kenyan’s collective experiential trudge of life. But
it has also acted as an antidote to the sometimes overwhelming fatalism of everyday life
experiences. Some Kenyan songs are paragons of Arts of the Possible. Music in Kenya has been
used to mobilize and awaken movements against demolarizing power and despondency.247 Hiphop poetry and the arts act, not just as a coping mechanism, but also as a form of didactic
resistance.248 Explaining the inspiration behind his album “Love + Protest,” Wainaina made
reference to Che Guevara’s statement that “the true revolutionary is guided by the greatest
feelings of love.”249 In the album is the song “Revolution Time,” which calls on young men who
“have got plans; …have got dreams; …got visions,” and who are fed up with the smelly status
quo, to sign up for revolution.
Besides, what other options do they have? Shrug their shoulders in indifference? Sit down
and suck their teeth? Take positions on the fence? Wainaina urges that something needs to be
done because, how could one play when the ground is uneven? When the rules are made behind
your back? When the judge, the jury and the referee are the beneficiary? How could one run
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when they had never walked? How can one learn to think if s/he was never allowed to speak? All
this, for Wainaina, meant that the law of the jungle was prevalent in the city where the cries of
the people met no pity. It is, therefore, imperative for people to stand up for revolution. It is
“Revolution Time.” It is time for the widow, the orphan, the needy and the sick to take a stand
for a better nation to expose all the wolves in sheep’s clothing. This is the labor of love that
lasted three extra years for Wainaina to bring to fruition. To be able to inform wananchi that:
It’s a revolution time,
…a solution time,
…a moving time
Wake up, we are losing time.
We wanna see the fruits in time
Don’t you sleep, it’s a waking time
Revolution time.
The same message is reverberated by various “Bado Mapambano” song versions done by coastal
youth and groups Inka and Watumwa. In their rendition, Watumwa vow to fear no more, remain
silent or lie down and slumber. It was time to ensure that justice was done for Internally
Displaced People and slum dwellers. This version reasserts the fulfilment and meeting of basic
needs such as food, housing and clothes as a right.

Over and beyond the entertainment industry, there is an ever-rising din making these
demands against the state and the political elite. There is a vibrant and prolific youth internet-age
protest movement that draws inspiration from the same mentalité situations behind Kenyan hiphop. As noted, one of President Kibaki’s proud hallmark achievements was the growth of
internet usage from a quarter of a million to about 14 million people. Regardless of
acknowledgement or the lack of knowledge thereof, this widespread use has amplified protest
voices from the technological savvy critical public.

Nuggets of Mentalité in an Age of eDemocracy
The internet world as exemplified by use of SNS has seen the proliferation of virtual
communities. The oral transaction, in everyday life, of identities and national politics has
emigrated to the World Wide Web. Social media, as well as other new media, have generated a
virtual infrastructure where people meet and transact business as well as carry on conversations.
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The experience of everyday life has been reproduced virtually with significant effect. This is
illustrated by the MRC, which is not only a social movement with an existential physical identity
but is also a virtual community. The crisis of citizenship behind the group’s call for secession has
also mediated action and interaction to an exclusive virtual identity on Facebook. Actual physical
mobilization is not only through word of mouth and direct contact between friends but also
through use of this particular popular site.250
There is, therefore, the group’s physical existence as individuals and movement and in
relatively felt virtual network geared towards an imagined ideal that is coterminous with an
eventual actual or physical autonomous community. The collective imagined future of the
coastal region is propagated and enhanced by this virtual presence (See a map of the region
covered by the desired autonomy in Figure 2 below, which was posted on Facebook).251

Figure 7.2: © MRC: Pwani si Kenya virtually imagined

This is a strategy has been used by striking doctors and nurses as well. However, the
activities of three other closely affiliated virtual communities are worth pointing out considering
this same ability to traverse between the virtual and physical experiences. These include the
Wanjiku Revolution, Unga Revolution and Pawa254.

MRC’s internet presence started on 26th May 2011 when it apparently opened an account on Facebook. Its stated
mission thereon is to become an independent nation as any other in the world.
251
This photo was posted on Facebook on 7th November 2012.
250
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Wanjiku Revolution Kenya
The activities of this virtual public critic are mostly textual and visual. The group
describes itself as an agitator for the respect worthy citizens of Kenya. It is apparent from the
group profile that it strongly identifies itself as the genuine Kenya nation. The identity of
Wanjiku Revolution is coterminous with the real Kenya and its actual owners, the wananchi as
opposed to the ruling elite. The latter are often portrayed in the site as a greedy and selfish
bunch: M/Pigs.252

According to the basic information identifiers, a standard requirement to start a virtual
Facebook community, the “group was born on 12th December 1963.” This is a little veiled
assertion of its identity as truly Kenyan because this is the date of the country’s independence.
Obviously, there was no Facebook then. Also, the group is apparently effeminate. With regard to
this sex choice, the inherent political meaning and symbolism of the Kikuyu female name,
“Wanjiku,” is instructive. The term “Wanjiku” entered popular political parlance and discourse
in the 1990s at the height of the call for constitutional reforms. Then, it was argued, especially by
progressive forces in the opposition, that the ideal constitution was one that met the basic needs
and reflected the wishes of the ordinary citizen embodied by a lowly and humble, if
impoverished woman, “Wanjiku.” In popular culture, “Wanjiku,” who more often than not has
always gotten the short end of the stick since independence, has been popularized by the cartoon
artist Gado (see Figure 3 below).
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This is a play on words that is Orwellian in inspiration. Kenyan representatives of the electorate for a long time,
before the 2010 Constitution, were, and have always been, Members of Parliament (MPs). They are portrayed as
greedy “pigs,” hence “M/Pigs.” This is especially considering that since the late 1990s, the first order of business for
new and old MPs always seems to be a self-awarded salary raise.
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Figure 7.3: © Gado: Wanjiku being exploited by suggested Value Added Tax

Wanjiku Revolution Kenya aims to advance the cause of the ordinary citizen by engaging
in various topical issues of the day. Around the days marking 50 years since the country attained
self-rule and gained independence in 2013, this movement, in concert with affiliated groups and
internet users in general, initiated the viral “HungryAt50” campaign. This was on the sidelines of
pompous government-sponsored national celebrations. The campaign claimed that although the
country was arguably a regional economic powerhouse, it was disturbing that sections of the
country were still food insecure. This necessitated heavy dependence on food aid and was
sanctioned by successive regime inefficiencies (See Figure below). In as far as the group is
concerned, the obtaining situation that prevailed at the dawn of independence regrettably remains
true of the country despite the march of time.
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Figure 7.4: Source: Wanjiku Revolution Kenya, 9th December 2013.

This was accompanied by a searching and critical observation that appeared on the social
networking site Facebook around the same time –viz.
1) Kuna wale walio pigania Uhuru, na kuna wale walio nyakua Uhuru ule;
2) Kuna wale walio pigania mashamba, na kuna wale walio nyakua mashamba yale;
3) Kuna wale walio pigana na dhuluma, na kuna wale walio tekeleza dhuluma zile;
4) Kuna wale walio simamia haki, na kuna wale walio simama kidete na ukoloni;
5) Kuna wale walio tupwa korokoroni, na kuna wale walio salia kuwasifu mabeberu;
6) Kuna wale walio pinga umasikini, na kuna wale waliosababisha umasikini huo;
7) Kuna wale walio teswa kuikomoboa Kenya tena; kuna wale walio nufaa bila jasho;
8) Kuna wale walio pigania Katiba mpya; kuna wale walio ipinga Katiba ile;
9) Kuna wale walio pigania haki za mpito; kuna wale walio pinga mapendekezo yale;
10) Kuna wale walio unga kesi za dhuluma ya utu; kuna wale walio pinga kesi zile.
Essentially, it states that in Kenya, there still prevails a status quo that reaches back to the dawn
of independence:
1. There are those who fought for freedom, and there are those who grabbed and stole
that freedom.
2. There are those who fought for land, and there are those that grabbed that land.
3. There are those who fought against oppression and injustice, and there are those who
perpetrated it.
4. There are those who stood for justice, and those who were steadfast in their support of
the colonial order.
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5. There are those who were detained, and those who remained content in their praise
British colonists
6. There are those who fought against poverty, and those who were its very cause.
7. There are those who were tortured in the course of the “Second Liberation,” and those
who benefitted without breaking a sweat.
8. There are those who fought for a new constitution, and those who blocked that
constitution.
9. There are those who fought for redress for historical injustices, and those who opposed
such a process.
10. There are those on the side of the case against repression and the breach of human
rights, and those who opposed such cases.
In its internet campaigns and social protest communication, Wanjiku Revolution works closely
with Unga Revolution among other SNSs allies.

Unga Revolution
As noted, this virtual community works closely with Wanjiku Revolution. It’s stated
mission and campaign is the end of poverty and hunger, not as a form of government charity but
as a basic human right and as an act of justice. One of its demands and slogan is for the
government to recognize that “Food is a Right.” It works closely with marginalized urban youth
and guilds such as (Nairobi) Hawkers Association, Boda Boda Association and Wamama
Mashinani (grassroots mamas). They are engaged in raising the runaway inequalities that exist in
society. In particular, they have opposed self-aggrandizement in the form of unilateral salary
increments by MPs. This is held up against the support of the political elite to stand up against
the imposition of value added tax and Parliament’s reluctance to have taxes imposed on MP
salaries in 2012. Like most other groups, they have heavily relied on the use of visual
illustrations to highlight socioeconomic inequalities (see Figure 4 below about the
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disproportional allocation of budgetary funds).

Figure 7.5: Disproportionate allocation of budgetary spending.253

The group first came to national prominence when they organized a symbolic march on
Harambee Avenue where most government offices, including the Office of the President and
parliament are located. The youthful crowd was armed with empty plastic plates among other
kitchenware. Unga Revolution, as their name suggests (it means maize flour the main staple food
for most families) was protesting the high cost of basic essentials.

Figures 7.6: ©Unga Revolution: a Facebook photo of a demonstration against the high cost of living.254
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It is rather difficult to correctively attribute some of the pictures and graphics used online by such groups due to
their viral nature. However, this graphic was retrieved from the Facebook photo album of Unga Revolution.
254
Unga Revolution, Facebook Photo Albums.
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Pawa254: Harnessing Art for Social Impact and Beyond
Pawa254 is the handiwork of a young charismatic and award-winning photo journalist,
Boniface Mwangi.255 His political activism was ignited when he witnessed, firsthand, the Post
Election Violence in 2007/2008. At great risk to himself, Mwangi documented the unfolding
gory ethnic violence that in terms of potential magnitude, was the country’s worst. This was a
turning point for the young photographer. He launched Picha Mtaani, a nationwide street
exhibition of photographs that he had taken during the violence. This was an individual initiative
designed to provide an opportunity for Kenyans to reflect on the national tragedy. Despite its
apparently harmless intentions, this campaign was hampered by government officials.
Unthwarted, Mwangi has since organized various public mobilization campaigns to not
only foster peace, but also against social inequality and grand corruption. He exemplifies
contemporary critical publics that are exploring the technological infrastructure afforded by
public social networking sites to mobilize youth. In a media interview, Mwangi expressed
disappointment with the Kenyan “talking-shop.” He pointed to the fact that Kenyans talked a lot
grumbling as they do on “Twitter, Facebook, blogs and offline in pubs, ‘chamaz’ and
‘barazas’…all they do is talk.” Mwangi felt that it was about time people stopped talking and do
something.256 He set up Kenya Ni Kwetu to tap into ideas for social action using visual art to
shed light on issues of social justice. Under the auspices of Pawa254, there have been various
street demonstrations with their genesis from both virtual and physical interactions and sharing
of ideas.
One of the creative initiatives undertaken was a discrete “anonymous Vulture Graffiti”
blitz of covering strategic parts of Nairobi early in 2012 such as the wall of the City Market. This
was an unprecedented classy street demonstration, unique especially because it was employing a
public art form. In this sense, it was a radical break with the traditional pitched battles between
various publics and anti-riot units. It censured the political class for bad governance, rampant
corruption and exploitation of public office to the detriment of the rest of the people.257 One of

The name is a creative and cryptic one that basically means “Empower Kenyans” or “Empower Kenya.” It is
derived from the English word “power” and Kenya’s country code, “+254.”
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James Smart, “A Chat With the Men Behind the Graffiti Murals in Nairobi,” The Headliner, NTV Kenya,
Youtube, Published March 2012.
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use of art as a medium of communicating public outrage as well as grassroots mobilization.
255
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the graffiti texts read: “MP’s, screwing Kenyans since 1963.” More critically, the idea and
image of a vulture was used to characterize and satirize the Kenyan politician. The street graffiti
carried a radical message to Kenyans to stand up for their rights and recognize their leaders for
what they are.258 More importantly, it listed a litany of all that had gone wrong in the past. This
included corruption scandals like Goldenberg, Anglo-Leasing, Triton and land-grabbing, ethnic
cleansing violence and more (See Figure below). The graffiti reminded Kenyans that it was the
young generation that had ended the Nyayo era. It was not impossible to do the same if such ills
persisted: power rested with the people. The massive conversation pieces simply highlighted
what most people voiced in their own quiet corners.259 But the Pawa254 and Wanjiku Revolution
campaign was led by an army of artistes with the main aim of getting the average Kenyan
talking.260

Figure 7.7: Street graffiti by Pawa254
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Figure 7.8: Part of the 2012 graffiti blitz in select Nairobi streets. 261

The 2012 graffiti blitz was followed by street protest campaigns organized by Pawa254
aimed at sitting MP. These were kicked off by the “Love Protest” in June 2012. This was
followed by two Occupy Parliament campaigns and culminating in ‘the mPigs’ protest against
yet another planned MP salary review upwards. These usually attracted hundreds of university
students, especially from Nairobi-based colleges Kenya Polytechnic and University of Nairobi
students.

Conclusion:
Despite the Kibaki-years economic intermission and respite, the majority of Kenyans, 50%
of the rural and urban population, continue to endure and experience untold hardships. The
burgeoning middleclass has, for a very long time, been stagnant and purposely, perhaps, stymied
especially in the Moi years. After more than 50 years of independence, most of them are
beginning to bemoan the great disparities in wealth and gross income inequalities. Yet the quest
for prosperity, as it was at independence, is shared by all and sundry. Kenyans across the board,
the faceless and nameless rural and urban folk as well as the lower and upper middle classes, are
imbued by the spirit of everyday struggle as they contend with a runaway cost of living. In taking
out their frustrations in the public sphere, it is the professionals –teachers, lecturers, doctors and
nurses- who have, in the last few years been the eloquent voice of latter day travails of various
critical publics. Instead of dismissing such protest as the gripping of already privileged and the
261
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educated, these social protestations should be used as a parameter with which to gauge the
intensity of lesser endowed and underprivileged people for whom everyday survival is
precarious, if not downright, a matter of life and death.
Although, the methods resorted to by Mungiki and SLDF, and the threat posed by the
secessionist MRC, are regrettable, they should be seen in that light. This study has not attempted
to detail the individual, family, village and group micro-histories of the people behind these three
movements. However, it asserts that most of them could and do trace their experiential suffering
in life, directly or indirectly, to historical injustices of the colonial era. Thus, there is a genealogy
of grievance that continues to feed their everyday frustrations and author their life-actions
including extortion, crime, violence and the criticisms and challenges posed to the state itself. In
this sense, these three groups are reminiscent of the Mau Mau minds, in deed and thought. This
permeation of the spirit of struggle throughout society in Kenya is reflected in popular culture. It
is a culture that, in the 21st Century, is informed by anti-colonial struggle and memory of the past
that has been creatively organized and powerfully juxtaposed with contemporary experience of
Kenya as a lived place and space with intensity. Various forms of art, including music, poetry,
cartoons, paintings and pictures, graffiti and SNS are time-bending genres and mediums of social
protest. These media are being harnessed by a generation that is reconstructing the complete
Kenyan experience guided by the spirit of struggle that is pushing from below to reconstitute and
remake the nation to reflect the true aspirations, dreams and hopes of the majority of Kenyans.
More than professional strike action and militias, a significant number of young people in the
country are eloquently putting things in perspective.
They are invoking the memory and spirit behind the Mau Mau struggle which has the
effect of “presencing” the past while at the same time familiarizing the present. Furthermore,
they lend their mind and voice, thereby acting as receptacles, to the collective trudge of
Kenyans’ crucible of experience as an everyday struggle. In the long-term, there is likelihood
that their creative work will resonate with other disgruntled elements and critical publics
breaking out into a veritable Wanjiku Revolution that will forge a popular Kenyan state. This is a
vision of a united country regardless of age, gender, ethnicity or creed; a vision of a united
country where the past is openly and fearlessly confronted, thrashed out and due justice meted
and old wounds embalmed and healed; a united country where public goods such as civil
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liberties, civic virtue, basic human rights and social services such as health, education and
infrastructure are accessible for all.
The old game of musical chairs has outlived itself in Kenya. There is a new song in the air.
It is a song that seeks to empower and mobilize ordinary citizens, especially the youth. People in
Kenya are stirring up to the solidarity forged in the crucible of the struggle for freedom and
independence from the yoke of European imperialism. For them, the struggle is still on: its
solidarity forever for equity and equality in the distribution of public goods.
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Chapter VIII – The Long Kenyan Century: A
People’s Elusive Quest for “the Good Life”

Preamble
All this was a long time ago, I remember,
…But set down
This set down
This: were we lead all that way for
Birth or Death? There was a birth, certainly,
We had evidence and no doubt. I have seen birth and death,
But had thought they were different; this Birth was
Hard and bitter agony for us, like Death, our death.
We returned to our places, these Kingdoms,
But no longer at ease here, in the old dispensation,
With an alien people clutching their gods.
I should be glad of another death.
– T.S. Eliot, The Journey of the Magi
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Where the Dance Is
According to legend, something pregnant with powerful symbolism happened on the day Kenya
achieved internal self-government. On that momentous day, 12th December 1964 it is said the
country’s new flag became momentarily stuck as it was being run up the flag pole.1 That
morning, the Union Jack had been brought down for the last time at a large midnight ceremony
attended by tens of thousands at Uhuru Gardens in Nairobi. There was wild cheering, celebration
with singing and dancing as “freedom” was ushered with pomp and a thousand fireworks that lit
up the night’s sky and the gathered throng of people’s beaming faces. The spotlight rested atop
the flag post “awaiting the bold flattering of Kenya’s new red, green, and black dawn.”2 At this
point, Prince Philip, there to represent the Queen, turned to Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta and
whispered, “It’s not too late to change your mind.”3
But even this slight embarrassing moment could not dampen the mood at the venue and
around millions of hearths around the country. There was unbridled hope as Kenya was poised at
the starting line of a beckoning and bright future as an independent country. The flag was finally
flying high at the venue and simultaneously at Mt. Kenya, the highest point on the country’s
landscape, to even more fireworks muffled by thunderous cheering as if from one throat. Many
hearts were gladdened and brimmed with joy.
If there is one thing that Kenyans excel in, besides their world record shuttering longdistance races reputation, it is celebrations. No opportunity is left unexploited for joyous
partying. Independence celebrations and ceremonies were held almost without respite throughout
independence week. But the period of most intensive pageantry and dedication extended from
11th to 14th December a few months later when the country became a republic on 12th December
1964.4
In a broadcast to the nation earlier that day, the Kenyatta told Kenyans, who actually
needed no reminding, to greet the planned moment at midnight with festivity and rejoicing.5 In
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this address, he reiterated that becoming a republic was a significant milestone on the road to
independence. It meant “absolute freedom” of Africans running their own government,
parliament and making all decisions affecting the country’s security and progress. It also meant
sovereignty “not only in fact, but also in appearance.”6 The unique and historic decision of the
main opposition party, KADU, to join the government, he said, bode well for building of “one
strong Kenya [sic] nation for the benefit of all, with leeway still for constructive self-criticism
amongst ourselves.” Kenyatta went on to promise that he and his ministers were “guided by a
single inspiration: to raise the living standards of the people.” His government’s single task was
“to attack as fiercely” as it could the enemies of malnutrition and sickness, illiteracy and
economic frustration. Such was the commitment with which to thrust open the gateways of hope
always looking out towards new frontiers of economic and social opportunity for every man,
woman and child.7
As in his numerous rhetoric laden speeches made throughout that year, the president told
Kenyans that the government could not be expected to fulfill this commitment alone. The
people’s understanding and contribution was needed. People that year had responded to the
triumphant call of harambee to pool resources and drive the country forward in a spirit of
promoting self-reliance. “Uhuru na kazi” (freedom and work) was the slogan and omnibus
rallying cry towards this goal. It pointed to the rewards of hard work that were greater and more
accessible with independence.8 “Uhuru na kazi” was to be the guiding spirit expected to imbue
everyone from the grassroots all the way up. This would be buttressed by individual and
collective discipline with thoughts of duty and morality. Eventually, the desired Kenyan state
that everyone yearned for would emerge. One that would ensure national dignity, freedom,
greater human respect founded on the belief in individual human rights. Human respect extended
beyond what a man was or what he did to what he owned and cherished.
These sentiments were echoed in his address later that day in his inauguration ceremony.
The president hailed and heralded the birth of the Kenyan state.9 In this speech, Kenyatta dug
deep within his recesses of his person in what was his most important address to the nation.
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There was a sense that he cared deeply that all, with him at the helm, work together to forge a
strong, stable and united African state. He led the people in imagining a Kenyan state in which
all participated in government, commerce and industry and the proper usage of land. Having
done so, however, Kenyatta went on to aptly caution that this “image in our minds” was not
enough. It was but a design and dreams were no refuge. There was need for vigor of practical
initiative to turn this image into reality.10 The guiding light of enlightenment, service and dignity
was enough to quell divisive forces of racialism and bigotry. Freedom and unity were pillars of
the state. The state was all the people of Kenya. They were no longer Kikuyu, Kamba, Giriama,
Kipsigis, Maasai, English, Asian or Somali. That is because the state embodied equality and
respect and cut through racial and ethnic distinctions. A moment in time had arrived when all
were able to achieve their individual and group goals and thereby command their own destiny
and rediscover their own voice.11
These words were the soft pouring rain on parched land that had not tasted water for
years. They were well-weighted and well-meaning. But then, they were just words,
unfortunately. During these heady days, however, the smell of freedom was in the air and
restored agency and voice palpable. Caught up in the contagious euphoria, everything was
achievable collectively. People at all levels of life were imbued by an all-consuming optimism.
There was absolute certainty that acting together, they could make things happen. They were not
just full of brimming hope but also commitment. Teachers, doctors, nurses, lawyers, architects,
engineers, writers and many other vocations were going to serve the nation.12 With the simple act
of lowering the Union Jack, and hoisting of the new flag, British colonialism ended. All its ills
and ethos “were over.”
In the place of the indignities, humiliation and oppression of colonialism, everyone was,
once again, bound together in the restored social fabric underlined by mutual reciprocity and
well-being. All committed to each other in the African spirit of mutual concern underscored by
the notion of the binding African philosophy of life: “I am because we are and since we are,
therefore I am.” Everyone was one’s brother’s or sister’s keeper from the president reaching
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down to the grassroots and back again.13 This was an aspiration of Mau Mau struggle. The armed
freedom struggle had occasioned a severe food shortage. This led to the composition of a Mau
Mau song that urged and charged people to split the little food there was even if it was a single
morsel of a bean in the spirit of sharing.14
Indeed, this was the spirit of sharing that harambee attempted to harness. For a while, the
president inspired and ably led harambee development projects in which communities pooled
their efforts, skills and financial resources in order to build schools and sponsor and send bright
students to national high schools, public universities and studies abroad; bridges; hospitals;
roads; cattle-dips; and water projects were initiated. People sought to ensure individual as well as
collective survival and growth. It was a historic and successful moment in which human rights in
the center front inspired by this collective vision and fanned by a spirit of accountability between
the individual and the group.15
But the music soon stopped. Independence, and its accompanying rosy brave new world
that it initially heralded, actually turned out to be only a game of musical chairs. It was a most
embittering farce for most people. It did not take much or long for people to realize and
appropriately recognize what the “transition” was: flag independence. Kenyatta had even
honored a few Mau Mau fighters with national flags but then that is all they received for their
effort and sacrifices. They felt betrayed. In a powerful analogy, they complained that it seemed
as if they were like unrewarded soccer players.
Those who fought colonial “order,” as discussed in chapter four, had reentered society
only to find that they were still landless in a rural world now realigned by land consolidation and
freehold title.16 Despite having played and won the game, the trophy was awarded to spectators.
Some in government, as discussed in chapter 5, even wanted the symbolic gift of the national
flag returned. This action led a few among freedom fighters to complain directly to the president
thus: “Our dear leader, whoever leaves his children to be mauled by such sinister hyenas
ordering them not to run so that they can be finished? Our beloved leader, did you honor us with
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the flag so that it could be a trophy fought over between the masses and Njuhiga (the educated
elite)?”17 Independence did not quite fix the criminal, albeit “legal,” policy foundations of the
edifice that is the postcolonial Kenya state. The historical and structural injustice, especially with
regard to the sensitive issue of land was addressed on the basis of the principle of “willing seller,
willing buyer.” This bore “justice” for the white settlers, most of whom were compensated for
their loss of land. Saying that Africans who expected the restoration of their ancestral lands were
dismayed is an underestimation of their independence plight.
The litmus test for independence was the practical enjoyment of the fruits of
independence of which the president talked about: land restoration and redistribution; dignity;
freedom from ignorance, poverty and disease, malnutrition, and economic frustration; and
greater human respect founded on the belief in individual human rights. As Kenyatta had said,
these were obstacles to an improved standard of living for all. They were thus to be attacked
fiercely. They were and have been with measured success.
Unfortunately, what has been fiercely and consistently attacked, since independence,
without a shadow of uncertainty are state coffers and commons such as game parks, wildlife
especially elephants and rhinos, land, both public and private and forests. This has rather
prominently featured the small class of the political elite and their cronies. It has involved a great
deal of undisciplined and unhinged greed. This is true of all the three different regimes after
independence. Long forgotten is the sense of individual and collective discipline with thoughts of
duty and morality of which Kenyatta spoke.
Mutual reciprocity, collective destiny and agency through participation in government,
commerce and industry in the spirit of harambee have been dislocated. This spirit has been
replaced by primitive capitalism of the educated and political elite. It involves individualistic
grabbing of wealth by the powerful. The poor and powerless in postcolonial Kenya have not
enjoyed the quality of human rights which is the enclosed or exclusive preserve of the wealthy.18
The dancing and celebration that accompanied independence was enjoyed by those at the top of
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the wealth pyramid. It is this group that hijacked the fruits of independence at the expense of the
greater majority of people in society. Land, employment, the best education and healthcare, civil
liberties and civic responsibility became stuck, like the flag at independence. The only difference
between the flag on the pole and these fruits of independence, however, being that the latter were
not either trapped mid-way or at the bottom, but rather, at the very top. This, it would also seem,
was not by ill-design but as a result of sheer elite greed. This, during and after 50 years of
independence, is clear to all and sundry. The state belongs to only a clique of people who control
its resources. The image and dream of the state for all that inspired protest and sacrifices before
and during Mau Mau, has been effectively frustrated since independence. It has been replaced by
the attitude of “to each, his own.” This is based upon a rigged, unjust system with its headwaters
in the criminal foundations of the colonial state.

Kenya in the Making: An Amorphous Postcolonial State
It would seem that the pathological colonial ethos transfigured the national psyche. The
image of the state that Kenyatta strove to painstakingly draw is forever elusive. Different
sections of society are no longer committed to a common destiny. They have, instead, turned
against each other. This has been especially the case between different ethnic groups, more so on
the touchy issue of land. Striving for an improved standard of life is now seen through the
narrow prism of professions, trades and group interests. Individualized greed as an attitude has
infected ordinary people.19 The independence dream of all for one and one for all has been
effectively shunted aside. There is a prevalent outlook of life that emphasizes the idea of
everyone unto his own. Whole sections of society have been effectively atomized, especially in
the Moi-years and the tumultuous 1990s. Different ethnic groups, teachers, doctors, nurses,
lawyers, architects, university professors and students, hawkers, matatu crews etc. who yearn for
the same thing, basic human rights defined by quality of life, do not see eye to eye on this bread
and butter issue.
It is, however, quite clear that there are two distinct ideologies competing for prominence
in the construction of the Kenyan state. On the one hand is the elite ideology of law and order.
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On the other, is the counter-ideology of the state as conceived and perpetrated by the elite. The
former aims at preserving and maintaining the order inaugurated by the British colonial state. It
is this “order” based, as it was, on the strength of the illegality of legality especially appertaining
to land that was in dispute during the Mau Mau 1950s. The Mau Mau war was a seminal moment
in which the Kenyan state was in the throes of formation. The war and the British counterinsurgency, supported by a section of loyal Kikuyu, was an exercise in state-building.20 The Mau
Mau war was and continues to epitomize the quest for popular statehood. It was a serious attempt
to reconfigure socioeconomic, the political order and power structure although it failed utterly in
this regard.
The war, and the politics of these turbulent times, provided an opportunity for a fresh
start but it had the exact opposite effect. Indeed, it only served to strengthen the prevailing order
although minimal concessions and compromises including independence were made. Suffice it to
say, that Kikuyu loyalists and moderate politicians, among them Kenyatta who were amenable to
the colonial project, provided the personnel to postcolonial state institutions.21 The end result has
been a security or surveillance state that is keener on political control and reactionary response to
crises as opposed on the provision of public welfare.
To stifle dissent and curb the demand for the restoration and redistribution of land,
among other grievances, what the state emphasized, and still does, is the central importance of
the respect for and sanctity of property rights. The “small” matter of the grand British colonial
“legal” heist involving land and labor was to be forgiven and forgotten. These “christianly”
virtues were the foundational themes upon which the future was to be built. There was no need to
dwell on the past as that would only stoke fires of revenge and animosity by “looking back on
scenes of anguish.” “Uhuru” for Kenya had to be joyful, not somber.22 It also reminded people
that the fruits of independence were there for as long as one had the strength to seek them
through hard work.23 That is what “uhuru na kazi” meant. This message was tailored specifically
to deal the high expectations for land restoration and redistribution. Land in post independent
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Kenya was to be paid for through the fruits of hard work and bought by aspiring African land
owners. Nothing was free. Formidable challenges that faced the country, such as nation-building,
unemployment, land hunger, malnutrition and economic frustration could be cured through hard
work.
It is slothfulness, therefore, that was a much greater problem according to this ideology.
In the same breath, it argued that colonialism was over and with it, all sense of exploitation. The
nation-building project and progress being sought was that of Kenyans by working for
themselves. People had no one else to rely upon but themselves. Independence was thus not
simply an opportunity but also a challenge. It was never mentioned that colonialism was akin to
taking food right out a child’s mouth and telling it to work to earn a living. Here it is important to
remind the reader that colonial capitalism, and its primitive postcolonial corollary, forever
altered and broke-down the relationship between people and food. Needless to say, this was a
bitter pill to swallow.
Nevertheless, it has been a consistent political message. While clamping down on the
underground movements of the 1980s and the huge wave of opposition in the 1990s, Moi’s
refrain was the need for a unified nation of “law and order.” Kibaki too was fond of reminding
people that Kenya was a working nation. This started early during his political term in the
highest office in the land. In his address to the nation in June 2003 on the annual celebration of
the attainment of self-government, he reiterated that the era of free things was over. Kenyans,
therefore, had to work hard together. Whoever did not want to work hard and wanted free things
had to surely want to leave the country. Hard work was necessary to repair the institutions,
revamp the economy, mend the constitution and fend for one’s family.24
All this time, nonetheless, there has been mute silence on the authors of law and order
regarding the selfish and wanton acquisitiveness of the educated and political elite; primitive
capitalism and the inherent moral depravity of grand corruption; the government’s glaring
unresponsiveness and the unrepresentative nature of the political system; and the centralizing
control of the state, especially with regard to development. Indeed, these identifiers stand out as
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the insignia on the shoulder board of the elite who command and control state institutions and
patrol the hallways of power.
The counter-ideology of official state-building by the elite has, before and since
independence, been espoused by various critical publics. These various groups that have formed
the subject of this research constitute the anti-colonial and anti-state ideological legacy of the
Mau Mau struggle. They are spurred by the desire to acquire individual and group agency and,
thereby, be in control or their own destiny and resources; they desire people-driven and centered
development and equity and equality; economic democracy and empowerment; basic human
rights such as decent housing, clean water, quality education and healthcare among other social
services; and freedom from hunger and malnutrition.
For most Kenyans, these are signifiers of progress, civic responsibility and civil liberty:
real “uhuru.” These represent a genealogy of grievance that reaches back to the dawn of
colonialism when the majority of the population in Kenya was permanently dispossessed. This,
therefore, can be said to represent a generational struggle and discontent with deep historical
roots in structural injustice propagated under colonialism and maintained long after
independence. If only one listens carefully, there has always been, in Kenya, this soft but stern
voice of public opinion.25 This is what the task of this study has been. To peer into and enter the
everyday experiences of ordinary people and, by so doing, truly step inside, and authoritatively
capture, their untold and painful experiential anxieties and everyday frustrations. These stern
voices of dissent are heard throughout the country’s past.
At the genesis of Kenya as a colonial project over 100 years ago, the ancestors of
political dissent did not fully understood the state or harbor a lot of sympathy for the idle poor.
But they knew the difference between fertile self-mastery in leaders and barren greed; they had a
keen regard for the personal autonomies which, under the law, give citizenship a chance of selfmastery.26 In the absence of self-mastery measured by the production and delivery of signifiers
of progress, civic responsibility and civil liberty by the state, people did not and will not render
to it loyalty, obedience or recognize it as legitimate. Rather, various critical publics will
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continue, as they have in the past, to couch their demands in a language that “demands an argued
accountability of power that the ideology of order will not accept.”27
Whatever form of organization this spirit of discontent has taken over the years, it has
always been criminalized by the ideology of law and order. These competing ideologies have
resulted in an amorphous and an unstable postcolonial state “peacefully” sustained only by the
investment of force. The postcolonial state, not unlike the British colonial state, is founded on
violence to institute “order” and impose ruling institutions from above. As such, it has had to rely
on various security apparatuses for continued stability. This unabated historical continuity is
evidenced by the prominence of violence in Kenya’s long century.28

Statehood? The Security and Surveillance State versus “Stateness”
Fifty years since independence and more than fifty years before then, attempts at statebuilding have been disastrous. So was the botched up decolonization process that was rigged
from the start.29 In this sense, the state-weakness and failure is structural and, therefore, wellworked in the nature of the state. In terms of institutionalization, plural democracy,
macroeconomics and securitization, it is a distant imitation of the European welfare state. The
Kenya is a shell or an eviscerated state lacking in the key and core functions besides “security”
like welfare. It is an extractive and extroverted state, which serves the interests of international
finance and the national elite respectively.30 As a top-bottom structure of control, it exists for
these collaborative interests. Mismanagement of the economy and maladministration has
severely limited the exactness of the approximation European state model. The result has been
state decay and the blighting of the lives of Kenyans.31 The only reprieve from implosion over
the years has been the development of the state as a surveillance state.
To say that Kenya is a police state is an understatement. As far as statehood goes, its
most prominent element of “statehood” is the disproportionate investment of force. Indeed, this
27
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has been one of the most enduring legacies of the colonial “conquest state.” As a modern state,
Kenya has evolved as it was forged through the investment of force. At the onset of British
imperialism, the genesis of the modern state was the “pacification” of the territory and its
inhabitants through military violence as an enactment and demonstration of power and might.
This opened the door for the establishment of the modalities of colonial state surveillance. This
included elements such as the physical presence of a small detachment of British forces, an
African paramilitary police force and a colonial administrative structure with its associated
bureaucratic enactments of control and authority such as the “tribal police.”
Since its early inception, therefore, political “order” in Kenya has been buttressed by the
material display of force and spatialization of the force monopolized by the state. The outbreak
of the Mau Mau war resulted in the strengthening of the military sinew of power. In a moment of
the self-doubt when he faced one of his greatest political tests after the assassination of Tom
Mboya in 1969, Kenyatta brought out military tanks and ordered the flying of the Kenya Air
Force jets as a further demonstration of force and control. What emerged was a surveillance state
that reached its zenith in the Moi regime, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout Kenya’s
history, pass-by marches by various military, police and paramilitary forces and air force fly-bys
during national holidays have been center-stage. This martial celebration of Kenya is an
exaggeration of this aspect of statehood. This exercise of power, especially by individual
politicians and regimes that have abused power; and benefitted from the control of state
institutions and resources; spawned corruption, is what has inspired widespread grassroots
discontent. The state is the driver of the accumulation process and the most important dispenser
of patronage and resources. Control over the state in Kenya has, moreover, become the central
preoccupation of politics in Kenya.32
Because the spatial and social uneven development was fostered during imperialism, a
time during which ethnic inequalities were magnified, ethnic competition and the concomitant
ethnic conflict has become the most important mode of political contestation in the postcolonial
period.33 This is what has, at the level of ethnic affiliation, diminished and atomized grassroots
discontent. National politics and competition for public goods is configured along ethnic lines,
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thus dissipating whatever inherent appeal the counter-ideology of popular statehood might have.
As a result, people of different ethnic groups, although equally dispossessed and excluded from
the power and socioeconomic privilege, do not see eye to eye. So much so that there is a
prevalent political anecdote that it is better for one to be devoured by a familiar ethnic hyena s/he
knows than by another hyena from another ethnic group. Public awareness of common or crosscutting predicaments, especially with regard to land hunger and shared limitations with regard to
self-mastery have, habitually, been drowned and deterred by “high-political resort to the auction
room of tribalism.”34 Instead of singular focus on the overdue resolution of historical injustices
especially those that regard land, the political elite recalibrate this central issue sitting at the top
of the politics of bread and butter in terms of “them” against “us.” An analysis of Kenyan politics
that focuses on, and stops at, ethnic conflict for this reason, must, therefore, be rather shallow
and misleading. Without a doubt, it is as shallow and misleading like the colonial, and indeed
many scholarly explanations of Mau Mau that saw minority manipulation of mass opinion rather
than a dynamic process.35
At another level, various critical publics, although imbued by the same spirit of Mau Mau
struggle for improved standards of life, do not work in concert to press the state. Critical publics
such as teachers, university professors, doctors and nurses including even more radical and
defiant Mau Mau minds such as Mungiki and the SLDF, have argued the same issues but “with
different metaphors.”36 They have been, for that reason, successfully contained by the securitysurveillance state while the radical and more violent manifestations of Mau Mau minds have
been violently crushed through state force. All this has served to further masculinize the
securitized nature of the postcolonial state. This has been at the expense of the real and deep
nature of Kenya’s politics of “stateness.”
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“Stateness” here implies looking beyond the basic and traditional elements of statehood.
It suggests the urgent need to qualify institutional entities we call states on the basis of
territoriality, possession of monopoly of force, population and government. In its place,
especially in the case of Kenya among many other imperial colonies around the world, functional
and citizen sensitive and responsible statehood is crucial. That is “stateness” in the modern
sense, which emphasizes the capacity and ability of the state to fulfil its expected roles with
regard to its internal population besides security and “order” that preserves a flawed status quo.
While the Kenyan state has relatively fulfilled roles such as controlling its borders and territory
and providing basic security, it has bumbled in as far as the promotion of general welfare and
social services.37
In the Kenyan case, moreover, law reform is one of the most significant aspects of
stateness. It is a political imperative to address colonial historical injustice with regard to the allimportant land question. Indeed, the politics of land in Kenya is perhaps the most fundamental
aspect of constitutional order and state character. This is because land policy and illegal legality
was at the center of the colonial state-building project that remains more or less intact. British
colonial land laws were critical to the role of the state in defining property rights. By extension,
they were decisive in shaping the locus and character of political authority in modern Africa. The
successes and limitations of the nation-building project must begin and end with respect to them.
In this sense, reforming the rules of land tenure means redefining and reconfiguring
relationships between and within communities, and between communities and the state.38 The
reconstitution of land policy and overhaul of existing land tenure legislation is at the core of the
debate around the nature of citizenship; political mobilization; and the future.39 Fixing systems of
power, property and law in Africa, and Kenya in particular, lies at the heart of restoration of the
relationship between people and food. After all, Africa’s “food problem” is not one of food
production, which should necessitate increasing it. Rather, it is one of guaranteeing access to
food, resources and/or the distribution of output.40 Indeed, reinstitution of land is key to the
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reestablishment of individual and group agency. This is true meaning of “uhuru”: substantive
freedom constituting and defined by the quality of life.
The primacy of land among other resources cannot be underestimated in as far as it
defines competent living, securing efficacious livelihood and giving people a voice. According to
leading scholars of personality and social psychology, and subjective well-being (SWB) in
particular, societal resources at people’s disposal allow them to make progress in achieving their
goals and enable them to lead a life of satisfaction and affective well-being.41 In this emergent
field that studies people’s cognitive and affective evaluations of their lives, it is suggested that
income and human rights correlate with SWB because they affect the ability of individuals and
communities to achieve diverse goals.42 As such, control of land, among other vital natural,
human and financial assets, is, indeed, at the center of basic human rights and dignity.

Popular Statehood: Human Rights, Dignity and Decency
At the core of the quest for popular statehood and politics in Kenya has been the desire
for competent living or self-sufficiency that allows for self-mastery in the sense of forging
individual and communal destinies. That is agency as defined by competence and having a
voice.43 Since early colonial days, besides the ownership and management of various rural assets
such as land and livestock, people have always wanted an active, felt and visible presence in the
formal and free market system that is the epitome of modernity. They have wanted and
demanded fairness of access in this regard, which is what caused the terrors of Mau Mau in the
1950s. This is an attitude that goes beyond the cultural argument pertaining to reciprocity within
society and between the rich and the poor in particular. It goes beyond the argument about how
greedy or socially ir/responsible the wealthy are or how lazy or worthy the poor are. It is about
the raising of voices to counter the latter rhetoric of the ideology of order and working nation
intended to shore up the status quo. Indeed, it is this status quo that they seek to dismantle and
reorder or restructure the social order.44
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Competent living means agency defined by connections between the rural and urban
areas and mobility of individuals between them; and visibility and audibility in action and
decision-making especially affecting people’s everyday lives.45 Further, it means having diverse
income sources, access to paid employment in urban and rural areas and access to group
financial insurance. What this all comes down to is the fulfilment of basic human rights and
human dignity defined in terms of having a bulwark against hard times based on relative but
sustainable wealth for everyday sustenance.46 This is an idea of development and freedom that
goes beyond ideas of social, economic and political capital to embrace Amartya Sen’s notion of
capability and agency.47 In this sense, real “uhuru” meant, and means, enabling development that
ensures that children are well-brought up and educated in proper schools and good health.48
Studies have proven that the SWB of nations correlate with income, rights, and the degree to
which basic needs are fulfilled for the majority of citizens.49 Income allows people to achieve
their material goals whereas rights and equality mean that a greater percentage of citizens have
freedom and opportunity to pursue a wide range of goals.50 In this sense, the Mau Mau war was
waged as a section of the Kikuyu sought and demanded ownership and management of land,
livestock, an active, felt, visible and appreciated presence in the formal and free cash-crops
market and a place in the colonially inaugurated modernity.
The Mau Mau rebellion was not waged, as the settlers and the colonial government
believed, because of the inability of the Kikuyu’s to adapt to the demands of modernization.51
Rather, it was a protest against an unequal hierarchical and racial distribution of the benefits of
the accruing goodies of modernization. This study has attempted to demonstrate that freedom
fighters were against colonial modernity’s concomitant dispossession and racial exclusion. They
hoped to rectify and reconfigure the socioeconomic structure and relations of power (see
chapters two, three and four). Furthermore, in as much as the pre-European village life and social
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fabric had been disrupted and ruptured, the war was not waged to bring back this “Edenic” era of
Africa.
It bespoke, instead, resentment towards the state because of its restrictions and constraints
with regard to accumulation and diversification of rural and urban socioeconomic activities
including the disposal of individual and group labor.52 This, then, is how Mau Mau minds in
Kenya’s long history spanning over a century ought to be understood. Critical publics in the
nation’s anti-colonial struggle; the populist dissidents of Kenyatta’s policies in the 1960s and the
underground movements; the muffled voices of the 1990s; and the whole range of resistance
voices of the 2000s are all a part of Kenya’s long oppositional history of dissent and struggles for
voice, competent living, over rural assets and especially land, political rights, individual and
communal self-mastery, political authority and ideology.53 These myriad voices of protest from
below in history, at present and in the future, are all a call for an end to the injustice of
dispossession and exclusionism. They demand the basic material security and substantive uplift,
daily amenities and efficiencies availed by modernity including tapped clean water, three square
meals, decent housing, good education, health and roads, electricity and civil liberties and civic
responsibility. Put differently, their place in time.
In this respect, the few listed markers of modernity signify and herald the golden hour of
arrival. In Kenya, as elsewhere in the majority of places in the world, it is an arrival that is long
belated. Furthermore, it is an arrival that remains an elusive quest for relative prosperity and
progress in Kenya and Africa in general. The under-privileged in society are not asking to be
wealthy, for egalitarianism or strict economic equality. They agitate and criticize the state in the
hope that it acts as the great equalizer between those who are born into privilege, and who
probably work hard too, and those who are born into situations that beleaguer all attempts at selfimprovement. Political agitation is for the provision of the appropriate opportunities for material
uplift to break from the vicious cycle of generational poverty. Theirs is a basic human rights
demand cast in light of very real and historical injustices felt every waking day appropriately
held against the state and, by extension, the international financial regime. It is a demand for the
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state and, by extension, the international financial grid, to reconcile the interests and the dignity
of each individual with the interests and dignity of everyone.54
It is a call that flies in the face of the official ideology of order that only emphasizes work
and duty. In this regard, it fits quite tidily with various international human rights texts and the
United Nationals Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). Chapter 29 (1) of the UDHR notes
that “everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his
personality is possible.”55 But then it also observes in Article 25 (1) that everyone has the right to
a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.56 The Bill of Rights has always been an integral
part of the Kenyan state and is adequately provided for in the constitution.
It is enshrined in Chapter 4 Sections 19 (2) and (3), which recognize that the importance
of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals
and communities and to promote social justice and the realization of the potential of all human
beings.57 These economic and social rights are further elaborated in Article 43 of the
constitution. They include the right to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes
the right to health care services; accessible and adequate housing and to reasonable standards of
sanitation; freedom from hunger and to have adequate food of acceptable quality clean and safe
water; and to education.58 Since the state commits itself to the solemn and fundamental duty of
observing, respecting, protecting, promoting and fulfilling the rights and fundamental freedom
guaranteed under Article 43, it is paramount that it is seen to do so especially with regard to
righting glaring historical injustices. One of the most significant objectives of this study has been
to demonstrate that the unresolved issue of land politics is fundamental to constitutional order
and the character of the Kenyan state. It is heartening that one of the fundamental themes of the
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country’s 2010 constitution is justice.59 In the process of making this constitution for the better
part of the first decade of the 21st Century, the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission
(CKRC) heard from people many stories of injustice dating back to a century and a half.60 These
are individual and communal narratives involving land theft and that of other property,
communal violence politically motivated killing and displacement of people, torture,
discrimination against, and exclusion of minorities, and a perverted political and legal system
under which impunity flourished.61 Such micro-narratives have been at the core of this study and
constitute the mentalité of struggle.

Epilogue –Remedying the Illegality of Colonial Legality: A Very Tall Order
In talking to the CKRC, people expressed the desire to have a constitution to redress past
and continuing injustices. But Kenya inherited a colonial legacy that created differentiation and
conflict of interests among its people as a matter of policy. It is a legacy that led to the uneven
development of regions and communities. The postcolonial Kenyan state is still heavily reliant
upon the instruments of coercion and primitive accumulation.62 It is, therefore, a state that still
does not recognize the intrinsic worth of the individual. Indeed, individuals and communities
exist for the state and the privileged few who control its apparatus. Yet, the opposite, the state
being seen to exist for the sake of individuals is the desired ideal.63 This is because even after the
country’s independence in 1963, and since, the colonial surveillance state was not transformed in
its essence. It continued to dominate society and rely on coercion.64
According to Ghai what this means is that in Kenya’s postcolonial history there has been
no need to practice democracy or respect for human rights. The principal role of the state has
been the accumulation of wealth, which has continued unabated, only having taken crude and
personalized forms after independence. “With universal franchise came not genuine democracy
but the ethnicization of politics, accompanied by violence serving to obscure the underlying
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process and reality of inequality and powerlessness.”65 As such, Ghai notes, the state is closely
associated with the politics of eating. This goes beyond the gastronomic implications of
Francois-Bayart’s Politics of the Belly. It implies a network of relations of patronage and
incentives and sanctions that sustain individual greed and cronyism.66 In many ways, therefore,
the severe physical loss of land, its coterminous pauperization through the coercion of labor and
aggregated mental torment inflicted since the inauguration of the colonial state remains a painful
wound as fresh today as it was then.
There exists, in the place of the hostile, constraining and oppressive colonial legal and
policy architecture, an availing and provident one today. This is an indisputable fact.
Nevertheless, the coterminous values of human dignity and human rights thus enshrined remain a
pipe dream for many Kenyans. The majority of them still live with all types of inhuman
humiliation and degradation, lack of individual or communal choice with regard to selffulfillment, autonomy or self-realization and the existence of the necessary conditions for
everyone to have their essential needs satisfied.67 This will continue to cause great resentment
among the marginalized who feel alienated from the state targeted at the arrogant privileged who
think that the state belongs to them.68
Yet there is a silver lining. As built, the constitution serves two critical functions: that of
nation building and state building. Questions of justice such as citizenship values, rights and
relationships among communities belong to the former while the latter refers to institutions for
representation, power sharing, accountability and litigation among other things.69 Thus, there is a
possibility that justice, the building of national solidarity bound by common values and a
commitment to fairness for all might yet triumph. It is true, as Ghai aptly notes, that a
constitution in itself cannot guarantee its own effectiveness. It is also true that the new
constitutional order was imposed on the recalcitrant ruling elite, which is entrusted with the
responsibility for its implementation. There is evidence that under Kenya’s fourth president
Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of the country’s first, and his deputy, William S. Ruto, there are

65

Ibid.
Ibid.
67
McCrudden, “Human Dignity,” 686.
68
Ghai, “Ethnicity, Nationhood and Pluralism,” 105.
69
Ibid.
66

449

sections of the elite hell-bent on frustrating the full measure of constitutional implementation.
Forces of the old colonial order not only control the state but also key sectors of society through
bribery, vast commercial and financial empires, manipulation of ethnicity, intimidation, armed
force and more.70
But the mentalité of struggle in the crucible of Kenya’s colonial and postcolonial
experience has produced a spirit that never sleeps. It is the unyielding Mau Mau spirit that says
“bado mapambano” (the struggle is still on). It is a Mau Mau mind that forever points to
openings and opportunities for the people to bring about change through participation, petitions,
sensible use of the vote, contesting for public offices, recourse to courts and solidarity.71
Although it is no place for the historian to make predictions, on the strength of historical
hindsight, the people by wielding this document will, eventually, emerge triumphant in this battle
and struggle for the good life in Kenya.
With that said, it is crucial to point out that every single soul in Kenya is locked in a
intricate, mutual and an eternal dance of life. It is certainly not a dirge. State House, Nairobi is
where the dance is; going down River Road, one witnesses that the dance is also there in the
streets of the capital; on the lush green former white highlands in the great Rift Valley and
Central Kenya is where the dance is; on the old beaches of the coast is where the dance is; on the
shores of Lake Nam Lolwe and beyond is where the dance is; on the slopes of Mr. Elgon, the
Aberdare Ranges and Mt. Kenya is where the dance is; it is also in the oil and water rich land
around Lk. Turkana; and it is the same dance is in the semi-arid region of the north eastern part
of the country. This is the mournful-sweet dance of the forgotten voices in Kenya’s ruefully long
century. Distinct are the drum beats of the Mau Mau war as it sits in the middle of the country’s
historical trajectory. It a dance filled with the bitter-sweet sounding drums that remind all, that
care to listen, of the wide open field of unfulfilled dreams of an all-inclusive state. It is a lockstep
dance. This is the dance of mutual reciprocity. It is a dance about how life ties people up in knots
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and about the dream of untying an intricate knot together. In so doing, their touch is gentle,
humorous; and the ends of the knotted strings are always left mysteriously loose.72

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Archival Sources
Kenya National Archives
KA/6/14 Complaints and Petitions to the President.
KA/6/32 Complaints and Petitions.
KA/6/33 Complaints and Petitions to the Prime Minister, Western Region.
KA/6/48 Complaints and Petitions to the Prime Minister, Central Province.
KA/6/59 Complaints and Petitions to the Prime Minister, Central Region.
KA/6/60 Complaints and Petitions.
KEN/34/1 Press Extracts.
MAC/KEN/33/4 African Elected Members Correspondence
DC/MKS 10B/13/1 District Report: Machakos
DC/MRU/1/4/5 District Report: Meru
MAA/8/106 Mumenyereri.
MSS/35/7 Correpondence Between James Beauttah and Others, 1966-1967.
MSS/35/9 James Beauttah: Loose Papers

72

This imagery of the knot and the dance is borrowed from the brilliant race relations researcher and expert, and
novelist from Sri Lanka, Ambalavaner Sivanandan, Where the Dance Is (London: Arcadia Books, 2000).

451

MSS/43/6 Kikuyu Highlands Squatters, Land Lords Association Correspondences, 1947-1952.
MSS/43/11 Undated Correspondence.
MSS/115/7/36 A Comment on the Official Records of Kenya (Archives) by M.P.K. Sorrenson.
MSS/129/26 Rehabilitation of Social Problems of Mau Mau History, 1953-1964.
VQ/16/5 Intelligence Reports.
British National Archives
CO533/115 Colonial Office: Kenya Original Correspondence
CO 533/154 Colonial Office: Kenya Original Correspondence
CO 533/193 Colonial Office: Kenya Original Correspondence
CO 533/422/1 Colonial Office: Kenya Original Correspondence. Johnstone Kenyatta:
memorandum on grievances of Kikuyu Central Association.
CO 533/543/2 Colonial Office: Kenya Original Correspondence. Petitions and Memorials:
Kikuyu People (1945-1947)
CO 533/543/4 Colonial Office: Kenya Original Correspondence. Petitions and Memorials:
Kikuyu People.
CO 533/543/6 Colonial Office: Kenya Original Correspondence. Petitions: Kikuyu Central
Association Kikuyu Grievances.
CO 822/448 Colonial Office: East Africa: Original Correspondence. External repercussions of
the Mau Mau situation in Kenya.
CO 822/458 Colonial Office: East Africa: Original Correspondence. Memorandum by Colin
Legum of the "Observer" newspaper about the background to Mau Mau.
C0 892/6/1 Colonial Office: East Africa Royal Commission (Dow Commission):
Correspondence and Papers. Kenya. Memoranda from the public: African claims to specific
areas of land.
DO 226/13 Dominions Office: High Commission and Consular Archives, Kenya: Internal
Affairs.
DO 226/14 Dominions Office: High Commission and Consular Archives, Kenya: National
Assembly of Kenya.

452

DO 226/15 Dominions Office: High Commission and Consular Archives, Kenya: Internal
political affairs in Kenya.
FCO 31/1510 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department: KENYA. Activities
of Lonrho Ltd in Kenya
FCO 31/1637 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department: Visit of Joan Lester,
UK Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to Kenya
and Zambia, 23-30 May 1974
FCO 31/1886 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department: Registered Files (P
and JE Series). Kenya: annual review for 1974
FCO 31/2020 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: KENYA. Kenya: annual review for 1975
FCO 31/2330 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department: KENYA. Soviet
subversion in Kenya
FCO 31/2557 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department: KENYA. Internal
situation in Kenya
FCO 31/2559 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department: Registered Files (P
and JE Series). KENYA. Kenya: form-at-a-glance
FCO 31/2832 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department: KENYA. Official
visits from the UK to Kenya
FCO 31/2838 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: East Africa Department: KENYA. Economy
of Kenya
FCO 141/5523 Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors: Records of Former
Colonial Administrations: Kenya: minutes of Executive Council meetings held at Government
House, 1943
FCO 141/5528 Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors: Records of Former
Colonial Administrations: Kenya: minutes of Executive Council meetings held at Government
House, 1948.
FCO 141/6836 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Records of Former Colonial
Administrations: Migrated Archives. KENYA. Kenya: future of the Coastal Strip (Kenya
Protectorate); report of the Commissioner, James Wilson Robertson
FCO 141/7114 Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors: Records of Former
Colonial Administrations: Migrated Archives. KENYA. Kenya Land Freedom Army
Books

453

Gichaga, Francis, J. Surviving the Academic Arena: My Complex Journey to the Apex (Nairobi:
University of Nairobi Press, 2011).
Hempstone, Smith. Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir (Sewanee: University of the South
Press, 1997).
Kariuki, Josiah M. “Mau Mau” Detainee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
Kipkorir, Benjamin E. Descent from Cherang’any Hills: Memoirs of a Reluctant Academic
(Nairobi: Macmillan Kenya, 2009).
Odinga, A.Oginga. Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga Odinga (London, Heinemann,
1967).
Thiong’o, Ngugi. Dreams in a Time of War (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010).
Government Publications
COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA
Carothers, John C. The Psychology of Mau Mau (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1954).
Corfield, Frank, D. The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, Sessional Paper No. 5 (Nairobi:
Government Printer, 1959-60)
Legislative Council Debates XLI (1951).
Legislative Council Debates XLII (1951).
Legislative Council Debates LXI (1951).
Legislative Council Debates LXII (1958).
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
Kenya Gazette Supplement: The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (Nairobi: Government Printer,
2010).
Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Nairobi:
Government Printer, July 1999).
GREAT BRITAIN
Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 5th Series 509 (1952);
SECONDARY SOURCES
Unpublished Material
Brocklesby, M. A. et. al., “Raising Voice –Securing a Livelihood: The Role of Diverse Voices in
Developing Secure Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas in Ethiopia,” Institute of Development Studies
Working Paper 2010 (2010).
454

Hood, Andrew J. “Developing the East African: The East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-1955,
and its Critics” (Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1997).
Karanja, Andrew M. and Nyoro, James K. “Coffee Prices and Regulation and Their Impact on
Livelihoods of Rural Community in Kenya,” (Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and
Development, Egerton University, October 2002)
Kirubi, Gichuhi M. “Turmoil in a University: An Analytical Study of the Conflicts,
Confrontations and Strikes in the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University College in the
Republic of Kenya, 1960-1978,” (PhD dissertation, Ohio University, 1983).
Llyod, Thomas. University of Endinburgh, “Making ‘Mau Mau’: Remaking Kikuyus; Remaking
Kenya?” Paper Presented at the Researching the Colonial and Postcolonial Workshop, nd.
Ogendo, H.W.Okoth. “The Political Economy of Land Law –An Essay in the Legal Organization
of Underdevelopment in Kenya, 1895-1974,” Ph.D Dissertation, Law School, Yale University
(1978),
Raggio, Osvaldo.“From the Natives’ Point of View: Microhistory, Local Politics, and the State,”
Paper presented at Clark Library Conference (Los Angeles, 1997).
Robson, James S. “Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s Fight Against Colonialism and Neo-colonialism: An
Exploration of the Theme of Betrayal,” Master of Arts Thesis, Department of English, Simon
Fraser University (December 1987).
Walker, Sidney J. “The African Writer and Social Change: A Case Study of Ngugi wa
Thiong’o,” Ph.D Dissertation, Howard University (1984).
Published
Books
Anderson, David. Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty war in Kenya and the End of Empire
(London: Phoenix, 2005).
Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North
America, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage, 2000).
Bayart, Jean- François. Ellis S. and Hibou, B. (trans. Stephen Ellis) The Criminalization of the
State in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
Bayart, Jean- François. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2009).
Benson, T.G. Kikuyu-English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
Berman, Bruce. Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (London:
James Currey, 1990).

455

Berman, Bruce and Lonsdale, John. Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa (James Currey:
Oxford, 1992).
Bolton, Gile. Africa Doesn’t Matter: How the West has Failed the Poorest Continent and what
we Can Do About It (New York: Arcade, 2007).
Branch, Daniel. Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War and
Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
_______ Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011 (Yale: Yale University Press, 2011).
Brewer, John. The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1988).
Brockway, Fenner. Why Mau Mau? An Analysis and Remedy (London: Congress of Peoples
Against Imperialism Centre, 1953).
Buijtenhuijs, Robert. Mau Mau Twenty Years After: The Myth and the Survivors (The Hague:
Mounton & Co., 1973).
Bulhan, Hussein A. Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression (New York: Plenum Press,
1985).
Clough, Marshall S. Fighting Two Sides: Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918-1940 (Niwot:
University Press of Colorado, 1990).
Cohen, David William, and E.S.Atieno Odhiambo. The Risks of Knowledge: Investigations into
the Death of the Hon. Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya, 1990 (Athens: Ohio University
Press, 2004).
Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners in Kenya. Repression Intensifies in Kenya Since
the August 1st Coup Attempt (London: Rye Express, 1983).
Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1992).
Edgerton, Robert B. Mau Mau: An African Crucible (The Free Press, New York, 1989).
Ekiert, Grzegorz. The State Against Society: Political Crises and their Aftermath in East Central
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1996).
Elkins, Caroline. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 2005).
Englebert, Pierre. Africa: Unity, Sovereignty and Sorrow (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2009).
_______ State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1963),
456

Furedi, Frank. The Mau Mau War in Perspective (London: James Currey, 1989).
Gardner, Leigh A. Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.
Gertzel, Cherry. The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963-8 (Nairobi: East African Publishing
House, 1970).
Gifford, Paul. Christianity, Politics and Public Life in Kenya (London, 2009).
Gitari, David. In Season and Out of Season: Sermons to a Nation (Eugene: Wipf and Stock,
1996).
Ginzburg, Carlo. The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
Hall, Catherine. Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 18301867 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
Haugerud, Angelique. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
Hodge, Joseph M. The Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the
Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).
Hornsby, Charles. Kenya: A History Since Independence (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).
Jackson, Robert H. and Carl G. Rosberg. Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat,
Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
Kanogo, Tabitha. Squatters and the roots of Mau Mau (Nairobi Heinmann, 1987).
Khan, Yasmine. The Great Partitions: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007).
Kenyatta, Jomo. Suffering Without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation (Nairobi: East
African Publishing House, 1968).
Knight, Carl. (ed.) Responsibility and Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011).
Kinyatti, Maina. History of Resistance in Kenya, 1884-2002 (Nairobi: Mau Mau Research
Centre, 2008).
_______ Thunder from the Mountains: Mau Mau Patriotic Songs (London: Zed Press, 1980).
457

Kurtz, J. Roger. Urban Obsessions, Urban fears: The Postcolonial Kenyan Novel (Trenton:
Africa World Press, Inc., 1998).
Legum, Colin. Africa Since Independence (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
Leys, Norman. Kenya (London: The Hogarth Press, 1926).
Maloba, Wanyubari O. Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt (Nairobi: East
African Educational Publishers, 1993).
Maxon, Robert M. Britain and Kenya’s Constitutions, 1950-1960 (Amherst: Cambria Press,
2011).
_______ Kenya’s Independence Constitution: Constitution-Making and End of Empire (Lanham:
Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011).
_______ Struggle for Kenya: The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 1912-1923 (New
Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1993).
McCulloch, Jock. Colonial Psychiatry and ‘the African Mind’ (Cambridge: Cambridge
University, 1995).
Metcalf, Thomas R. Ideologies of the Raj (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Miller, Norman. and Rodger Yeager. Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity (Westview Press:
Boulder, 1994).
Mugo, Micere G. Writing and Speaking From the Heart of My Mind: Selected Essays and
Speeches (New Jersey: Africa World Press , 2012).
Odhiambo, E.S.Atieno. Siasa: Politics and Nationalism in E.A, 1905-1939 (Nairobi: Kenya
Literature Bureau, 1981).
Ogot, Bethwell A. and William R. Ochieng. Decolonization & Independence in Kenya, 1940-93
eds. (London: James Currey, 1995).
Press, Robert M. Peaceful Resistance: Advancing Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2006).
Rosberg, Carl and John Nottingham. The Myth of “Mau Mau:” Nationalism in Kenya (New
York: Praeger, 1966).
Sabar, Galia. Church State and Society in Kenya: From Mediation to Opposition, 1963-1993
(London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2002).
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).
Shaw, Lauren. Songs and Social Change in Latin America (Lanham: Lexington, 2013).
Sivanandan, Ambalavaner. Where the Dance Is (London: Arcadia Books, 2000).
458

Sorrenson, M.P.K. Origins of European Settlement in Kenya (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1968).
Spruyt, Hendrik. The Sovereign State and its Competitors (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1994).
Stiftung, Friedrich Ebert and Citizens for Justice. We Lived to Tell the Story: The Nyayo House
Story (Nairobi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) nd.
Stone, Lawrence. An Imperial state at War: Britain From 1689 to 1815 (London & New York:
Routledge, 1994).
Thiong’o, Ngugi. Petals of Blood (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1977).
_______ Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance (New York: Basic Civitas Books,
2009).
_______ Writers in Politics: A Re-engagement with Issues of Literature and Society (Oxford:
James Currey, 1997).
Thompson, Edward P. Customs in Common (Pontypool: The Merlin Press, 1991).
Throup, David W. Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau (London: James Currey, 1987),
Tilly, Charles. The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975).
Tignor, Robert L. The Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu and the Maasai
from 1900 to 1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Umoja. Moi’s Reign of Terror: A Decade of Nyayo Crimes Against the People of Kenya
(London: United Movement for Democracy in Kenya, 1989).
Waihenya, Waithaka and Teresia Ndikaru. A Voice Unstilled: Ndingi Mwana’a Nzeki (Nairobi:
Longhorn, 2009).
Wrong, Michela. It’s Our Turn To Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-blower (London: Fourth
Estate, 2009).
Young, Crawford. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994).
Articles and Chapters
Akuku, Moses. “Hard Road to Democracy,” The Standard, 25th May 1993.
“A Mysterious Death,” Weekly Review, 23rd February 1990.
Anderson, David M. “Mau Mau in the High Court and the ‘Lost’ British Empire Archives:
Colonial Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle?” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History 39 (2011), 699-716.
459

Amboga, Seth. “What Next After the Alliance,” Kenya Times, 14th December 1995.
Asens, Jaume and Pisarello, Gerardo. “The Illegality of Power,” Blog Article, 17th February
2012.
Austin, Gareth. “The ‘Reversal of Fortune’ Thesis and the Compression of History: Perspectives
from African and Comparative Economic History,” Journal of International Development 20
(2008), 996-1027.
Awino, Otieno Ajina A. “Meaning of Democracy Being Misinterpreted,” Kenya Times, 18th
November 1993 “Meaning of Democracy Being Misinterpreted,” Kenya Times, 18th November
1993.
Barnett, Correlli. “The Wasting of Britain's Marshall Aid,” BBC History, (2011).
Bayart, Jean- François. “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion,” African Affairs 99
(2000).
“Black Magic Spurs African Terrorists,” Detroit News, 1st November 1952.
Boone, Catherine. “Property and Constitutional Order: Land Tenure Reform and the Future of
the African State,” African Affairs 106 (2007).
Branch, David and Nicholas Cheeseman. “The Politics of Control in Kenya: Understanding the
Bureaucratic-Executive State, 1952-78,” Review of African Political Economy 33 (2006), 11-31.
Bundotich, John. “Opposition’s Self-immolation,” Kenya Times, 12th March 1996.
Bush, Ray. “The Politics of Food and Starvation,” Review of African Political Economy 23
(1996), 169-195.
Collier Ruth B. and David Collier. “The African State at the End of the Twentieth Century:
Parameters of the Critical Juncture,” in The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between
Disintegration and Reconfiguration (eds.) Villalon, L.A., and Huxtable, P.A., (London: Lynne
Rienner, 1998).
Courrier d’Afrique, 5th November 1952
Cooper, Frederick. “Review Article: Mau Mau and the Discourses of Decolonization,” Journal
of African History 29 (1988).
Daily Express, 28th October 1952.
“Ex-MP Tells of Terror Cult,” Daily Nation Team, 17th November 1997.
“Oath-taking charge: 58 released on Ksh. 50,000 Bond,” Daily Nation, 16th February 1995.
“University Staff Walk Out as Unrest Spreads,” Daily Nation Team, 6th September 2012.
Daina D.N. “Leaders Stifling Our Democracy,” Daily Nation, 23rd March 1994.
460

Dalton, George. “Traditional Economic Systems,” in The African Experience, I (eds.) John N.
Paden, and Edward W. Soja, (Northwestern University Press: Evanston, 1970).
Diener, Ed. et. al. “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of Nations,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 69 (1995).
Diener, E., et. al. “Wealth and Happiness Across the World: Material Prosperity Predicts Life,
Evaluation, Whereas Psychosocial Prosperity Predicts Positive Feeling” Journal of Personality
Social Psychology 99 (2010): 52-61.
Dowling, T.J. “What Good Governance Entails,” The Economic Review, 4th -10th October 1993.
Durrani, Shiraz. “The Other Kenya: Underground and Alternative Literature,” Collection
Building, 16 (1997):
East African Standard, 24th November 1954.
“Native Labour” East African Standard, 8th February 1913.
“Revolutionaries Warned: Kenyatta says ‘I will fight again,’” East African Standard, 12th April
1965.
Ghai, Yash P. “Ethnicity, Nationhood and Pluralism: The 2010 Kenya Constitution,” in Ethnicty,
Nationhood and Pluralism: Kenyan Perspectives (eds.) Yash P. Ghai. and Jill C. Ghai (Ottawa:
Global Centre for Pluralism, 2013).
Gitonga, Isaac B. “Change Must Come From Citizens,” Daily Nation, 12th December 1994.
Hooper, Glenn. (ed.) Landscape and Empire, 1770-2000 (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2005).
Goldsmith, Paul. “The Mombasa Republican Council –Conflict assessment: Threats and
Opportunities for Engagement,” (November 2011).
Human Rights Watch. “‘All the men have gone:’ War crimes in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon conflict,”
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008).
Human Rights Watch. “Kenya: Army and Rebel Militias Commit War Crimes in Mt. Elgon,”
Human Rights Watch Portal (April 2008).
“Is this the Hand of Jacob?” West African Pilot, 28th October 1952.
Jenje, Bozo.“Kenya: Secessionist Group On a Mission to Meet the Queen,” Daily Nation, 27th
February 2012.
Kabando, Kabando. “New Political Thinking a Must,” Daily Nation, 7th May 1995.
Kadida, Jillo. “Police Arrest Rowdy Members of Banned Sect,” Sunday Nation, 5th October
2003.
Kariuki, Charles M. “Kenyans Need Better Government,” Daily Nation, 5th July 1995.
461

“Kenya Terrorists Afflict Africa,” Great Falls Tribune, 3rd November 1952.
Kihuria, Njonjo. “Bedan Mbugua Recalls Muge’s Last Words,” The Star, 14th August 2013.
Kimani, Michael M. “Government Should Heed Counsel,” Daily Nation, 15th April 1995.
Kimani, Victor. “Let Us Reason Together,” The Nairobi Law Monthly (No. 33, June 1991).
Kimaru, Simmi. “Where the Opposition Has Failed,” Daily Nation, 2nd November 1994.
Kinyatti, Maina. "Mau Mau: The Peak of African Nationalism in Kenya,” Kenya Historical
Review 5, no. 2 (1977).
Knighton, Ben. “Muingiki Madness,” Religion and Politics in Kenya: Essays in Honor of a
Meddlesome Priest (ed.) Knighton, B., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Koross, Kibiwott. “History of Teachers’ Strikes Since Independence,” The Star, 3rd September
2012.
KPMG. “Kenya –Country Profile,” (South Africa): 3, nd.
Kraxberger, Brennan M.“The United States and Africa: Shifting Geopolitics in an ‘Age of
Terror,’” Africa Today 52 (2005).
Legum, Colin. “Mau Mau: An Analysis of Problems in Kikuyuland with Some Proposals to Deal
with the Situation,” The Observer, 20th November 1952.
Lipsedge, Maurice. “Colonial Psychiatry and ‘The African Mind,’” BMJ 312 (1996).
Lonsdale John. “Conquest State, 1895-1904,” in A Modern History of Kenya, 1895-1980 (ed.)
William R. Ochieng’ (London: Evan Brothers, 1989).
_______ “Compromised Critics,” in Religion and Politics in Kenya: Essays in Honor of a
Meddlesome Priest (ed.) Knighton, B., (NewYork: Palgrave, 2009),
_______ “Mau Mau and Nationhood,” in Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms, Authority and
Narration (eds.) Atieno E.S. Odhiambo and John Lonsdale (Oxford: James Currey, 2003).
_______ “Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya,” Journal of African
History 31 (1990).
Makanyayiera, Odoyo. “Do Kenyans Need this Alliance?” Daily Nation, 14th March 1996.
Masolo, D.A. “Presencing the Past and Remembering the Present: Social Features of Popular
Music in Kenya,” in Music and the Racial Imagination (ed.) Radano, R.M., & Bohlman, P.V.,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
Maxon, Robert M. “Agriculture,” in Themes in Kenyan History (ed.) William R. Ochieng’
(James Currey: Ohio University Press, 1990).
Mazrui, Ali and Willy Mutunga “The State vs. The Academic Union in Postcolonial Kenya,”
Review of African Political Economy 22 (1995).
462

McCrudden, Chrsitopher. “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights,” The
European Journal of International Law 19 (2008).
McGrath, Laura, and Paula Reavey and Steven D. Brown. “The Scenes and Spaces of Anxiety:
Embodied Expressions of Distress in Public and Private Fora,” Emotion, Space and Society 1
(2008).
Mcneil, Donald J. “Romania's Revolution of 1989: An Enduring Enigma,” New York Times, 31st
December 1999.
Mohamed, Zenudin A. “No Benefit for Multipartyism,” Daily Nation, 30th January 1996.
Muasya, Isaac W. “The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on Education in
Kenya,” International Journal of Arts and Commerce 1 (2012).
Mungai, J.M. “Opportunists Hijack Pluralism, Sunday Nation, 19th September 1993.
Mwai, Peter. “Maelezo Kuhusu Asili ya Mungiki,” Taifa Leo, 6th March, 2009.
Mwahani, Abadalla. “What’s the Aim of the Alliance?” Daily Nation, 21st March 1996.
Mwenda, Aruyaru S. “From a Dream to a Resounding Reality: The Inception of a Doctors Union
in Kenya,” Pan African Medical Journal (2012).
Ng'ang'a, Mukaru. "Mau Mau, Loyalists and Politics in Murang'a, 1952-1970," Kenya Historical
Review 5, no. 2 (1977).
Nguyo, Harrison N. “Kenyan Society Needs Redemption,” Daily Nation, 19th September 1995.
Njogu, Kimani. “Religious Versification: From Depoliticisation to Repoliticisation,” in Songs
and Politics in Eastern Africa (ed.) Kimani Njogu and Herve Maupeu (Nairobi: French Institute
for Research in Africa, 2007).
Njoya, Timothy. “Pulpit as a Forum for the Restoration of Government,” Unbound: An
Interactive Journal of Christian Social Justice (1st February 2012).
“Note on Present Situation in Kenya,” Life Magazine, 4th November 1952.
Nyakwara, Sylvester W. “Opposition Leaders Must Act Now,” Daily Nation,” 8th December
1995.
Nyong’o, Anyang. “Struggles for Political Power and Class Contradictions in Kenya,”
Contemporary Marxism (Fall 1983).
_______ “What ‘the Friends of the Peasants’ are and How They Pose the Question of the
Peasantry,” Review of African Political Economy 8 (Spring, 1981).
Ochieng’, William R. “Food Production in the Pre-Colonial Period,” in Themes in Kenyan
History (ed.) William R. Ochieng’ (James Currey: Ohio University Press, 1990).

463

Odhiambo, E.S.Atieno. “Formative Years, 1945-55,” in Decolonization and independence in
Kenya, 1940-93 (eds.) Bethwel A. Ogot and William R. Ochieng’ (London: James Currey,
1995).
_______ “Inventing Kenya,” in Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93 (eds.)
William, R. Ochieng’ and Bethwell A. Ogot (London: James Currey, 1995).
_______ “The Production of History in Kenya: The Mau Mau Debate,” Canadian Journal of
African Studies 25, No. 2 (1991).
Ogendo, H.W. Okoth. “The Tragic African Commons: A Century of Expropriation, Suppression
and Subversion,” University of Nairobi Law Journal 1 (2003).
Ogot, Bethwell A. “Mau Mau and Nationhood: The Untold Story,” in Mau Mau and
Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration (eds.) E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale
(Oxford: James Currey, 2003).
Oraro, J.L.O., “Majimbo Debate,” The Weekly Review, 7th January 1994.
Osewe, Okoth. “240,000 Teachers on Strike,” Committee for Workers’ International, 3rd October
2002.
Otieno, Awinda. “Mungiki: Neo-Mau Mau and the Prospects for Democracy in Kenya,” Review
of African Political Economy 34 (September 2007).
Oyuga, Chrispine. “Polls: Leaders Let Kenyans Down,” Daily Nation, 19th January 1993.
Oyugi,W. “An Obscene Inequality,” Kenya Social Watch Group Website (2000).
Oyugi, Walter et al. “Mired in the Unsolved National Question,” Social Watch Website (2008).
Pomerantsev, Peter. “Diary,” London Review of Books 35, 5th December 2013.
Rajab, Ramadhan. “Lecturers Strike On, UASU Boss Declares,” The Star, 6th September 2012.
Rono,Joseph K. “The Impact of the Structural Adjustment Programmes on Kenyan Society,”
Journal of Social Development in Africa 17 (January 2002).
Rosenberg, Aaron.“The Literature of Song: Kantai and Wainaina’s ‘Joka’ as Syncretic Multitext,” Journal of the African Literature Association 1.2 (Sum/Fall 2007), 108-128.
Schroth, Jörg. “Distributive Justice and Welfarism in Utilitarianism,” Inquiry: An
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (2008).
Sen, Amartya. “Equality of What?,” in Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Septuagenarian. “Time for the Young to Wake Up,” Daily Nation, 28th December 1993
Southall, Roger. “Reforming the State? Kleptocracy & the Political Transition in Kenya,”
Review of the African Economy 26 (1999).
464

Speedy Daily, 28th October 1952
Stoler, Ann Laura, and Frederick Cooper. "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a
Research Agenda," in The tensions of Empire (eds.) Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
Tenia, Nelson. “Kenya is Sick,” The Nairobi Law Monthly (No. 35, August 1991).
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, “Country Risk Service Report: 4th Quarter, 1996,”
(18th December 1996).
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, “Country Risk Service Report: 1st Quarter, 1998,”
(13th February 1998).
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, “Country Risk Service Report: 3rd Quarter, 1996,”
(24th September 1996).
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, “Country Risk Service Report: 3rd Quarter, 1997,”
(20th August 1997).
The Observer, 26th October 1952.
Tinker, Jon. “Who’s killing Kenya’s jumbos,” New Scientist, 22nd May 1975.
Thompson, Spurgeon. “Returning the Gaze: Culture and the Politics of Surveillance in Ireland,”
International Journal of English Studies 2 (2002), 95-107.
“Unrest in Kenya,” Times of India, 24th October 1952.
Wachira, James. “Kenya Needs a New Agenda,” The Economic Review, 7th -13th February 1994.
Wadia, Wilson M. “Opposition Has Played its Role,” Daily Nation, 7th January 1995.
Wanyonyi, George. “Kenya Needs New Blood,” The Economic Review, 6th -12th December1993.
Watkins, Oscar Ferris. “Land Tenure: A Reply to Dr. Leakey,” East African Standard, October
27th 1939.
“What is happening in Kenya,” Komsomol Pravda, 28th October 1952.

465

